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Lomé to Cotonou and Beyond: What Happened to the 'Spirit of Lomé' in EU Development Cooperation?

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About the Author

James Mackie has worked for four decades in development cooperation. For some 30 years he has focused on EU international development cooperation, first at CONCORD Europe in Brussels as its secretary general, and then as a programme manager and senior advisor at the 'think and do tank' European Centre for Development Policy Management in Maastricht. Since 2006 he has also taught courses on the EU and international development at the Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies of the College of Europe in Bruges and more recently at the Nyansapo College Institute of Diplomatic Practice and Development Policies in Accra. He holds a PhD in human geography from the School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London.

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This paper grew out of years of interacting with officials in the ACP and the EU focused around their efforts to make the most of the Lomé-Cotonou partnership that governed their relations. Seeking to make sense of the thinking behind this framework and how it worked in practice, as well as explain it to different audiences, including my students in Europe and Africa, has been a key source of intellectual stimulus, so I hope it serves them well. I have benefited greatly from comments received on a draft version from different colleagues and friends to whom I owe my gratitude, including in particular: Jean-Claude Boidin, Jean Bossuyt, Dieter Frisch, PI Gomes, Sieglinde Gstöhl, Niels Keijzer, Nana Bema Kumi and Jan Vanheukelom.

Abstract

The first Lomé Convention between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Economic Community was signed in 1975. It was heralded as a unique model for North-South relations in the spirit of the New International Economic Order. Now as a new 20-year cycle begins, it is appropriate to ask what the ACP and European Union (EU) partners retained from these progressive ambitions to build into their post-Cotonou agreement. To what extent therefore, after 45 years, are we witnessing the final end of the '*spirit of Lomé*' in EU-ACP cooperation on development?

Based on the extensive literature on Lomé-Cotonou, this paper traces the evolution of the model of North-South relations that they represented. It tests each agreement against three criteria: (i) commitment to a balanced partnership, (ii) the legal regime and (iii) the practice of implementation. The conclusion reached is that the successor agreements did not live up to their initial promise. Although the EU remains committed to international partnerships, its relationship with the ACP has become increasingly asymmetrical. The post-Cotonou Agreement and the end of the European Development Fund represent a major break with the past. Little remains of the Lomé I efforts to balance the partnership except, it seems, a continuing commitment to dialogue.

Introduction: The legacy of 45 years of cooperation

The first EEC-ACP Lomé Convention (1975) between the then European Economic Community (EEC) and the Group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries was hailed as a new and unique model of North-South relations in the spirit of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) for its attempt to balance the relationship between the two parties as equitably as possible. Yet in looking at the four Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) through the prism of North-South relations, one is struck by the contrast between this initial positive perception of Lomé and the more negative assessments made of its successors. This concern with maintaining a balanced partnership has been regularly invoked throughout the 45-year history of this ACP-European Union (EU) relationship. Now as the partnership enters a new 20-year cycle and the ideal of an 'equal partnership' is raised again, it is worth revisiting what this has meant in practice. Based on a review of the extensive academic, official and other literature, this paper seeks to retrace and summarise this history.

Achieving a balanced partnership is vital in any cooperation relationship. All parties need to see their interests taken into account if the relationship is to succeed and be sustainable. In development cooperation this is particularly true. Development does not work without ownership. Trade arrangements were also a central part of Lomé and Cotonou, but much has been written on them elsewhere. Rather, this paper focuses on the development cooperation pillar of the agreements.

The new post-Cotonou agreement (2021) is substantially different from its predecessors (Boidin 2020; Medinilla 2021). The expectation of a new departure that it creates is reinforced by another key change for the relationship: the European Development Fund (EDF) ceases to exist and henceforth EU-ACP development cooperation will be funded from the EU budget. Other, less central but still relevant changes are also afoot: the Directorate General for Development Cooperation (DG DEVCO) has been renamed as DG International Partnerships (DG INTPA) and, perhaps significantly, with Brexit the 45 years of Lomé-Cotonou have also coincided with the 47 years of UK membership of the EU. Last, but probably not least, the ACP have reorganised themselves into the Organisation of ACP States (OACPS) with a new Georgetown Agreement that makes virtually no reference to Europe.

All these changes add up to a substantial reorientation of EU development cooperation and, it seems, a fundamental realignment in the Union's relationship with the ACP. To what extent therefore, after 45 years, are we witnessing the final end of the '*spirit of Lomé*' in EU-ACP cooperation on development? The paper discusses the origins and meaning of the term and constructs a simple analytical framework around its main features. This is then used to analyse each of the agreements in turn, including the new post-Cotonou Agreement, to see how much this initial spirit survived over the 45 years. The paper also considers the impact of two contextual factors: Brexit and the renewal of the OACPS and then concludes with a reflection on future prospects.

The '*spirit of Lomé*'

The term '*spirit of Lomé*' has been commonly used in ACP-EU circles, but also appears in the academic literature (e.g. Whiteman 2017; Brown 2000). It refers to the collective approach to the negotiation and design of the first Lomé Convention. This spirit was then translated through into a number of features that sought to rebalance the way the partnership would operate, despite the different economic weight and powers of the parties involved.

For development cooperation the key features of the basic Lomé package included three fundamental elements:

- First, the package rested on a set of *agreed principles* including equality of partners, respect for sovereignty, mutual interest, interdependence and the right of each state to determine its own political, social, cultural and economic policies which give status to the ACP even though the EEC remained the dominant partner. These were underpinned by a set of joint institutions for the governance of the agreement including a joint Council, Committee of Ambassadors and Joint Parliamentary Assembly, through which the application of the principles could be monitored and sustained. The right of ACP countries to define their own development strategies and models was formally recognised.
- Second, there is the *legal standing* the package had as an international agreement signed by all the states involved, both ACP and EEC, with the Commission as the implementation agent for the EU member states. The legal

standing also extends to the EDF as a financial protocol, therefore a full part of this international agreement, and separate from the EEC/EU budget.

- Third, in *implementation* these principles were put into practice through the co-management of the funds involving, inter alia, dual signatures of both the Commission and the partner government to sign-off on all projects. There are also legally binding contracts providing security on the EDF allocation to each partner and medium-term predictability of the funds over the 5-7 years of each EDF cycle. EDF funds were divided into envelopes for national and regional purposes, emergency funding and a specific instrument for commodity price support, the export price stability mechanism or STABEX.¹

These basic features of the Lomé package add up to a concerted attempt to balance the relationship via institutional mechanisms to provide for dialogue, equal representation and co-management to counteract what was clearly an asymmetrical power relationship (Ravenhill 1979; Elgström 2000; Gomes 2013).

Analytical framework

In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s the international debate on North-South relations and development was largely conducted in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Thereafter the 1990s thematic conferences of the United Nations (UN) helped to define a more widely agreed agenda that crystallised in the UN Millennium Declaration 2000. Building on this, further new international agreements on development were gradually put in place, starting with the Monterrey Compact from the 2002 UN Financing for Development Conference, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005) and then the UN 2030 Agenda, its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Addis Ababa Agenda for Action (AAAA) of the 3rd UN Finance for Development (FfD) conference (UN-FfD3 2015).

All of these emphasised the right of developing countries to define their own strategies for development, the importance of richer countries providing larger amounts of

¹ STABEX (Système de stabilisation des recettes d'exportation). Another instrument to address fluctuations in global mineral prices, SYSMIN (Système de développement du potentiel minier), was added in Lomé II.

predictable funding² to support the formers' efforts in domestic resource mobilisation and the importance of institutional arrangements that promoted equality and mutual responsibility in partnerships. Ownership, dialogue, predictability and mutual accountability emerged as key catchphrases. In particular the Paris Declaration highlights ownership of the development process by developing countries as its very first principle. The Busan Outcome Document (2011) takes this further and advocates a broader view of ownership (Bossuyt et al. 2016: 77), stressing that parliaments and local authorities can play a useful role in ensuring broad-based democratic ownership involving multiple actors (OECD 2011: para 21). More recently, it seems that support for 'ownership' as a principle in the donor development narrative has increasingly been pushed on to the backfoot to be replaced by talk of 'mutual benefits' (Keijzer & Black 2020), partly in response to the rise of the South-South Cooperation (SSC) narrative (Mawdsley 2019).

There has also been a more political economy-inspired critique of power relations in development cooperation that questions the degree to which ownership by partner countries is difficult, if not impossible, given the power of donors. It is argued that this needs to be countered by development professionals deliberately 'thinking and working politically' (Booth 2015; TWP Network³). More recently the debate on 'decolonising development' (Rutazibwa 2020; Peace Direct 2021), focuses on power relations in international development cooperation. This critique argues that the influence of donors on the development process runs extremely deep, operating through mechanisms that are often un-recognised, informal, cultural and even racist patterns of behaviour, as much as through formal rules and procedures. To counter such tendencies, donors need to be open to criticism and dialogue and be willing to share decision making and power (Peace Direct 2021).

Thus, although 'NIEO' as a term to capture what North-South relations should have looked like in the 1970s, may have disappeared from usage in recent decades, similar ideas have survived and evolved into a new discourse on progressive North-South relations in the 21st century debate.

² The UN FfD3 conference's AAAA, reiterates the UN's 0.7% ODA/GNI target and stresses the importance of "clarity, predictability and transparency" in development cooperation funding (UN FfD3 2015, paras 51-53).

³ <https://twpcommunity.org>

In conducting this review of development cooperation arrangements under the Lomé and Cotonou Conventions, the key concern is thus how they deal with the inevitable inequality between partners with such hugely different levels of resources and what measures are then taken to mitigate this inequality. The relevant features can usefully be categorised under three rough headings that echo some of the basic features of Lomé and can form a framework for an analysis to judge whether the 'spirit of Lomé' lives on. The first two of these sets of measures apply to the agreements themselves and the third to how they are executed:

1. *Commitment to a balanced partnership*: This starts from a recognition of the political nature of the relationship and the power inequality between the parties. Typically, this would involve a commitment to the formal equality of the partners, even though the partnership remains asymmetrical. The agreement should also include a recognition of the right to policy space and independent decision making for the weaker partner, and a set of devices to promote balanced governance via joint institutions and continuing dialogue.
2. *The legal regime of the partnership*: This covers the way in which the partnership is formalised in binding agreements that spell out rights and mutual obligations. This should include the scope of governance and mutual accountability by joint institutions and the level of contractual security, particularly of the financial resources to be provided.
3. *The implementation of development cooperation*, according to international principles of aid or development effectiveness and including in particular the key principle of developing country ownership. This is typically ensured by some form of co-management of implementation, but also in the behaviour patterns of stakeholders and their recognition of the power relations involved.

These three elements are reviewed below for each of the Lomé-Cotonou agreements in turn. This analysis is then also summarised in a table at the end of the paper.

Lomé I and the 'spirit of Lomé'

The first Lomé Convention was heralded in its day as establishing a new type of more equal relationship between developing and developed nations. In particular it was seen as a model of what such partnerships could be under the NIEO (Whiteman 2017)

that was in discussion in the UN at the time. "The convention stands ... as one of the few successfully negotiated multilateral agreements in the contentious arena of North-South relations" (Ravenhill 1979: 150).

The negotiations for the first Lomé Convention started in 1973 when the UK joined the EEC. They were in large measure a question of integrating a whole new group of anglophone Commonwealth nations alongside 18 francophone nations covered by the Yaoundé Convention and of accommodating both French and British aspirations⁴ for their former colonies (Hewitt & Whiteman 2004; Frisch 2008).

UN legal historian Ahmed Mahiou traces the origins of the NIEO to a UN General Assembly resolution of 1 May 1974. Reviewing UN archives, he discusses the impact of the concept and talks about the "undeniable influence that the new international economic order has had in the development of certain international legal regimes, including universal ones (...), regional ones (development agreements between Europe and the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, ...)" (Mahiou 2011: 5). He focuses in particular on the nature of the Lomé regime itself. In terms of wider development thinking, the NIEO was part of the 2nd UN Decade for Development and its International Development Strategy (UNGA 1970). This was heavily oriented to increasing the transfer of financial resources to developing countries, inter alia setting the well-known target of 0.7% of GNI for ODA. UNCTAD III (1972)⁵ and IV (1976), where the NIEO and North-South relations were extensively discussed, provided a backdrop to the negotiation of Lomé I. They covered the emerging debt crisis and the need for developed countries to reach the ODA target by the middle of the decade. A G77 resolution tabled by Jamaica at UNCTAD IV called for ODA flows to be "predictable, continuous and assured" (UNCTAD 1976) and advanced various criteria for ODA including it having a high grant element, be untied, that loans should be measured

⁴ In Protocol 22 of the UK accession treaty to the European Communities, twenty Commonwealth countries were offered the opportunity to negotiate a convention similar to the existing Yaoundé convention. The countries are also listed in Annex VI (OJ [L73] Special Edition 27.3.1972).

⁵ UNCTAD III (1972) on the topic of *Financial resources for development: total inflow of public and private resources* (Resolution adopted by 80 votes with 12 abstentions – report p.92) discussed, inter alia, three key issues: (a) the growing debt burden and need to increase proportion of grants over loans, (b) need for a general untying of aid, (c) the need to channel more ODA through multilateral financial institutions and (d) in the context of declining flows to developing countries – called on advanced countries to increase ODA "to reach a minimum net amount of disbursements of 0.7% of GNP ... by the middle of the decade".

net of interest and that non-project financing was preferred. While not all these features were written into Lomé I, they do identify the type of expectations of the G77 for balancing the North-South relationship.

The 'spirit of Lomé' thus responded well to some of the ideas of the NIEO. In particular, the funding model of the EDF as the financial protocol of the Convention provided a level of security of funding over five years with a legally binding contract that was unheard of in those days. Indeed, Commissioner Claude Cheysson is quoted as having said: "It is your money! You should use it to meet your priorities in the best possible way" (cited in Frisch 2008: 13). Equally, perhaps as a result of the unique way the Convention was negotiated collectively, with the two groups each aligned behind a single negotiator, the Commission for the EEC member states and Nigeria for the ACP, another key positive feature was the governance provisions for the agreement with its joint institutional arrangements. This was further entrenched by the decision the ACP then took to establish themselves as a formal Group with the 1975 Georgetown Agreement. In sum, these various features – collective negotiation, secure funding, joint institutions and indeed trade measures⁶ – all contributed to the NIEO aura of the Lomé Convention that continues to be recognised in research circles (Ravenhill 1979; Mailafia 1997; Arts 2000; Brown 2000; Hewitt & Whiteman 2004; Nunn & Price 2004; Whiteman 2017; Babarinde 2019; Hurt 2003; 2020; Drieghe 2020).

Lomé I thus measures up well to the analytical framework

1. *The commitment to a balanced partnership* was reflected in the principles of the convention and governance through joint institutions.
2. *The legal regime of the partnership* was covered by the chosen format of a five-year international agreement with a financial protocol attached, that offered contractual security in particular on the funding.
3. *The implementation of the development cooperation process* was covered by the co-decision mechanism on programmes.

⁶ Lomé I's non-reciprocal trade preferences and protocols guaranteeing prices on commodity exports were also seen as major breakthroughs for the ACP.

Lomé II and III – the hard-nosed realism of the 1980s

Many authors concur that through the subsequent two decades of the 1980s and 1990s the Lomé successor agreements did not live up to the initial promising start. As Hewitt & Whiteman (2004: 143) put it: "The 1978–79 negotiations to renew Lomé marked the first nail in the coffin of the Lomé idea – equality and interdependence. The spirit went after that, along with producer power, and the NIEO, and the North–South dialogue."

The negotiation of Lomé II was fraught. The ACP were unhappy with the negotiation but they were also more divided than for Lomé I and lacked decisive leadership. The EEC and the Commission's role "was predominantly negative" (Ravenhill 1979: 167). Perhaps most importantly, faced with the enormity of the debt crisis and the ensuing economic decline the ACP were facing, the scale of the EDF and the continuing resources it provided became their key concern that overrode other considerations (Hewitt & Whiteman 2004: 144).

Debate on the NIEO quickly waned in the 1980s, a period of crisis in development with the difficult years of the debt crisis and the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that underpinned the neo-liberal 'Washington Consensus'. This overshadowed all other discussions on aid and development and side-lined any real progress for years. ODA levels also remained stagnant. However, through this period, the UN and particularly UNCTAD continued to be a prime forum for discussing North-South relations though with little progress made. In UNCTAD (V-1979, VI-1983 and VII-1987) development finance discussions continued to focus on the debt crisis and on the need to increase ODA though with little North-South alignment emerging. The prioritisation of grants over loans and the untying of aid, both of which the EU accepted, were recurrent themes.

The Commission followed the policies of the 'Washington Consensus' (Brown 2000; Hurt 2003: 162), however it also attempted to formulate a more responsive approach to support under the SAPs. This emphasised the need for flexibility and a practical rather than too theoretical an approach. It thus expressed willingness to support ACP governments' efforts to mitigate the social costs of adjustment with restructured social services, providing plans were realistic and owned by the communities they were

intended to serve (Frisch & Boidin 1988). This led to the establishment of a Structural Adjustment Facility in Lomé III and Lomé IV.

The form of Lomé II and III did not change much and thus still responds to the analytical framework, albeit with some backsliding:

1. *The commitment to a balanced partnership* was eroded with the European insistence on following the IMF line on structural adjustment even though the Commission sought to soften this with a more responsive approach
2. *The legal regime of the partnership* fortunately remained the same thus providing secure funding in a very difficult period for the ACP.
3. *The implementation of the development cooperation process* formally continued on the same basis, although decisions were now dominated by the SAP regimes imposed on ACP governments.

Lomé IV – the post-Cold War era and human rights conditionality

Despite the difficulties of the period Commission President Jacques Delors, speaking in Dakar shortly after the start of Lomé IV continued to emphasise the EU's perception of the Convention as a "model of cooperation based on contracts, mutual respect and duration" (David 1991: 2).

The Lomé IV Convention (1989) had a whole section (Part III) on debt and structural adjustment support. It stipulated that finance would normally be provided in the form of grants rather than loans in order to help avoid increases in debt. As indicated above, it also provided for structural adjustment support to help ensure that "adjustment is economically viable and socially and politically bearable" (Art. 243 (e)) (Brown 2004).

Historically, Lomé IV and particularly the revised Lomé IVbis are the moment when human rights conditionality started with the EU increasingly emphasising political dialogue and the introduction of 'essential elements' (Hurt 2003; Bretheron & Vogler 2005). The end of the Cold War occurred just as Lomé IV was being ratified, so it was not until its revision in 1995, that the Commission was able to fully adjust the Convention to the new political agenda of all major donors in this new era of international politics: "the EU was quick to respond to the new orientation of policy and pursued an activist

interpretation of the terms of Lomé IV and a much more radical review of the Convention in 1995 than had been envisaged" (Brown 2004: 27).

The end of the Cold War also meant the EU started to take a new interest in Eastern Europe. The ACP were thus no longer the only poorer countries in which Europe had an interest, thereby starting what many have seen as a decline in their privileged position. "From the ACP point of view, the Commission had failed to defend it (...). From the viewpoint of Brussels, however, the Commission had simply moved on" (Hewitt & Whiteman 2004: 145).

The 1990s were, however, also an era of international debate and consensus building on the international development agenda in a series of major UN conferences (Rio 1992, Copenhagen and Beijing 1995, etc.). These established detailed agreements on many aspects of development including both objectives, the roles of a much wider variety of development actors and the relations between Northern and Southern states. Developed countries also sought to push the debate forward using in particular their vehicle of the OECD and its Development Assistance Committee (OECD, 1996), in which the EU member states played a prominent role. The conclusions of these 1990s debates ultimately came together in the UN's Millennium Declaration.

The Commission's 1997 Green Paper was intended to set the terms of the debate on what should follow Lomé IV. It sought to draw lessons from the 40 years of Yaoundé and Lomé experience and to situate the debate in the new global context. It argued for a stronger political relationship between the ACP and the EU to revive a "partnership that had lost its substance" (European Commission 1997). Describing the results of aid under Lomé as "patchy" (ibid.: 6; McMahon 2005) it advocated more effective development cooperation with an emphasis on performance, results monitoring and evaluation. New features such as the involvement of a wider range of actors, including the private sector and non-governmental organisations, and new themes such as the protection of the environment were suggested.

There were of course attenuating circumstances weighing on the EU that can explain this more hard-nosed attitude: the end of the Cold War, a gradually rising level of unused funds in the EDF and the increasingly critical views of member states of the Commission's ability to manage a development programme in the final years of the

Santer Commission (1999). The 1998 OECD Peer Review of EU aid was particularly critical of the poor policy culture in the Commission, lack of attention to implementation and results and an aid-management system with high transaction costs. Lomé was singled out as not being 'geared towards business demands' that did not help in attracting foreign investment to ACP countries (OECD 1999).

Once again, the basic from of Lomé IV remained the same, but some elements of practice shifted the balance in the relationship:

1. *The commitment to a balanced partnership* was confronted with the unilateral introduction of EU human rights conditionality.
2. *The legal regime of the partnership* in essence continued to provide security of funding, although this started to be questioned as a backlog of unused EDF funds built up.
3. *The implementation of the development cooperation process* formally continued on the same basis, although still influenced by the SAP regimes, and it suffered from the poor implementation record identified by the OECD.

The Cotonou Agreement – performance reviews and the new Millennium

The new agreement that emerged from the Green Paper debate and the negotiation still maintains the language of equality of the partners and ACP ownership of their development strategies. The governance through joint institutions was maintained as was the EDF and co-management of development resources. However, the financial instruments were simplified, with STABEX and SYSMIN disappearing, and the allocation of funds was linked to performance with a mid-term review in each cycle when unused funds could be withdrawn or redistributed to other ACP governments that were spending resources faster. More emphasis was put on political dialogue. 'Essential elements', first seen in the revised Lomé IV, enabled suspension of the agreement in cases of abuse. As in the revised Lomé IV, the actors of the partnership were expanded to include local authorities, civil society organisations and the private sector.

However, despite the strong element of continuity in the overall framework, the new Agreement was nevertheless seen as a definite break with the 'spirit of Lomé' and heavily criticised in academic work on evolving North-South relations (Hewitt & Whiteman 2004; Arts & Dickson 2004). Others saw it as the next logical step in the

gradual evolution of Lomé in line with the latest international thinking on development cooperation and North-South relations (Brown 2000: 381). Or they highlighted the potential contradiction between maintaining a special EU-ACP relationship while also working closely with other donors (Hurt 2003: 164). Yet it was also recognised that the ACP did welcome the rationalisation of the aid pillar and the wording on partnership which emphasised once again ACP ownership of their development strategies (Hurt 2003: 165). But some were more cynical, and bluntly assessed the only attraction of the new agreement as financial (Whiteman 2012: 7). The aid element was so important to the ACP that it overshadowed the less than satisfactory model of North-South relations under offer. Over time, this became even more evident as the other two pillars, trade and political dialogue, moved to different fora (Bossuyt et al. 2016). That said, the ACP were also under no illusions that the institutionalisation of performance-related reviews in Cotonou meant the definitive loss of secure funding.⁷

From the angle of an ACP diplomat, PI Gomes (2013) is perhaps less damning in his language, but nevertheless identifies aspects of Cotonou that ACP states found deeply unsatisfactory. For instance, he argues that some of the principles evoked by the CPA such as 'democratic stability' could potentially come into conflict with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Equally an agenda of development cooperation that includes highly political issues such as peacebuilding, migration and good governance is seen by the ACP as likely to give rise to tensions. However, he also indicates that the 2005 revision that strengthened the provisions for intensified political dialogue (Mackie & Zinke 2005; Mackie 2008) following internationally recognised standards and norms when a violation of the 'essential elements' had occurred, was positive and "a major gain from the ACP's perspective in helping to prevent democratic stability and governance being given a purely Eurocentric orientation" (Gomes 2013: 718-719).

Since signing Cotonou there has been one other major exercise in international norm setting for development cooperation that involved member states of the ACP and the EU: the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 (OECD 2005) with its follow-up meetings in Accra (2008) and Busan (2011). The pertinence of the Declaration for the discussion on the North-South relationship lies in the prime emphasis it places on the

⁷ Author's conversation with the ACP Deputy Secretary General, Carl Greenidge, at the time.

principle of 'ownership'. This chimes with the Lomé-Cotonou principle of respecting ACP partners' development strategies and the wider call for respecting 'policy space' for development partners.

The EU was a strong proponent of the Paris Declaration as can be seen in its primary development policy statements, the European Consensus on Development (2005 & 2017). These principles were indeed also written into the CPA (Art. 2) during its 2010 revision and again in the CPA's Annex IV on EDF Management (Art. 1), although the concept of ownership was already in the original text.

Gomes highlights the importance to the ACP of the concepts of equality of partners and ownership in Cotonou. He comments positively on the improvements made to Cotonou by including principles from the Paris Declaration from 2005 which he argues many ACP states supported (Gomes 2013: 719). Ghanaian academic John Akokpari also points to the value of the Declaration and the importance of the ownership principle that he sees as entirely consistent with Cotonou. However, he concludes that, the EU has been reluctant to follow this principle in practice: "Historically, the EU has not been keen on relinquishing control of decisions relating to aid. Even in the aftermath of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda, ownership and control over aid policies still remain largely under the control of the EU" (Akokpari 2017: 64-65). This is in effect endorsed in the joint communication on *A renewed partnership with the ACP*:

"The institutional set-up (...) should enable decisions and actions to be taken quickly and effectively. The present system based on joint institutions has proven to be useful to share experience but it is now outdated since it is too heavy and cumbersome" (European Commission & HR 2016: 28).

It is also echoed in an independent evaluation report on the 11th EDF (2014-2020) though drawing the opposite conclusion:

"The partnership between the EU and the ACP states is extremely rich and has provided a platform for discussions and support that is unlike that of any other donors. However, under EDF11 it has suffered. The role of the partner countries (...) in the decision-making and implementation of the EDF must be rebalanced to reflect the spirit of the CPA" (Mokoro, DAI & GeoTest 2017: viii).

Co-management of development cooperation, an element of the 'spirit of Lomé' carried through to Cotonou, was key to supporting the principle of the 'ownership'. Yet, in their assessment, Bossuyt et al. (2016) reviewed the actual practice of managing EDF funds over 40 years and concluded that increasingly over time the EU took a stronger role in managing funds at the national level, in many cases making co-management more of a myth than reality (see also Herrero et al. 2015). Thus, co-management might work "with ACP countries that have stable democracies, good policies and strong institutions" but in less promising circumstances with 'authoritarian regimes' or 'weak governance and administrative systems' it was less evident. Coupled to that the EU was often equally to blame by pushing its political agenda and "its own cooperation priorities – which do not necessarily coincide with the main concerns or needs of government and/or citizens in ACP countries" (Bossuyt et al. 2016: 72).

In sum, on the three areas of scrutiny, the relationship under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement can be assessed as follows:

1. *The commitment to a balanced partnership* was seen much as under Lomé, though the asymmetry of the relationship was perhaps more explicit with stronger conditionalities around 'essential elements' introduced. The policy space for the ACP was however, nominally at least, still recognised. The joint institutions were maintained and if anything strengthened.
2. *The legal regime of the partnership* still took the form of an international agreement with a financial protocol. However, the security of funding was reduced by the introduction of performance reviews that could result in the withdrawal of funds. The export guarantee funds of STABEX and SYSMIN that provided budget support during commodity price crises disappeared.
3. *The practice of the implementation of the development cooperation process* formally continued to operate under co-management. However, over time the EU became increasingly frustrated with what it saw as a heavy bureaucratic process holding back delivery and became more hands-on in implementation.

The post-Cotonou Agreement – the 2030 Agenda and mutual interests

The new EU-OACPS Partnership Agreement (EC-OACPS 2021) was initialled by both parties on 15 April 2021. In terms of North-South relations it is a major shift compared to

the CPA. Neither development cooperation nor indeed trade⁸ are any longer at its centre (Carbone 2021). Rather, from the very first paper it is made clear, in terms rather reminiscent of South-South Cooperation,⁹ that this is about a political partnership with the overall purpose “to generate mutually beneficial outcomes on common and intersecting interests and in accordance with their shared values”. Thereafter it spells out that the agreement is intended to contribute to achieving the SDGs, the UN's 2030 Agenda and the Paris Climate Agreement and a set of objectives that start with human rights, democracy, good governance and gender equality and go on to refer to peace and security and resilient societies. Only after these, does the text move on to a more classic listing of development priorities including poverty eradication and different aspects of the three pillars of sustainable development: social, economic and environmental. The list then closes with the contentious objective (Carbone 2021: 251) of implementing a “comprehensive and balanced approach to migration”.

What is particularly striking is that in neither Part I on General Provisions nor Part II on Strategic Priorities is there any reference to a location where these objectives or the strategic priorities are to be pursued. Thus, the text could be talking about ACP countries or equally about EU member states, or indeed anywhere else. The Agreement is thus not specifically about the development of the ACP as in the Lomé-Cotonou past, but about achieving the 2030 Agenda worldwide. Just as the 2030 Agenda is now universal, so it seems is the new EU-OACPS Partnership Agreement.

No doubt, this apparent universalism is partly a product of the overall construction of the new agreement out of four distinct parts: an overarching General Part that applies to all ACP states and three Regional Protocols for each of the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions. It is in the latter that things become more specific and related to particular issues and institutions. But even here the introductions in each of the Regional Protocols are still couched in general, indeed, universal terms.

⁸ Trade cooperation is covered in Article 16 which explains this is now dealt with in the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiated as part of Cotonou in 2000, which already did away with the preferential trade regime of the Lomé Conventions.

⁹ Mawdsley (2019) argues that there is latterly a discernible rapprochement between the language of South-South and North-South Cooperation with Northern donors becoming more willing to push their own interests in international development cooperation and adopt objectives and phrases from SSC to suit their own needs.

A key aspect of the 'spirit of Lomé', is dialogue. This is maintained and indeed if anything has been strengthened with what might be described as more mature provisions that build on the experience and *acquis* from Lomé-Cotonou. Rather than political dialogue as in the CPA, it is now described by the less loaded and more targeted term 'partnership dialogue' and the processes involved are well described both in terms of features and in terms of actors to be involved. Moreover, the lessons learnt on political dialogue that led to changes in the 2005 and 2010 revisions of Cotonou are respected. At the same time, the 'essential elements' (human rights, democracy promotion, rule of law and the ban on weapons of mass destruction) and the 'fundamental element'¹⁰ (good governance) continue.

Equally, the joint governance institutions which have been a hallmark of Lomé-Cotonou, have also been maintained: the joint Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the Parliamentary Assembly. Moreover, these are also to be established at the regional level, which may in practice prove quite heavy, but does mean that formal dialogue can be maintained at both levels which is healthy.

However, there is no development cooperation funding attached to the agreement. The EDF disappears and the only commitment the EU makes in the brief Part IV on Means of Cooperation and Implementation is "to making available the appropriate level of financial resources in line with its internal regulations and procedures" (Art. 82). The CPA by contrast had a financial section that was four times as long and a set of detailed financial annexes that specified the precise amount of funds to be provided. Aside from the absence of specifics on funding, which are now only to be found in the EU Regulation establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) that is a purely European document, the other casualty is the detail on the programming and co-management of funds that these financial sections of the CPA contained. Co-management has completely gone, even though the programming and use of the funds "shall be based on an early, continuous and inclusive dialogue between EU and OACPS member" (Art. 82.9), which is expected to enhance ownership and alignment with country systems.

¹⁰ The Cotonou Agreement's 'fundamental element' on good governance, if invoked, can only be used to prompt a suspension of the agreement in cases of serious corruption (Art. 9:3)

One might argue that politically this presentation of the new agreement is a radical step towards a more equal partnership and greater maturity in the relationship. The development of the ACP is no longer the overall object of the agreement, rather both, EU and ACP, are partnering together to achieve the 2030 Agenda. This is a global agenda that is not set by either of them, although both parties have participated extensively in determining it (Holden 2020). Equally, the new agreement can be said to follow the more generalised 'financing for development and means of implementation' approach of the 2030 Agenda and the AAAA by referring to multiple sources of funding, including both national and international resources and from both public and private sources. Domestic resource mobilisation thus gets a mention as does SSC and Triangular Cooperation (Art. 82.10) and more advanced ACP countries are also expected to contribute by developing "new forms of engagement, including innovative financial instruments and co-financing" (Art. 82.5).

On the other hand, one can also portray this as the final end and logical conclusion of a long process of erosion of the principles of security and predictability which were such prized elements of the 'spirit of Lomé' back in 1975. What is more with co-management gone and no EDF, the use and implementation of the 'appropriate' funds that the EU is expected to provide, remains essentially in its own hands. This can only be a setback for the principle of ownership.

In development cooperation terms therefore, the most fundamental change in the new post-Cotonou arrangement is arguably that the EDF ceases to exist as from 2021 with funding for the ACP henceforth coming from the new EU budget single instrument, the NDICI (Urpilainen 2021; Saltnes & Steingass 2021: 2). The European Commission, supported by the European Parliament, has long sought to integrate the EDF into the EU budget (Cox et al. 1997; Mackie et al. 2004; EPRS & DAI 2014) where both institutions have felt they would have more control over the funds and the way they were used, not least to improve accountability towards European taxpayers (D'Alfonso 2014).

On the other hand, there are also potential dangers for the ACP in 'budgetising' the EDF in this way (Mackie et al., 2004). In particular, it is still unclear how the Commission can maintain some level of predictability and security of funds for the ACP under an EU budget regime and in the absence of a legally binding financial protocol to an international agreement. Implementation and management of the EU's budget is

clearly a responsibility of the Commission alone and this may also affect the operation of co-management, particularly as there is no formal obligation as co-management is anyway no longer in the agreement itself.

By omitting a financial protocol to the agreement and by 'budgetising' the EDF the legal regime governing EU funding for the ACP has fundamentally changed to become conditional on continuing EU goodwill rather than established in a multi-annual legal contract. This will have consequences for its use and governance. EU funds are no longer something the ACP can depend on as in the past. Initially, the ACP were strongly in favour of maintaining the EDF outside the EU budget (ACP Negotiating Mandate 2018: paras 82-83). However, in the negotiation they had little choice, but to accept this longstanding European ambition.

The EU funds for the ACP will henceforth come from the NDICI. The arguments supporting the EDF integration into the NDICI appear to be purely European arguments to improve efficiency of EU budget management and scrutiny by the European Parliament (Jones et al. 2018). In its Impact Assessment for the proposal the Commission does recognise some ACP concerns. It briefly refers to the possible loss of the EDF's 'flexibility features' and argues that "[e]xisting EDF flexibilities (e.g. large reserve and multi-annuality) should be imported as far as is possible within the annuality of the EU budget" (EC Impact Assessment 2018). The Commission is thus aware that budget funds will not be as secure as in the EDF. No mention is made, however, of the negative impact this will have on co-management. This can perhaps be judged by the existing practice of management in the EU budget's Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), where the level of discussion and common preparation of projects is generally less than under the EDF, although formal partner country approval is still sought for spending (Herrero et al. 2015: 70).

Although it can be argued that this new ACP-EU agreement emphatically takes the relationship into the 21st century and the era of the 2030 Agenda, it clearly also further reduces the strength of the ACP position in the asymmetrical power relationship (Gomes 2013). A positive spin might suggest this is part and parcel of moving away from a North-South relationship into a world where the ACP have a much wider choice of partners. The argument that Cotonou was still a post-colonial arrangement that needed radical reform may well be right, but equally it remains the case that the

OACPS includes most of the poorest and most fragile countries in the world that can least afford to cope with such a weakening of their position in what used to be a reasonably dependable regime. In particular all semblance of security of funding has now disappeared, the level of funding is not even specified and it is to come from the EU budget over which the ACP partners have no say. The funding can no longer be said to be “predictable, continuous and assured” (UNCTAD 1976) in any sense.

Thus overall, while it is clear that the new post-Cotonou agreement moves the partnership into a new era, the verdict from the analytical framework is not reassuring:

1. The *commitment to balancing* asymmetrical power relations and improving the position of the ACP does not appear to be any stronger than before, though the joint institutions and the commitment to dialogue remain.
2. The *legal regime* of the partnership has deteriorated sharply for the ACP and particularly on the specific issue of security of funding.
3. Finally, on the *practice of the implementation of the development cooperation process*, while it is too early to say how this will play out in practice, there do seem to be real grounds for concern on the future of co-management with the EDF ceasing to exist and the funds now included in the EU budget.

Other contextual factors: Brexit and the new OACPS

Two other concurrent factors external to the negotiation of the post-Cotonou Partnership Agreement are relevant to this discussion on its outcome and the decline and apparent disappearance of the ‘spirit of Lomé’: the departure of the UK from the EU and the signing of a new Georgetown Agreement.

The impact of Brexit

The negotiation of Lomé I was largely provoked by the accession of the UK to the EEC in 1973 and the need to see how the association arrangement for former French colonies and Overseas Countries and Territories might be adapted for some former British colonies (Ravenhill 1979; Frisch 2008; Hewitt & Whiteman 2004). Research on newly accessible archives (Drieghe 2020) confirms what was long understood but not well documented: that the deal offered by the EEC was very heavily influenced by the dynamics of what both the French and the British sought to achieve. Although Drieghe’s work focused on three trade aspects (non-reciprocal market access, STABEX

and the sugar protocol) of Lomé I, one can assume that this Franco-British dominance permeated the rest of the discussion. Her conclusion points to the fundamentally weak position of the ACP, faced with a bloc unwilling to bend much once it had decided its own internal position (Elgström 2000), despite their apparent success at negotiating an agreement that was heralded at the time as a new departure in North-South relations in the spirit of the NIEO.

With the Brexit referendum occurring in June 2016, just months before the EU institutions kicked off their initial internal discussion on the post-Cotonou agreement (European Commission 2016), the UK, traditionally one of the stronger promoters of the ACP-EU relationship, was not involved in the consideration of the new agreement (Furness et al. 2020). How this might have impacted, or not, on the negotiation and its outcome is beyond the scope of this paper, but Commonwealth members of the OACPS are now firmly entrenched in the relationship with the EU, which Brexit does not seem to be undermining. On the other hand, Brexit removes one of the main ex-colonial powers from the agreement thereby weakening its post-colonial character.

The formation of the OACPS

Sir Sridath Ramphal (2019), the Guyanese Foreign Minister at the time of Lomé I and heavily involved in the negotiations, emphasised that for him the most significant outcome of the Lomé I negotiations was the process of ACP unification. The unity established in the Group was unparalleled among developing countries at that time and was the major breakthrough that enabled the ACP to negotiate a good deal.

That unity was preserved for the post-Cotonou negotiation. It was consolidated in a root-and-branch revision of the ACP's Georgetown Agreement in December 2019 (Gomes 2017), a substantial change from its 1975 predecessor. In particular, it no longer lists among its objectives the promotion of ACP relations with the EU. Rather, it focuses on the sustainable development of the OACPS members, improving relations between them and "developing strategic relations and partnerships with external parties". No specific external parties are then mentioned. Instead, by way of examples, more general reference is made to the 'Global South' and to 'regional and international organisations', for the specific purpose of "building global consensus on SSC and Triangular Cooperation" (ACP 2019: Art 5). Equally, in the section on membership (Art. 6) no reference is made to signatories to the ACP-EC Partnership

Agreement as in the past. Instead, all independent states from the three regions are eligible to join the organisation.

The ACP have thus clearly committed themselves to pursuing a new road that is no longer linked to Europe, but rather points to a future of playing their own role as an international organisation in global development processes and particularly in the two evolving realms of SSC and Triangular Cooperation (Gomes 2016; 2017). In other words, the new OACPS is no longer there to promote North-South relations, but rather all relations that serve international cooperation and development, and particularly as seen from the perspective of the Global South. The traditional link with the EU is still mentioned positively as a relationship to be maintained at the start of the Agreement and again in the last Annex, but it is no longer the core purpose of the Group.

In the run-up to the negotiations and with the EU proposing three regional agreements linked by an umbrella, the ACP focused on the umbrella element, that is the ACP-wide 'General Part' of the new agreement. Even the interest that some African leaders and officials expressed in the African Union (AU) negotiating on behalf of Africa,¹¹ did not deter them from maintaining the unity of the whole ACP Group. Ultimately, therefore, the Group negotiated as one and consolidated that unity with a new Georgetown Agreement that no longer focuses on Europe. Various observers (Carbone 2018; Medinilla & Bossuyt 2019; Lopes 2019; Hurt 2020) suggested that the African Union should be directly involved in the post-Cotonou negotiations as this would strengthen African agency. Equally, it was hoped this would help rationalise the cooperation frameworks between the AU and the EU by ensuring the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adopted by the two Unions in 2007 could be merged or at least brought closer together with the new agreement.

While the AU was in the end not accepted as a negotiating partner for the General Part of the post-Cotonou Agreement (Carbone 2020), it was the principal party in the negotiation of the Africa Regional Protocol. This commits the parties to "ensure

¹¹ It was principally African foreign ministers who supported the idea of the AU negotiating on behalf of Africa, whereas ministers of finance and development tended to support the ACP as the negotiator (Carbone 2021). This is consistent with the reality that African ambassadors in Addis deal primarily with ministries of foreign affairs in their capitals, whereas those in Brussels tend to relate to ministries of trade and finance reflecting their governments' primary interests in the EU (author's conversation with ex-African ambassador in Brussels).

coherence and complementarity between this Protocol and the continent-to-continent partnership as defined in successive AU-EU Summits and related outcome documents" (Africa Regional Protocol: Art. 3). Reference is also made to support for various AU priorities.¹² This does seem to lay adequate foundations for improved complementarity between the JAES and the post-Cotonou Agreement. There are similar articles in the Caribbean and Pacific Regional Protocols on regional integration and cooperation (Art. 4 in both), but neither make reference to specific projects or cooperation frameworks between these two regions and the EU.¹³

In sum, these two contextual factors may have some impact on the first of the three areas of scrutiny (the commitment to a balanced partnership) but less on the other two. Thus, Brexit reduces the size of the ex-colonial power bloc inside the EU which may help balance the partnership. Equally the ACP states clearly hope that the renewal and reorientation of the OACPS delinking it from the EU, should strengthen their hand in the *balance of the partnership*.

Conclusion: The end of an era – can the principle of ownership survive?

This paper has sought to address the question of to what extent we are witnessing the final end of the '*spirit of Lomé*' in EU-ACP cooperation on development? Over a succession of five ACP-EU agreements the conditions have gradually shifted. In particular, there has been a progressive reduction in the contractual security for the ACP and of co-management, to a point where this new post-Cotonou agreement appears to jettison the original spirit and efforts made to balance the relationship.

Major changes are taking place in EU development cooperation. The new OACPS-EU Partnership Agreement and the end of the EDF are but two. A third is the establishment of the single budget instrument NDICI. This brings together all the EU's 'geographic' and 'thematic' cooperation funds in one instrument. So, not only is the EDF being 'budgetised', but these funds are also incorporated into a wide budget instrument

¹² For instance, in Africa: the AU, Agenda 2063, Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), Programme for Infrastructure Development of Africa (PIDA), African Governance Architecture (AGA), African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

¹³ However, in the trade cooperation section for the Caribbean Protocol (Art. 13) both the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) are specifically mentioned.

along with funds for cooperation with all the EU's partners across the world. There is also a name change indicating a new orientation: the European Commission's DG DEVCO became DG INTPA in January 2021. To complete the picture, it is worth going back to the new European Consensus (European Union 2017) which ushered in a new development policy era focused around the UN's 2030 Agenda, but also made clear the EU would push its own values and interests in its international partnerships (Furness et al. 2020). The 2030 Agenda is heavily referenced in the new agreement.

The EU's new development policy, new single budget instrument and new development DG name all point to a future where the EU takes a stronger and more assertive stance on international partnerships with development cooperation as one element of its toolbox. The Union is positioning itself as a proactive partner, willing to abide by the new global consensus that the 2030 Agenda represents, but with strong views of its own that it is not afraid to put forward and committed to full control over the resources it devotes to development cooperation. It thus seeks to take a robust approach to international partnerships that it wishes to conduct on its own terms.

It is thus clear that ACP-EU relations are entering a new era. 45 years ago Lomé I introduced the so-called 'spirit of Lomé' seen as a manifestation of the NIEO and its aspiration to rebalance power relations in North-South cooperation. A legally binding framework with mutual contractual obligations, joint institutions for its governance, secure funding and co-management were the tools to ensure its satisfactory implementation. The subsequent practice of Lomé cooperation over the ensuing 25 years, however, proved rather different from the Commission's original presentation that it was the ACP's money that they had to decide how best to use. In legal terms, it was still the case up until 2000, that unused EDF funds remained available to the ACP and could not be taken back. It was only with Cotonou that access to the funds started to be based on performance reviews and could be withdrawn if not satisfactorily used. Elements of the initial Lomé construct (joint institutions, co-management) did survive under Cotonou and indeed could be said to have been reinforced by more emphasis on dialogue. But the CPA also entrenched the presence of new conditionalities in the 'essential elements'. Moreover, through the subsequent 20 years the ideal of co-management was increasingly eroded, with the EU pushing the priorities it saw as appropriate and taking growing de-facto control over

implementation. Dialogue at multiple levels went on, but the EU's approach to it became increasingly robust.

Already labelled as an “asymmetrical partnership” (Ravenhill 1979) in Lomé I, this pattern intensified (Elgström 2000) and latterly, two thirds of the way through the span of the CPA, the same charge was repeated (Gomes 2013). If anything, under Cotonou the partnership became even more asymmetrical in the power relationship between the EU and the ACP, though some still found (Carbone 2021: 262) that the negotiations for post-Cotonou were “less asymmetrical than in earlier instances”.

These findings are summarised in a comparative manner in Table 1 below.

The new post-Cotonou agreement sets the framework till 2040. The agreement differs hugely from its predecessors. The first obvious big change is that it no longer includes a financial protocol or specific commitment to actual amounts of funding. Even that last vestige of security is now gone. There will be less hurdles for the Commission to overcome in moving funds elsewhere if it judges they are not used effectively by the ACP. In terms of implementation, the integration of the funds into the EU budget will reduce the space for co-management, making it even less likely to occur. The constraints on how the Commission manages and spends the funds have thus been drastically reduced, which jeopardises the space for partner country ownership.

The one aspect of the ‘*spirit of Lomé*’ package that does appear to be retained, at least on paper, is the effort to *balance the partnership* through a commitment to dialogue. A strong emphasis on dialogue is still there, the joint institutions remain and have indeed increased in number with more added for the Regional Protocols. There is also an explicit recognition that the partnership is political and if anything, this is more direct in the statement that the objective is to achieve ‘mutually beneficial outcomes’. That, in itself, seems to suggest a greater aspiration to equality in the partnership rather reminiscent of the language of SSC. At the same time, there is no longer any reference to the sovereign control of ACP states over their own development, though this could be said to be well covered in the 2030 Agenda, around which the agreement is built. In the Regional Protocols this is also partially corrected with the main priorities for each region directly listing existing regional policy commitments.

If the *legal regime* of the new agreement and the prospects for the *practice of implementation* have both moved away from a position that favours the ACP and even the *commitment to a balanced partnership* has shifted to a more robust and politically assertive relationship, the obvious conclusion is that the partnership has become even more asymmetrical than in the previous 45 years.

On the other hand, a more positive reading might suggest that the fact that the new agreement no longer refers to national sovereignty, can be seen as a sign of a new maturity in the partnership where such statements are no longer needed. Is this perhaps the new more grown-up '*spirit of Lomé*' that heralds a greater degree of equality in the partnership going forward? The fora for dialogue still exist, so the answer will partly be found in how robustly the ACP use them. The fact that the ACP have now reorganised themselves and plan to focus on SSC, the Global South and Triangular Cooperation rather than just on the EU, may also help to defuse the asymmetry and make the relationship more balanced and less vulnerable to EU influence. At the same time, while the EU can be commended for its renewed emphasis on partnerships in international relations, the evidence of the Lomé-Cotonou partnership, as it was always called, suggests it still needs to remember a key lesson: if partnerships are to work well and deliver for all, dominant partners need to give adequate space to the views and decisions of less powerful partners. Ownership is vital for development. If this lesson of 45 years cooperation can henceforth be more robustly applied, the '*spirit of Lomé*' in EU-ACP cooperation on development might just survive.

Table 1: Comparison of major changes for ACP-EU development cooperation (Lomé to post-Cotonou)

ACP-EU Conventions 'Spirit of Lomé' elements	Lomé I 1975-1979	Lomé II 1980-1985	Lomé III 1985-1989	Lomé IV + IV bis 1990-95 + 1995-99	Cotonou 2000-2020	Post-Cotonou 2021-2041
1. Balanced partnership	Joint institutions	Joint institutions But also structural adjustment conditionalities	Joint institutions But also structural adjustment conditionalities	Joint institutions + But also human rights 'essential elements' (from Lomé IV bis)	Joint institutions + But also 'essential elements' + performance reviews (e.g. Mid-Term Review)	Joint institutions for a 'political' partnership Objective: Achieving the SDGs rather than development of the ACP
2. Legal regime	International agreement for 5 years Financial protocol with specific amounts + contractual security	International agreement for 5 years Financial protocol with specific amounts + contractual security	International agreement for 5 years Financial protocol with specific amounts + contractual security	International agreement for 10 (5+5) years Financial protocol + contractual security, though unused funds start to build up	International agreement for 20 years Financial protocol, but funds can be withdrawn based on performance, Stabex & Sysmin scrapped	International agreement for 20 years, but without financial protocol EDF ceases to exist, funds from EU budget + no specific financial amounts
3. Practice of implementation	Co-management	Co-management though decisions subject to structural adjustment rules	Co-management though decisions subject to structural adjustment rules	Co-management though decisions still subject to structural adjustment rules + poor implementation	Growing disuse/abuse of co-management over time	EU budget funds, so co-management severely constrained
European Development Fund (EDF)	4 th EDF: ECU 3.4 bn	5 th EDF: ECU 4.7 bn	6 th EDF: ECU 8 bn	7 th (1990-95): ECU 12bn + 8 th EDF (1996-99): €12.8 bn	9 th (2000-07) €13.8 + €9.9 bn leftover from 8 th EDF + 10 th (2008-13) €22.682 bn + 11 th (2014-2020) €30.5 bn	All funds from NDICI-Global Europe S-S Africa: min €29.18 bn
Number of ACP states	46	58	65	68	79	79
Number of EU states	9	10	10	10-15	15 – 28	27
Relevant contemporaneous international events and debates	UN 2 nd Decade of Development (1970s) UNCTAD III (1972) UK joins European Communities (1973) The ACP Georgetown Agreement (1975) UNCTAD IV (1976)	World Bank & IMF SAPs → the 'Washington Consensus'	World Bank & IMF SAPs → the 'Washington Consensus' End of Cold War (1989)	UN Conferences of the 1990s → UN Millennium Declaration (2000) Critical OECD Peer Review of EU aid (1998)	Monterrey Compact @UN-FfD1 (2002) Paris Declaration (2005) MDGs (2002) + SDGs (2015) AAAA @UN-FfD3 (2015) UK Brexit Referendum (2016) The new OACPS Georgetown Agreement (2019)	DG DEVCO becomes DG INTPA (2021) UK leaves the EU (2021)

Sources (additional to text of paper): Brown 2004; European Commission, 9 June 2021; Frisch 2008; Pouwels, June 2021

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
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