



Brugge

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Natolin

VO “Svoboda” party phenomenon in Ukraine

Nika Palaguta



DEPARTMENT OF
EUROPEAN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

Natolin Best Master Thesis

03 / 2014



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NIKA PALAGUTA

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Table of Contents

Summary	VII
The Natolin Best Masters’ Theses Series	IX
La série des meilleures thèses des Masters du campus de Natolin	XI
Introduction	1
Chapter 1. Historical background	5
1.1 Nationalist organizations in XX century	6
1.1.1 Leaders	8
1.1.2 Symbols	11
1.2 Ukrainians in German Army after 1941	13
1.3 Official ideological basis	17
1.3.1 Ideology of the party	17
1.3.2 Symbols used by the party	18
1.3.3 Program documents	21
1.4 Members of the party	30
Chapter 2. Political life of VO “Svoboda” from 2004 till 2012	37

Chapter 3. Political life of the party after the success on the Parliament elections 2012	41
3.1 Reasons for the success	41
3.1.1 Political environment	41
3.1.2 Reorientation of the electorate	42
3.1.3 Election campaign	43
3.1.4 VO “Svoboda” promotion	45
3.1.5 The perception of the party	46
3.2 VO “Svoboda” after 2012	49
3.3 Current position	54
3.3.1 Loss of credibility in Galicia	54
3.3.2 Non fulfillment of pre-election claims	56
3.3.3 Failure to gain more credibility	56
3.3.4 Defused electorate	57
3.4 International co-operation	58
<hr/>	
Conclusion	63
<hr/>	
Bibliography	67
<hr/>	
Annex 1.	81
<hr/>	
Annex 2.	85
<hr/>	
Annex 3	88
<hr/>	

Summary

This Thesis analyzes the activity of Ukrainian far – right party VO « Svoboda », which became a new phenomenon in Ukrainian political arena in 2012 as it was the first time that an extreme right party entered the Ukrainian Parliament – Verkhovna Rada. The work aims to answer the questions if the party is indeed extreme or whether this image was created by it and by the external forces deliberately.

In the related literature Andrew Wilson made an analysis of Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990, Andreas Umland, Anton Shekhovtsov and Vicheslav Likhachev carried out numerous research on the topic of far-right movement development in Ukraine, Alyna Polyakova carried out a research among activists. Articles dedicated to the position and political activity of the party were published in media by Taras Vozniak, Katerina Peshko, etc. Various surveys were also conducted by research centers and in the course of exit-polls.

First of all, current research concentrates on the ideological component, which is actively put forward by party members and discussed in various media inside the country and abroad. The aim is to trace the ideology to the time when it emerged and to understand under what circumstances it appeared and to what extent it can be topical in contemporary Ukraine. It is also important to know the reasons behind the adoption of a particular ideological basis and those for keeping it until the present time. The objective is also to understand whether the actions of the party and its ideology coincide.

The second and the third parts of the work are dedicated to the political activity of the party in the course of Ukrainian history until present days. The goal is to understand the evolution of the party from a local one to the member of the Parliament. The research also aims to give information on the reasons of the success of the party, which is done on the basis of surveys and analytical literature.

Finally, this work tries to highlight the current position of the party and its perspectives in the face of current changes. It tries to understand the possible opportunities the party possesses to continue its political life inside or outside the Parliament.

The attempt is made to carry out a summary of party's activity and its ideology in connection with the events on domestic and international level is made in the end.

The Natolin Best Masters' Theses Series

PROF. NANETTE NEUWAHL

DIRECTOR OF STUDIES

COLLEGE OF EUROPE (EIS PROGRAMME, NATOLIN CAMPUS)

The “Natolin Best Master’s Thesis” series showcases the best Masters’ Theses produced by the students of the Natolin campus of the College of Europe in any given year.

The College of Europe (CoE), founded in 1949 at the instigation and with the support of leading European figures, in particular, Salvador de Madariaga, Winston Churchill, Paul-Henri Spaak and Alcide de Gasperi, is the world’s first university institute of postgraduate studies and training specialised in European affairs. The idea behind this particular institution was, to establish an institute where university graduates European countries could study and live together, and the objective was to enhance cross-border interaction and mutual understanding. The Natolin campus of the College of Europe in Natolin, Warsaw (Poland) was established in 1992 in response to the revolutions of 1989 and in anticipation of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the European Union. Ever since, the College of Europe operates as ‘one College – two campuses’.

The European Interdisciplinary Studies (EIS) programme at the Natolin campus invites students to view the process of European integration beyond disciplinary boundaries. Students are awarded a ‘Master of Arts in European Interdisciplinary Studies’. This programme takes into account the idea that European integration goes beyond the limits of one academic discipline and is designed to respond to the increasing need for experts who have a more comprehensive understanding of the European integration process and European affairs. The EIS programme is open to graduates in Economics, Law or Political Science, but also to graduates of History, Communication Studies, Languages, Philosophy, or Philology who are interested in pursuing a career in European institutions or European affairs in general. This academic programme and its professional dimension prepare graduates to enter the international, European and national public sectors as well as nongovernmental and private sectors. For some of them, it also serves as a stepping stone towards doctoral studies.

The European Single Market, governance and external relations are focal points of academic activity. Recognised for its academic excellence in European studies, the Natolin campus of the College of Europe has endeavoured to enhance its research activities, as well as to encourage those of its students who are predisposed to do so,

to contemplate a career in academia. The European Parliament *Bronislaw Geremek* European Civilisation Chair and the *European Neighbourhood* Policy Chair in particular, encourage research on European History and Civilisation, respectively, the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood.

The EIS programme culminates in the writing of an important Master's Thesis. At the College of Europe every student must, in order to get his or her degree, produce a Thesis within the framework of one of the courses followed during the academic year. The research must be original and linked to European policies and affairs, on a topic chosen by the student or proposed by the Professor supervising the Thesis. Very often, a student chooses a subject which is of importance to his or her subsequent career plan. Masters' theses are written either in French or in English, the two official languages of the College of Europe, often not the native language of the students.

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PROF. NANETTE NEUWAHL
DIRECTEUR D'ÉTUDE
COLLÈGE D'EUROPE (PROGRAMME EIS, CAMPUS NATOLIN)

La série « Meilleure thèse de Master du campus de Natolin » met en valeur les meilleures thèses de master rédigées par les étudiants du campus de Natolin du Collège d'Europe pour une année donnée.

Le Collège d'Europe (CoE), fondé en 1949 à l'instigation et avec le soutien de figures européennes de proue telles que Salvador de Madariaga, Winston Churchill, Paul-Henri Spaak et Alcide de Gasperi, est le premier institut universitaire d'études supérieures du monde spécialisé dans les affaires européennes. L'idée à l'origine de cette institution était de créer un institut dans lequel des diplômés universitaires issus de différents pays européens pourraient étudier et vivre ensemble afin de promouvoir la communication transfrontalière et la compréhension mutuelle. Le campus de Natolin du Collège d'Europe à Natolin, Varsovie (Pologne) a été fondé en 1992 à la suite des révolutions de 1989 et pour anticiper les différents élargissements de l'Union européenne prévus pour 2004 et 2007. Depuis lors, le Collège d'Europe fonctionne désormais selon la formule « un collège – deux campus ».

Le programme d'études européennes interdisciplinaires (EIS) du campus de Natolin invite les étudiants à analyser le processus de l'intégration européenne au-delà des frontières disciplinaires. Les étudiants obtiennent un « Master en études européennes interdisciplinaires ». Ce programme tient compte de l'idée que l'intégration européenne dépasse les limites d'une seule discipline académique et est conçu pour répondre aux besoins croissants d'experts qui conservent une compréhension globale du processus de l'intégration européenne et des affaires européennes. Le programme EIS est ouvert non seulement aux étudiants en économie, en droit ou en science politique, mais également aux diplômés en histoire, en communication, en langues, en philosophie ou en philologie désireux de poursuivre une carrière dans les institutions européennes ou les affaires européennes, en général. Ce programme académique et sa dimension professionnelle préparent les étudiants à intégrer les secteurs publics nationaux, européens et internationaux ainsi que les secteurs non-gouvernementaux et privés. Pour certains d'entre eux, ce programme constitue également une étape vers des études doctorales.

Le marché unique européen, la gouvernance et les relations extérieures sont des points majeurs de l'activité d'enseignement. Reconnu pour l'excellence de ses programmes en études européennes, le campus de Natolin du Collège d'Europe s'est engagé à améliorer ses activités de recherche, ainsi qu'à encourager ses étudiants les mieux prédisposés dans une carrière d'enseignement. La chaire de civilisation européenne du parlement européen *Bronislaw Geremek* et la chaire de politique de voisinage européen en particulier, encouragent la recherche sur l'histoire et la civilisation européenne, respectivement, et sur le voisinage avec l'Europe de l'est et du sud.

Le programme EIS se termine par la rédaction d'une importante thèse de Master. Au Collège d'Europe, chaque étudiant doit, pour obtenir son diplôme, produire une thèse dans le cadre de l'un des cours qu'il a suivis au cours de son année d'enseignement. La recherche doit être originale et liée aux politiques et aux affaires européennes, sur un sujet choisi par l'étudiant, ou sur proposition du professeur chargé de la thèse. Souvent, l'étudiant choisit un sujet qui est important pour le déroulement ultérieur de sa carrière. Les thèses de master sont écrites en français et ou en anglais, les deux langues officielles du Collège d'Europe, bien souvent une langue différente de la langue maternelle de l'étudiant.

Un comité scientifique sélectionne les meilleures thèses de master parmi les 100 dossiers produits sur le campus de Natolin chaque année. En les publiant, nous sommes fiers de disséminer dans toute la communauté enseignante européenne quelques-unes des recherches les plus intéressantes menées par nos étudiants.

Introduction

The Ukrainian system of political parties was formed in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union. As the previous political system consisted only of one party, the Communist one, new political activists found themselves in the condition of political uncertainty, as they had no political experience. Some of the ancient functionaries of the country in the course of the events stayed in the government, some of them supported by the national movements. As there was no business environment and all the property was state-owned, the economic transitions were characterized by the division of the key facilities and enterprises between newly emerged businessmen. It was a constant undergoing process even in the end of 2013. The political parties clearly could not exist without any external support, thus they found sponsors in business circles, which was certainly very beneficial for those circles, as this gave them a leverage to promote their interests. The citizens of the new state, in their turn, faced the necessity to choose between political parties and politicians, actions they were not experienced in. All of this gave way to the formation of a political environment with an absolutely excessive number of political parties on the one hand, and a lack of any clear political program in these parties, on the other. Many political parties in Ukraine still can be characterized as political projects, aiming for one short term goal (pulling the votes, promoting politicians, etc.).

SNPU (Social – Nationalist Party of Ukraine), VO “Svoboda`s” (All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” (Freedom)) predecessor emerged in these conditions as a local radical force. It had its not numerous contingent of supporters, but it did not have much success even on the local level. At that time, they had to compete with the major national – democratic force – Rukh, which had far more support among the population. But after 2004, a new stage of political life of the party begins. The party changes its leader and name. It also starts to act as an independent political actor, although it does not find a major support, because there are now other more popular political unions with national – democratic vision – BUT (Block Yulii Tymoshenko) and NUNS (Nasha Ukraina Narodna Samooborona (Our Ukraine People`s Selfdefence). In 2004 as a result of President Elections and the events that followed, Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of

NUNS, becomes a President and Yuliya Tymoshenko, BUT leader – a Prime Minister. But the parties can not reach consensus and law making is hampered by endless political discourses and the Parliament is frequently blocked. Ukrainians become disillusioned by national – democratic political leaders. In 2006-2007 VO “Svoboda” gains positions in local Councils of Ternopil` and Lviv.

In 2012 VO “Svoboda”, which is still considered a local force, overcomes a 5% barrier and gains more than 10% on the Parliament Elections, which entitles it to enter the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament). This success will be largely discussed, especially taking into consideration the reputation of the party as extreme right and its members as scandalous and eccentric. The majority however will belong to Partiya Regioniv (the Party of Regions), the head of which was former Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich. The party of Regions and its members were considered to have closer ties to Russian Federation and were perceived as a pro-Russian force. The opposition mainly consisted of national – democratic forces: “Bat`kivshchyna”, headed by former Yanukovich opponent on President Elections 2010 – Yuliya Tymoshenko- and centrist force “UDAR”, led by Vitalii Klychko, a world famous former boxer. VO “Svoboda” enters in coalition with “Bat`kivshchyna”.

As VO “Svoboda” was so successful, the reasons for this success were widely discussed in the media and among political scientists. They name different reasons, but all of them claim that the party is neither inclined to extremist violence nor to fascism. The topic became even more discussed in the light of the events in Ukraine in the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014. The party will take an active part in the events and became even more known through the media. After the escape of the former President Yanukovich, some members of the party gain positions in the Cabinet of Ministers. The questions about the party’s real character, intentions and ideology were always arguable. The former leaders of the country tried to use the controversial sides of the party’s ideology to sully the reputation of the opposition. Afterwards, due to the increasing Russian interest in Ukrainian territories, when the new Ukrainian government started its work, the existence of the party and the fact that it had positioned itself as a right wing formation began to be actively used by Kremlin propaganda to promote the myth about far right extremism in Ukraine.

The phenomenon of far right parties and organizations has been studied by many prominent scientists and journalists: Vyacheslav Likhachev, Anton Shekhovtsov, Andreas Umland, Andrew Wilson, Oleksey Garan`, Taras Vosnyak, Katerina Peshko, etc.

Current work aims first of all to put together the party's present activity and its ideology and to find out whether the party is really dangerous or if it is only a part of a deliberate political image. One of the means is to explore the ideological basis using historical research and evidences. First of all, it is important to answer the question of where the ideology of the party comes from and how and for what purpose VO "Svoboda" uses it now. It is also crucial to know how the ideology is incorporated into the party's program and whether the most important goals the party sets are connected to it. On the other hand, it should be understood whether the members of the party have reasons to believe in the messages the party brings. In addition, it is relevant to understand, what percentage of Ukrainian citizens share this ideology and what party does in regions where their ideology does not have much support.

Another aim is to trace the party's evolution from being marginal formation to a member of the Parliament. To achieve this goal it is necessary to analyze what periods the party went through, what steps were taken by the party leaders to make VO "Svoboda" succeed and the kind of political narrative was used by the party to attract new supporters. It should be found out what kind of electorate and for what reasons voted for the party in 2006 and 2007 Parliament Elections and how the behavior of the electorate it differed in 2012. The evolution of the party should be examined in a historical, political, and social context in order to give an answer to the reasons behind the party's success to enter the Parliament.

As VO "Svoboda" took part in the revolutionary events in Ukraine in 2013-2014, its role in this events must be clarified. It is important to know what part did the party play, which side it took and under what circumstances. In the course of this work, it must be made comprehensible the reason why the party joined the riots in the first place and how it acted afterwards. The reaction of the people to the actions of the party members and the position it took are also worth of attention.

The question of the place the party occupies in the political life of the country and the circumstances of this position are also very important. Is VO "Svoboda" really such a radical power as it is pictured to be or is it just another party that accepted the rules of the game and is capable to cooperate with other political actors? Is it a strong and independent political movement or is it an instrument for the major forces to achieve their objectives? Does it demand fundamental and drastic changes within the Ukrainian state, and, if it does, what means does it have to achieve the goal? Do those goals differ significantly from those of its political allies and opponents? What actions did the party take in order to succeed in its aims? This research is aimed to answer these questions

in an attempt to understand the real influence of the party on the political life in the country.

As for the external dimension, the most crucial point is to understand an international vector the party sees for the development of the country. As the party positions itself in the right wing, the question arises of whether it is interested in European integration process and for what reason. For this purpose the analysis of the political program, party members' discourses and statements, and a personal interview with the party official representative will be carried out. In addition, the aim is to highlight what exactly VO "Svoboda" expects of integration and to what extent it would be useful for Ukraine from the party's perspective.

On the other hand the question of international cooperation is relevant for the party itself. Thus, it is useful to trace the party's relationship with the colleagues from other countries. It is important to emphasize whether the cooperation was fruitful and whether VO "Svoboda" is a member of the same alliances as in the beginning of its existence. The reasons for these alliances and for their suspension must be clarified to see how the party is loyal as a partner.

Finally, it is crucial to understand the possibilities for the future of the party. As the situation changed so drastically in Ukrainian political life, is it possible that VO "Svoboda" continues its existence in its current form and with the ideology it has now? Or should it possibly adapt to new circumstances and search for a new narrative and new alliances inside the country? Can it still stay in its political niche? Is it possible that the party continues to be popular among the electorate, or has its rating declined? Is it still conceivable that VO "Svoboda" stays in the parliament or will it return to the local level? Is the support is still strong among its traditional electorate? Thus the current position of the party on the national and local levels should be defined in order to describe party's perspectives.

As a result, this work seeks to give an extended perspective on the history of the right wing Ukrainian party VO "Svoboda" in connection with its ideology and to answer the questions concerning its image, activity, external and internal alliances, and attitude towards Ukrainian domestic and international policy. In order to reach this goal the work takes into account the events that took place in the XX century as well as those which occurred after 1991. The research analyzes historical literature, contemporary media and scientific articles, video materials and first-hand interviews.

Chapter 1. Historical background

The history of Ukrainian nationalist movement is deeply rooted in Ukrainian history. In the beginning of the XX century, Ukraine did not have a state and the different regions were incorporated in other states (Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, emerging Soviet state). The Soviet period in the history of Ukrainian lands was especially violent due to collectivization, industrialization, which resulted into famine and various prosecutions. In November 1941 all Soviet Ukraine was occupied by Nazi German troops, except for Bukovina and Bessarabia invaded by the Romanian army¹.

After 2 years of Soviet occupation of Galicia and Volhynia some people welcomed German invasion as they perceived it as liberation from Soviet rule. In these circumstances, it is important to pay attention to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and to Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) created by Ukrainians as well as to SS “Galicia” Division.² The information about these formations has a direct ideological link with contemporary Ukrainian nationalistic movements, therefore should be taken into consideration.

¹ Paul Robert Magocsi, *A history of Ukraine*, University of Toronto Press, 1996, p. 666 – 667.

² Olesya Khromeychuk, *Undermined Ukrainians. Post War Narratives of the Waffen SS ‘Galicia’ Division*, Pater Lang AG, International Academic Publishers, Bern, 2013, p. 3.

1.1 Nationalist organizations in XX century

The history of OUN starts in Vienna in 1929 partially as an answer to the incapability of the existing political parties to gain independence for Ukraine and to Polish policy towards Ukrainians.³ And partially as a successor of UVO – Ukrainian Military Organization (“Ukrains`ka Viis`kova Organizatsiya”) at first military, then terrorist organization, which at a certain point of its history started forming a wing of Galician youth.⁴ The ideology of the organization derived from Dmitriy Dontsov’s radicalism and had the establishment of an Ukrainian state as an aim.⁵ The organization did not cooperate with any other political organizations and parties.⁶ Instead OUN has carried out numerous terrorist attacks against political figures (of different nationalities), which resulted in alienation of Poles and Ukrainians and in the search for an ally OUN found itself sympathizing with fascism.⁷

In the course of the II World War, Galicia and Volhynia were occupied by Soviet and then by Nazi troops. As there was no Ukrainian state before (unlike Polish state), OUN saw Germany as an ally to establish it. The situation was aggravated by Soviet policy of deportation, collectivization and hasty mass murder of Ukrainian political prisoners in 1941 before the retreat. The murders were attributed to Jews among others. As a consequence of all events aforementioned, thousands of Ukrainians joined the Nazi police and took part in the Final Solution. This taught them that the solution of a national problem is possible through physical elimination.⁸

Before the outbreak of the war, the radical faction of OUN was not very popular among citizens of Galicia and Volhynia as there were more mild political organizations (e.g. UNDO – Ukrainian National - Democratic Alliance).⁹ But by 1941 OUN remained the last Ukrainian political organization, and was split into two parts OUN – **Mel`nik** (more inclined to cooperation) and OUN – **Bandera** (radical wing). Finally, OUN(B) took the lead (by 1943) and declared Ukrainian independence in 1941, after which a vast majority of leaders (including Bandera himself) were either eliminated or sent to concentration

3 Timothy Snyder, *The reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569 – 1999*, Yale University Press, 2003, p. 143.

4 Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine. A history*, Fourth edition, University of Toronto Press 2009, p. 443 – 444.

5 Timothy Snyder, op. cit. p. 143.

6 Roman Solchanek, ‘The Radical Right in Ukraine’, in: S.P. Ramet (ed.), *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999, p. 281.

7 Timothy Snyder, op. cit. p. 143

8 Timothy Snyder, op. cit. p. 154 -178.

9 Timothy Snyder, op. cit. p. 150.

camps by Germans. But OUN(B) continued its existence and incorporated soldiers from the former OUN(M) and also from another partisan army **UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army)**. The new leader of **OUN - UPA** became Mikola Lebed and was succeeded by Roman Shukhevich. Under their governance the ethnic cleansing of Poles and the prosecutions of ex-members of OUN(M) and those who refused to take part in purges were carried out. In the meantime, many Ukrainians left the German police for UPA. Many of them believed that unlike Soviets and Germans, who will eventually get their resources exhausted, stop fighting and leave, Poles will stay. That is why, taught by Soviets and Germans, they turned to physical elimination of Poles as a way to build an independent state. Mass desertion from the police made Germans to think about substitution of Ukrainians by Poles, who were already affected by ethnic cleansings and were eager to take revenge on Ukrainians, which they did immediately. This resulted into civil Ukrainian-Polish war including mass murders of civilians from both sides.¹⁰

Several words should be said about the leaders of the movement, as some of them are remembered by VO "Svoboda" and used as symbols while others are less famous. First of all it is necessary to emphasize that the party commemorates the day of UPA creation each year.¹¹ The day refers precisely to the birth of a partisan army created 14 October 1942 in cooperation with a much more radicalized OUN(B), in contrast to earlier UPA formations led by Taras Bulba-Borovets', which were also known before as UPA Polisska Sich.¹² The party also put forward an initiative of official recognition of OUN – UPA soldiers as heroes who fought for Ukrainian independence.¹³ This initiative was also promoted by ex-President Viktor Yushchenko and judged by his opponents.¹⁴ Apart from that, the party has initiated different types of actions supporting OUN – UPA. For

¹⁰ Timothy Snyder, op. cit. p. 154 – 178.

¹¹ "Svoboda" nachala svoi ejegodnii marsh za priznanie OUN –UPA. Available at: <http://news.bigmir.net/ukraine/761932-Svoboda-nachala-svoi-ejegodnii-marsh-za-priznanie-OYN-YPA>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

¹² OUN – UPA . Official webpage. History. Available at: <http://oun-upa.org.ua/ru/history.html>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

¹³ Den` sozdaniya UPA, 14 octiabria, doljen stat` national`nym prazdnikom: Tiahnybok. Available at: <http://interfax.com.ua/news/political/170069.html>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

¹⁴ Sud priznal zakonnym ukaz Yushchenko o chestvovanii voinov OUN-UPA. Available at: <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/1240800-sud-priznal-zakonnym-ukaz-yushchenko-o-chestvovanii-voinov-oun-upa>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

example photo exhibition¹⁵, finance help for veterans of the movement,¹⁶ memorials installation.¹⁷

1.1.1 Leaders

Probably the most used image of Ukrainian nationalist is an image of **Stepan Bandera**, one of the leaders of the radical wing of OUN till 1941 (with a break although as, after the assassination of Bronislaw Pieracki, he spent several years in Bereza Kartuzka – a Polish concentration camp). For a long time he was in charge of propaganda and ideology formation, meanwhile giving orders and planning OUN`s numerous terrorist attacks. In 1941 Bandera was sent to Sachsenhausen. After been released from the camp, he emigrated and lived in Germany, until he was killed in 1959. Practically no nationalist demonstration in Ukraine is held without his portrait. ¹⁸ In 2010, under President Yushchenko`s mandate, Bandera was granted a title of national hero, but after the change of ruling elites this law was abolished. VO “Svoboda” demands that the title would be granted to Bandera again together with Shukhevych. ¹⁹

The party also commemorates Bandera`s birth anniversary. The last one was held on the night of 1 January 2014 was especially controversial as the participants were carrying flares and together with some emblems and the fact that the party is right-wing gave way to certain associations and talks about fascists in power. The press secretary Yuriy Syrotyuk says though that the demonstration is held every year. According to him it was decided to carry the flares at night in order to make the manifestation more esthetically attractive.²⁰ Of course public discussion added to increasing of the quantity of people who know about the party, though it does harm the country as contributes to “fascist rise” panic.

15 Poltavski svobodivtsi initsiuvaly peresuvnu vulychnu fotovystavky pro OUN-UPA. Available at: <http://www.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/novyny/042827/>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

16 Kievski oseredky “Students`koi svobody” ta “Sokola” vidvidaly kombataniv OUN – UPA. Available at: <http://www.kyiv.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/novyny/043848/>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

17 Na Ternopol`shchyni vidkryly pam`yatnyk voynam OUN – UPA. Available at: <http://www.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/novyny/004814/>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

18 Stepan Bandera. Available at: <http://oun-upa.org.ua/personalities/#> (consulted on 01.04.2014).

19 “Svoboda” trebuje vernut` Bandere zvanie geroya. Available at: <http://vlasti.net/news/176463> (consulted on 01.04.2014).

20 Interview with Yuriy Syrotyuk, a Member of the Parliament since 2012, a member of VO “Svoboda”, a press-secretary, Kiev, 11 February 2014, Annex 1.

Many sayings attributed to Bandera are used. Probably the most well-known are “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes” (“Slava Ukraini! Geroyam slava!”), “Liberty to nation (people), liberty for the man” (“Svoboda narodu, svoboda liudyni”).

Another famous leader is **Roman Shukhevych**. Shukhevich was a member of OUN since 1929. He took part in various OUN operations. In 1941 he was one of the leaders of **Nachtigall**, a part of formation created by Abwehr (the other one was named **Roland**) before the outbreak of German – Soviet War²¹, and a leader of UPA since 1943. He was eventually killed in 1950.²²

VO “Svoboda” pays tribute to Shukhevich memory as well. For example, it commemorates the anniversary of his death²³ and opened a museum devoted to him in 2007.²⁴ The party certainly considers him as a hero, as it can be concluded from the official biography note on the official VO “Svoboda” webpage.²⁵

Mikola Lebed` was initially an OUN terrorist. For his deeds he was sent to prison, but escaped. In the course of the war seized the power over UPA and dismissed Bulba-Borovets` with his allies²⁶ and prosecuted and killed former UPA members, who refused to cooperate.²⁷ Bulba – Borovets` says in his book “Army without a state” that after Lebed` came to power he accused former UPA militants who did not take his side of being foreign agents. The members of his groups tried to engage ex-UPA soldiers in new formation, and those who refused were killed.²⁸ Lebid` fled to USA after the war and died only in 1998.²⁹

21 Taras Hunczak and Dmytro Shtohryn, *Ukraine. The Challenges of World War II*, University Press of America, 2003, p. 211 – 212.

22 OUN – UPA. Personalii. Available at: <http://oun-upa.org.ua/personalities/#>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

23 Mijgirska “Svoboda” vshanuvala pam`iat` Romana Shukhevycha u 64-tu richnytsu z dnya iogo zagybeli. Available at: <http://www.zakarpattya.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/novyny/048537/>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

24 Roman Shukhevych: Otsinky. Geroizm. Spekuliatsii. Available at: <http://www.svoboda.org.ua/dopysy/dopysy/002832/>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

25 The leader of UPA – Roman Shukhevych. Available at: <http://www.svoboda.kiev.ua/dopysy/dopysy/022730/>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

26 Roman Shukhevych. Available at: <http://oun-upa.org.ua/personalities/#shukhevich>(consulted on 01.04.2014)

27 Timothy Snyder, op. cit. p. 164.

28 Taras Bulba – Borovets`, *Armiya bez derjavy*, Available at: http://zustrich.quebec-ukraine.com/lib/bulba/bulba_255victimes.htm(consulted on 01.04.2014).

29 Mikola Lebed`. Available at: <http://oun-upa.org.ua/personalities/#lebed>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

Taras Bulba-Borovets` was a leader of partisan movement in Volhynia and Polissya. Also a leader of UPA "Polisska Sich". He refused to co-operate with UPA group led by Lebid`. Borovets` emigrated to Canada shortly after the war.³⁰ In his books he condemns the internal war inside Ukrainian national movement during the II World War.³¹ In 2011 VO "Svoboda" initiated commemoration of "Polisska Sich".³²

Andriy Mel`nik was a more mature and experienced soldier as he took part in I World War and was one of the organizers and leaders of regiment of Sichovy Striltsy since 1918. He lost the battle for leading OUN to Stepan Bandera. After the war he lived and died in immigration.³³ Although Andriy Mel`nik's portrait is not as popular as his opponent's Bandera, he is still commemorated by the members of VO "Svoboda" as a hero. In 2006 the official ceremony of memorial establishment was held in Volya Yakubova (Mel`nik's birthplace). The members of the party, including the leader Oleg Tiahnybok, were present.³⁴

Evgen Konovalets` was a founder of OUN in 1929 that is why is especially respected by VO "Svoboda". He was killed by a bomb in Rotterdam in 1938 by Soviet special agent Pavel Sudoplatov,³⁵ which deprived OUN of a shrewd and experienced leader. Before forming OUN, Konovalets` was the head of UVO, but when Polish rule was officially recognized by the Western countries in 1923, many militants left UVO. As a way out, Konovalets` started to make contacts with Polish enemies (Germany and Lithuania) and with nationalist youth organizations, which eventually resulted in formation of OUN.³⁶

Yaroslav Stetsko – an ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism and OUN in particular, whose works became also an official ideological basis for SNPU / "Svoboda".

Dmitry (Dmitro) Dontsov was a "father" of Ukrainian nationalist ideas in the beginning of XX century. His integral nationalism argued that the nation is the highest value and

30 Taras Bulba-Borovets`. Available at: <http://oun-upa.org.ua/personalities/#bulba>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

31 Taras Bulba – Borovets`, *Armiya bez derjavy*, Op. cit. Available at: http://zustrich.quebec-ukraine.com/lib/bulba/bulba_255victimes.htm

32 Z initsiatyvy VO "Svoboda" v Olevsku vshanuit` Olevs`ku respubliku , viis`kovym formuvanniam iakoi bula OUN – Polis`ka Sich. Available at: <http://www.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/novyny/019875/> (consulted on 01.04.2014).

33 Andriy Mel`nik. Available at: <http://oun-upa.org.ua/personalities/#melnyk>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

34 Vidkryttia pam`iatnogo pogrudyda golovi Provodu OUN Andriu Mel`niku. Available at: <http://www.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/novyny/002537/>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

35 Evgen Konovalets`. Available at: <http://oun-upa.org.ua/ru/personalities.html#konowalec>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

36 Orest Subtelny, op. cit. p. 443 – 444.

it is more important than the individual. However, the individuals inside the nation should be determined and ruthless in order to achieve the ultimate nation's goals. Politics were recognized as a Darwinian struggle, which created confrontations on a permanent basis. That is why only the nation which was the strongest could survive and form a strong state, with the only strong leader in the head as a must. No particular references to economic, state or institutional policy are found in his writings.³⁷ Generally, the ideas of such kind were quite popular at that time.

As for VO "Svoboda" it (or at least particular members) proclaims itself the successor of Dontsov's ideology as it can be concluded from the statement made by Irina Farion on the 4.10.2013 at the day when Dontsov memorial plate was hanged on one of the buildings in Lviv.³⁸ In 2013 as well the party's subsidiary in Melitopol' (Dontsov's birthplace) put forward an initiative to install Dontsov's monument in the city³⁹ and organized a manifestation celebrating the 130th birthday of the ideologist. Party members commemorated Dontsov marching through the city with his portrait, black and red and official state flags, but the symbology of the party clearly prevailed.⁴⁰

1.1.2 Symbols

Some specific symbols used by OUN and UPA can be sometimes seen during nationalist demonstrations, but rather rarely. Generally the most popular images are the black and red flag, pictures of Bandera, Shukhevich and Konovalts', a Trident and the official Ukrainian state flag. As for the black and red flag, it is connected to OUN (B), but according to the testimony of Andrey Grechilo, a specialist in Ukrainian heraldic, it was never de jure attributed to the organization.⁴¹

37 Orest Subtelny, op. cit. p. 441 – 442.

38 Memorial plate dedicated to Dmitro Dontsov was installed in Lviv. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9aRErpye3gE> (consulted on 01.04.2014).

39 Melitopol'ska "Svoboda" sobiraiet podpisi za ustanovlenie pamiatnika Dmitriyu Dontsovu. Available at: <http://mzm.zp.ua/news/melitopolskaya-svoboda-sobiraiet-podpisi-za-ustanovlenie-pamyatnika-dmitriyu-doncovu/> (consulted on 01.04.2014).

40 V Melitopolie otmietili ubilei Dmitriya Dontsova – ideologa ukrainskogo natsionalizma. Available at: <http://dpni.org/articles/novostnaya/37149/> (consulted on 01.04.2014).

41 Chorno – chervonyi prapor ne e praporom OUN i UPA – geraldist. Available at: <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/25251033.html> (consulted on 01.04.2014).

OUN (B) SYMBOLS ⁴²:



OUN (B) EMBLEM



BLACK AND RED REVOLUTIONARY FLAG

OUN (M) SYMBOLS ⁴³:



OUN (M) EMBLEM



OUN (M) FLAG

VO “Svoboda” usually uses purely OUN (B) symbology, but other organizations nowadays sometimes combine them: ⁴⁴



A FLAG USED BY RIGHT WING ORGANIZATION “PRAVIY SEKTOR” (RIGHT SECTOR) DURING THE REVOLUTION MOVEMENTS IN UKRAINE IN 2013-2014

42 OUN – UPA. Organization. Available at: <http://oun-upa.org.ua/ru/organization.html>(consulted on 01.04.2014).

43 *Ibid.*

44 Pravyy sektor. Official webpage. Available at: <http://vk.com/public62043361> (consulted on 31.03. 2014).

1.2 Ukrainians in German Army after 1941

After the split of UPA and OUN(B)'s victory over OUN(M), ancient members of OUN(M) accepted being a part of a newly created Division SS "Galicia" as a way escape to be sent to Germany. It became possible because at that moment the German Army was already retreating and was interested in recruiting new militants.⁴⁵

The **Division SS "Galicia"** was formed in April 1943. It existed until 1945, and took part in several battles (Battle of Brody, operations in Slovakia and Slovenia, as well as fighting the Red Army). The history of the Division is especially peculiar as it was an officially formed as a part of SS unlike other politically oriented organizations that came to existence before the start of German military campaign. Although it had UPA, and other formations like Carpathian Sich (which resisted Hungarian Army invasion in March 1939), Polisska Sich (also known as Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army since 1943, which according to Bul'ba-Borovets` collaborated with both oppressors in conformity with the needs⁴⁶) the Nachtigall and Roland battalions and others as predecessors. Their creation was also officially approved by Nazi leaders, unlike divisions, created earlier by Abwehr.⁴⁷

The Division was only formed because the German army suffered losses and many Ukrainians were in favor of the creation of their own army. However, official German authorities did not aim to foster Ukrainian self-determination and SS "Galicia" was perceived by Germans as a part of the German Army. That is why the Ukrainian "Trident" was not recognized as a sign of Division, but was substituted by a lion, a Galician symbol.⁴⁸



THE OFFICIAL SS "GALICIA" EMBLEM⁴⁹

45 Timothy Snyder, *op. cit.* p. 154 – 178.

46 Olesya Khromeychuk, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

47 Taras Hunczak and Dmytro Shtohryn, *op. cit.*, p. 209 – 213.

48 Olesya Khromeychuk, *op. cit.*, p.53.

49 Ukrainian Division Galicia. Official webpage Available at: <http://www.voiakudg.com>(consulted on 31.03. 2014)

The role of the Division in violence against Jewish population is not proved as there is no direct evidence in the participation of the Division members in attacks towards Jews.⁵⁰ But it should be admitted that, by the time of the Division creation, the Final Solution had already been completed in the previous years.⁵¹ The propagandistic images, of course, contributed to the perception of SS “Galicia” as anti-Semitist. On the other hand, German propaganda allied Bolsheviks and Jews. Thus, this kind of images can not be perceived as an evidence of anti-Semitism within the Division.⁵² In addition the members of the Division had to swear to Hitler, as the oath (valid until 1945) states “in my fight against bolshevism I will implicitly follow the orders of the highest commander of German Wehrmacht Adolf Hitler”.⁵³ But the question of how guilty the members of the Division and the Division in the whole were in war crimes remains arguable as the historians do not fully agree with each other. There are 3 main points of view:

- they are totally guilty as were a part of German Army;
- they can not be guilty as the Division was formed only in 1943;
- there are people inside the Division individually guilty of war crimes as there are evidences against them.⁵⁴

In 1945, as it the fall of Third Reich became clear, the Division was renamed into Ukrainian Division and acquired the Trident (Trizub) as a symbol.⁵⁵ Many of SS “Galicia” warriors surrendered to US and British Army as they wanted to escape from Soviet prosecutions. As a big part of them were former Polish Citizens, they were saved from deportation and eventually settled in Great Britain and Canada.⁵⁶

The narrators in favor of SS “Galicia” are mainly composed of ex-participants and ex-leaders of the Division living in Europe and Canada. They claim that the aim of the Division was to form an independent Ukrainian state free from Russian or German oppression.⁵⁷

50 Olesya Khromeychuk, op. cit., p. 32-37.

51 Timothy Snyder, op. cit. p. 166.

52 Olesya Khromeychuk, op. cit., p. 32-37.

53 Ukrainian Division Galicia. Official webpage. Op. cit. Available at: <http://www.galiciadivision.com/name/>(consulted on 31.03. 2014).

54 Olesya Khromeychuk, op. cit., p. 89.

55 Taras Hunczak and Dmytro Shtohryn, op. cit. p. 224.

56 Timothy Snyder, op. cit. p. 166.

57 Olesya Khromeychuk, op. cit., p. 3 -10.

The Division SS “Galicia” is commemorated in Lviv starting from 2010, during the “vishivanka parade”⁵⁸. According to the words of Yurii Mikhalchishin (a member of VO “Svoboda”) the parade is held to maintain national memory. The one in 2013 was especially bright as it was dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Division. It should be emphasized, though, that members of VO “Svoboda” are not the only ones to take part in the event. The event is completely official. For example, Lviv City Council is mentioned as one of the organizations of the rock concert which took place for the occasion.⁵⁹

Several symbols were used during the parades:

- The official emblem of SS “Galicia”;
- The official Ukrainian flag (blue and yellow);
- The black and red flag (non-official flag symbolizing revolution fight).
- The “Idea of Nation” symbol.
- The portraits of OUN – UPA leaders (especially Bandera`s)⁶⁰

VO “Svoboda” also took part in the event as well as in adapting controversial laws aimed for SS “Galicia” recognition. For example, following the initiative of “Svoboda” in 2004 one of the streets in Ternopil` was renamed after “Galicia” Division.⁶¹ In 2013 members of the party took part in reburial of members of division remains in Lviv oblast.⁶² In addition, the leader of the party Oleg Tiahnybok presented a book under the title “Division “Galicia” in veterans’ questions and answers” in 2009⁶³ and in May 2010 gained a medal from the veterans⁶⁴.

58 Vishivanka – traditional Ukrainian embroidered blouse.

59 Lvovskii benefis nardepa U. Mikhal`chishina k 70-letiyu devizii SS-Galichina. Available at: <http://bruchwiese.livejournal.com/138385.html>(consulted on 31.03. 2014).

60 Lvovskii benefis nardepa U. Mikhal`chishina k 70-letiyu devizii SS-Galichina. Op. cit. Available at: <http://bruchwiese.livejournal.com/138385.html>(consulted on 31.03. 2014).

61 Olesya Khromeychuk, op. cit., p. 160.

62 Na L`vovschinie torjestvenno perezahoronili ostatki voinov SS-Galichina. In Lviv oblast a ceremony of reburial of the remains of warriors of SS “Galicia” took place. Available at: http://censor.net.ua/photo_news/249881/na_lvovschie_torjestvenno_perezahoronili_ostanki_voinov_ss_galichina_fotoreportaj(consulted on 31.03. 2014).

63 Tiagnibok prezentoval knigu o divizii SS-Galichina. Available at: <http://ru.tsn.ua/ukrayina/tyagnibok-prezentoval-knigu-o-divizii-ss-galichina.html>(consulted on 31.03. 2014).

64 Tiagnibok poluchil nagradu ot divizii SS-Galichina. Available at: <http://ru.tsn.ua/ukrayina/tyagnibok-poluchil-nagradu-ot-divizii-ss-galichina.html> (consulted on 31.03. 2014).

The status of OUN – UPA as well as of the groups incorporated to the German army are not quite clear. From one ruling party and President to another, the official position on the issue changes radically. VO “Svoboda” is firm in its position of recognition of the militants of OUN – UPA, and SS divisions as national heroes who fought for the wellbeing of Ukraine.

But as it is made evident, the status of OUN and UPA, SS “Galicia” and generally Galicians and Volhynians during the II World War is very controversial. As for VO “Svoboda”, it is impossible to know the opinion of each party member on the issue. It is obvious, though, that a certain amount of people, especially in Galicia, supported the contribution of those groups into liberation movement in Ukraine during the II World War and earlier and does not recognize them as anti-heroes.

With regard to this, it is clear that for VO “Svoboda” it is useful to support contribution to commemoration of OUN, UPA and Division “Galicia” in terms of engaging more votes, as well as it is important for the popularity of certain members to pronounce speeches during commemoration events. Thus, by recuperating the memory about Division “Galicia”, VO “Svoboda” may pursue two main political goals: gaining support from the target audience and gaining popularity, because the problem is widely discussed by people and in the mass media. On the other hand, insisting on recognition of those groups and their militants as heroes does not give more credibility to the party in the East of the country (where a different historical memory was created) and sometimes this position is used against them.

1.3 Official ideological basis

VO “Svoboda” started its official existence in 2004. Although, the party’s history dates from 2004, it has a predecessor, called “Social-nationalist party of Ukraine” (SNPU), created de facto in 1991 and registered officially in 1995⁶⁵ with the leader and a fonder Yaroslav Andrushkiv⁶⁶ SNPU in its tern was formed from the organizations “Varta rukhu”, “Students`ke bratstvo”, “OUM “Spadschuna”, “Ukrainian veterans of Afghanistan”.⁶⁷

In his interview from 26.07.11 Andrushkiv says that back in 1980 he was first proposed to participate in reanimation of youth movements mainly to recreate scout organization “Plast” (first created in Galicia in 1911). Than he as many others entered the organization “Narodniy Rukh Ukrainy” (Ukrainian National Movement). It was clear at that moment that Soviet Union was dissolving, but many were afraid that the government will use the force. For the purpose of protection the leaders, the “Varta Rukhu” (Rukh guard) was created. It trained people physically. The majority of the people were Afghanistan veterans and the rest came from martial arts sections. The ideological differences between nationalists and national democrats resulted in creation of SNPU separately from Rukh. Rukh, Andrushkiv says, consisted from intellectuals, who did not pay much attention to common people.⁶⁸

1.3.1 Ideology of the party

The official ideological basis for the current party VO “Svoboda”, as well as of SNPU is the text by Yaroslav Stitsko “Two revolutions”.⁶⁹ This is a rather poetic text, which touches upon the problems of Ukrainian liberation throughout history. It also refers to the Ukrainian National Liberation War (1648 – 1676). He says that these two Revolutions are not chosen for contrasting them, but to find them similar and to demonstrate that

65 Social Nationalist Party of Ukraine program. Available at: <http://www.vatra.cc/sotsial-natsionalizm/prohrama-sotsial-natsionalnoyi-partiyi-ukrayiny.html>(consulted on 2.03.14).

66 Ukraine elections. Available at: http://ukraine-elections.com.ua/parties/politicheskaya_partiya_svoboda(consulted on 2.03.14).

67 VO “Svoboda”. Pro partiu. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/istoriya/(consulted on 2.03.14).

68 Olga Musafirova, *Osnovatel` Social – Natsionalisticheskoi partii Yaroslav Andrushkiv: “Iesli viyavili seksota, to luchshe iego nie trogat”*. Available at: <http://glavcom.ua/articles/4295.html> (consulted on 2.03.14).

69 VO “Svoboda”. Pro partiu. Op. cit. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/istoriya/ (consulted on 2.03.14).

the present (by which Stets`ko meant the beginning of the XX century) is connected to the past.⁷⁰

The perception of nationalism is heroic, mainly, that the individual (nationalist) is not afraid to die, as he knows that he lives for the nation. If the values of the nation are under a threat he will give his life for them to be protected, because only then his life is valuable, when it serves for protection of values of nation.⁷¹

The social order they are aimed for is described by Stets`ko as having two bases: national and ethnical. The socio-economic fight of classes shall not exist, he says, as there shall be no distinction based upon which class (intellectuals, workers or peasants) an individual comes from. The equality shall be based on objective conditions for an individual with certain morality aimed for determined goal.⁷²

There is a reference to the European values in the text as well. The author states that Ukrainians always had a sense of nobility and aristocracy, unlike Moscovits. Thus, Ukrainians have sense of self pride and are not inclined to communal stile of life.⁷³

1.3.2 Symbols used by the party

The emblem the party used was quite controversial. It was called “The idea of nation”,⁷⁴ but it also reminded many people of the emblem “Wolf’s hook” (Wolfsangel), which was used by SS-Panzer-Division Das Reich during the II World War.⁷⁵ Though the symbol was modified, it is clear that there is a certain similarity. It was also used by the youth branch of SNPU - “Patriot Ukrainy” (“Ukrainian Patriot”).⁷⁶ The modern organization with the same name uses “The idea of nation” as well.⁷⁷

70 Yaroslav Stet`sko, *Dvi revolutsii*. Available at : <http://www.ukrcenter.com/Література/Ярослав-Стецько/55307/Дві-революції-збірка>(consulted on 2.03.14).

71 *Ibid.*

72 *Ibid.*

73 *Ibid.*

74 VO “Svoboda”. 20 rokiv borot`by za natsionalnu ideu. Available at : <http://initiativenational.blogspot.com/2011/09/20-n.html>(consulted on 2.03.14).

75 SS-Panzer Division Das Reich Available at : <http://www.axishistory.com/axis-nations/1250-2-ss-panzer-division-das-reich>(consulted on 2.03.14).

76 VO “Svoboda”. 20 rokiv borot`by za natsionalnu ideu. Op. cit. Available at : <http://initiativenational.blogspot.com/2011/09/20-n.html>(consulted on 2.03.14).

77 “Patriot Ukrainy”. Official webpage. Available at : <http://patriotukr.org.ua/?rub=doc>(consulted on 2.03.14).

Yaroslav Andrushkiv, the former SNPU leader claims basically that the symbol was adapted as the members of the party did not like the others and also because in the new Ukrainian state they wanted that their emblem would be radically different from the emblems of other parties.⁷⁸




SS-PANZER-DIVISION
DAS REICH`S EMBLEM⁷⁹



EMBLEM OF "PATRIOT UKRAINI"
("UKRAINIAN PATRIOT")⁸⁰

The idea of nation" can sometimes be seen among the symbols, VO "Svoboda" too.



A BROCHURE DEDICATED TO 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF SNPU - "SVOBODA"⁸¹

78 Olga Musafirova, *Osnovatel` Social – Natsionalisticheskoi partii Yaroslav Andrushkiv: "Iesli viyavili seksota, to luchshe iego nie trogat"*. Op. cit. Available at: <http://glavcom.ua/articles/4295.html> (consulted on 2.03.14).

79 SS-Panzer Division Das Reich, op. cit. Available at : <http://www.axishistory.com/axis-nations/1250-2-ss-panzer-division-das-reich>(consulted on 2.03.14).

80 "Patriot Ukrainy". Official link, op. cit. Available at : <http://patriotukr.org.ua/?rub=doc>(consulted on 2.03.14).

81 VO "Svoboda". 20 rokov borot`by za natsionalnu ideu. Op. cit. Available at : <http://initiativenational.blogspot.com/2011/09/20-n.html>(consulted on 2.03.14).

The official emblem was changed along with the name of the party in 2004. The new emblem became “Trizub – Volya” (“Trident – Freedom (Will)”)⁸². The trident can be also found on the official Small Ukrainian State Emblem.⁸³



FLAG OF VO “SVOBODA”⁸⁴



SMALL UKRAINIAN STATE EMBLEM⁸⁵

SNPU had its own journal as well, called “Orientyr” (“Guidelines”). It had Andriy Parubiy (currently a secretary of the Council of National Security and Defense, since 2014, member of the party “Bat`kivschina” (“Fatherland”); in 1999 a head of the organization “Ukrainian Patriot”) as a chief editor. Apparently SNPU had some contacts with European right parties. In an issue from 1999, 2 articles are dedicated to a meeting of European right parties in Paris, where we can see a chief editor on the photo with Jean-Marie le Pen,⁸⁶ which is followed by the article by Mr. Parubiy himself. In his article, the author praises the initiative of nationalism in Europe. He says that it is essential for Ukraine to rediscover its European roots and he also adds that, on the contrary, Russia together with communism is an enemy. The future of Ukraine, in his point of view, is in Europe and in nationalism.⁸⁷ The following year le Pen came to Ukraine himself. A

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Ukrainian Emblem. Available at : <https://sites.google.com/site/simvoliuk/gerb-ukraieni>(consulted on 2.03.14).

⁸⁴ VO “Svoboda”. 20 rokiv borot`by za natsionalnu ideu. Op. cit. Available at : <http://initiativenational.blogspot.com/2011/09/20-n.html>(consulted on 2.03.14).

⁸⁵ Ukrainian Emblem. Op. cit. Available at : <https://sites.google.com/site/simvoliuk/gerb-ukraieni>(consulted on 2.03.14).

⁸⁶ Orientyr. Jurnal Social – Natsionalistychnoi Partii Ukrainy, № 99/12-2, 1999, p. 21. Available at : <http://archivar-ua.livejournal.com/pics/catalog/2395> (consulted on 2.03.14).

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

photo depicts him next to SNPU leader Andrushkiv at a ceremony of commemoration of victims of the communist regime.⁸⁸

The topics of the journal sometimes were of ideological character and even went as far as metaphysical discourses. The articles about martial arts are constantly present. The analysis of the political or economical situation or debates with the representatives of other parties were absent.⁸⁹ Throughout its evolution, the analytical articles start to appear. In some of them, the political life of Ukraine is analyzed (from the perspective of SNPU), others are dedicated to world right movements.⁹⁰

In 2004, after holding the 9 congress, SNPU was officially given a new name, and that is the moment, when VO “Svoboda” starts its existence in its modern form.

1.3.3 Program documents

VO “Svoboda’s” political program did not emerge at once as well. In order to understand the evolution of “Svoboda”, the development of “Social-nationalist party of Ukraine” must be taken into consideration.

The general character of the document can be described as having a determined and resolute air. It proclaims that social - nationalism takes patriotic upbringing, religious education, with no regard to the confession, sport and esthetics as a basis”. The program states that the party will not form alliances with other parties. Among the main issues for Ukraine, the program names Russia and the fight with its influence the same as with communist ideology are stated to be among its main goals. Russia, unlike Ukraine and European countries, is said not to know what the notion of nation state is, as it is composed of different nations. On the other hand, the document claims that it sees Ukrainian state as a nation state, but where all the citizens notwithstanding their nationality are granted the same rights.⁹¹

88 Olga Musafirova, *Osnovatel` Social – Natsionalisticheskoi partii Yaroslav Andrushkiv: “Iesli viyavili seksota, to luchshe iego nie trogat”*, op. cit. Available at: <http://glavcom.ua/articles/4295.html> (consulted on 2.03.14).

89 Orientyry. *Jornal of Social Nationalist Party of Ukraine*, № 99/12-2, 1999, op. cit., p. 10-12. Available at : <http://archivar-ua.livejournal.com/pics/catalog/2395> (consulted on 2.03.14).

90 Orientyry. *Jornal of Social Nationalist Party of Ukraine*, № 2 (5), 2001. Available at : <http://archivar-ua.livejournal.com/pics/catalog/2395> (consulted on 2.03.14).

91 Social Nationalist Party of Ukraine program. Op. cit. Available at: <http://www.vatra.cc/sotsial-natsionalizm/prohrama-sotsial-natsionalnoyi-partiyi-ukrayiny.html>(consulted on 2.03.14).

The program, however, does not introduce any particular steps, economical or political, and therefore is rather declarative and naive. Especially it is obvious in the part which deals with economic issues. For example, article 20 states that the only jurisdiction of the state will be tax collecting, at the same time article 21 says that Ukrainian entrepreneurs will be able to plan their business for ten years ahead.⁹² Partially this kind of ignorance can be attributed to the fact that market economy did not exist before in Ukraine for many years and the ideologists of the program were not aware of how it functions, as well as a vivid political life, which leads the program to be containing nothing but proclamations.

The name of the party as well as the head of the party changed in 2004 to VO "Svoboda". Oleg Tiahnybok became a new political leader. Yaroslav Andrushkiv left the party and started his own business. In his interview, he explains why SNPU stopped its existence. In the beginning of the 1990, he says, there was a place for national liberation fight and the question only was if you do or do not support Ukraine. That was a time when political education was only to be formed as there was no political choice in USSR. Unlike that period, the time came for the political fight.⁹³

Oleg Tiahnybok, was previously a member of the national-democratic parliament fraction "Nasha Ukraina", from which he was expelled in 2004 for a racist statement⁹⁴ made in July 2004, where, while performing an election campaigning for candidate Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of "Nasha Ukraina", he said: "You young people and those who already have grey hair, you are the ones of whom the Moscow-Jewish mafia that rules Ukraine is afraid".⁹⁵ He was acquitted by the court, though.⁹⁶

VO "Svoboda`s" program, unlike that of the "Social-nationalist party of Ukraine" is far more detailed. It can be noticed first of all from the size of the documents, as the program of "Social-nationalistic party of Ukraine" consisted of 31 articles,⁹⁷ whereas

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ Vgolos, *Yaroslav Andrushkiv: SNPU ta VO "Svoboda" rizni politychni yavyscha*. Available at: http://vgolos.com.ua/articles/yaroslav_andrushkiv_snpu_ta_vo_svoboda__rizni_politychni_yavyscha_105711.html (consulted on 2.03.14).

⁹⁴ Ukraine elections. Op. cit. Available at: http://ukraine-elections.com.ua/parties/politicheskaya_partiya/svoboda (consulted on 2.03.14).

⁹⁵ Povnyi tekst vystupu Olega Tiahnyboka na gori Yavoryna. Available at: <http://www.svoboda.org.ua/dokumenty/vystupy/002108/> (consulted on 2.03.14).

⁹⁶ Oleg Tiahnybok`s biography. Available at: <http://vibori.in.ua/kandidaty/biografii/459-biografiya-tyagnibok.html> (consulted on 2.03.14).

⁹⁷ Social Nationalist Party of Ukraine program. Op. cit. Available at: <http://www.vatra.cc/sotsial-natsionalizm/prohrama-sotsial-natsionalnoyi-partiyi-ukrayiny.html> (consulted on 2.03.14).

VO “Svoboda`s” program consists of 13 parts with the quantity of articles from 16 to 60 each. It is also rather precise in its claims. Those claims differ: from those demanding to include the section “nationality”⁹⁸ into the passport to that wishing to establish fair rights for workers⁹⁹ or agriculture producers. The program opens up with the demand of lustration, mainly to publish the names of ex-KGB agents on Ukrainian service and to remove from the government those people who had positions in USSR.¹⁰⁰

All the other articles can be divided into the following categories:

PROTECTIONIST

- “To prohibit the sale of strategic enterprises and to take back privatized ones. To guarantee state control on state monopolies”¹⁰¹
- “To give preferences to local investors over foreigners in privatizing the enterprises”¹⁰²
- “To forbid the trade of agricultural soil in Ukraine”.¹⁰³
- “Not to give right to possess lands to non-Ukrainian citizens and people with no citizenship”.¹⁰⁴
- “To forbid credits in foreign currency (exception: credits for those who are engaged into foreign economic activity”¹⁰⁵
- “To make building companies give preferences to Ukrainian workers...”¹⁰⁶

98 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, Art.7. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/ (consulted on 2.03.14).

99 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Art.57. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

100 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Art.1,2. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

101 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part.2, art. 11. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

102 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2 art. 14. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

103 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2, art.19. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

104 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2, art.23. Available at:http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

105 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2, art.34. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

106 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2, art.38. Available at:http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

- “To create government orders for agriculture”¹⁰⁷
- “To stimulate the exchange of foreign products for national ones”¹⁰⁸
- “To stimulate Ukrainian scientists to return to Ukraine”¹⁰⁹

NATIONALIST

- To introduce section “nationality” in passports¹¹⁰
- criminal responsibility for any Ukrainophobic manifestations¹¹¹
- claims that only “a person who was never judged or made answer for anti-Ukrainian delinquency can become a President”¹¹²
- “equality of representation of Ukrainians and national minorities in organs of executive power”¹¹³
- “make all candidates for filling positions which demand voting to indicate nationality in official biographies”¹¹⁴
- “To introduce a law of citizenship, under which the citizenship would be granted only to people born in Ukraine or who are ethnical Ukrainians who returned from abroad to live and work permanently in Ukraine. To allow to gain Ukrainian citizenship to people born from foreigners and people with no citizenship after they attain majority only under condition of commanding Ukrainian language, knowing Ukrainian history and the content of the Constitution”¹¹⁵

107 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2, Art.44. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

108 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2, Art.48. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

109 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 3, art.14. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

110 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 1, art.7. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

111 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 1, art.8. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

112 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 1, art.11. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

113 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 1, art.9. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

114 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 1, art.14. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

115 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 4, art.1. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

- “ To forbid the adoption of Ukrainian children by foreigners”¹¹⁶
- “ To introduce symmetric visa regime with foreign countries”¹¹⁷

One of the subchapters, called “The nation health” is quite remarkable as well. It states:

- “To create mandatory medical insurance”¹¹⁸
- “To forbid abortions..., to set equal legal responsibility for abortions as for attempt on somebody’s life.”¹¹⁹
- “ To repair and to nationalize health resorts”¹²⁰
- “To set strict governmental control over the quality and prices on pharmaceutical products, especially on the imported ones”¹²¹
- “To introduce a criminal responsibility for the propaganda of drugs and sexual perversion”¹²²
- “ To introduce a special tax for tobacco, alcohol and GMO”
- “ To encourage relocation of industrial enterprises on a safe distance from settlements”

LABOUR LEGISLATION ¹²³

- “To create fair Labour Code. To create a tariff scale of wage according to European standards”¹²⁴

116 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 4, art.10. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

117 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 4, art.11. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

118 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 3, art.2. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

119 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 3, art.3. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

120 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 3, art.5. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

121 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 3, art.4. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

122 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 3, art.8. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

123 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 1, art.28. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

124 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2, art.56. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

- “To create trade unions. To provide a right fore strike”¹²⁵
- “To set the retirement age in accordance with average life expectancy”¹²⁶

TAXES

- proportional tax system

RADICAL INNOVATIONS

- “to let all the people who is mentally stable and not judged to buy and carry bladded and fire weapons”¹²⁷
- “To build Ukrainian military-industrial complex to provide Military forces with modern weapons and for the Ukraine to perform effectively on the international market of weapons”¹²⁸
- “To reintroduce a full scale primary military education and civil defense in schools and a net of military departments at Universities”¹²⁹

ENERGY

- “to adopt the law of energy independence of Ukraine under the principle of consumption limitation, increasing the output, diversification of sources”¹³⁰
- “to diversify the sources of energy: no more than 30% from each country”¹³¹
- “to develop own sources”, “To develop coalmining as a first-priority field”¹³²
- “to adopt and to develop an energy saving program”¹³³

125 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2, art.57. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

126 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 1, art.58. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

127 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 1, art.31. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

128 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 7, art.15. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

129 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 7, art.18. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

130 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2, art.2. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

131 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2, art.3. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

132 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2, art.7. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

133 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2, art.9 Available at: <http://www.svoboda.org.ua/>

- “to develop and to implement state program of subsidizing of energy saving programs”¹³⁴

INVESTMENTS

- “tax stimulation of investment into science, education and innovations”¹³⁵

One of the most crucial points of the program is decentralization of power, giving more independence to local administrative units. Article 30¹³⁶ claims “to deepen the influence of local self-government on the life of the community...”. Mr. Yuriy Syrotyuk, member of VO “Svoboda” and of the Parliament, confirms that it is necessary to eliminate excessive bureaucratic procedures, the oblast and state administrations must be dissolved. He also claims that the idea of the party is to give more rights and financial support to small local committees. According to what he says the level of consciousness of the civil society is higher than that of the governing administrations, that is why it is important to give way to local regulation. The right to choose and the institutional rights of the citizens must be enforced, but, on the other hand, the level of consciousness of each citizen must be high.¹³⁷

VO “Svoboda” has its project of constitution as well. It opens up with the following statements: “The Ukrainian nation inherited spiritual and material culture of Tripil`e, of skiffs and hundreds of other generations of Ukrainians... Ukraine has become a state as a result of three hundred years of National Liberation War”.

Unlike the current Constitution, the project of Constitution of VO “Svoboda” surprisingly does not refer to some basic rights, as right of life, or right of honor and dignity, the statement of equality of all people is absent as well.¹³⁸ The rights it refers to are: right of

pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

134 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2, art.10. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

135 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 2, art.30. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/(consulted on 2.03.14).

136 The Program of VO “Svoboda”, op. cit., Part 1. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/, (consulted on 2.03.14).

137 Interview with Yuriy Syrotyuk, a Member of the Parliament since 2012, a member of VO “Svoboda”, a press-secretary, Kiev, 11 February 2014, Annex 1.

138 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”). Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/(consulted on 2.04.2014); Constitution of Ukraine. Available at: <http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254K/96-BP>(consulted on 2.04.2014);

movement¹³⁹, right to work¹⁴⁰, right to have trade unions¹⁴¹, right to strike¹⁴², right to accommodation¹⁴³, right to medical treatment¹⁴⁴ and right to education¹⁴⁵. It also states that there should be a death penalty for “crimes against Ukrainian nation, Ukrainian state, and felonies against the person and citizen”.¹⁴⁶

The project of Constitution contains some unclear statements. For example, it says that the development of Ukrainian state is achieved within the frame of “national and social solidarity, historical justice and power hierarchy”¹⁴⁷; or that the sources of the law among others are “general law (common sense) and norms of law of justice”¹⁴⁸; it also states that the censorship is forbidden but a few lines further says that “anti-Ukrainian propaganda, amoral and illegal behavior, violence, sexual perversion cultivation, together with all that goes against Ukrainian spirituality is forbidden”¹⁴⁹; the private property can be confiscated if there is a “social need”¹⁵⁰; “nobody can intrude into personal life of an individual, if it has no amoral or illegal nature”¹⁵¹. Nowhere in the project of Constitution the notions of “historical justice”, “common sense”, “anti-Ukrainian propaganda”, “amoral

139 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 2, Art. 31. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014)

140 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 2, Art. 32. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014)

141 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 2, Art. 32. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014)

142 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 2, Art. 32. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014)

143 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 2, Art. 37. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014)

144 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 2, Art. 38. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014)

145 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 2, Art. 40. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014)

146 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 1, Art. 1. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014)

147 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 3, Art. 4. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014)

148 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 1, Art. 6. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014)

149 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 1, Art. 18. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014)

150 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 2, Art. 28. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014)

151 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 2, Art. 29. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014).

behavior”, “actions of amoral nature”, “sexual perversion”, “Ukrainian spirituality” or “social need” are explained.

On the other hand, there are some statements that are absolutely irrelevant, like “Ukrainian state shall provide all graduates with first working positions”¹⁵², which is clearly impossible, as Ukrainian state does not have so many job places in disposition, because the majority of the enterprises are not state-owned.

There are some articles that are guided to attract certain radical or religious electorate. For example: “Everybody who is mentally sane and was not charged with crime can have a gun”¹⁵³; the usage of it shall be taught in Universities ¹⁵⁴ or “no abortions allowed”¹⁵⁵. It also refers to religion in 2 of the chapters of Preamble and several other articles in the main text.

152 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 2, Art. 38. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014).

153 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 2, Art. 45. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014).

154 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 2, Art. 46. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014).

155 National Constitution (project of VO “Svoboda”), op. cit., Part 1, Art.15. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/konstytutsiya/ (consulted on 2.04.2014).

1.4 Members of the party

To understand better the structure and organization of the party, as well as to have a general impression about it, is necessary to know some of the main members of the party.

The head of the party – **Oleg Tiahnybok** was born in 1968 in Lviv. In 1993 he graduated from Lviv State Medical University, surgeon. In 1993 he gains second education in jurisprudence in Lviv State I. Franco University. While at University takes part in civil life. He becomes a head of student community of the University in 1991 in Lviv.¹⁵⁶ He takes part in student hunger strikes in 1990 and 1992. This is the same year he enters SNPU. In 1994, Mr. Tiahnybok becomes a deputy of Lviv oblast parliament.¹⁵⁷ In 1997 he is the head of Lviv SNPU organization and from 1998 to 2004 – a leader of the organization in Kiev. He is also a member of fraction UNP (Ukrainian National Party) a part of the block “Nasha Ukraina”.¹⁵⁸

On his official biography page it is stated that “...since he was a child Oleg remembered KGB searches in his apartment”. This is due to the fact that his grandfather Artemii Tsigelski was a Ukrainian priest who declined Russian orthodoxy. For that he was sent to Siberia for 7 years. It is also indicated that Mr. Tiahnybok’s great grandfather was a Longin Tsigelski was a deputy in Vienna Seim, one of the initiators of ZUNR (West Ukrainian People’s Republic) creation. Some of his ancestors are also claimed to have been killed by NKVD.¹⁵⁹ “...my world outlook formation is due to my family”, he says in his speech for the official promotion campaign.¹⁶⁰ Mr. Tiahnybok’s younger brother is also a member of the party a member of the Parliament from December 2012.¹⁶¹

Despite of the speech, he was expelled for from “Nasha Ukraina”, Mr. Tiahnybok’s other speeches are less intense. For example, he says about nationalism: “Nationalism is a positive ideology. It implies the protection of what belongs to you and respect for what is

156 Oleg Tiahnybok’s biography. Op. cit. Available at: <http://vibori.in.ua/kandidaty/biografii/459-biografiya-tyagnibok.html>(consulted on 2.03.14).

157 Oleg Tiahnybok’s biography. Available at: <http://tiahnybok.info/about/biography/>(consulted on 2.03.14).

158 Oleg Tiahnybok’s biography. Op. cit. Available at: <http://vibori.in.ua/kandidaty/biografii/459-biografiya-tyagnibok.html>(consulted on 2.03.14).

159 Oleg Tiahnybok’s biography. Op. cit. Available at: <http://tiahnybok.info/about/biography/>(consulted on 2.03.14).

160 Oleg Tiahnybok’s biography. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoIyNOd2bgo>(consulted on 2.03.14).

161 Verhovna Rada Ukrainy. Official webpage. Available at: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/site2/p_deputat?d_id=15793(consulted on 2.03.14).

not yours”¹⁶² In addition, though Tiahnybok speeches are rather charismatic, his rhetoric and behavior became milder since 2004.

The repressions of the members of the family are not less important for the biographies of the members of VO “Svoboda” For example, **Yuriy Syrotyuk**, born in 1976, is member of the Parliament since 2012. The party press – secretary says that he personally was born in a family of people, who were repressed. His grandfather was a member of UPA and was killed in 1944 by NKVD. His other grandfather was arrested in 1944 by Soviets as well. His father was taken to Siberia as he was a child and only returned when he was already a grown-up. He also claims that he felt oppressed by Soviet regime himself. He says he was not allowed to enter the Soviet youth organization, where everybody else was admitted and this fact surprised him as he was a child. He attributes it to his family history. Moreover, he also relates his nationality and use of Ukrainian (not Russian) to the fact, that despite of him been one of the best students, he could not find a job after graduation.

Irina Farion is probably one of the most controversial characters in the party. She was born in Kiev in 1964. Ms Farion graduated from Lviv State University in 1987 and has an education of Ukrainian philologist. She claims to be religious. Her official biography does not mention any repressed relatives.¹⁶³ Ms Farion has a lot of political experience, as she started her career in the old Communist party. She gives a lot of interviews and takes an active part in discussion programs. The most scandalous case she was criticized for is the one in the kindergarten, when she told children not to use Russian variants of names, but only the Ukrainian ones.¹⁶⁴ Ms Farion was also one of the defenders of the controversial text “Black raven” by Vasilii Shkliar, which was considered xenophobic by some.¹⁶⁵

Her general rhetoric revolves around the language issues. She says that the only glue for Ukrainians is state language. She judged actively the former ruling party (“Partiya Regioniv”). In her speech from 17.12.2010 for the program called “Big politics” on Inter channel she calls the government “a colonial administration” and “horde”. The

162 Oleg Tiahnybok`s biography. Op. cit. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoIyNOd2bgo> (consulted on 2.03.14).

163 Lidery partii. Irina Farion. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/lidery/iryna_farion/ (consulted on 2.03.14).

164 Farion in the kindergarten. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wMMdDsCjOfk>(consulted on 2.03.14).

165 Irina Farion in the program “Velika Polityka” (Big politics) from 04.03.2011. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Is1fxXSurHo&list=PLAA4C6EA6FA49FD71>(consulted on 2.03.14).

“horde” needs to take the language away, for the purpose not to rule people with national identities, but masses to fulfill their business interests. In the same program she said that she does not support social-democratic ideology.¹⁶⁶

Another controversial politician is **Yuriy Mikhalchyshyn**, born in 1982, studied political science at Lviv National I. Franco University.¹⁶⁷ In the program “Shuster Live” in 21.06.13 he said that his grandfather, who was a priest, and grandmother were expelled from Ukraine by Armiya Kraiova in 1944.¹⁶⁸ His general rhetoric is sharp and rigorous. It should be admitted, though, that Mikhalchishin radicalized his speeches and especially his behavior during the years spent in “Svoboda”. He talks a lot about history, historic memory and political issues. For example in the same “Shuster Live” from 21.06.13 he said that all states, despite their history, must find a compromise and to understand the difference between those who fought against two dictators (Hitler, Stalin) and those who put people into concentration camps.¹⁶⁹ Mr. Mihalchishin is one of the authors of the law project “About withdrawing the term “Great homeland war” (22.06.1941 – 9.05.1945) from Ukrainian normative documents and study literature as it distorts historical truth” from 05.06.13, which is considered a rather radical innovation as it directly touches upon historic memory.¹⁷⁰ He also criticizes Partiya Regioniv a lot. In one of his speeches in the Parliament he called them “Donetsk-fascist aggressors”.¹⁷¹ Yuriy Mikhalchishin is also known for taking an active part in demonstrations in commemoration of SS “Galichina” and other demonstrations of nationalist direction in Lviv.

Andrei Mohnik, born in 1972, member of the party since 2004. Has a position of the deputy chef of VO “Svoboda” in political matters, since 2014 he is Minister of ecology and natural resources of Ukraine.¹⁷²

166 Irina Farion in the program “Velika Polityka” (Big politics) from 17.12.2010. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K1bo4nbUcks&list=PLAA4C6EA6FA49FD71> (consulted on 2.03.14).

167 Yuriy Mikhalchishyn biography. Available at: <http://mykhalchyshyn.info/biohrafyia/> (consulted on 2.03.14).

168 Yuriy Mikhalchishyn in “Shuster Live” from 21.06.2013. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07qscbJgeOE> (consulted on 2.03.14).

169 *Ibid.*

170 Yuriy Mikhalchishyn. Verhovna Rada Ukrainy. Official webpage. Available at: <http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/pt2/reports.dep2?PERSON=15788&SKL=8> (consulted on 2.03.14).

171 Yuriy Mikhalchishyn`s speech in Verhovnaya Rada on 23.05.2013. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBRfmichjWk> (consulted on 2.03.14).

172 Andrei Mohnik, Verhovna Rada Ukrainy. Official webpage. Available at: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/site2/p_deputat?d_id=7171 (consulted on 2.03.14).

Igor Miroshnychenko, born in 1976, member of the Parliament. Ex-journalist. Miroshnychenko is also known for his anti-Semitic talks¹⁷³ and for the scandal over his sources of income.¹⁷⁴ The evolution from sport journalist to hooligan was gradual and finally resulted into the attack on the head of “1 Natsional`nii Kanal” (1 National Channel) on the 18.03.2014 together with **Bohdan Bieniuk**, a former actor.¹⁷⁵ The official version – for the critique of “Svoboda”. Indeed, the channel was state owned and thus controlled by the former regime.

Oleksandr Sych became a Vice Minister since 2014. He is well known for being in a head of “Plast”¹⁷⁶ (which implies possible increase of VO “Svoboda” youth wing in future) and for his intolerable statements towards women. Sych is a main ideologist of abortion ban as well.¹⁷⁷

Igor Shvaika, a lawyer, is mostly known in media for his personal life and for prosecutions for the so called raider usurpations (generally usurpation either by force or by ruse) of 2 enterprises in Kharkiv oblast. Since 2014 a Minister of Ministry of agrarian policy. He has a law background, but virtually no experience in agrarian issues.¹⁷⁸

Igor Kryvets`kyi is a businessman from Lviv. One can rarely notice him in media, although he is a head of the “Svoboda” economic council”. He owns mostly restaurants and hotels in Western Ukraine and some small enterprises. Although Krivetskii contributes financially in VO “Svoboda”, his income cannot be compared to that of major Ukrainian oligarchs.¹⁷⁹

VO “Svoboda” traditionally has a youth wing – **C14** (read as “Sich”). It includes young supporters and members of the party. The leader’s name is **Evgen Karas`**, better known under the nickname Vortex. Vortex graduated from the faculty of Philosophy of Kiev

173 Igor Miroshnychenko, Verhovna Rada Ukrainy. Official webpage. Available at: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/site2/p_deputat?d_id=15700, (consulted on 2.03.14).

174 Svobodovets Igor` Miroshnychenko delaiet den`gin a rossianah, no skrivaet eto. Available at: <http://polemika.com.ua/news-111524.html>(consulted on 2.03.14).

175 “Svoboda” syloy zastavila uvolitsya rukovoditelia Pervogo Natsional`nogo. Available at: <http://ru.tsn.ua/politika/svoboda-siloy-zastavila-uvolitsya-rukovoditelya-pervogo-natsionalnogo-video-355546.html>(consulted on 2.03.14)

176 Plast, Official Webpage, *Plastun Oleksandr Sych pryznachenyi na posadu vice – Premiera*, 27.02.14. Available at: <http://www.plast.org.ua/news?newsid=10854>(consulted on 15.03.14)

177 Hu is hu v revoliutsionnom pravitel`stve Ukrainy. Available at: <http://www.liveinternet.ru/users/2503040/post315927716/>(consulted on 2.03.14)

178 *Ibid.*

179 Niezavisimoe biuro novosti, *Neopytnyi politik iz mielkogo biznesa. Portriet fraktsii „Svoboda” v Verhovnoi Rade*. Available at: <http://nbnews.com.ua/ru/tema/74151/>(consulted on 2.03.14)

State Shevchenko University. He was already wanted by the police (unofficially though) a year before the beginning of the manifestations.¹⁸⁰ There are also official youth organizations “Students`ka svoboda” and “Soril”.

Table 1. The members of the party characteristics

	DATE OF BIRTH	NUMBER OF YEARS IN THE PARTY	EDUCATION/WORK EXPERIENCE
OLEG TIAHNYBOK	1968	Before 2004	Medicine, law/little work experience/ political activist since 1990
ANDRII MOHNIK	1972	2004	Engineering, law
IRYNA FARION	1964	2005	Philology/ got engaged in politics since University
YURIY MIHALCHYSHYN	1982	-	Political science
IGOR MIROSHNYCHENKO	1976	2008	Journalism / has an experience in sport journalism
OLEKSANDR SYCH	1964	2006	History / Philosophy/ has certain experience in law/ Political activist
IGOR SHVAIKA	1976	2007	Law/ Law
BOHDAN BIENIUK	1957	-	Actor
OLEKSII KAIDA	1971	1993	Engineering, governance/ has a political experience
YURIY SYROTYUK	1976	2006	Historian/Journalism
IGOR KRYVETS`KYI	1972	-	Businessman
OLEG PAN`KEVYCH	1972	1993	History, law/ Political activist since 1990

Thus, clearly the ideology is a part of VO “Svoboda`s” world outlook and their policy. And taking into consideration the history of Ukraine, and Galicia and Volynia in particular and the ideological basis provided by Dmitry Dontsov and Yaroslav Stets`ko, it should be admitted that it is not an ideology of pure Ukrainian nationalism, as the basic ideas

180 LB.ua, *Evgen Karas`*: “Ogoloshennya v rozshuk pomsta za te,shcho my zlovyly miliceisku spec grupu, elitnyi “eskadron smerti”, 08.02.2014. Available at: http://society.lb.ua/position/2014/02/08/254736_karas.html, (consulted on 07.04.2014).

derive from the historical context and European philosophical and political thought of the end of XIX – beginning of the XX century. Those ideas however overlapped with historical events and geopolitical circumstances.

In the meantime, comparing the situation of the end of the XX century and in the beginning it is evident, that the context changed, though certain things can be recognized as those to be compared. For example, Ukrainian nationalism was fostered by the fact that Ukraine, still in the end of XX century, did not have an independent state as it had in the beginning of the century. The hostile environment was created by the oppressors, though not Poles or Germans, but Soviets and the memory of it was kept vivid, as after the oppressions and enormous bloodshed of WWII, Ukrainians were also oppressed by Soviet rule after the war and then again in the beginning of the 1970s. In addition, it is likely that family memory is highly influential and created somewhat an alternative historic memory from the official historical narrative in the USSR. This adds to a rejection of this perception of history in other regions of Ukraine, the official state position and the rise of national awareness in the eve of the collapse of Soviet Union, which created a favorable environment for the founding of nationalist organizations in Galicia. Furthermore, the situation of disturbances inside the Soviet Union and a fear of force application made activists create paramilitary and youth organizations, just like in the beginning of the century.

Party members sometimes find certain historical similarities in the political alignment of forces even earlier than XX century, through the works of ideologists. For example, Yaroslav Andrushkiv directly matches the idea inside main ideological text of SNPU “Two revolutions” by Yaroslav Stets`ko and the situation in Ukrainian politics in the beginning of 1990, which resulted into the creation of SNPU itself. He claims that in his book Stets`ko says that the policy of Ukrainian het`man Khmelnytsky, who was oriented towards common people, was more successful than that of het`man Mazepa oriented towards elites. That is why, Andrushkiv says, based on this idea among others, a part from Rukh decided to found their own party – SNPU.¹⁸¹

But, on the other hand, the situation in Ukraine at the moment of SNPU creation was very different, to that, for example, before the II WW. The idea of nations seemed not to dominate the world. Gorbachev was reluctant to oppress anybody. Ukraine was a united state, though inside of another state. In addition there were no major war actions on the

181 Olga Musafirova, *Osnovatel` Social – Natsionalisticheskoi partii Yaroslav Andrushkiv: “Iesli viyavili seksota, to luchshe iego nie trogat”*, op. cit. Available at: <http://glavcom.ua/articles/4295.html> (consulted on 2.03.14)

territory of Galicia, no bloodshed, no ethnic cleansings, and no terrorists. The world at that moment was already actively globalizing and interconnected economically and politically (which, of course, might not have been noticed by Ukrainian citizens as they were locked inside the country). But, from this point of view, it is difficult to understand why a new political party adapted an old ideology of the end of XIX century, took the text written by a terrorist, recognized those terrorists¹⁸² and people guilty of mass slaughters as heroes and adapted symbols, that even the members of the party considered that reminded them of the Nazi emblem¹⁸³.

Partially, it can be attributed to the closeness of Soviet Union, both physically and in terms of historical science, which conserved old problems and proceeded with oppressions on national basis. On the other hand, there was a clear demand for the Ukrainian nation to be recognized on the political level and there were more radical groups that had a will or habit for more radical actions and ideas than those of national - democrats. SNPU consciously or unconsciously took the niche.

VO "Svoboda" as a successor took a part of this ideology. First of all, the idea of the nation's wellbeing as a core. The program of the party was modified, it got detailed and completed by the project of reform of the constitution. But still there are rudiments of ancient XIX century ideology. Protectionism can be arguable, as it exists in one form or another, but the project of constitution clearly lacks the basic security guarantees for individual. The façade of the party also changed significantly: no official controversial symbols (at least they are not used too frequently and most likely only in particular regions), mild colors, frequently used those of the state flag, an inspiring name. This image is much more easily sold to the voters than that of SNPU. But still, both old heroes and old rhetoric are actively used, even more actively than in the 1990s due to media and Internet. The members of the party were and some of them still are quite excentric. On the other hand, those issues only became crucial for the country when the party entered the parliament, which came to many as the surprise.

182 OUN – UPA. Personalii. Official link. Op. cit. Available at: <http://oun-upa.org.ua/ru/personalities.html>, (consulted on 2.03.14).

183 Olga Musafirova, *Osnovatel' Social – Natsionalisticheskoi partii Yaroslav Andrushkiv: "Iesli viyavili seksota, to luchshe iego nie trogat"*, op. cit. Available at: <http://glavcom.ua/articles/4295.html> (consulted on 2.03.14).

Chapter 2. Political life of VO “Svoboda” from 2004 till 2012

As it is well known, in 2004 the Presidential elections were held in Ukraine. VO “Svoboda” did not present its candidate, but actively supported candidate Yushchenko, until Tiahnybok pronounced his famous speech. Yushchenko was a representative of national democratic forces, and a pro-European leader. His main opponent – Yanukovich, on the contrary, had an image of being pro-Russian. Naturally, the question arose as to what extent it was possible that Tiahnybok was a part of organized actions¹⁸⁴ and was bribed by Yushchenko’s opponent. However, there is an alternative explanation. Viacheslav Lihachev in his article “Right extremism in Ukraine on the rise” comments that it was the only time in Ukrainian history that somebody tried to make a distinction inside right-conservative movement between mild and extremist wings. This is due to the fact that at that time extreme right parties’ popularity declined significantly, therefore a part of politicians found a shelter in more moderate national – democratic ones.¹⁸⁵

On the other hand, VO “Svoboda’s” presence on the political arena was always favored by pro-Russian forces, even if there was no direct financial support, just from a strategic point of view. First of all, to discredit Ukrainian national movements as without a doubt many VO “Svoboda’s” members have a habit to pronounce excentric speeches and obviously there is no way the East supports OUN, UPA, Bandera, Shukhevich or Konovalets` as heroes (though the last two names might not even sound familiar for citizens of Eastern regions). In addition to this, it is not possible to use for instance “Bratstvo” for this purpose, as “Bratstvo” and its leader Dmytro Korchyns`kiy are well known to be provocateurs.¹⁸⁶ Secondly, because VO “Svoboda” can always compete with national-democratic parties and leaders and pull off the votes. For example, as it was

184 Anton Shekhovtsov, *Prorosiiska mereja za lashtunkamy kompanii antyukrains`kogo naklepu*, *Ukrainska Pravda*, 4.02.2014. Available at: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2014/02/4/7012704/> (consulted on 11.04.2014).

185 Viacheslav Likhachev, *Praviy ekstremizm v Ukraine na podiemi, ch.1*, Eurasian Jewish Congress, 2012. Available at: <http://eajc.org/page18/news34106.html> (consulted on 11.04.2014).

186 Expert.Ukrainskiy Delovoy Jurnal, *Iliusia “Svobody”*, № 28 (220), 20.07.2009. Available at: <http://expert.ua/articles/8/0/7041/> (consulted on 11.04.2014).

on Presidential Elections in 2010. During those elections, there were several national democratic candidates, except for leader Timoshenko, including Oleg Tiahnybok, who gained 1,43%.¹⁸⁷ Although “Svoboda” was favored not only by pro-Russian politicians, but their presence was much welcomed by less ambitious purposes. For example, during the Local Elections in Kiev in 2008, VO “Svoboda” was in the same niche as BUT (Yuliya Tymoshenko’s block), which was convenient for Leonid Chernivetskiy, though not the most significant factor. The magazine “Expert” also affirmed, that VO “Svoboda” did not lose its connections with “Nasha Ukraina” and was supported by it in period from 2004 to 2007¹⁸⁸ (“Nasha Ukraina”, in its turn was supported by Aleksandr Tret`yakov, as it is stated in his interview¹⁸⁹. Tret`yakov was an owner of Mediaholding “Glavred” at that time, which was a part of “Privat” group, owned by Igor Kolomoiskiy).¹⁹⁰

In 2006, VO “Svoboda” as a new political force took part in the local and Parliament elections. VO “Svoboda” received 0,36% of the votes¹⁹¹ in the Parliament elections and did not enter the Parliament, but the results on local elections allowed it to occupy 10 positions in Lviv Oblast Rada, 9 in Lviv City Rada and 4 in Ternopol City Rada.¹⁹²

After 2004, Ukraine suffered from constant political crisis. On 2.04.2007 President Victor Yushchenko issued an edict which dismissed the Parliament.¹⁹³ Thus, new elections were held on the 30.09.2007. VO “Svoboda” took part in the elections again and this time achieved a result of 0,76%, which was more than in 2006, but insignificant and the party failed to enter the Parliament again.¹⁹⁴ Ukrainskaya Pravda after the elections said that the party might succeed in future in case of failure of other national – democratic forces, but on the other hand it had a very narrow scope of interests and claims, which are not very popular in Ukraine as a whole, but only in certain regions. The author also

187 Centralna viborch komissiya, Vibory narodnyh deputativ Ukrainy 26 bereznia 2006 roku. Available at: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vnd_2010/(consulted on 11.04.2014).

188 Expert, Op. cit.

189 LB.ua, *Tret'yakov bol'she ne budet finansirovat' partii*, 13.08.2012. Available at: <http://bg-is.com/index.php/Ukrainskie-GK-Otraslevye-SMI/2011-03-23-00-51-44.html>(consulted on 11.04.2014).

190 Business groups, the information systems, *Mediaholding “Glavred”*, Available at: <http://bg-is.com/index.php/Ukrainskie-GK-Otraslevye-SMI/2011-03-23-00-51-44.html>(consulted on 11.04.2014)..

191 Centralna viborch komissiya, Vibory narodnyh deputativ Ukrainy 26 bereznia 2006 roku. Op. cit. Available at: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vnd_2006/(consulted on 11.04.2014).

192 VO “Svoboda”, Official webpage, *Pro partiu*, Op. cit. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/istoriya/(consulted on 11.04.2014).

193 Ukaz Prezidenta Ukraini Pro dostrokovye pryvpyneennia povnovajen` Verhovnoi Radi Ukrainy from 26.04.2007. Available at: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/264/2007>(consulted on 11.04.2014).

194 Centralna viborch komissiya, Vibory narodnyh deputativ Ukrainy 26 bereznia 2006 roku. Available at: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vnd_2007/(consulted on 11.04.2014).

criticizes it for being unclear in Foreign Policy position, harsh rhetoric, which frightens the electorate and lack of financing for the election campaign.¹⁹⁵

Due to new distortions in the Parliament after 2004, in 2009 the extraordinary elections to Ternopil` Oblast Rada were initiated by the Decision of Verhovnaya Rada №3686 from 03.03.2009. Those elections were supported mainly by BUT and the Party of the Regions.¹⁹⁶ As a result of these elections, VO “Svoboda” gained about 35% of votes and 50 places in Ternopil` Rada out of 120. It might have been due to inadequate policy of main political forces at that time, which made the electorate (which traditionally supports parties with national connotation) vote for VO “Svoboda”¹⁹⁷. On the other hand, some political scientists claim that the party did not actively participate in election campaign.¹⁹⁸ In any case, as a result of elections, VO “Svoboda” accumulated a lot of influence in Ternopil` region and became a force of regional significance for major parties. Oleksiy Kaida (comes from Berdyans`k, Zaporijaska oblast), became the head of Ternopil` Rada¹⁹⁹, Decision of Ternopil` Rada N513 from 26.03.2009.²⁰⁰

On the other hand, as a successful political project, the party certainly became more attractive to investors. An indirect prove of it can be a praise VO “Svoboda” received from Igor Kolomoiski, the most powerful of so called “Dnepropetrovsk oligarchs”.²⁰¹

195 Sergei Bagrianskiy, “Praviye” v Ukraine posle viborov: *perspektivy i nedostatki*, Ukrainskaya Pravda, 25.10.2007. Available at: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2007/10/25/4426396/> (consulted on 11.04.2014).

196 Verhovna Rada Ukrainy. Official webpage. Poimenne golosuvannya pro proekt postanovy pro vyznannya takoiu, shcho vtratyla chynnist` Postanovy Verrhovnoi Rady Ukrainy “Pro pryznachennya pozachergovyh vyboriv deputativ Ternopolskoi oblasnoi rady (№ 3686) – za osnovu ta v tsilomu. Available at: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_arh_golos?g_id=527906&n_skl=6 (consulted on 11.04.2014).

197 Aleksandr Koshak, *15 marta sostoyalis` dosrochnye vibory v Ternopol`skiy oblastnoi soviet*, 16.03.2009. Available at: <http://www.sciday.net/node/1828> (consulted on 11.04.2014).

198 Andreas Umland, Anton Shekhovtsov, *Pravoradikalnaya partiinaya politika v postsovietskoi Ukraine i zagadka elektoralnoi marginalnosti ukrainских ul`tranatsionalistov v 1994-2009*, Forum vostochnoevropskoi istorii I kultury, - Russkoye izdanie № 2, 2001. Available at: http://www.academia.edu/323613/_1994-2009_ (consulted on 11.04.2014).

199 Biografiya Oleksiya Kaidy, Available at: <http://kayda.info/biografiya/> (consulted on 11.04.2014).

200 Ternopil`ska Oblasna Rada, Rishennya vid 26 bereznia 2009 roku № 513. Available at: <http://www.obl-rada.te.ua/dokumenty/rishennya-sesij-oblasnoji-rady/rishennya-20-sesiji/rishennya-vid-26-bereznia-2009-roku-513.html> (consulted on 11.04.2014).

201 Kolomoiski predrekaet bol`shoe budushchee VO “Svoboda”. 2.12.2010. Available at: <http://kayda.info/biografiya/> (consulted on 11.04.2014).

While being in charge of Ternopil` Rada, VO "Svoboda" increased pensions to UPA warriors in 2010 and was supported by members of the Party of Regions in this²⁰². The veterans of UPA in Lviv receive an additions to pensions as well.²⁰³

In 2011, Lviv Rada issued a law, according to which it was allowed to sell alcohol drinks only from 12.00 to 20.00. The reason announced was to improve the health of the citizens. The law contained the following statements: it is forbidden to sell alcohol in stalls and in any public places from 12.00 to 20.00, except for bars, restaurants, and cafés (in order to have the status, the license is needed). According to the law (art. 10-12) only Lviv Rada from that moment was authorized to give licenses to all new enterprises that wanted to sell alcohol drinks (not the department of economic policy, which was from that moment only responsible for checking the documents).²⁰⁴ But it should have been taken into consideration that the law was not approved by VO "Svoboda" members uniquely, because there were members of other parties present as well.

202 Fokus.ua, *Regionaly Ternopolya povysili pensii veteranam OUN-UPA*, 26.02.2010. Available at: <http://fokus.ua/politics/127092>(consulted on 11.04.2014).

203 Zerkalo Nedeli, *Vo Lvove veteranam UPA povysili doplaty k pensiyam*, 19.03.2013. Available at: http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/vo-lvove-veteranam-upa-povysili-doplaty-k-pensiyami-119030_.html, (consulted on 11.04.2014).

204 L`vivska Mis`ka Rada, *Uhvala № 1000, vid 15.12.2011*. Available at: [http://www8.city-adm.lviv.ua/inTEAM/Uhvaly.nsf/\(SearchForWeb\)/84A7DA44F8CCoE20C225796E00544398?OpenDocument](http://www8.city-adm.lviv.ua/inTEAM/Uhvaly.nsf/(SearchForWeb)/84A7DA44F8CCoE20C225796E00544398?OpenDocument) (consulted on 11.04.2014).

Chapter 3. Political life of the party after the success on the Parliament elections 2012

3.1 Reasons for the success

3.1.1 Political environment

The unexpected success came to VO “Svoboda” as a whole after the recent Parliament elections in 2012, when the party crossed the barrier of 5% and entered the Parliament. In fact, VO “Svoboda” gained 10% of votes, nearly 13% had “UDAR” and the Communist Party, 25% - “Bat`kivshchina” and 30% the Party of Regions. In total more than 2,2 millions of Ukrainians voted for VO “Svoboda”. The presence was around 58%, the citizens were equally politically active in all the regions except for, Nikolaiv, Kirovograd, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk oblast and Crimea, where the attendance was lower. So the victory can not be attributed to Western regions, although in those regions VO “Svoboda” had traditionally a lot of votes, but it outperformed “Bat`kyvshchina” only in Lviv oblast (Galicia). What was the most striking is that “Svoboda” outperformed Party of regions and Communists in Kiev. ²⁰⁵

Thus, according to the results of the elections, 9 parties were represented in the Parliament: 185 – Party of regions, “Bat`kyvshchyna” United Opposition – 101, “UDAR” – 40, VO “Svoboda” 37, Communist Party of Ukraine – 32, “United Centre” 3, People`s Party – 1, Radical Oleg Liashko Party and party “Soiuz” – 1 each. ²⁰⁶

As for the reasons for the progress the party made, several can be named. First of all, the parties that were considering to enter the Parliament except for VO “Svoboda”(4,6%) were Party of Regions, with 22,7 % prognosis, “Bat`kivshchyna” – 15,6% , “UDAR” – 14,7%, Communist Party of Ukraine – 9,2%, “Radical Oleg Liashko Party – 0,7%, and Natalya Korolevskaya`s party “Go, Ukraine” - 2,1%. ²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ Centralna viborch komissiya, *Vibory narodnyh deputativ Ukrainy 28 October 2012*, Available at: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vnd_2012/(consulted on 07.04.2014).

²⁰⁶ Ukrainska Pravda, *Spysok deputativ novoi Verkhovnoi Rady*, 11.11.2012, Available at: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2012/11/11/6977259/>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

²⁰⁷ SOCIS, A centre for marketing and social research, *Elektoral`na sytuacia v Ukraini naperedodni vyboriv do Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainy*, 17.10.2012. Available at: <http://www.socis.kiev.ua/ua/press/elektoralna-sytuatsija-v-ukrajini-naperedodni-vyboriv-do-verkhovnoji-rady-ukrajiny.html> (consulted on 07.04.2014).

3.1.2 Reorientation of the electorate

The Director of the centre of social and marketing research “Socis”, Nikolai Churilov says in his interview that, in his opinion, the success of VO “Svoboda” can be partially attributed to the decline of rating of “UDAR”. It is first of all, he admits, because “UDAR” refused the coalition with “Bat`kivshchyna” and VO “Svoboda”, which made people think that “UDAR” might not be sure in the preferences and can possibly ally with Party of Regions. On the other hand, the alliance with strong national – democratic force was useful for VO “Svoboda” as it made the image of the party more moderate. Maybe VO “Svoboda” obtained some electorate by entering the coalition and “Bat`kivshchyna”, an ally and some more credibility (as before the opposition was not united for a long time). In addition, says Aleksey Antipovich, the head of the sociology group “Rating”, the electorate in the West might have thought that “UDAR” did not want to make a coalition, because they doubted that VO “Svoboda” would pass to the Parliament and decided not to support it. VO “Svoboda” has an image to follow the principle and therefore not allying with the ruling party (Communists, for example, traditionally allied with the Party of Regions, so given those parties gained necessary quantity of votes they could obtain the Constitutional majority - 300, especially if some of those who were not attached to any fraction allied). Some electorate came from “UDAR” to “Bat`kivshchyna” as well, because they returned to promoting Timoshenko again, as she turned out to be more popular than Yatseniuk. There might be a piece coming from Korolevskaya, as she, on the contrary, did not change her rhetoric in time. Although, she had a completely different electorate.²⁰⁸ A reason for the success can be also attributed to the fact that there was no other extreme right party to compete with VO “Svoboda”.²⁰⁹

On the other hand, VO “Svoboda’s” electorate turned out to be rather diffused. Firstly of all, in territorial dimension. VO “Svoboda” was successful not only in traditional Galicia, but in Kiev, where it took 10% as well.²¹⁰ It can be attributed to two facts: a policy of the government that was perceived as anti Ukrainian by some, which formed a protest electorate and disillusionment by the failure of the previous national – democratic government. In addition, according to Andreas Umland, an associate

208 Katerina Peshko, *Vybory 2012: fenomenalna sociologiya*, Glavcom, 31.10.2012, Available at: <http://glavcom.ua/articles/8552.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

209 Anton Shekhovtsov, *Ukraine: the far-right in parliament for the first time*, ODR, 1.11.2012. Available at: <http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/anton-shekhovtsov/ukraine-far-right-in-parliament-for-first-time>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

210 Kiev online, *Parlamentski vibory 2012. Kak golosovali v Kieve I oblasti*, 1.11.2012. Available at: <http://kiev-online.com.ua/vybory-2012-voting-kiev-957.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

professor in Kiev-Mohila Academy, the discrepancies in motivation of electorate might be also attributed to a tactical decision to create a strong opposition and to keep the ideologically-oriented electorate with this opposition.²¹¹ Many experts at that time said also that there might be more demand for radical oppositional actions in the society.²¹²

3.1.3 Election campaign

According to the experts, the electoral campaign carried out by VO “Svoboda” was quite successful as it tackled the target electorate.²¹³ First of all, the images of the campaign became milder, general tone is patriotic, appealing to a struggle, a narrative always used by VO “Svoboda”. Viacheslav Likhachev emphasizes that the party makes special stress on negative connotations blaming the enemies in all Ukrainian problems.²¹⁴ Ukrainians, according to VO “Svoboda’s” electoral propaganda, must fight against oligarchs, who seized the power (no particular place of dislocation of oligarchs actives is named), against corruption, especially in the Parliament and courts, for Ukrainian as the only state language, for abolition of “Kharkiv treaties” (that allowed to prolong a stay of Russian fleet in Black sea in exchange for reduced gas prices), to implement a pension and tax reform and generally to counteract the “negative consequences of Yanukovich rule”. They must also fight for a strong country with Ukrainian nation in the lead and for lustration. The party affiliated here to the fact that after 1991, though the Soviet Union collapsed, the same people stayed in power. Lustration is one of the main VO “Svoboda`s” claims. Oleg Tiahnybok, the leader of the party, while talking about the change of power in 1990s, says “All those young Ukrainians who took part in student revolution were expelled from politics, and the people who kept the power were communist-komsomol members”.²¹⁵ However, sometimes lustration is demanded also for the politicians, who have no connection to the Soviet Union. For example, in February 2014, a member of the party Igor Miroshnychenko stated that Yuliya Tymoshenko should also be included in the lustration list. He also added: “Lustration

211 Andreas Umland, *A Typical Variety of European Right-Wing Radicalism?*, *Russian Politics and Law*, vol. 51, no. 5, September–October 2013, pp. 86–95.

212 Resultaty eksyt-polu: hto I yak golosuvav – rozpodil electorativ za demografichnymy pokaznykamy. Vybery 2012. Spodivane I nespodivane. Dumky ekspertiv. Available at: <http://dif-exitpoll.org.ua/ua/novini/smdfbjofhopikopik.htm>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

213 *Ibid.*

214 Viacheslav Likhachev, *Praviy ekstremizm v Ukrainie na podiomie, ch. 2.*, Eurasian Jewish Congress, 2012, Available at: <http://eajc.org/page18/news34106.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

215 Oleg Tiahnybok`s biography, a film for official agitation campaign 2012, Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoIyNOd2bgo> (consulted on 03.04.2014).

is our demand since 2005...” (Miroshnychenko himself is the member of the party since 2008).²¹⁶ The party insists on investigation of privatizations of state-owned enterprises and for recognition OUN – UPA as heroes. Constant repetition of the word “ours” is remarkable, the movie also uses black-and white colors to address to the era in the beginning of 1990 and uses portraits and citations of ancient nationalists.²¹⁷

Generally, the rhetoric is based on the party’s program and party’s Constitution project. It should be admitted, that some of the problems the party addresses to do exist: corruption, total dependence of the courts,²¹⁸ tax law, the protests against which were held all over the country in 2010.²¹⁹ One of the problems inside the executive power is the problem of so called “tushki” (the members of the Parliament, who are paid by the parties to vote the laws they are interested in without questioning). VO “Svoboda” is very much proud that they do not have such party members. Yuriy Syrotyuk says that only those, who worked for the party for many years were listed and eventually entered the Parliament. There were no new or unfamiliar faces, he claims.²²⁰ Another problem is nepotism, but with this problem, though, members of VO “Svoboda” are acquainted personally as well as members of other parties.²²¹ Raider attacks (which should be subject of separate study), many of which were held by the representatives of the ruling party and Yanukovich and his “Family” in particular, constant economic difficulties, embezzlement, etc. can be added to this list. But no real steps are named by VO “Svoboda”, only general intention to tackle those problems.

Alina Polyakova from the University of Berkeley also says that the electoral agitation might indirectly be started earlier, than actual agitation in a form establishing organization and branches, which involves participation of civil society. This,

216 RBK Ukraina, *Tymoshenko pidpadaie pid zakon pro lustratsiu*, - “Svoboda”, 23.02.2014. Available at: <http://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/politics/tymoshenko-podpadaet-pod-zakon-o-lyustratsii---svoboda--23022014152400>(consulted on 15.04.2014).

217 2012 Elections. VO “Svoboda”. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=npTp5HC8QSA>(consulted on 03.04.2014).

218 Ukrainska Pravda, *Verkhovna Rada napravila “Evrointegratsionnye izmeneniya v Konstitutsiu v KS*, 5.09.2013. Available at: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2013/09/5/6997340/> (consulted on 07.04.2014).

219 Korrespondent.net, *Ot Lvova do Donetsks, po vsej Ukrainie prohodyat akcii protesta protiv Nalogovogo Kodeksa*, 25.11.2010, Available at: <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/1142361--ot-donecka-do-lvova-po-vsej-ukraine-prohodyat-akcii-protesta-protiv-nalogovogo-kodeksa>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

220 Interview with Yuriy Syrotyuk, a Member of the Parliament since 2012, a member of VO “Svoboda”, a press-secretary, op. cit. Kiev, 11 February 2014, Annex 1.

221 Ukrainska Pravda, *Parlaments `kyi nepotism. Simeini pidryady shturmuut` radu*, 11.09.2012. Available at: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2012/09/11/6972487/>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

according to the author, legitimizes party's activity in the area as people get used to it.²²² Indeed, "Svoboda" has several youth subsidiaries, for example, "Students' freedom" ("Students' ka Svoboda")²²³, "Sokil".²²⁴ These are nice wings, which collects money for veterans and promotes sports and healthy life. C14, on the other hand, is not officially linked to VO "Svoboda", but some members of C14 (14 apparently stands for 14 words of David Lane, famous racists²²⁵) are definitely also members of VO "Svoboda", including the leader Evgen Karas' (Vortex). These activists are involved in more radical actions, like bursting into offices²²⁶ and getting involved into fights, conflicts on ideological basis and clashes with the police. Vortex was one of majors in seized Kiev Rada as well.²²⁷

3.1.4 VO "Svoboda" promotion

On the other hand, the Ruling Party contributed to the popularity of VO "Svoboda" itself. Anton Shekhovtsov says that starting from 2009 party members were constant guests in various political programs on pro-governmental channels "Inter" (the head of the channel at that moment was Valeriy Khoroshkovsky, loyal to power at that time; in 2013 he had to sell U.A. Inter Media Group Ltd to Dmitry Firtash,²²⁸ his business partner, according to the source, because of his disaccord with the ruling party; Firtash in his turn is well-known to be closely related to Kremlin, he was arrested in Austria in March 2014 and officially charged with fraud, but indeed in relation with Moscow policy towards Ukraine²²⁹ and "First National" – a state – owned channel. Mainly

222 Alina Polyakova, *Organizing Nationalism: How the Radical Right succeeds and fails in Ukraine*, Scholar Research brief, University of California, Berkeley, February 2012. Available at: <http://www.irex.org/resource/organizing-nationalism-how-radical-right-succeeds-and-fails-ukraine-research-brief>(consulted on 07.04.2014) .

223 VGMO "Students' ka Svoboda" (All-Ukrainian youth civil organization "Student Freedom"). Available at: <http://studsvoboda.org.ua>(consulted on 07.04.2014) .

224 MGO "Sokil" (Youth civil organization "Sokil"). Available at: <http://www.sokil.org.ua>(consulted on 03.04.2014) .

225 SverigesRadio, Radio Shvetsii, *Shvedskii neinatsist izbit v Ukrainie*, Available at: <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/gruppsida.aspx?programid=2103&grupp=6919&artikel=5837752>(consulted on 15.04.14).

226 Ostrov, *Uchastnika aksii v zashchitu Luganskih shahterov v Kieve uvolnyaut so stolichnogo predpriyatiya Ahmetova*, 16.01.2013. Available at: <http://www.ostro.org/general/society/news/413150/>(consulted on 07.04.2014) .

227 LB.ua, *Evgen Karas' : "Ogoloshennya v rozshuk pomsta za te,shcho my zlovyly miliceisku spec grupu, elitnyi eskadron smerti* ,08.02.2014. Op. cit. Available at: http://society.lb.ua/position/2014/02/08/254736_karas.html, (consulted on 07.04.2014) .

228 Dzerkalo Tyjdnya, *Khoroshkovski pokinul Ukrainu*, 04.02.2013. Available at: <http://zn.ua/POLITICS/posle-prodazhi-intera-horoshkovskiy-pokinul-ukrainu.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014) .

229 Information Agency Unian, *Firtash arestovan v Vene po pros'be FBI*, 13.03.2014. Available at: <http://www.unian.net/politics/896074-firtash-arestovan-v-vene-po-prosbe-fbr.html>(consulted on

members of “Svoboda” appeared in programs “Shuster Live” 10 out of 20 and “Velyka Polityka” of Evgeniy Kisielev – 11 out of 19.²³⁰ Such a decision was taken, according to the analyst, because nationalist movement and the opposition itself was much more easily discredited with the participation of excentric members of VO “Svoboda”, than with that of moderate “Bat`kivshchyna”.²³¹ Apparently, it was also not the purpose to add to the popularity of “Bat`kivshchyna”.

Though, VO “Svoboda`s” electorate, according to exit – polls was not what it was expected to be. Many experts agreed afterwards, that it was not taken into consideration before, as certain percentage was hidden and difficult to tackle.²³² For example, the majority of those, who gave a vote for the party (48%) were University graduates, 30% had a specialization, 12% had graduated from school and only 3% had not the full course at school. This was the highest percentage of educated people of all parties.²³³ Of course, the Western regions were the most active in voting for VO “Svoboda”, Lviv oblast especially. Many scientists agree, that a specific perception of memory can be noticed in Galicia. A big part of VO “Svoboda`s” electorate according to the polls was in favor of Association Agreement (64%), which is nearly on one level with “UDAR”, “Bat`kivshchyna” and “Go, Ukraine!” and against Customs Union with Russia (69%), which is more than the aforementioned parties had.²³⁴

3.1.5 The perception of the party

Ordinary Kiev students sometimes find positive features in VO “Svoboda” for its supports of European integration, and as a whole people are in favor of promoting Ukrainian

07.04.2014).

230 Anton Shekhovtsov, *From Para-Militarism to Radical Right-Wing Populism: The Rise of the Ukrainian Far-Right Party Svoboda*, Available at: http://www.academia.edu/3292417/From_Para-Militarism_to_Radical_Right-Wing_Populism_The_Rise_of_the_Ukrainian_Far-Right_Party_Svoboda(consulted on 07.04.2014).

231 Anton Shekhovtsov, *From electoral success to revolutionary failure. The Ukrainian Svoboda party*, Available at: <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2014-03-05-shekhovtsov-en.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

232 Resultaty eksyt-polu: hto I yak golosuvav – rozpodil electorativ za demografichnymy pokaznykamy. Vybory 2012. Spodivane I nespodivane. Dumky ekspertiv.Op. cit. Available at: <http://dif-exitpoll.org.ua/ua/novini/smdfbjofhopikopik.htm>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

233 *Ibid.*

234 Korrespondent.net, *Opros. Storonniki PRI KPU hotyat v tamozheniy soiyz, a Bat`kivshchyny, UDARa i Svobody v ES*, 01.10.2012. Available at: <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/1401316-opros-storonniki-pr-i-kpu-hotyat-v-tamozhenyj-soyuz-a-batkivshchini-udara-i-svobody-v-es>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

culture, including those who do not particularly like the party. Some admit though, that they became more popular due to the demand for radical actions.²³⁵

According to a small poll held in Kiev Mohila Academy and in Shevchenko University²³⁶

- in Kiev Mohila Academy the students to the question to describe their attitude to VO “Svoboda” say:

Student A, in favor, told that he liked VO “Svoboda” as their demands, stated in the program are more realistic than those in program documents of other parties and because the homogeneity of the party it can take decisions easily. He claims that Ukrainian nationalism must not be considered as rival to the other cultures, the essence of it is to give way of development to all cultures in the country, but in such way, that Ukrainian one was not oppressed.

Student B, against, says basically that VO “Svoboda” is not better than the other parties and that they use general rhetoric which leads to no actions. Although the student considers, that as Ukraine is so heterogeneous, there should be some nationalism.

Student C, neutral, states that although the party brings a new ideology, it should take into consideration the majority of Ukrainians, but such power must be in the Parliament, as they work on their mistakes.

- in Shevchenko University

Student A, in favor says that he thinks, that there are a lot of interesting speakers and pragmatic politicians in the party. The students claims that he likes party` s rhetoric and thinks that they brought a part of it to Maidan. There is no much difference between VO “Svoboda” and other political parties, as they are all projects, and are made for one specific leader.

Student B, against does not support the party, as shares centrist political views, although does not consider it radical. The student knows them for the eccentric leaders mostly, but says that the party is quite ordinary, and it just occupied the niche of radical right on political arena.

235 Interviews with students of Kiev Mohila Academy and Shevchenko University in Kiev, Kiev, February - March 2014, Annex 2.

236 Kiev Mohila Academy is considered more liberal one and Shevchenko University more conformist.

Student C, neutral, says that he is and is not in favor of VO “Svoboda”, because on the one hand he shares the idea of European integration, but on the other hand, this idea is not promoted by VO “Svoboda” uniquely.

3.2 VO "Svoboda" after 2012

The situation in Ukraine in the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014 changes VO "Svoboda`s" position. First of all, members of the party, as well as the leader took active part in manifestations, at least they were active in pronouncing speeches. The party and the leader became widely known. Still the rating of the party fell.

Among other things, it can be due to the actions of the party after the elections and the most important in the course of uprising. As VO "Svoboda" already was a member of opposition coalition, it also started to take part in the events. Among other reasons, Alina Polyakova names for example, VO "Svoboda`s" flat refusal of policy exercised by the ruling party.²³⁷ Anton Shekhovtsov gives another reason. He says, that the decision might be tactical, as VO "Svoboda" realized that a big part of its electorate comprises from those, who support European integration and thus decided to gain some more support.²³⁸ It can be also due to the character of party's actions. As a habit, during recent years they organized and were involved in different manifestations. The unchangeable rhetoric and type of actions the party initiated gives a ground to suspect that by doing it, they were trying to gain more popularity and involve not only old European integration electorate, but also some new militants. For example, the most resonance action took place on the 1.01.2014 with a march with torches in commemoration of Stepan Bandera. It took place at night time again.²³⁹ In this case, it should be said that exactly the same type of manifestation took place a year ago, though the context clearly changed.

The narrative of the party members did not change as well, it can be hardly detected in Tiahnybok speeches as he took a moderate language before, but it can certainly be seen on the example of Irina Farion, whose discourse did not change even a bit towards less intense, neither changed the topics. Anything she starts with, ends up with historic-ideological discourse and language issues.²⁴⁰ It was evident though, that at that time Party of Regions eagerly used this subject to attract militants in the Eastern regions. The actions small organizations linked to VO "Svoboda" took part in were also

237 Alina Polyakova, *Why did the Ukrainian far right support Euromaidan?*, 24.02.2014. Available at: <http://ontheeasternfront.blogspot.com/2014/02/why-did-ukrainian-far-right-support.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

238 Anton Shekhovtsov, *Ukrainski pravi i Euromaidan*, Available at: http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/anons2014/Shehovcov_Ukr_krajn-pravi_i-Euromajdan.htm(consulted on 07.04.2014).

239 "Svoboda`s" torchlight procession in Kiev on the 01.01.2014. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=skG0tMYU5fI>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

240 Irina Farion`s speech on Maidan, 20.12.2013. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=ирина+фарион+майдан(consulted on 07.04.2014).

remarkable. For example, on 24.11.2013 a manifestation in Lviv, during which were used symbols of White Power and Greek flag (apparently supporting recently arrested colleagues from “Golden Dawn”, the member of which was accused of a murder²⁴¹, although official VO “Svoboda” denies its relations with this party).²⁴² On the video, the sign C14 is clearly seen, Ukrainian flag and red and black flags as well. Main affiliations were anti-communistic, agitation to revolution, racism, Greek right movement, healthy way of life, and of course the main aim was claimed to be: the recognition of Ukrainian famine (Holodomor). Many of the participants wore masks.²⁴³ On 29.01.14 another manifestation took place in Lviv (official reason – commemoration of UPA). Now it was the movement “Avtonomnyi opir” (Autonomous resistance), that organized it. On the video, Yuriy Mikhalchyshyn is pronouncing the speech. Both parades took place at night with torches. White Power flags can be seen again.²⁴⁴ For some curious reason the march in favor of UPA, which took place a month before, was organized at day time, with no torches or White Power flags around.²⁴⁵ The same can be said about UPA march in Kiev at the same time.²⁴⁶ The demolition of Lenin’s monument, at the time, when the protests were not very harsh also contributed to negative image of vandals, ruining the peace, which was very much advantageous for Yanukovich. The responsibility was taken by Igor Miroschnichenko,²⁴⁷ which makes think, that the decision was initiated by the party, whereas manifestations in Lviv are arguable, as Mikhalchyshyn has a reputation of radical even inside the party. It should be admitted though, that it was not the first time Lenin suffered in Kiev.²⁴⁸ To all aforementioned, it should be added, that Mikhalchyshyn

241 Canadian Institute for the Study of Antisemitism, *The Rise of Far Right in Europe*, 30.11.2013. Available at: <http://canisa.org/1/post/2013/11/the-rise-of-the-far-right-in-europe.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

242 Komsomols`ka Pravda v Ukraine, *U Tyagnyboka otkrestilis` ot grecheskih neo-natsistov*, 02.10.2013. . Available at: http://kp.ua/Default.aspx?page_id=3&city_id=-1&date=021013&news_id=416396(consulted on 07.04.2014) .

243 Aggressive youth march (Holodomor, Lviv). Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gcTEfczux1Y>(consulted on 07.04.2014) .

244 Gazeta.ua, *Vo Lvovii na marshe geroiev Krut vikrikivali lievatskie lozungi i trebovali orujie*, 30.01.2013. Available at: http://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/politics/_vo-lvove-na-marshe-geroev-krut-vykrikivali-levackie-lozungi-i-trebovali-oruzhie/479804(consulted on 07.04.2014) .

245 A march in commemoration of UPA, Lviv 13.10.2013. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BxdZh9wIt1c>(consulted on 07.04.2014) .

246 A march in commemoration of UPA, Kiev, 14.10.2013. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ppsIuv2gbw>(consulted on 07.04.2014) .

247 European Pravda, *Pamiatnik Lenina sniesli*, 08.12.2013. Available at: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2013/12/8/7005453/>(consulted on 07.04.2014) .

248 Information Agency Unian, *V Kieve Leninu otbili nos i ruku*, 30.06.2009. Available at: <http://www.unian.net/society/238442-v-kieve-leninu-otbili-nos-i-ruku-dobavlenyi-foto.html>(consulted on

had a long and fruitful relationship with "Avtonomnyi opir" until in April 2013 the organization accused VO "Svoboda" of usurpation of the event called "Parad vishivanok", which clearly symbolized a riot against the party.²⁴⁹ But apparently it was triggered from the outside. In the beginning of 2013, the organization called "Zahyst praci" (Labour protection) appeared in Lviv. The organization is led by Oleg Vernik, the leader or an ex-leader of notorious Russian group CIS-EMO in Ukraine²⁵⁰ (the members of which were allowed by Kremlin as observers on Crimean Referendum). After this many activists from "Avtonomnyi opir" joined "Zahyst praci".²⁵¹ The manifestation against building on Ozarkevicha str. held by "Avtonomnyi opir" inside "Zahyst praci" was widely discussed.²⁵²

The apogee of the first wave of riots in Kiev was on the 1 of December in Kiev on Bankova Street, when certain participant of "Right Sector" made an attempt to attack the police by force. It must be emphasized, that at that time, the protestors stressed a peaceful character of manifestations. C14 was a part of the organization, which also comprised from "Tryzub (Stepana Bandery)", UNA-UNSO, "Patriot Ukrainy/Social Natsionalistycha Asambleya" (Ukrainian Patriot/Social National Assembly), "Biliy molot" (White hammer), "Bratstvo" (Brotherhood).²⁵³ The most active formations (which officially declared that they take the responsibility) were "Bratstvo", leader Dmitriy Korchyn`sky and "Patriot Ukrainy", leader Andrey Biletsky. Both Korchyn`sky and Biletsky have a bad reputation of agent provocateurs. As the result of the events Korchyn`sky fled in unknown direction and Patriot Ukrainy activists were put into prison. What is peculiar, that after the events, VO "Svoboda" solicited to release those activists.²⁵⁴ All of them were released by the law № 4202, registered 23.02.2014 by Oleg Liashko and voted on 24.02.2014. Only the

07.04.2014) .

249 Lvivski Noviny Online, *Avtonomniy opir skasuvav parad vyshivanok centrom Lvova*, 28.04.13. Available at: <http://lvivexpres.com/news/2013/04/28/45632-avtonomniy-opir-skasuvav-parad-vyshivanok-centrom-lvova>(consulted on 15.04.14).

250 Vibory.org, *Ukrainskyi kerivnyk CIS-EMO Oleg Vernik na znak protestu proty idei perenosu vyboriv zalyshyv organizaciu*, 13.12.13. Available at: <http://vybory.org/articles/ukranskij-kervnik-cis-emo-oleg-vernik-na-znak-protestu-proti-de-perenosu-viborv-zalishiv-organzatsyu.html>(consulted on 15.04.14).

251 RKM, "Avtonomniy opir" VS VO Svoboda: hto zagnav v Mikhalchyshyna zradnytsku palytsiu, 19.09.13. Available at: <http://rkm.kiev.ua/obschestvo/99972/>(consulted on 15.04.14)

252 Vseukrainska nezalejna profspilka "Zahyst paratsi". Official webpage. Available at: <http://www.tradeunion.org.ua/l-viv-ozarkevicha-zbori-bez-militsiyi/>, (consulted on 15.04.14).

253 Anton Shekhovtsov, *Ukrainski pravi i Euromaidan*, Op. cit. Available at: http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/anons2014/Shehovcov_Ukr_krajn-pravi_i-Euromajdan.htm(consulted on 07.04.2014).

254 Andrey Illienko`s appeal. 17.02.2014. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/andriy.illenko/posts/722972437743549?stream_ref=10(consulted on 07.04.2014) .

Communists did not vote for it.²⁵⁵ The story, on the other hand had a continuation, as Rada (the Parliament) was assaulted again on the 27.03.2014. Oleg Odnorojenko, one of the “Patriot Ukrainy” leaders pronounces the speech.²⁵⁶

All the aforementioned can suggest that the party is not as monolithic as it wants to seem. They might have only close people and old party members (not forgetting the relatives) in the Parliament, but the party and its militants and members are sometimes incapable to speak with one voice. In addition, instead of consolidating the actions and changing the rhetoric together character of activity, “svobodovists” continued with odious, inconsistent proclamations and aggression. It is arguable, whether it was necessary, when the conflict entered the phase of force, but in many situations, radical actions seem to be avoidable and provoked on purpose.²⁵⁷ It might mean, they know, they are losing popularity, but try to keep radicals. These deeds can also mean that either the party is incapable to adapt to the circumstances, or its leaders are incapable to take right decisions, or they do make such decisions deliberately. As for the unclear role in releasing the activists/probable agents it is hard to say, why the party actively took part in it, and especially not only VO “Svoboda”, but other parties as well.

Aggressive actions of local character are VO “Svoboda`s” distinctive feature. It all started from fights in the Parliament right after the 2012 elections²⁵⁸ party members bit a member of the Parliament Doniy supposedly for his comments concerning VO “Svoboda`s” alliance with President Yanukovich. The alliance, according to Doniy, would be useful for VO “Svoboda” at that time as in the case of new Parliament elections, there was no guarantee for VO “Svoboda” to win.²⁵⁹ Another celebrated case took place on the 18.03.2014, after Yanukovich escaped already, when two of the party members bit a head of the First National channel. The event received broad coverage in media.²⁶⁰

255 Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, *Poimenne golosuvannya pro vkliuchennya do poriadku dennogo Proektu postanovy pro zvil`nennya polityvazniv*, 24.02.2014. Available at: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_golos?g_id=3937(consulted on 07.04.2014).

256 An assault of Verkhovnaya rada by Praviy Sector, 27.03.2014. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og3Iqu2SmRQ>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

257 Anton Shekhovtsov, *Neo-Natsistskie provokatory “Pravogo Sectora”*, 24.03.2014. Available at: http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.com/2014/03/blog-post_28.html(consulted on 07.04.2014).

258 BBC Ukraine, *V Parlamenti stalasya biika: “Svoboda” ne puskae do zaly Tabalovyh*, 12.12.2012. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/news_in_brief/2012/12/121212_ek_svoboda_tabalov.shtml(consulted on 07.04.2014).

259 Informatsiine agenstvo Unian, *Izbitii “svobodovtsami” Doniy, s sotryaseniem mozga nahoditsya v bolnitsem*, 23.02.2014. Available at: <http://www.unian.net/politics/888743-izbitiyiy-svobodovtsami-doniy-s-sotryaseniem-mozga-nahoditsya-v-bolnitse.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

260 TCH (TSN (news)), *“Svoboda” sylou zmusyla zvil`nytsya kerivnuka Pershogo Natsional`nogo*,

In the meantime, members of C14 have established a so called activist union "Nikoly znov" (Never again). Their official claim is lustration and fight against corruption. In fact there are several actions already held by the organization. For example, C14 (together with the police) returned a visit to "Kievpasservice";²⁶¹ The enterprise was prepared to be privatized as many others. Generally, the new owners were businessmen close to Party of Regions.²⁶² Another incident took place in "Delta-Bank", this time without the police.²⁶³ "Delta-Bank" is owned by Mykola (Nikolay) Lagun, who in the course of recent years bought several major banks (Kreditprombank, Swedbank, etc.) and was going to create the fourth major bank structure, which could compete with "Privat Bank" owned by Igor Kolomoiskiy.²⁶⁴

18.03.2014. Available at: <http://tsn.ua/politika/svoboda-siloyu-zmusila-zvilnitis-kerivnika-pershogo-nacionalnogo-video-340534.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

261 Dmytro Riznychenko, Viddil Propagandy (Propaganda Department), *Nasha C14 (Our C14)*, Available at: <http://reznichenko-d.livejournal.com/443391.html> (consulted on 07.04.2014).

262 Golos Stolytsi, "Kyivpass" potrapit v pryvatni ruky, 15.03.2013. Available at: http://newsradio.com.ua/2013_03_15/Ki-vpasserv-s-potrapit-u-privatn-ruki/(consulted on 07.04.2014).

263 *Ibid.*

264 iPress.ua, *Novinskiy, Yanukovich and Lagun skupovuiyt` banky, yaki zaburaut`sya z Ukrainy*, 26.01.2013. Available at: http://ipress.ua/news/adarych_yanukovykh_ta_lagun_skupovuyut_ievropeyski_banky_yaki_zabyrayutsya_iz_ukrainy_14720.html(consulted on 07.04.2014).

3.3 Current position

VO “Svoboda`s” rating decreased dramatically since 2012. According to rating agency “Socis” on the 26.03.2014 the rating of the party is 3.5%, and in the total rating they are number 7. They are at that moment less popular than Communist party and the party of Oleg Liashko. Oleg Tiahnybok`s – 1,7%, which makes him number nine in political struggle. Except for the main candidates Timoshenko and Poroshenco he yields to quite controversial figures, like Mikhailo Dobkin, Petro Simonenko and Oleg Liashko. The next after Tiahnybok is Dmitro Yarosh with 0.9%.²⁶⁵

3.3.1 Loss of credibility in Galicia

Among others the following reasons for this can be named. VO “Svoboda`s” rating started to decrease a long time ago, since they came to power. First of all in Galicia. In June of 2013 the newspaper “Express” started a series of articles dedicated to the source of financing of the party and Tiahnybok himself. The authors of the article claimed that the official source of financing are fake²⁶⁶ and that VO “Svoboda” was financed by one of criminal leaders of Lviv. In favor of that the authors gave the evidences of close partnership between one of the members of the party – Igor Krivets`kiy and criminal circles of Lviv. The article emphasizes, that Krivets`kiy himself is a criminal, a member and than the leader of gangster groups, closely related to another gangster leader with a nickname Vova Morda (Volodymyr Didukh). The article gives examples of co-operation between Krivets`kiy and Donetsk business circles.²⁶⁷ Another point – is close business interests between members of VO “Svoboda”, the Party of Regions and Communist party.²⁶⁸

The last part of publications, was dedicated to relations between Tiahnybok`s family and Vasiliy Novitski,²⁶⁹ a swindler arrested in Austria in 2012. Novitsky and Tiahnyboks

265 SOCIS, A centre for social and marketing research, *Ukraina na starti prezydentskyh vyboriv. Resultaty sociologichnogo doslidjennya*, 26.03.2014. Available at: <http://www.socis.kiev.ua/ua/press/rezultaty-sotsiolohichnoho-doslidzhennja-elektoralni-orijentatsiji-ukrajintsiv.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

266 Ekspres, *Groshi Tyahnyboka. Dokumenty I facky*, 13.06.2013. Available at: <http://expres.ua/main/2013/06/13/88677-groshi-tyagnyboka-dokumenty-fakty>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

267 Ekspres, *Groshi Tyahnyboka -3.Haziain partii Svoboda..*16.09.2013. Available at: <http://expres.ua/main/2013/09/16/93785-groshi-tyagnyboka-3-hazyayin-partiyi-svoboda>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

268 Ekspres, *Groshi Tyahnyboka -2.Biznes z serpom I molotom. Rozsliduvannya*. 19.08.2013. Available at: <http://expres.ua/main/2013/08/19/92115-groshi-tyagnyboka-2-biznes-serpom-molotom-rozsliduvannya>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

269 Ekspres, *Groshi Tyahnyboka – 4. Ugoda z deyavolom*. 09.11.2013. Available at: <http://expres.ua/main/2013/10/28/95943-groshi-tyagnyboka-4-ugola-dyyavolom>, (consulted on 07.04.2014).

had a common business of selling pharmaceutical product of unknown content on Ukrainian territory (at first registered in Ukraine, than banned). The “medicine” was stated to cure cancer, AIDS and radiation sickness and cost 77 euro.²⁷⁰ These articles undermined VO “Svoboda`s” popularity in Galicia. The party stated that the articles were a response to the law the passed in the local Parliament, which prohibited selling cigarettes in stalls, owned by the owner of a newspaper. VO “Svoboda” also decided to go to the court for justice.²⁷¹ This, however, did not lend them much credibility as the material in the article was supported by documents. Another scandal began when a member of Party of Regions declared that the reason for VO “Svoboda” to oppose French company “Chevron” to enter the region and to begin extraction of shale gas was that the party demanded a huge bribe²⁷² (Chevron denied it afterword, for the demand of “Svoboda”, who blocked the tribune²⁷³). The material appeared in the same newspaper at first. But it also had a big resonance on local level. At a certain point, according to the Taras Vosniak and his blog on *Ukrainska Pravda* (from 10.10.2013), the services of the members of so called “Dognal sect”, a scandalous religious organization²⁷⁴, were used to derange the work of Lviv Oblast Rada (Lviv Regional Council).²⁷⁵ On the other hand such an action, were not quite comprehensible, as obviously could not stop the decision-making process. In addition, one of iPress journalists says, that this can be an indicator of weakened position of VO “Svoboda”²⁷⁶ and also possible lack of party discipline, as one of the deputies made a statement criticizing the accord, but the head of the Lviv Oblast Rada was Pavlo Kolodiy, a member of VO “Svoboda”, who might have blocked the decision to be put on the agenda.²⁷⁷

270 Fakty i Kommentarii, *V Avstrii zaderjan izobretatil` preparata “Ukrainin” Vasili Novitskii*, 13.09.2012. Available at: <http://fakty.ua/152951-v-avstrii-zaderzhali-izobretatelya-preparata-ukrain-vasiliya-novickogo>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

271 LB.ua, *Tyahnybok podal v sud na gazetnu “Expres”*, 11.11.2013. Available at: http://lb.ua/news/2013/11/11/239830_tyagnibok_podal_sud_gazetu.html(consulted on 07.04.2014).

272 iPress, *“Svoboda” vymagala u Chevron 450 mln za dozvil na vydobutok slantsevogo gazu*, 17.09.2013. Available at: http://ipress.ua/news/svoboda_vymagala_u_chevron_450_mln_za_dozvil_na_vydobutok_slantsevogo_gazu_28321.html (consulted on 07.04.2014).

273 iPress, *Slantsevaya petlya dlya Svobody*, 4.10.13. Available at: http://ipress.ua/articles/slantseva_petlya_dlya_svobody_29782.html(consulted on 15.04.14).

274 Kanal 24, Chernoe bratstvo: *“Podgorietskie otsy” – sozdateli sekty Dognala*, 15.11.13. Available at: http://24tv.ua/home/showSingleNews.do?chernoie_bratstvo_podgoretskie_ottsi__sozdateli_sekti_dognala&objectId=383898&lang=ru(consulted on 15.04.14).

275 *Ukrainskaia Pravda Blogi, VO „Svoboda” – vilne padinnya prodovjuetsya*. 10.10.13. Available at: <http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/voznjak/5256edbeaf2b8/>(consulted on 15.04.14).

276 iPress, *Partiya Tyahnyboka: pochatok kintsya*, 04.10.13. Available at: http://ipress.ua/ljlive/partiya_tyahnyboka_pochatok_kintsya_29755.html(consulted on 15.04.14).

277 iPress, *Slantsevaya petlya dlya Svobody*, 4.10.13. Op. cit. Available at: <http://ipress.ua/articles/>

3.3.2 Non fulfillment of pre-election claims

Another issue is a fight VO “Svoboda” proclaims against unlawful constructions, which is an important point in their policy. Citizens of Lviv were particularly dissatisfied with the co-operation between Lviv administration, dominated by VO “Svoboda” and the company “Integral bud” (owner Volodimir Zubik, a member of Party of Regions), whom they gave a permission on 30.06.13 to build a new building in the place, having a historic significance (according to activists’ claims).²⁷⁸ Many activists belong to “Avtonomnyi Opir”. Some questions rose in connections with permissions issued 30.05.13 and 19.07.2013, which allowed to build shopping malls “Epitsentr”²⁷⁹ VO “Svoboda`s” activists made several demonstrations against building of the malls of the net before.²⁸⁰ The net itself belongs to Gerega family, members of Party of Regions, which “Svoboda” claimed were responsible for falsifications in 2012. Thus, actions and deeds do not coincide. Under such circumstances, it is evident why “Svoboda” lost some electorate.

3.3.3 Failure to gain more credibility

On the other hand, certain part of their electorate expected sharp and uncompromising policy from the party. Instead the only actions, which could be qualified as uncompromising, were fights on the Parliament tribunes or elsewhere. Of course, it is arguable, as it sometimes a failure to vote could be attributed to lack of power or mandates, but in some cases “Svoboda” supported the ruling party. So some people might feel disappointed.²⁸¹

Due to the course of the events in the end of 2013 a conclusion might be made, that there are a lot of people supporting European integration (though there is certain disillusionment). VO “Svoboda” did not promote European integration very actively at first, they look at it more like a measure against Russian aggressive policy.²⁸² Yuriy

slantseva_petlya_dlya_svobody_29782.html(consulted on 15.04.14).

278 “Avtonomnyi opir”, official link, *Peremoga na antyzabudovnomu fronti*, 12.02.2014. Available at: <http://opir.info/2014/02/12/peremoga-na-antyzabudovnomu-fronti/>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

279 Straik. First social portal, *VO “Svoboda” i Partiya regioniv maut`u Lvovi spil`ni biznes interesy*, 10.09.2013. Available at: <http://www.socportal.info/interview/vosvoboda-i-partiya-regioniv-mayut-u-l>.(consulted on 07.04.2014).

280 Liga. Novosti, “*Svoboda*” *nachala piketirovat` gipermarkety “Epicentr” po vsei Ukrainie*, 31.01.2012. Available at: http://news.liga.net/news/politics/758413-svoboda_nachala_piketirovat_magaziny_geregi_po_vsey_ukraine.htm(consulted on 07.04.2014).

281 Katerina Peshko, *Padienie reitinga “Svobody”. 5 glavnyh prichin*, Glavcom, 09.10.2013. Available at: <http://glavcom.ua/articles/14519.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

282 Oleg Tiahnybok`s speech during the round table in favor of European Integration, published on

Syrotyuk, a press secretary says, that the party does not see any loss of sovereignty as a result of signing the Association Agreement as it is different from actual membership in the EU. He says that Ukraine is already a member of WTO, where there are certain rules. Association Agreement, Mr. Syrotuk believes, will boost Ukrainian economy and free competition will make the owners of the enterprises modernize their facilities.²⁸³

3.3.4 Defused electorate

With the regard of the description of VO “Svoboda`s” electorate in 2012, some additional reasons may be named. For example, the protest electorate might be partially gone, as Yanukovich, who was a menace has left the country. Those, who are in favor of European integration now are more active in supporting moderate national democratic parties like “Bat`kivshchyna” and reappeared Poroshenko`s “Solidarnist`” (Solidarity) or centrist “UDAR”. On the one hand, VO “Svoboda” may attract some radical electorate, as Russian pressure increased significantly (and Russian threat always was topic № 1 for SNPU/”Svoboda”), but on the other hand, many people believe that the image of the party (which it apparently refuses to change) will give more causes to Russian propaganda to claim fascist dominance in Ukraine. Plus, in case if one does not get too much into details of political life, an impression can be elaborated, that certain far-right groups trigger the aggression and disability, which may also contribute to antipathy towards right party. Especially, people in the East are influenced by such kind of images, left alone massive Russian propaganda. The most radical electorate may be more attracted in “Praviy Sector”, and certainly, they pulled a part of VO “Svoboda`s” electorate according to the statistics. In addition, VO “Svoboda” is not a new power anymore. People got acquainted with their policy and their actions. As for VO “Svoboda” itself, it is very important for it to support current government as they gained some good Minister Portfolios, disproportional to the support they have in the society.

11.10.2013. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1-Z9Nx-H-8>(consulted on 07.04.2014) .

283 Interview with Yuriy Syrotyuk, a Member of the Parliament since 2012, a member of VO “Svoboda”, a press-secretary, Kiev, 11 February 2014, Annex 1.

3.4 International co-operation

As it was said previously, European integration was not the main subject of VO “Svoboda`s” speeches, yet an important one. In certain way, SNPU/”Svoboda” integrated itself in European political life, making alliances with far-right parties in Europe. In the end of the 1990, the party became a member of EuroNat – an alliance of nationalist parties, creation of which was initiated by Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of French “Front National”.²⁸⁴ As it was mentioned above, leaders and members of “Svoboda” had meetings with Jean-Marie le Pen and were present at EuroNat meetings.

Than following the initiative of Jobbik²⁸⁵, the “Alliance of European National Movements” was established. The event took place in Budapest on the 24.10.2009.²⁸⁶ The party took part in the conferences of AEMN in 2010 in Strasburg²⁸⁷ and in the same year in Tokyo²⁸⁸.

Lately, especially after the outbreak of Crimean crisis, many of old allies turned away from “Svoboda”, and declared their sympathy to Russia. In the official statement from 5.03.2014 (which is called “Ukraine – Official Statement”) on AEMN page it is written, that they understand their Ukrainian colleagues, but suspect them to ally with Western forces. In addition they basically say, that Russia has more rights for Crimea: “Crimea, which as well as being a strategic area within Russia’s legitimate sphere of influence is also populated by ethnic Russians”. Europe, it is stated (and Britain in particular) have other problems to solve.²⁸⁹ The statement of Front National on 1.03.2014 is even more determined. It proclaims full support to Putin and recognizes him as a protector for Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.²⁹⁰ Further on, the leader of Bulgarian “Ataka” made a

284 Canadian Institute for the Study of Antisemitism, *The Rise of Far Right in Europe*, 30.11.2013. Op. cit. Available at: <http://canisa.org/1/post/2013/11/the-rise-of-the-far-right-in-europe.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

285 Anton Shekhovtsov, *The Old and New European Friends of Ukrainians Far-Right Svoboda party*, 2.09.2013. Available at: <http://searchlightmagazine.com/archive/the-old-and-new-european-friends-of-ukraine-s-far-right-svoboda-party>, (consulted on 07.04.2014) .

286 European Parliament, Official webpage, European Political Parties. Available at: <http://www.elections2014.eu/en/european-political-parties>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

287 Destra Sociale, Official webpage, *AEMN meeting in Strasburg*, 10.09.2010. Available at: <http://www.destrasociale.eu/aemn-meeting-a-strasburgo/>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

288 Canadian Institute for the Study of Antisemitism, *The Rise of Far Right in Europe*, 30.11.2013. Op. cit. Available at: <http://canisa.org/1/post/2013/11/the-rise-of-the-far-right-in-europe.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

289 AEMN, Official webpage, *Ukraine – Official Statement*, 5.03.2014. Available at: <http://aemn.eu/2014/03/05/ukraine-official-statement/>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

290 Le site officiel du Front National, *Urgence humanitaire en Ukraine russophone et en Crimée russe : le Front national appelle au dialogue et à l'apaisement*, 01.03.2014. Available at: <http://www.frontnational.fr>.

statement in favor of Vladimir Putin`s policy.²⁹¹ According to Anton Shekhovtsov Italian far right declared their favorable attitude to Moscow policy as well (among them Roma Nord, Movimento Sociale Europeo, Contro Tempo, XX Flotta, Comunità Militante Formello, Ostia).²⁹²

The demarche followed during Crimean referendum. Naturally, only the observers invited by official Moscow were present. Website censor.net published a list of those observers, which turned to be linked to far-right European movements. Some of them co-operate with Russia for a long time. The core consisted mainly of the members of self-proclaimed “International organization for observing the elections CIS-EMO”, led by Aleksey Kochetkov, who in his turn was a member of central assembly of “Russkoie Natsional`noie yedinstvo”, PHE, (Russian National Unity).²⁹³ It first appeared in Ukraine in 2004, than during the elections in Kazakhstan.²⁹⁴ During the referendum he was together with controversial politicians, the majority of which are representatives of far – right European parties and organizations. From the analysis of those, who were present one can conclude, which allies “Svoboda” has lost. For example, the representatives of the following parties were noticed: “Front National”, “Jobbik”, “Freedom Party of Austria”, “Flemish interest”, “ATAKA”, “BNP”, the general secretary of AEMN Valerio Cignetti and Béla Kovács, Deputy Chair and Treasurer of AEMN.²⁹⁵ Thus, many ancient VO “Svoboda`s” allies started to work against Ukraine as a country and against “Svoboda” itself as it became a part of the government, the new AEMN`s partners in Moscow do not recognize. Although, a turn to Russia of many parties in AEMN can be also attributed to the Parliament elections in the EU, for which the unity of nationalist parties is needed. It is also due to the change of the policy of Front National, which dominates AEMN.

com/2014/03/urgence-humanitaire-en-ukraine-russophone-et-en-crimee-russe-le-front-national-appelle-au-dialogue-et-a-lapaisement/(consulted on 07.04.2014).

291 Bulgarian news, Bolgariaya. *Lider partii “Ataka” Siderov obozhlilsya na Prezidenta Plevnielieva za ohaivanie Rossii*, 24.03.2014. Available at: <http://bgnews.bulgar-rus.ru/archives/38503>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

292 Anton Shekhovtsov, *Italian fascists love Putin*, 29.03.2014. Available at: <http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.com/2014/03/italian-fascists-love-putin.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

293 Censor.net, *Blogger: na referendum v Krym pod vidom nabliudatelei Rossiya otpravila fashistov I agentov FSB*, 16.03.2014. Available at: http://censor.net.ua/news/276127/na_referendum_v_krym_pod_vidom_nablyudateleyi_rossiya_otpravila_fashistov_i_agentov_fsb_bloger, (consulted on 07.04.2014).

294 Sergei Il`ko, *Na vibory v Ukraine opredelen smotryaschii ot Kremlya*, Information Agency Unian, 23.02.2012. Available at: <http://www.unian.net/politics/612744-na-vyiboryi-v-ukraine-opredelen-smotryaschiy-ot-kremlya.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

295 Aleksandr Zasmorjuk and Evgeniy Matiushenko, *Nabliudateli bezzakonia v Krimu obkatali shemu razdeleniya Evropy*, 24.03.2014. Available at: <http://www.unian.net/politics/899858-nabliudateli-za-bezzakoniem-v-kryimu-obkatali-shemu-razdeleniya-evropyi.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

After the death of Jean-Marie le Pen, Marine le Pen took different course, aimed to gain more influence.²⁹⁶ In November 2013 together with Geert Wilders of Holland's Party for Freedom she announced that they are going to start the "the liberation from the European elite, the monster in Brussels".²⁹⁷

The trend, however is not new. On the 10.01.2013 an article appeared in "Ejenedelnik 2000", which contained an interview with Mateusz Piskorski, which claimed that VO "Svoboda" was expelled from the organization for its "racist statements". Mr. Piskorski, however, was recognized as Kremlin agent, that appeared in places of a particular Russian interest such as Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.²⁹⁸ (later he called a Referendum in Crimea was held in accordance to law²⁹⁹) The article claimed that at that moment the following parties had a membership: Members: BNP, Front National, (Bulgaria) National-Democratic Party, Jobbik, (Italy) Fiamma Tricolore, Belgian National Front, "Flemish interest", National Democratic party of Sweden, National Portugal party "Renovator", Spanish Republican Social Movement "Right World", Bulgarian "Ataka", etc.³⁰⁰ The article gained a resonance in media and various investigations followed. But only on the 19.03.2014 the letter appeared on the official website of VO "Svoboda", which expressed party's discontent with AEMN policy³⁰¹, which is peculiar, as Béla Kovács expressed already his discontent in his latter to Tiahnybok and moreover in 2013 he and Gábor Vona, the leader of Jobbik, were in Moskow.³⁰² Marine le Pen visited it as well.

296 Canadian Institute for the Study of Antisemitism, *The Rise of Far Right in Europe*, 30.11.2013. Op. cit. Available at: <http://canisa.org/1/post/2013/11/the-rise-of-the-far-right-in-europe.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

297 The Financial Times, *Wilders and Le pen join forces against Brussels*, 13.11.2013. Available at: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1f4ce478-4c83-11e3-923d-00144feabdco.html#axzz2y9nPFqvT>(consulted on 06.04.2014)

298 Michał Kaciewicz and Michał Krzymowski, *Piskorski za pieniądze Kremla*, Newsweek, 13.01.2013. Available at: <http://polska.newsweek.pl/piskorski-za-pieniadze-kremla,100408,1,1.html>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

299 Anna J. Dudek, *Mateusz Piskorski: Referendum na Krymie zgodne z prawem, a ja nie muszę zgadzać się z polskim MSZ*, NaTemat.pl, March 2014, Available at: <http://natemat.pl/9525,piskorski-w-kontrwywiadzie-referendum-na-krymie-zgodne-z-prawem-a-ja-nie-musze-zgadzac-sie-z-polskim-msz>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

300 Oksana Shkoda, "Svoboda" skivaiet svoi proval v Evropie, Ejenedel'nik 2000, Available at: <http://2000.net.ua/2000/derzhava/ekspertiza/87027>(consulted on 06.04.2014).

301 Oleh Pankevych, Deputy Chairman of the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda", *A letter to the President of Alliance of European National Movements*, 19.03.2014. Available at: <http://en.pankevych.info/publications/articles/00010591> (consulted on 06.04.2014).

302 Jobbik, Official webpage, *Gábor Vona had a lecture at Lomonosov University*, 24.05.2013. Available at: http://www.jobbik.com/gabor_vona_had_lecture_lomonosov_university_russia(consulted on 07.04.2014).

³⁰³ On the local level the flag of “Eurasian Movement” (used by Aleksandr Dugin)³⁰⁴ is seen on the photo in Youth Leadership Training event in Hungary funded by the AEMN in 2013.³⁰⁵

Further on, Anton Shekhovtsov in his article “The old and new European friends of Ukraine’s far-right Svoboda party” from 2.09.2013 says that at that moment the party was already looking for the new alliances in Europe. But the new groups are more extreme than previous ones ³⁰⁶ (especially taking into consideration that so far VO “Svoboda`s” radicalism, if there is one, ended on populist hooliganism). Still on in March 2013, VO “Svoboda`s” member visited a conference entitled “Vision Europe”, where largely the representatives of extreme – rights organizations and parties were present. The following can be mentioned: Party of the Swedes, National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) (Germany), New Force (Italy), Land and People association (France), Danish Party, and Gonzalo Martín Garcia, National Democracy Party (Spain). The scientist also precludes, that as none of this parties is a member of AEMN and the previous project European National Front was unsuccessful, VO “Svoboda” may engage in such alliance, if it takes place.³⁰⁷

303 Front National, Official webpage, *Moscou : Marine Le Pen reçue par Alexei Pouchkov, chef de la commission des Affaires étrangères à la Douma*, 19.06.2013. Available at: <http://www.frontnational.com/2013/06/moscou-marine-le-pen-recue-par-alexei-pouchkov-chef-de-la-commission-des-affaires-etrangeres-a-la-douma/>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

304 International Eurasian Movement. Official Webpage. Available at: <http://evrazia.info/article/161>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

305 AEMN, Official webpage, *A weekend in Hungary*, 14.10.2013. Available at: <http://aemn.eu/2013/10/14/weekend-hungary/>(consulted on 07.04.2014).

306 Anton Shekhovtsov, *The Old and New European Friends of Ukrainians Far-Right Svoboda party*, 2.09.2013. Op. cit. Available at: <http://searchlightmagazine.com/archive/the-old-and-new-european-friends-of-ukraine-s-far-right-svoboda-party>, (consulted on 07.04.2014).

307 *Ibid.*

Conclusion

Political party VO “Svoboda” started its existence as a Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine, which in its turn was a breakaway radical wing of national – democratic party Rukh. Both parties emerged as a result of the process of collapse of Soviet Union. The need for a party with nationalist ideology was dictated by the historical conditions Ukrainian state was formed in. The party elaborated its ideology on the basis of the mixture of local heroes of the beginning and the middle of XX century and an old ideology borrowed from them. As a result VO “Svoboda”, a successor of SNPU still claims to use the ideological basis and the philosophy of the beginning of the century, which was to a large extent influenced by radical nationalism and fascism. The decision to adapt such ideological background was dictated by the fact that the party was looking for the target electorate and the niche on the political arena.

The ideology the Party uses clearly has a local character and does not suit for the whole country, there is no demand for those ideas and not many people share the same feelings for the figures and formations the party promotes and uses for propaganda. There is also a big doubt whether anybody of main party members shares this ideology. Due to their age, it is clear, that they could not possibly participate in many events they constantly refer to as tragic. Rather, some of them are influenced to large extent by the oppression of Soviet times against their family members and relatives (and themselves sometimes) as well as by the local historic memory. But it is not easy for VO “Svoboda” to renounce this ideology as it was always the basis for obtaining certain rating, especially on local level.

Party`s structure also represent the traditional one, as it has a certain core and accompanying youth organizations and activists, who share party ideology. The minus for VO “Svoboda” particularly is that the right wing activists may be sometimes aggressive and providing discipline in these organizations does not seem easy.

The program of VO “Svoboda” has borrowed certain things from SNPU program, including nation protection rhetoric, but much was added, it became larger and appeals to more specific issues. On the other hand, it remains to a large extant populist and does

not offer direct steps, which would allow to cope with real economic, political and social problems of the country.

Party's electorate, according to the results of the last elections and to the polls, is composed largely from the citizens of some Western Ukrainian regions, who support party's ideology. The support it gained in Kiev seems to be temporary one. But on the other hand, it includes a lot of educated citizens.

The members of the party claim to be ideologically conscience and to share the philosophy of declared authorities. Many of them are notorious for their controversial performances including speeches with race connotation. Because of this, the party is at times seen as eccentric and scandalous by some and aggressive by others. But the real actions show that the ideology is a instrument to attract local electorate, because the party certainly is not involved in any type of activity their heroes were involved in, neither terrorism, nor ethnic cleansings. The party is more interested in protecting its political and material interests.

Social – Nationalist Party of Ukraine was a local force and because there was no big demand for radical nationalist movements in the end of 1990 – beginning of 2000, the party (as many other radical wing nationalist parties and organizations) started to form a part of coalition of national – democratic parties and to dissolve. However, after 2004, due to certain circumstances, the party had a chance to act as a separate one. Although current leader of the party Oleg Tyahnybok already entered the Parliament as a member of a political block, the first moderate success the party new as a whole was in 2006 and even more in 2007. As a result of these elections, several party members gained positions in local Councils and thus the party obtained some influence on local political arena, became an important partner for the major political forces of that time at a local level and also became more attractive for the investors.

The big success party knew in 2012, on Parliament elections. But as it turned out, largely not due to extraordinary support of the party or sudden outbreak of ideology popularization, but because, certain per cent of population was strongly opposed to the previous regime, immodest in its political and material appetites, and wanted to create an opposition. In addition, the rhetoric of the party members became more moderate, and tackled larger audience. Many, though, wanted to see sure and radical actions, which also contributed to the result of elections. The fact that the party had an alliance with democratic oppositional political forces, as well as its support of European vector of development was also seen as positive. On the other hand, some were clearly disillusioned by the inability of previous national democratic parties to consolidate and

to provide consistent policy, thus were reluctant to vote for them, but did not want to vote for major Party of Regions, as their policy was seen as anti – Ukrainian. In addition, VO “Svoboda” also kept its positions in tradition region of Galicia and generally in the Western Ukraine, to certain extent thanks to skillful promotion actions and mobilization of activists. But, the promotion campaign was also held by the rival Party of regions, which had a will and instruments to contribute to popularization of the party (for the following usage of its image to discredit national forces). A poll, though shows, that VO “Svoboda” is not seen as an extraordinary political force and that it is recognized more because of its exceptional member and their speeches, than for the actual program or constructive actions.

In the internal arena the party seem to fully adapt to the rules of the game, as it fruitfully collaborated as with the ruling party and with the opposition. On the other hand, little official co-operation is noticed with other right organizations and parties. It might have existed though on the level of activists and people taking part in the events of the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014. In the external dimension, it seems evident, that it lost its old partners, who now found new stronger ones. Unfortunately for VO “Svoboda”, their co-operation automatically excludes the party from the alliance. That is why, VO “Svoboda” is currently searching for new foreign partners. But as there is no possibility to ally with the moderate wing far right, it has no other option, but to search co-operation with the most extreme ones. The question arises though, whether their views coincide and whether there is anything in common, but the fact that they also call themselves right – wing. On the other hand, many differences can be found between VO “Svoboda” and its ancient allies, which did not prevent them to have common work.

Although the European integration was never mentioned by the party as the main goal, but it recognizes the necessity of it for the country and does not see it as an obstacle for building a strong state. On the contrary, it sees it as a remedy for constant pressure form the Eastern neighbor, which it always perceived as one of the main issue. A reference to this issue was always present in the party`s political program, beginning from the first one, SNPU program. It also does exist in the current one, though it is put in more moderate and constructive way. As there is a lot of support for European integration (in contrast to integration to so called Eurasian Union), VO “Svoboda” is unlikely to change its opinion in the short term.

VO “Svoboda” failed to comply with the demands of contemporary Ukrainian electorate and especially badly performed in the course of riots and afterwards. Though it had a chance to demarginalise, as it was elected to the State Parliament and the so called “cordon sanitaire”

was removed for it when it formed a coalition with centrists, the party not only failed to meet its actual promises or to take effective action, but also did not invent any new messages to attract more votes. More than that, party's activity sometimes looked parasitic, as it seemed as an attempt to gain rating benefiting from the riots, which were widely discussed in media. Many actions came to the old populism, patriotic speeches and demonstration of the physical force of the party members, which looks not only useless, but also maleficent from the perspective of the problems the country is facing. Moreover, the research works carried out by political scientists in the field show, that the ideology of the party as well as the narrative of the party members was used by their ideological opponents and, as the course of the events show, by the aggressors outside Ukraine. These facts certainly contributed to rapid decline of the rating of the party and its leader personally.

The future of the party now seems vague even left alone the military invasion of external actor. The rating is lost, new, more popular political forces, which were in opposition have become more popular and the old Party of Regions still enjoys public support. No constructive actions were taken towards gaining support in the East of the country. In addition, a part of radical electorate can be pulled by Praviy Sector, a new radical right party. It is very likely, according to the polls, that in the case of Parliament elections VO "Svoboda" would not pass 5% barrier to enter the Parliament and thus it would go back to local level and fight for positions on local (Galicia, Ternopil') level. But even there it would have to face several problems. First, it lost a part of its rating as a result of media scandals and failure to stamp its authority in Chevron case, for example, and probably some influence on local activists ("Avtonomniy Opir"). On the other hand, the party is not new already and the potential electorate knows how it acted previously, so a part from it can turn to Praviy Sector instead. General eccentric behavior of certain party members is unlikely to attract a lot of supporters, especially, that some of them discredited themselves by their controversial behavior. In addition, though national – democratic parties do not enjoy public trust either, they may result to gain popularity in the regions, where VO "Svoboda" succeeded in previous years. Another issue is the fact that apparently, the party is clearly not homogeneous and the statements of party members sometimes do not coincide. Some party activists also commit controversial actions, which are not supported by others. Plus, the party is now strongly associated with the extreme right movement, which is certainly not homogeneous and at times very controversial, certain people may fail to make a distinction. Massive Russian state media propaganda also contributes to this image. Thus, either the party searches for a new image and changes somehow its narrative, or it dissolves in time, or goes back to being a local force of doubtful actual influence.

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Annex 1.

An abstract of the interview with Yuriy Syrotyuk, a Member of the Parliament since 2012, a member of VO “Svoboda”, a press-secretary, Kiev, 11 February 2014.

About historic memory and party ideology

Why did you become a member of VO “Svoboda”

I was born in a family of repressed. My granddad, the father of my father - Khariton, was from Volhynia. He was killed by Bolsheviks, as he supported UPA, he, and others were found in kryivka³⁰⁸ and violently killed. My mother`s father was taken away by NKVD in winter 1944, he never returned and his fate is unknown. My father was taken to Siberia when he was a child. He lived there until 1960, when he could return after military service. That`s why there always were antisoviet opinion in the family. The father always expressed his hate to communism, he always listened to radio “Svoboda”. He was not prosecuted as he was an ordinary worker in an ordinary village; he was not allowed to have education.

And me, when I was at school, in the 2 grade, I was not admitted to pioneers (pionery)³⁰⁹. I was very surprised, that I was not allowed to enter the organization as I was a very good pupil. All of the children were admitted but me. It was a big puzzle for me. But then I understood that it was due to the past of my parents and grandparents.

In 89 I saw Ukrainian flag in public for the first time. And I remember well my father having tears in his eyes.

.....

Then I entered the historical faculty in Ternopil` University and as I had an outlook formed in the family I had no other choice, but to join national movement. I joined UNA-UNSO in 1993, in 1994 – “Tryzub”.

....

I met Oleg Tiahnybok, the leader of VO “Svoboda” in 2004 and began to support the party in PR campaigns, in press-service and then joined the party.

308 Kryivka – a place, where Ukrainian partisans used to hide.

309 Pionery – soviet youth organization.

Not all of Ukrainians recognize Stepan Bandera as a hero. Does “Svoboda” have a plan to become more centrist with a purpose to attract more electorate?

When there is a question if everybody recognizes, I ask everybody if actually read him. What makes them not to agree (with the author)? Do they know anything about Bandera except for the what was written in Soviet books? For example, his father was a priest, he himself never killed anyone, he did not shoot from the machine gun, he did not hang people, because when he was young he got to Warszawa process and was sentenced to life imprisonment. After Bereza Kartuzka (Polish concentration camp) was destroyed he went to German concentration camp.

.....

When we talk about some evident characters, like Hitler, it is obvious, that Hitler can be nobody`s hero. Because Nazism is unacceptable.

The party has an image of radical. And it took a decision to hold a torch procession on the anniversary of Stepan Bandera`s. Why?

There is a torch procession held before the Olympic games to start. Is this associated with Nazi? It can seem that way to Germans as they had Nazism, they walked with torches and now they have a phantom fear that Nazism can be reconstructed. We had no such experience, Ukrainian Nationalists fought against Hitler and against Stalin. UPA fought against Germans and against Moscovits, against all invaders. I had no Nazis in my family. I have nothing to expiate, I have no guilt complex. We do not walk with torches because of the Nazi, Ukrainians never were Nazi. The torch procession was held for the 8 time. We celebrated Bandera`s birthday in the evening and in order to make it nice, we took the torches. Every year we make one and the same route, but nothing yet was written about it.

.....

In our actions there is no analogy with Nazism, communism, bol`shevism and other misanthropic ideology. We don`t have complexes about Nazism, as we never were Nazi.

Co-operation with other political forces

Can “Svoboda” give up certain ideas for political co-operation, for example as or the Constitution reform? At first the party did not support Constitution – 2004, and now it does? What made you change your mind?

We did not change our mind. We don't change our mind situationally. They said, that nationalist won't make deal with anyone, but look on how "Svoboda" acts during international negotiations, negotiating with the government, with opposition. We act as the most disciplined party. We understand, that there is a regime of Yanukovich, which usurped the power and deprived people of civil and social rights, and in order to fight with it, the unity of all must be achieved: civil society, independent media. Our friends from "Bat`kivschyna" and "UDAR" find it more difficult to talk because they have no ideology. I don't want to criticize our political brothers, but they made an evolution from conservatives to social – democrats and just simply to populists.

...

...

We decided that we will be political competitors in independent country, but now there are things, that unite us: everybody wants to get rid of Yanukovich regime, everybody wants to eliminate the negative consequences of his rule and modernize and reform the country. As for the Constitution, we never were enthusiastic about the parliament republic as in the period of economic and political transformations, president power is more swift to react.

.....

Now we are discussing the Constitution 2004 as Yanukovich was elected under this Constitution, but the constitutional Court abolished it and changes the volume of his authority. But did the people give him that authority? Did they vote for it? If the Constitution was changed, new elections should have been held, as he gained much more authority. He did not use this authority for the wellbeing of the state. That is why it is necessary to go back to the initial positions.

.....

In the peaceful time "Svoboda":

- a) has our own project of Constitution. It was not written 5 years ago.
- b) me and my political brothers are sure that the question is not in the balance of the power on the top, but it is about the possibility to influence more actively the processes inside the country. In art. 5 of the Constitution, it is written that people are the source of power. The citizen is interested in realization of this power. So if the balance of power to be divided, the mechanism of the direct democracy must be increased.

What relation does "Svoboda" have to Right Sector (Pravyi Sector)?

We have no relation to Pravyi Sector. "Svoboda" is not Pravyi Sector. Indeed there is no such organization as Pravyi Sector. It was created by the regime, when people grew to understand that there was no peaceful mechanism for the protest, when on the 16.01.2014 it issued the laws according to which we were forbidden to gather more than 3 people, to walk with national flag, that tents are not allowed, took all the democratic fights and freedoms away, deprived people of their right to peaceful protest and provoked non-peaceful one. It is a response of the society. We did not create Pravyi Sector, the power created a situation, when the citizens understood: the laws do not work, the methods do not work, 50 days of peaceful standing does not work, moreover you can be killed for that.

.....

We don't know who were under the masks. Even those who took the responsibility for it, do not control it all. But even the most radical wing was against violence, murders or terrorism.

European integration and signing of the Association Agreement

The agreement implies reduction of the tariffs on the imported goods, which would reduce the revenue coming to the treasury. What is your opinion on the issue?

We live in times of globalization and our countries have to compete not with quotas and tariffs, or excise duties, but with their quality.

.....

Closedness does not foster modernization. We need to compete. But in some countries, the state protects essential markets.

....

Today the competition gives way to improve quality. Closing the markets will not give us any advantage. The association agreement is a chance.

Does your party agree that the country delegates a part of its power to supranational authority?

Association does not mean entering the EU. There is no question of reduction of the sovereign rights. When we entered WTO we also agreed with certain rules. But I don't see any loss of sovereignty here.

Annex 2.

Abstracts of interviews with students of Kiev Mohyla Academy and Shevchenko University in Kiev, Kiev, February - March 2014.

Why do you support/ do not support VO “Svoboda”?

KIEV – MOHYLA ACADEMY

Student A (in favor of the party)

There were a lot of parties, the so called, national-democratic ones: “Nasha Ukraina”, “Bat`kivshchyna”, they were in power partially, but failed to use their possibilities, because there are different groups of influence inside those parties, but in “Svoboda” there is only one. The party is strong, as there are no different environments and due to the fact that the party is so monolithic, I think it can do more than if it had different interests inside it.

.....

I like very much the position that demands that all the strategic enterprises have to belong to the state. It does not mean implication of the soviet model with all the business belonging to the state, collectivization, etc. , it means the enterprises of rocket engineering, heavy industry, without which the state can not survive, but not to certain people, who manage them according to their interests. They also have the passages which would make Ukrainians equal in their positions, as we have an issue that Ukraine belonged to Moscow for a long time.

Student B (neutral) I am from Lviv. There is a stereotype that we support “Svoboda” but indeed, Lviv made me neutral to this party. The activity of the party in the beginning was radical and was perceived in the East and in the Centre as unacceptable. I did not like it, as I did not want to be associated with this party uniquely (only because I come from Lviv). I am neutral to them because I think that such a power must be in the Parliament. They correct their mistakes, they try to work on their image, but I can not say that I like all methods and mechanism they use. I like that they put forward the ideas (in Parliament), which were not promoted before, for example, concerning Ukrainian language, Bandera, Shukhevych. I am used to it, I do not question this, so I like it. But on the other hand sometimes they cross the line, that is why I am cautious about it. When

you are in politics, you should take into consideration all the people in the country. One must understand that people in the East do not support those ideas. There should be a golden middle. I respect sober mind in politics.

Student C (does not support the party) I wouldn't say I am totally against the party, but I do not support the values they promote. I do not like radical approach to anything, destruction is not creative. When people talk about ruining old, without talking about construction of something new, it frightens me. Sometimes "Svoboda" says that afterwards we will have fair civil society, but those are general phrases and they stay radical in their actions. All the other parties also speak about civil society. That is why I can not identify what exactly they want to propose me. They are very active now, promoting non-peaceful Maidan. This message is actively spread through the net. But I do not like, that their message does not coincide with the actions. They see, that there is a demand for certain kind of radical actions in Ukraine that is why they support it. But I can not support the party, which does not have any productive strategy.

NATIONAL SHEVCHENKO UNIVERSITY

Student A (in favor of the party) There are a lot of interesting speakers and also pragmatic politicians in "Svoboda".

....

I did not take a very close look to their program, but I like that they express freely their view, they are very persuasive and I like the charisma, with which they do it. They can work with the public, they brought some rhetoric to Maidan, which people supported.

Student B (neutral) I agree and at the same time I do not agree (with the policy of the party). How can we distinguish between nationalist and non-nationalist parties anyway? All of them tell that they support peoples' interests. It means all of them work for the interests of the country. I agree with the fact that they speak Ukrainian, though I am from Vilnytsya. But I can not say that they are indeed really nationalistic.

Student C (does not support the party) I have more centrist vision in politics, that is why I do not completely support "Svoboda".

....

There are a lot of myths around "Svoboda", that they are nationalist, radical, but I must say that they are not as radical as some other organizations.

*Do you think VO “Svoboda” is a new phenomenon
on Ukrainian political arena?*

KIEV - MOHYLA ACADEMY

Student A (in favor of the party) Yes, I think so.

Student B (neutral) Well, it bring the ideological progress. For example, few people used the saying “Slava Ukraini, Geroiam Slava” (Glory to Ukraine, glory to the heroes) very frequently, but it was normal for “Svoboda”.

Student C (does not support the party) I know some “svobodovists” and they do not differ from all the rest of the nationalists, which were before. Nationalism is a very emotional thing. When a person starts to think about the problem of nationalism, they touch the problems of the attitude to the country, self identification as a Ukrainian, that is fortunately becoming important for young people. So I can not say, that this nationalism is somehow different, but as any ideology it adapts to the circumstances.


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Student A (in favor of the party) To certain extent it is very similar to other parties as they are the parties made for certain leader rather than for ideology. We know that in some countries there are polar parties, like Republicans and Democrats, whose vector is known in advance, with no regard on who the leader is. But in Ukraine, we still have rather political projects, than parties.

Student B (neutral) Than the question should why “Svoboda” is not the only party on Maidan? There are other parties, which support one determined way of Ukrainian development. If they have common interests, than we can not single out only this party. That is why I do not agree, that “Svoboda” is something new.

Student C (does not support the party) No, I do not think, that it is something new. In Ukraine there are a lot of projects, rather than parties. They always stick to certain ideology and the people adjust to it. “Svoboda” party as all the other projects (BUT, UDAR) took its line, took the nationalist niche, so it does not differ significantly.

Annex 3



A LINK BETWEEN VO "SVOBODA" AND YOUTH ACTIVISTS ORGANIZATIONS