Lingua Natolina

ISSUE 1 : (NON) CONFORMITY (VOL.1)

Lingua Natolina

It is *Lingua Natolina*'s belief that the accomplishment of cross-cultural meaning is both a personal and collective adventure beyond the borders set by language and conventional forms of expression. In this sense, rather than a definitive and coherent outlet, our hybrid and multilingual journal is an experience in European intellectual community. The College of Europe's students hail from over 50 countries. By bringing together the talented students of the College of Europe Mario-Soares Promotion (2020-2021), and key voices in the pan-European cultural discourse, we intend to lift up a true Babel-like cacophony that has the potential to spur intercultural and multilingual dialogue further. In this first volume of our issue on (non)conformity, readers will find a collection of academic and creative essays, as well as stories and art that bears witness to the rich cultural tapestry of Europe. This volume includes original texts in Belarusian, German, Italian, French, and English from students and key artists, writers, academics, and political figures. This seminal motivation to enact a shift away from conventional modes of expression led to the choice of the theme of (non)conformity through which form could match content in our first issue. The concept of conformity presents us with an ambivalence key to the semantic slipperiness that occurs when working between languages. In translating, should we conform to the dictates of authorial intention, or the aesthetics of form? And following from this, should conformity be positively or negatively valued? The French philosopher Henri Bergson stated that it is by conforming with our deeper selves that we find true freedom. However, conformity with social norms reframes the question: some transgressions prove unacceptable, but remaining 'within the ranks' is not always desirable. As befits this postmodern age, the discourses contained in the following pages will surely undermine each other and answer these questions about conformity very differently. Instead of bounding meaning into a hermetic idea of "European" civilization, this first volume of *Lingua Natolina* reinforces the cosmopolitan and forever elusive heritage of Europe through an exploration of (non)conformity in (His)Story, and Politics.

Kevin Le Merle, Editor-in-Chief

CONTENTS

EUROPEAN (HIS)STORIES

The European (His)Stories section inscribes itself in the awareness that history is constantly being written and rewritten, whether it be through fiction, creative essays, current political discourses, or academic explorations of the past. It features prominent writers, artists, and political figures, not only to give you a glimpse of the cosmopolitan story and history of Europe, but also to participate in writing it.

Deniz Alper Acar, *Beginning of the Journey*, 2020. Ink drawing, 297 x 210 mm.

Уладзімір Някляеў - перш за ўсё беларускі паэт і пісьменнік. Ён з'яўляўся адным з лідараў беларускага супраціву дыктатуры, кандыдатам на выбарах 2010 года ў Беларусі, былым старшынёй Беларускага ПЭН-цэнтра, які, нягледзячы на шматлікія арышты і пагрозы ягонаму жыццю, працягвае барацьбу.

Яго кароткае эсэ адлюстроўвае сутыкненне двух сусветаў у адной краіне: бясконцую барацьбу і нежаданне прыстасоўвацца да таго ладу жыцця, які людзі без каштоўнасцей спрабуюць навязаць іншым.

Uladzimir Niakliaeŭ is a Belarusian poet and writer above all else. He is one of the leaders of the Belarusian resistance against Lukashenko's regime. He was a candidate for the 2010 elections in Belarus, leader of the Writers' Union, who, despite multiple arrests and threats to his life, still continues his fight.

This short essay, translated into English by Volha Zaitsava, depicts the ever-present collision of two worlds within one country: a constant struggle and unwillingness to conform to the ways of life that those without values are trying to impose on others.

US AND THEM
МЫ І ЯНЫ

Мы і яны. І Беларусь. Яны, як і мы, кажуць: яна ў нас адна.

І нібыта яно так. І не так. Бо надта ўжо розныя ў нас Беларусі. Яны тут не жывуць, яны тут палююць. Гэтаксама яны маглі б паляваць дзе заўгодна. Але там свае паляўнічыя.

Іх Беларусь бязмоўная, бяздумная. Бяспамятная, бязмозглая, каб круціць ёй, як яны ўсхочуць.

Для іх яна тое, што ў рот, што ў жывот. Што чарка і скварка.

А для нас што ў душу, што ў сэрца. Што дух і кроў.

Як спалучыць гэтая дзве Беларусі? З чаго пачаць? Мы меркавалі: з духа. З ідэі нацыянальнай.

А яны вырашылі: з чаркі ды скваркі. З ідэі сацыяльнай.

І павесілі білборды: «Мы любім Беларусь». Якую? Тую, дзе яны п'юць? Абжыраюцца? Дык паўсюль п'юць і жаруць.

Але толькі тут раптам гукнецца глыбока ў памяці тупат Пагоні каля Крэўскага замка.

Толькі тут захлынецца знячэўку душа, слухаючы Купалінку.

Нечым такім, што не выказаць. Што гэта? Адкуль?..

Вось тое, што гукаецца ў памяці, чым захлынаецца душа і ёсць Беларусь.

Для таго, каб яна гукнулася ў памяці трэба мець памяць. Не чужую сваю.

Каб гукнулася ў душы трэба мець душу. Сваю не чужую. А тым больш, не здабытую на паляванні.

Uladzimir Niakliaeŭ

It's us and them. And Belarus.
Just like us, they claim it's all they have.
To a random onlooker it might even seem as though it's true. But at a closer glance – not really.
See, their Belarus is much too different from the one we call our own. What they make of their lives is not exactly living, but rather hunting. Something they could have perfectly done anywhere else.
Their Belarus is speechless, thoughtless. It's absentminded and demented. It can be twisted in any way they want.
For them it aims for their gut. It's their source of income, food and lust. It's nothing but a place to drag out their wretched existence.
For us it aims for the heart, for the soul. For the truth and conscience.
Do we stand a chance to unite the two? Where can one start? We thought we could start with people's spirit.
With a higher idea of the nation.
They chose to start with basic needs. With the base idea of necessity.
Their billboards scream: "And we love Belarus!" But which one is it? The one where food and booze is all there is to life?
It's not for us.
For when the silence falls, the sound of far-off hooves will be heard. And it will trigger the overpowering memory of a brave horse rider approaching Kreusky Castle. And just like an echo, old tunes will evoke deep-seated memories. Will move and heal the soul.
It's something that can't really be expressed or explained, something that comes from within.
What is it? You might ask.
Where does it really come from? ...
I'll tell you. Whatever brings back long-lost memories and overwhelms the soul IS Belarus, IS home.
Of course, for it to resonate in memory, one needs to have a memory. It can't be someone else's, it needs to be our own.
For it to overwhelm the soul, one needs to have a soul.
It can't be someone else's. And even more so, it cannot be the soul procured on a hunting ground.

translation by Volha Zaitsava

LIFE OF GRAND DUKE VITAŬT

ЖЫЦЦЯПІС ВЯЛІКАГА КНЯЗЯ ЛІТОЎСКАГА

Валерый Зайцаў - беларускі мастак, які прысвяціў сваё жыццё мастацтву і выкарыстоўваў яго для прасоўвання беларускіх нацыянальных каштоўнасцей, адмаўляючыся тым самым падпарадкоўвацца несправядлівасці і жорсткасці аўтарытарнага рэжыму ў сваёй краіне.

Лепш за ўсё гэта адчуваецца ў яго працы "Жыццяпіс Вялікага Князя Вітаўта", якая адлюстроўвае жыццёвы шлях чалавека, які стаў сімвалам нацыянальнага адраджэння і гонару ў сучаснай Беларусі.

Нестандартныя рашэнні Вялікага Князя Вітаўта і яго нежаданне адпавядаць чаканням прывялі Вялікае Княства Літоўскае і Каралеўства Польскае да перамогі ў Грунвальдскай бітве, якая змяніла ход гісторыі і з'яўляецца адной з самых значных бітваў у сярэднявечнай Еўропе.

Valery Zaitsau is a Belarusian artist who found solace in his art and used it to promote Belarusian national values, thus refusing to comply with the injustice and cruelty of the authoritarian regime in his country.

This sentiment is best expressed in his intricate work "Life of Grand Duke Vitaŭt" which portrays the man who became the symbol of national rebirth and pride in modern-day Belarus.

The unconventional decisions made by Grand Duke Vitaŭt and his unwillingness to conform to expectations led the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland to victory in the Battle of Grunwald, which turned the tide of history and has become one of the most significant battles in medieval Europe.

Volha Zaitsava

Valery Zaitsau, *Life of Grand Duke Vitaŭt*, 2014. Icon painting, tempera and gold on panel, 96.7 cm x 120 cm.
Валеры Зайцаў, "Жыццяпіс Вялікага Князя Літоўскага", 2014, іканапіс, тэмпера і золата на панэлі,
96,7 см х 120 см

Dans ce texte aux allures de manifeste, **Simon Berger**, *auteur de* Laisser aller ton serviteur *aux éditions Corti, envoie valser les idéologies conformistes qui nous entravent. La traduction anglaise du texte original a été réalisée par Kevin Le Merle.*

Simon Berger is the French author of Laisse aller ton serviteur *with Corti publishing. In this text resembling a manifesto he sends the conformist ideologies that hinder us spiralling. The English translation of his French text was completed by Kevin Le Merle.*

ON DANCE: NOTES ON APOLITICISM

DE LA DANSE : NOTES SUR L'APOLITISME

Ich würde nur an einen Gott glauben, der zu tanzen verstünde.
Nietzsche, *Also sprach Zarathustra*, I, « Vom Lesen und Schreiben »
"I should believe only in a God who understood how to dance."
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I, "Of Reading and Writing"

Il ne doit pas être aisé de filmer des corps qui dansent. À la succession d'immobilités que la caméra veut imposer au réel pour le saisir, la danse oppose ses mouvements, uns et indivisibles.

D'où l'incomparable génie de ce tango, dansé par Stefania Sandrelli et Dominique Sanda dans *Le Conformiste* de Bertolucci.

Les deux femmes dansent, sans autre désir que de danser, et les couples venus guincher à Joinville s'arrêtent, médusés, et regardent.

Trintignant, le conformiste, est assis sur le côté, agacé, impatient.

Il parle politique. Il pense politique.

Il ne danse pas.

C'est peut-être la définition même du conformiste : celui qui ne danse pas.

Le conformiste est pris dans des espaces géométriques, infiniment répétables ; le regard du conformiste déroule des parois de marbre blanc, de grands vides que rien ne heurte.

Le trajet du conformiste est droit et infini ; il avance avec la rigueur d'un axiome, sur des lignes immobiles à force d'être uniformes.

Le fascisme est cette itération hiératique et grotesque : une ligne qui ne tolère que la reproduction de sa propre immobilité. Une machine à engourdir les jambes.

Congruence du fascisme et du capitalisme : la frénésie d'aller et de mouvoir, la malléabilité et le déracinement, ne sont aussi qu'illusions de mouvement : rien ne distingue l'extrême vitesse de l'immobilité absolue. Le capitalisme sécrète du temps libre pour l'aliéner, du vivant pour l'occire, de la singularité pour la conformer.

Fascisme et capitalisme veulent que l'individu ne soit pas indivis ; cohérent et prévisible, mais surtout pas entier. Tyrannies géométriques, zénoniennes, qui segmentent, découpent, dissèquent.

Usines de mosaïques et de fragmentations, où l'individu n'est plus qu'une unité (productive, statistique), jamais un unicum.

Filming dancing bodies is no easy task. Dance opposes the indivisible whole of its movement to the series of stills that the camera attempts to impose on reality.

Hence the incomparable genius of the tango, danced by Stefania Sandrelli and Dominique Sanda in *The Conformist* by Bertolucci.

The two women dance, without any other desire than to dance, and the couples that came to boogie in Joinville stop, mesmerised, and watch.

Trintignant, the conformist, is sitting on the side, annoyed and impatient.

He speaks of politics. Thinks of politics.

He does not dance.

That is maybe the very definition of the conformist: the one that does not dance.

The conformist is caught up in a series of geometrical spaces, infinitely alike and repeatable; the stare of the conformist unravels white marble walls, and the great empty expanses that nothing disturbs.

The conformist's trajectory is straight and infinite; he advances with the rigour of an axiom, on lines made motionless by their own uniformity.

Fascism is that hieratic and grotesque iteration: a line that only tolerates the imitation of its own immobility. A machine made to numb your legs.

There is overlap between fascism and capitalism: the frenzy of going and moving, a plasticity and uprooting that are nothing more than the illusion of movement: nothing distinguishes extreme speed from absolute immobility.

Capitalism secretes free time only to alienate it, life only to reap it, singularity only to conform it.

Fascism and capitalism require of the individual that he be divided; coherent and predictable, but definitely not whole: like a geometric and zenonian tyranny that segments, cuts up, and dissects.

Factories of mosaics, and patchworks, where the individual is nothing more than a unit (a productive statistic), never a unicum.

« Je ne veux voir aucune tête dépasser » ; sinon je la tranche.

Fascisme et capitalisme, formidables écoles d'Égalisation.

Procuste et Mammon.

La danse, c'est le lieu où la tête dépasse. Un bon danseur n'est pas un sac de membres ; il danse avec son visage.

Le fascisme veut le même (tyrannie des marionnettistes), le capitalisme veut l'égal (tyrannie des comptables), le libéralisme veut la tranquillité (tyrannie des marchands) ; la danse veut le duel, le face-à-face, l'asymétrie, le vertige.

La danse nous offre le spectacle d'un pouvoir débarrassé de la politique ; d'un pouvoir rendu au pur jeu des sens.

Le fascisme veut seulement la parade. Pour vouloir de l'authentique danse, il faut cesser de vouloir de la politique.

La danse ne dit même pas « Ni Dieu ni maître » : elle est rituel ; elle est maîtrise.

La danse est en deçà de l'anarchie.

Bien sûr, la danse est la coutume suprême. Mais précisément pour cela, parce qu'elle est tradition, elle vient des organes, des tréfonds ; le danseur, même le bourgeois dans sa valse, même le prince en pavane, quand il veut bien s'abandonner à la danse, sent qu'il répond à une exigence qui se rit des convenances.

Voilà pourquoi il est si dur de rester assis au concert, à l'opéra. Parce que la musique appelle sa réponse organique.

La danse réveille en nous l'archaïsme de notre condition apolitique que nous avons voulu faire taire. Subversion des gestes quotidiens, en une révolution corporelle strictement normée.

Posons une dernière définition péremptoire : la danse, c'est de la subversion codifiée. C'est de l'anticonformisme conformé à une exigence plus haute.

Il faut danser, pour laisser le politique agacé, impuissant, sur le côté.

Danser, comme dansent Stefania Sandrelli et Dominique Sanda, un tango sous le regard médusé des guincheurs de Joinville, puis rire de cette folie qui, pour douce et passagère qu'elle fût, n'en a pas moins tout emporté sur son passage.

"I do not want to see any head sticking out"; if I do, a body shall be beheaded.

Fascism and capitalism, formidable schools of Equalisation.

Procrustes and Mammon.

Dance, that's where our heads stick out. A good dancer is not a bag of limbs; he dances with his face.

Fascism seeks similitude (the tyranny of puppeteers), capitalism seeks a sort of levelling out (the tyranny of accountants), liberalism seeks tranquillity (the tyranny of merchants); dance seeks duel, face-offs, asymmetry, and vertigo.

Dance offers the spectacle of a power that is rid of politics; of a power returned to the pure play of our senses.

Fascism only wants parade. To seek out authentic dance, one must cease to desire politics.

Dance does not even say "Nor God nor master": it is ritual; it is mastery.

Dance is beneath anarchy.

Of course, dance is the supreme custom. But that is precisely why, because it is tradition, that rises from the gut, the innermost; the dancer, even the bourgeois in his waltz, even the prince in his pavane, when he accepts to lose himself to dance, feels that he responds to an imperative that laughs at rules.

That is why it so difficult to sit through a concert or an opera. Because music calls for an organic response.

Dance awakens the archaism of our apoliticism, that we tried, in vain, to repress. It subverts daily gestures into a strictly normed corporeal revolution.

Let us express a last peremptory definition: dance, is codified subversion. It is anti-conformism conformed to a higher imperative.

We must dance, to leave the vexed and now impotent politics, to the side.

Dance, like Stefania Sandrelli and Dominique Sanda dance. Dance a tango under the mesmerised stare of the others of Joinville, then laugh of that folly, which although gentle and ephemeral, succeeded in carrying away everything in its path.

Kevin Le Merle, *Dancing with Stallions*, 2020. Charcoal drawing.

Simon Berger
translated by Kevin Le Merle

He took his leave of an affair with a local German woman with just a terse note.

"Monika, we got the news today that we shall return to Britain in a day or two. I don't know when I will see you again, but I will write soon. Much love. Michael." He did not write or see her again.

Even so, as the years passed after the war, Monika was never completely gone from his mind. Her image came back often to him. Always he tried to hide from his thoughts the reality of it all, perhaps conveniently as if she had been merely a passing episode that ended when the war ended. Michael was a British soldier sent to Germany after the end of the Second World War. His affair with Monika had been much more than a mere episode or just a fling of a young man then in his early twenties. Its abrupt end with his promise to write to her stayed stubbornly within him like a framed, dark shadow of guilt hovering in a corner of his mind, refusing not to reappear.

During those years, Michael followed his chosen pre-war trade in insurance. To succeed, he kept a safe image of himself, more or less as a caricature of the insurance business. He adopted the required manner in keeping with his masters' submissive façade toward the industry's self-created aura of respectability and solidness designed to assure appearances and expectations of unsuspecting clients.

True to the image, he wore the dark suits and respectable shirts and modest ties of his trade, spoke carefully its policy-schedule jargon common to this work and to the post-war way of life. He arrived on time at the office every day by train from suburban Surrey, and read *The Times* newspaper en route every day.

Succeed he did, rising to become a senior partner of the firm in the City of London at 38 years old. He had married. There were no children. His wife had died in 1960 after a long illness.

One morning about three years after his wife's death and some seventeen years after Michael's note to Monika, an article in *The Times* about post-war Germany reawakens Monika to him. As he sits in the usual seat of the usual carriage on the usual train from Surrey to London, the article inspires a dramatic thought, in itself a rare event in Michael's mind. He stares out of the window and ponders: Perhaps there is now no reason not to find out about his former German lover? He could easily take a little time off from work, make the trip, round the circle, lose the Monika image, renew the image, whatever? Turning on the insurance slot in his brain, he thinks about the risks and decides they are very limited. He would not be announced, nobody would know him, and, anyway, he could just go there and look around a bit in a sort of secret way, without any preordained reason? Yes, he thought. He more or less decides to go.

A few weeks later, Michael sits in a train carriage, this time en route to Germany. His thoughts about her race the train. Would she still be alive? Would she still be there, or gone somewhere else? She would be in her mid-late forties, a bit more than his age. What would she look like now? Was she still married, married again, with more children?

He looks out of the window and muses… isn't this trip a futile venture? Wasn't it, always, pointless for him to think about her? Weren't their brief lives together before destined to be a temporary thing, anyway, even if they did become lovers? The war saw to that.

He turns to read *The Times*. There is only one other person in the carriage, a young man who sits opposite him, reading a book. Michael puts down his newspaper, decides he should engage in polite conversation.

"What are you reading?"

"It's one of my textbooks. I am a student of law at the university," he says. "We have a break and I am going to my small hometown where my parents live. It's the last stop."

"Ah, that's where I am going," says Michael. "When does the train arrive?"

"Oh, it should be there in an hour or so," the student says.

The student closes his book, puts it by his side and, with studious curiosity, asks Michael why he should be going to such a small town. At first, Michael isn't sure what to say. He judges this will be just a conversation that will be forgotten when they leave the carriage.

Indeed, he feels strangely relieved at the chance to talk freely after years of just thinking about it all in his head.

"Oh, I was there some years ago, as a soldier in fact. I left after the war. I want to go back and see if somebody I met then is still there, a girl I knew then who was very kind."

The student asks him where this was. Michael tells him and names the street.

"You know that little town?" Michael asks.

"Oh, yes, my parents live there," the student says.

He doesn't show it, but the student is now internally, intensely interested.

"She was German, of course?"

"Monika, oh, yes," says Michael quietly.

The young man hears the woman's name, pauses, then asks, "Did you know her well?"

"Well, yes, I suppose you could say she was a very good friend," says Michael, "I would like to see if she is still there."

The student continues his questions in the same gentle manner.

"That is rather a long time now. It is 1963 now, that's 17 years or so ago?"

"Well, yes, I thought of that, of course," says Michael, "but I would like to know, and, maybe, even see her again, she might be gone somewhere else and…" he coughs, "I suppose it might even be a bit different to go there again."

This word "different", by which he means "mistake", awakens the thoughts of risk kept at the back of his mind which now leap to the front of it. Michael feels now more like the man of the daily train from Surrey to London.

Volha Zaitsava, *Sleeping Rough*, Amsterdam, 2016.

Risk, and his office mind is back in charge. He searches for some reassurance, and finds a counter proposal within that mutters "What harm could there be in just looking around?"

He is still anxious. His eyes search aimlessly around the carriage, then up to the compartment with his bag, then at the student who wants to carry on the conversation.

"What was the girl like?" he says. "I suppose she might have been a very pretty girl?"

"Oh yes," Michael says, rather hurriedly.

He has become disturbed by the student's questions. He wants to move away from the subject. He looks uncertain and again looks around the carriage, as if to calm himself. He looks at the student and asks what the small town is like now.

"As I said, it's where my parents live and have done for many years, the same place as you are going to. I was born there, my parents and me have always lived there. Much has changed, but I know many of the same families are still there."

Michael looks to the window, away from the student, cringes, and then looks up at his bag.

"You know, I think I will get off at the next stop and look around a bit," he says. "Good luck with your studies."

"Thank you. The next stop is quite near, it's the one before the last one where I will get off. Goodbye then." the student says.

Michael takes down his bag, waves to the boy, and wanders off down the corridor.

As the train moves slowly out of the station, the boy muses on the conversation passed between them. He felt sure he knew who this Monika was. She lived in the house close by for many years. He thinks this Monika was about the same age as his mother. And was it not her son with whom he played? This boy, was he not the son of a British soldier? He was about seven years old like him.

He thinks again, back to his parent's stories and his own memories of those past days when British forces occupied this part of Germany. He recalls that some in the surviving local population said they had good reason to like the British soldiers: they gave children sweets and chocolates, cigarettes to older men, and lonesome soldiers found lonesome wives and widows. He recalls that his nearby friend showed off the chocolates his mother got from a British soldier.

And he knew other children who somehow had received chocolate, but not him, and he was always bewildered how they got it, until one day his mother said the British soldiers gave some girls chocolate which they passed onto their brothers or their children. And one thing remained very clear — his own mother was not pleased when the student asked why she too did not know a British soldier, that threatened by the threatening hand of his mother, he had to run out of the room quickly.

Although he was not so old then, he still remembers the return of Monika's husband in 1949, he thinks, and what his mother and her neighbours said about Monika's behaviour and how there was much outrage.

All this he knew while talking to Michael. He wonders whether he should have said more to the man. Again, he relives the conversation with Michael. *I am, perhaps, a little bit naive, but I could not imagine how someone could believe in a "Wiedersehen" without troubles, and I could not speak about it to this man.*

Just then, the carriage door opens, and the student's thoughts are interrupted and ended with shock and surprise. Michael reappears with his bag.

"Hello again," says Michael, hesitantly, "I changed my mind and thought I'd get off at the next stop, as planned. I think it might, er it might be, more interesting. I thought about it and had a coffee in the bar."

The student looks up, trying hard not to show his astonishment, he can manage only a murmured, "Hello."

The train now pulls into the station.

It stops. The student sees his mother is waiting on the platform. He and Michael gather their bags. They leave the carriage and bid each other goodbye. The boy goes down the platform. Michael waits until the student is out of view, then slowly leaves the train, waits a bit then moves off in the same direction.

The student and his mother have gone further down the platform. In the mother's car on their way back to his parent's home the student asks his mother to tell him something more about the past and this Monika who lived nearby.

She does not answer, looks at him, grimaces, and shrugs. He decides he will not say or ask anything else.

"Now, tell me about your work at the university," she says.

<div align="right">

Roy Eales

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Deniz Alper Acar, *Courageous*, 2020. Ink drawing, 297 x 210 mm.

About the artist: Deniz Alper Acar is an aerospace engineer, machine learning enthusiast, and self-taught artist from Turkey.

POLITICS

Lingua Natolina's Politics section does not seek to simply follow the news and inform, nor aim for straightforward coherence. Rather, it intends to provide a forum for diverging worldviews, and create true democratic dialogue, that not only regroups dissimilar topics, but also bridges cultures and languages. Building a stronger Europe involves rekindling true intercultural communication. The Politics section was started in conjunction with the College of Europe Natolin Politics Student Society for this purpose.

Burak Beşir Fındıklı, *Soldiers on duty at the European Capital of chocolate, beer, and waffles, following the terrorist attacks that shook the entire world*, La Grand Place, Brussels, 2016.

Emeline Ogereau studierte Deutsch-Französische Beziehungen in Regensburg, Bayern, und engagierte sich danach als Juniorbotschafterin am deutsch-französischen Jugendwerk. In ihrem Studium am College of Europe in Natolin spezialisiert sie sich im Bereich der Erinnerungspolitik. Ihr Artikel untersucht regionale Identitäten Deutschlands und deren Konformität gegenüber vergangener geopolitischen Grenzen. Dabei enthüllt sie inwiefern der deutsche Einheitsprozess den Erwartungen entspricht.

After studying German and French relations in Regensburg, Bavaria, and being a volunteer for three years in the French-German Organisation for Youth as a Youth Ambassador, *Emeline Ogereau*'s interests at the College of Europe in Natolin link to political memory. In this article she explores German regional identity and the question of its conformity with geopolitical borders from the past. She uncovers the extent to which standards expected in the process of German reunification have been met.

30 YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION:
ARE EAST AND WEST FINALLY UNITED?

"Durch eine gemeinsame Anstrengung wird es uns gelingen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern und Sachsen-Anhalt, Brandenburg, Sachsen und Thüringen schon bald wieder in blühende Landschaften zu verwandeln, in denen es sich zu leben und zu arbeiten lohnt."[1]

Dieses Versprechen gab Helmut Kohl am 1. Juli 1990 für die Zeit nach der deutschen Wiedervereinigung.

Seit 1997 wird von der Bundesregierung jedes Jahr ein Bericht zum Stand der deutschen Einheit veröffentlicht.[2] Der diesjährigen Ausgabe nach, hat Deutschland nach 30 Jahren nahezu die perfekte wirtschaftliche Einheit hergestellt. 2018 erreichten die ostdeutschen Haushaltseinkommen 89% und die Produktivität fast 100% des Niveaus in Westdeutschland.[3]

Der Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die neuen Bundesländer, Marco Wanderwitz, sieht weiterhin Bedarf an weiteren Maßnahmen damit Ostdeutschland 100% der westlichen Wirtschaftslage entspricht. Man darf jedoch nicht vergessen, dass die Produktivität Ostdeutschlands 1990 nur 37% und das Haushaltseinkommen nur 50% des Westniveaus erreichte. Auch heutzutage sind die Konsequenzen der Wiedervereinigung ein wichtiger Bestandteil der öffentlichen Debatte. Die deutsche Einheit kann man hierbei gut durch eine bekannte Metapher darstellen: ist das Glas halb leer oder halb voll?

"Through a joint effort, we will soon be able to transform Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia back into blooming landscapes. (….) Nobody will be worse off than before, but many will be better."[1]

On the 1st July 1990, that was the promise Helmut Kohl made for the years following German reunification. Every year since 1997 the Federal government publishes reports on the state of German unity.[2]

The report of the 30-year anniversary presents Germany as close to completing economic unity. In East Germany, in 2018, household disposable income was close to 89% of federal average and productivity was nearly 100%.[3]

According to the Delegate of the Federal government for the new Länder, Marco Wanderwitz, further steps have to be taken to achieve 100% economic equality - but we should remember that in 1990, East Germany had 37% of the productivity of West Germany, and households had half the income. Discourse on the outcomes of the German reunification are still crucial in the present day. The perception of German unity could be considered in terms of a well-known metaphor: should we see the glass half empty or half full?

[1] It was a promise made on the day, when the Treaty on the Economical and Monetary Union came in force. ""Blühende Landschaften": Diese Zitate von Helmut Kohl werden bleiben", *Augsburger Allgemeine*, July 16, 2017, https://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/politik/Bluehende-Landschaften-Diese-Zitate-von-Helmut-Kohl-werden-bleiben-id41753096.html
[2] "Kluft zwischen Ost und West wird tiefer", *Der Spiegel*, September 26, 2012, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bericht-zum-stand-der-deutschen-einheit-ostdeutschland-faellt-zurueck-a-858019.html
[3] AL, "Réunification allemande : où en est-on, 30 ans après ?" *Missions allemandes en France*, September 18, 2020, https://allemagneenfrance.diplo.de/fr-fr/actualites-nouvelles-d-allemagne/04-Themesdesociete/-/2385734

Volha Zaitsava, *Construction Works*, Dresden, 2016.

Sind die Grenzen immer noch sichtbar?

Laut des Geschichtswissenschaftlers Emmanuel Droit, holt der Osten immer noch auf.[4] Im Bereich der Infrastruktur wie Straßen oder der Krankenhäuser, fällt der Unterschied mittlerweile fast nicht mehr auf. Unterschiede im BIP, sowie Einkommen und Arbeitslosigkeit bleiben jedoch immer noch bedeutsam.[5]

Wie Elisa Goudin-Steinmann, Dozentin in Germanistik an der Sorbonne Nouvelle, erklärt, basiert die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft auf Landwirtschaft und Rohstoffförderung, welche eine relativ niedrige Wertschöpfung generieren. Obwohl Medien dem Ost-West Unterschied mehr Aufmerksamkeit schenken, bestehen auch deutliche regionale Disparitäten zwischen dem Norden und dem Süden.[6] Die Überrepräsentation des Ost-West Gefälles im Vergleich zu dem zwischen Nord- und Süddeutschland förderte möglicherweise Verschanzungen der Trennungsnarrativen in beiden Regionen.

Are the borders still visible?

As the historian Emmanuel Droit exposes, eastern Germany is still catching up. If we take into account infrastructure such as roads and hospitals, this difference is not as visible as before.[4] Nevertheless, some differences are still apparent. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP), rates of income and rates of unemployment between the East and West are quite significantly different.[5]

Elisa Goudin-Steinmann, lecturer in German studies, emphasises that the eastern economy is based on agriculture and raw material extraction, which has less added value. Numbers and maps are often used in media to describe this difference, although differences between North and South Germany could also prove particularly relevant.[6] This overexposure of the public to eastern and western divisions, whilst diminishing regional differences between North and South, has perhaps been conducive to entrenching narratives of division and disenchantment in both regions.

[4]   Emmanuel Droit, Elisa Goudin-Steinmann, "Allemagne : entre l'Est et l'Ouest, la frontière fantôme," *France Culture*, October 12, 2020,
https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/cultures-monde/entre-separation-et-reunification-des-territoires-desunis-14-allemagne-entre-lest-et-louest-la
[5]   For example, in 2018, the level of income in Eastern Germany is 16.9% less than those in West Germany. Jérôme Vaillant, "L'Allemagne de l'Est est-elle la perdante de la réunification?" *Slate*, November 8, 2019, http://www.slate.fr/story/183936/allemagne-est-perdante-reunification-rda-rfa-chute-du-mur-de-berlin
[6]   Emmanuel Droit, Elisa Goudin-Steinmann "Allemagne".

West und Ost: verschiedene Ansichten?

Nach der Wende wurde das Westsystem mit dem Konzept des Liberalismus und der Demokratie in Ostdeutschland eingeführt. Während der Alltag im Westen unverändert blieb, war die Wende für den Osten ein tiefgreifender Umbruch. In der DDR war der Staat für alles verantwortlich: die Industrie, die Kultur, sogar der Urlaub. Von einem Tag auf den anderen musste sich die Bevölkerung des Ostens den westlichen Standards anpassen. Unternehmen scheiterten an verschiedenen Schwierigkeiten, wie zum Beispiel dem Verlust zahlreicher Einwohner, als die Menschen gen Westen abwanderten.[7] Der gesellschaftliche Umbruch löste bei vielen Ostdeutschen ein Gefühl der Unsicherheit, Angst und Frustration aus, welche von politischen Partien wie die AFD ausgenutzt werden.[8]

Ost-Identität?

Obwohl der gesellschaftliche Umbruch viele unterschiedliche Reaktionen hervorrief, hat nach Professor Goudin-Steinmann die aktuelle Generation eine kritische Auffassung der DDR. Viele Ungleichheiten bestehen immer noch, beispielweise im Bereich der Wirtschaft und der Unterrepräsentation der Ostdeutschen in Führungspositionen.[9] "Wenn man nicht gleich behandelt wird kann man sich nicht gleich fühlen", wie eine Einwohnerin Ostdeutschlands erklärte.[10] Ostdeutsche möchten nicht eine besondere Identität fördern, die eigentlich eine Konstruktion der Medien und politischen Sphäre und deshalb auch relativ fremd ist. Einige sehen die DDR Erfahrungen als einen Teil Ihrer historischen und kulturellen Herkunft, wovon schriftliche und musikalische Ostkultur einen wichtigen Bestandteil bilden. Andere möchten vor allem dass für die Jugendlichen mehr Chancen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt und im Bereich der Bildung entstehen.

West and East: different perceptions?

Following the collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), western liberal democracy was introduced in eastern Germany. Western people did not feel any change in their daily life, yet for those in the East, this change was seismic. In the GDR, everything was supervised by the State; whether it be industry, culture, or even holidays. From one day to the next, eastern German people had to fit in with western standards. Businesses failed as a result of various difficulties such as the loss of numerous inhabitants as people migrated westwards.[7] This brutal societal change incited feelings of insecurity, fear and frustration, which are exploited by political parties such as the Alternative Für Deutschland (AFD).[8]

Eastern identity?

Although this societal transformation relates to the manifestation of various reaction movements, as Professor Goudin-Steinmann says, the current generation has a critical perception of the GDR government. Various disparities still remain, such as economic aspects and the lack of representation of eastern people in Germany's elites. "If you are not treated equally, you can not feel equal," as an eastern German woman explained. Eastern Germans do not want to identify with a specific discourse which is in fact constructed by media and political spheres that are alien in some respects. For example, some see their roots in the historical and cultural recognition of GDR experiences and aspects of life, such as the work of musicians or writers. Some simply want more opportunities in order for all young eastern people to be able to study and find a job.

[7]   A significant effect of the reunification was the migration of numerous people to the West. 1.5 million young people left their hometown. Emmanuel Droit, Elisa Goudin-Steinmann, "Allemagne".

[8]   Emmanuel Droit, Elisa Goudin-Steinmann, "Allemagne".

[9]   Indeed, they only represent 2% of the German elite.

[10]   "Wir Ostdeutsche! 30 Jahre im vereinten Land," *RBB Fernsehen*, September 30, 2020, https://www.rbb-online.de/doku/u-w/wir-ostdeutschen.html

Das digitale Projekt "Wie sind der Osten", das von der Journalistin und Psychologin, Melanie Stein, eingeführt wurde, stellt die Vielfalt des Ostens durch zwischenmenschliche Geschichten vor[11]. So steht es als ein Beispiel wodurch man die vielfältige Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen der DDR verarbeiten kann. Somit spricht dieses Projekt Bänder über die Notwendigkeit, den laufenden Prozess der deutschen Wiedervereinigung aufrechtzuerhalten.

The project "Wir sind der Osten" ("We are the East") , which was set up by journalist and psychologist Melanie Stein, is a digital initiative which presents the diversity of Eastern people's stories. It is an example of a mechanism through which we can understand the various experiences and memories of the GDR: it speaks volumes about the necessity to maintain the ongoing process of German unity.

Emeline Ogereau

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[11]   "Wir sind der Osten," https://wirsindderosten.de/

Joseph Tyrrell, *Lettuces*, Brittany, France, 2017.

Joseph Tyrrell, *Muzeum Pamięci Sybiru*. Białystok, Poland, 2020.

Antoine Granier est un étudiant du Collège d'Europe qui se spécialise dans l'accession des pays des Balkans occidentaux à l'Union Européene, et plus généralement aux relations entre l'UE et l'Europe de l'Est. Dans cet article qui déligne le rapport entre la Serbie et la Russie, il explique que la non-conformité de la Serbie en matière de politique d'accession à l'UE relève d'une véritable stratégie géopolitique.

Antoine Granier is a College of Europe student specialising in Western-Balkan countries' accession to the European Union, as well as the relations between the EU and Eastern Europe. In this telling article delineating Serbia's ties with Russia, he suggests that Serbia's failure to fully conform with the EU's accession process serves a strategic geopolitical agenda.

SERBIA: A RETURN TO THE NON-ALIGNMENT POLICY?

SERBIE : RETOUR À LA POLITIQUE DE NON-ALIGNEMENT?

La Serbie, pays candidat à l'adhésion de l'Union Européenne (UE) refuse d'imposer des sanctions à la Russie, sanctions pourtant demandées par l'ensemble de l'UE.[1] En effet, la Serbie entretient de très fortes relations avec Moscou qui est, notamment, un allié de taille pour lutter contre la reconnaissance officielle du Kosovo puisqu'elle détient un siège permanent au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. Ensuite, le 25 octobre 2019, la Serbie signe un accord de libre-échange avec l'Union Économique Eurasiatique (UEEA), un bloc commercial largement dominé par la Russie.[2] De ce fait, comment interpréter cette non-conformité de la part de la Serbie vis-à-vis du processus d'adhésion à l'Union européenne ? Faut-il y voir une perte d'influence de l'Europe unifiée au profit de la Russie ? Moscou a-t-elle réellement une grande influence dans cette région des Balkans ? Ou encore, est-ce que Belgrade décide de réemployer la politique de non-alignement appliquée par l'ancienne Yougoslavie ?

Concentrons-nous tout d'abord sur l'importance du traité commercial. Premièrement, comme l'a rappelé un porte-parole de l'UE, la Serbie peut conclure des accords commerciaux avec tous les pays qu'elle souhaite avant son adhésion à l'UE. [3] Cependant, lorsqu'elle en deviendra un membre à part entière, elle devra se retirer de tous les pactes commerciaux qu'elle a conclus, afin de se conformer à la politique commerciale de l'UE.[4]

The European Union (EU) candidate country Serbia is refusing to impose sanctions on Russia, even though the whole EU is calling for them.[1] Indeed, Serbia has very strong relations with Moscow which is, in particular, a major ally in the fight against the official recognition of Kosovo, since it has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. On the 25th of October 2019, Serbia signed a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a trade bloc largely dominated by Russia.[2] So how should we interpret this non-compliance on the part of Serbia with regard to the EU accession process? Is it to be seen as a loss of influence of a unified Europe in favour of Russia? Does Moscow really have a great influence in this Balkan region? Or has Belgrade decided to re-use the non-alignment policy applied by the former Yugoslavia?

To answer these questions we must first take a closer look at Serbia's relationship to its trade agreements. Firstly, as an EU spokesperson pointed out, Serbia can conclude trade agreements with any country it wants before joining the EU.[3] However, when it becomes a full member, it will have to withdraw from all the trade pacts it has concluded, in order to comply with EU trade policy.[4]

[1]   Maja Poznatov, "La Serbie mise sur la solidarité avec l'UE face à l'embargo russe," *EURACTIV*, August 26, 2014, https://www.euractiv.fr/section/l-europe-dans-le-monde/news/la-serbie-mise-sur-la-solidarite-avec-l-ue-face-a-l-embargo-russe/
[2]   Joanne Massard, "L'adhésion de la Serbie à l'UE est-elle toujours possible ?" *Euronews*, November 30, 2019, https://fr.euronews.com/2019/10/30/l-adhesion-de-la-serbie-a-l-ue-est-elle-toujours-possible
[3]   Andrew Rettman, "Serbia pact with Russian bloc to be short-lived, EU says," *EU Observer*, August 29, 2019, https://euobserver.com/enlargement/145745
[4]   Rettman, "Serbia pact with Russian bloc to be short-lived, EU says"

Deuxièmement, il faut relativiser l'impact commercial de ce traité commercial, et ce à plusieurs niveaux. Pour commencer, la Serbie avait déjà conclu des accords commerciaux séparés avec la Russie (2000), le Belarus (2009) et le Kazakhstan (2012).[5] Par conséquent, la Serbie, en concluant cet accord de libre-échange avec l'UEEA, ne s'engage réellement qu'avec le Kirghizistan et l'Arménie. Ensuite, la Russie, qui est pourtant de loin le pays leader de ce bloc eurasiatique, représentait, en 2019, en réalité seulement 11,4% des importations serbes et 6,9,% des exportations serbes. En comparaison, l'Union européenne seule représentait, la même année, 64,6% des exportations et 63% des importations de la Serbie.[6]

Il faut donc grandement relativiser l'importance économique de ce traité de libre-échange. Comme le résume Florian Bieber, historien spécialisé dans l'histoire contemporaine des Balkans, ce traité est bien plus politique et symbolique qu'économique. Il permet à Moscou de montrer un peu les muscles et se montrer plus importants dans cette région qu'ils ne le sont réellement.[7] Toutefois, la Russie met en garde l'UE sur le fait qu'il ne faut pas prendre les Balkans occidentaux comme une « chose acquise » et que différents acteurs y restent encore influents à différents niveaux. Quant à la Serbie, elle se constitue des outils supplémentaires pour faire pencher les négociations de son adhésion de manière plus significative en sa faveur.

The impact of this pact on trade needs to be put into perspective on several levels. For a start, Serbia had already concluded separate trade agreements with Russia (2000), Belarus (2009) and Kazakhstan (2012).[5] Consequently, Serbia, in concluding this free trade agreement with the EUAE, is only really engaging with Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. Secondly, in 2019, Russia, which is by far the leading country in this Eurasian bloc, actually represented only 11.4% of Serbian imports and 6.9.% of Serbian exports. In comparison, the European Union alone accounted for 64.6% of Serbian exports and 63% of Serbian imports in the same year.[6]

The economic importance of this free trade treaty must therefore be put into perspective. As Florian Bieber, a historian specialising in the contemporary history of the Balkans, sums up, this treaty is much more political and symbolic than economic. It allows Moscow to flex its muscles a little and show itself to be more important in this region than it really is.[7] However, Russia warns the EU that the Western Balkans should not be taken for granted and that different actors still have influence in the region at different levels. As for Serbia, it is building up additional tools to tip the accession negotiations more significantly in its favour.

[5]   "Razvojna agencija Srbije," *Development Agency of Serbia*, accessed October 16, 2020, https://ras.gov.rs/export-promotion/free-trade-agreements
"Российский совет по международным делам," *Russian International Affairs Council*, accessed October 16, 2020, https://russiancouncil.ru/papers/EAEU-Serbia-WP37-En.pdf
[6]   "Републички завод за статистику Србије," *Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia*, accessed October 16, 2020, http://archive.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Default.aspx
[7]   Trent Murray, "Belgrade's balancing act : Serbia plays both EU and Russia on trade," *Euronews*, October 25, 2019, https://www.euronews.com/2019/10/25/belgrade-s-balancing-act-serbia-plays-both-eu-and-russia-on-trade
[8]   Florent Marciacq, "Entre amitié avec la Russie et intégration européenne : la Serbie à la croisée des chemins," *Regard sur l'est*, December 15, 2014, http://regard-est.com/entre-amitie-avec-la-russie-et-integration-europeenne-la-serbie-a-la-croisee-des-chemins
[9]   Florent Marciacq, "The Western Balkans and the EU in Multilateral Organisations: Foreign Policy Coordination and Declaratory Alignment in the OSCE," *Journal of Regional Security* 7, no. 2 (2012): 129.
[10]   Milica Stojanovic, "Serbia Signs Trade Deal With Russia's Eurasian Union," *Balkan Insight*, October 25, 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/10/25/serbia-signs-trade-deal-with-russias-eurasian-union/

Quant au choix de la Serbie de ne pas appliquer les sanctions européennes à l'encontre de la Russie, il ne doit pas être perçu comme un changement de cap de la politique étrangère de la Serbie. Au contraire, il doit être replacé dans une dynamique plus ancienne d'amitié entre la Serbie et la Russie[8] : la première a besoin de la seconde pour la non-reconnaissance de l'indépendance du Kosovo, tandis que la seconde a besoin d'alliés sur des questions comme la guerre en Ossétie du Sud par exemple, ou encore sur les questions de violations des libertés civiques et fondamentales dans l'espace postsoviétique. [9] Cependant, cette politique de non-alignement devra prendre fin dès l'adhésion de la Serbie à l'UE. En effet, comme l'a rappelé en 2019 Maja Kocijancic, la porte-parole du Service Européen pour l'Action Extérieure (SEAE) pour les questions de politiques de voisinage et d'élargissement, les États adhérant à l'UE doivent impérativement s'aligner sur la Politique Étrangère et de Sécurité Commune (PESC) de l'Union Européenne.[10]

Serbia's choice not to apply European sanctions against Russia should not be seen as a change of course in Serbia's foreign policy. On the contrary, it should be seen in the context of an older dynamic of friendship between Serbia and Russia[8]: the former needs the latter for the non-recognition of Kosovo's independence, while the latter needs allies on issues such as the war in South Ossetia, for example, or on questions of violations of civil and fundamental freedoms in the post-Soviet space.[9] However, this policy of non-alignment will have to come to an end as soon as Serbia joins the EU. Indeed, as Maja Kocijancic, the spokeswoman of the European External Action Service (EEAS) for questions of neighbourhood and enlargement policies pointed out in 2019, it is essential for the States joining the EU to align themselves with the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).[10]

Antoine Granier

Joseph Tyrrell, *Mtatsminda Ferris Wheel*, Tbilisi, Georgia, 2017.

Giovanni Penna è uno studente di MSc in Migration Studies all'Università di Oxford. La sua ricerca copre argomenti quali l'attivismo, la solidarietà con i migranti e la ricerca partecipativa. Ha presentato un suo lavoro di ricerca alla Conferenza Annuale dell'American Association of Geograhers in Washington DC. In questo saggio, scritto in memoria di David Graeber (1961-2020), Giovanni discute le potenzialità non convenzionali del municipalismo libertario e le opportunità aperte dal confederalismo democratico in Rojava per una politica progressista in un'Europa sempre più multiculturale.

Giovanni Penna is an MSc in Migration Studies student at the University of Oxford. His research covers topics ranging from grassroots activism, community-based research and the criminalisation of migrant solidarity. His work has featured in the Annual Conference of the American Association of Geographers in Washington DC. In this essay written in memory of David Graeber (1961-2020), he discusses the nonconformist potentialities of libertarian municipalism and the opportunities opened up by Rojava's democratic confederalism for progressive politics in an increasingly multicultural Europe.

LESSONS FROM ROJAVA:

HOW A NONCONFORMIST IMAGINARY CAN SAVE EUROPE

LEZIONI DAL ROJAVA: COME UN IMMAGINARIO NON CONVENZIONALE PUÒ SALVARE L'EUROPA

Il municipalismo libertario rappresenta uno dei contributi principali di Murray Bookchin al pensiero accademico. Prefigura la creazione di una nuova forma di politica, "risolutamente pubblica, [...] elettorale su base municipale, confederale nella sua concezione e dal carattere rivoluzionario".[1] Complessivamente, il municipalismo libertario è un appello a ricreare il modo in cui le persone interpretano la loro vita politica, che abbia al centro il benessere collettivo e valori egualitari. In questo saggio sosterrò che questa riconfigurazione della partecipazione politica a partire dal basso può democratizzare l'Europa, ridistribuire il potere e rispondere alla sfida che l'Unione Europea sta affrontando su immigrazione e multiculturalismo crescente. Per illustrare queste opportunità, mi baserò sull'interpretazione fatta da David Graeber della rivoluzione nel Rojava (Kurdistan occidentale) come un esperimento di successo di democrazia anti-autoritaria, per dimostrare che la lezione curda può aprire nuovi orizzonti per un'Europa multiculturale. [2] Adoperando il concetto di 'oltre l'Europa' di Chiara Milan , in questo testo immagino un sistema in grado di avere la meglio sul populismo esclusorio.[3]

Libertarian municipalism is one of Murray Bookchin's main contributions to academic knowledge. It envisions the creation of a new form of politics, "unflinchingly public, [...] electoral on a municipal basis, confederal in its vision and revolutionary in its character".[1] Overall, libertarian municipalism calls for a restructuring of the way in which people enact their political lives, centred around collective well-being and egalitarian values. I will argue that this reconfiguration of political participation from below has the potential to democratise Europe, redistribute power and respond to the challenges posed to the EU by growing multiculturalism and immigration. To illustrate these opportunities, I will draw from David Graeber's reading of the revolution in Rojava (Western Kurdistan) as a successful experiment in anti-authoritarian democracy, to argue that the Kurdish lesson can open up new visions for a multicultural Europe.[2] Employing Chiara Milan's 'beyond Europe' frame, I imagine a system capable of overcoming exclusionary populism.[3]

[1]   Murray Bookchin, "Libertarian municipalism: an overview," *Green Perspectives*, October 1, 1991, https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/murray-bookchin-libertarian-municipalism-an-overview.
[2]   David Graeber, "Why is the world ignoring the revolutionary Kurds in Syria?" *The Guardian*, October 8, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/08/why-world-ignoring-revolutionary-kurds-syria-isis
[3]   Chiara Milan, "Beyond Europe: alternative visions of Europe amongst young activists in self-managed spaces in Italy," *European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology* 7, no.3 (2020): 242-264.

Oggi, all'inizio degli anni '20 del Duemila, le questioni portate alla ribalta vent'anni fa dal movimento no global sono ancora attuali. Le sue critiche a una globalizzazione guidata dal libero mercato, considerata responsabile di degrado ambientale e disuguaglianze sociali [4], sono sempre più rilevanti, con l'inasprirsi della crisi climatica e la percezione della perdita del senso di comunità e di appartenenza. Gli slogan nativisti e populisti, che promettono di 'riprendersi il controllo' dagli immigrati e dalla burocrazia centralizzata dell'UE, hanno riscosso un grande successo popolare non solo nella Gran Bretagna della Brexit, ma più in generale in tutta Europa.[5] Le alternative tradizionali a queste espressioni politiche reazionarie tendono a raggiungere risultati insoddisfacenti alle elezioni generali, e inoltre sembrano incapaci di proporre nuovi scenari politici in grado di generare entusiasmo e partecipazione, specie tra i giovani, e questo è ancora più grave.

Fornendo una risposta a questi problemi, il municipalismo libertario potrebbe ridistribuire il potere su scala locale, contrastare l'ondata di populismo identitario e ricostruire le comunità. Questo progetto comporterebbe il ripristino delle assemblee municipali e delle riunioni di quartiere come forme di governo locale, con delegati che si alternano a rotazione, collegate tra loro da un sistema confederale.[6] Questo interesse per la dimensione locale della politica deriva dal fatto che il municipalismo libertario vede il mondo da una prospettiva socio-ecologica, rifiutando così qualunque divisione tra 'società' e 'natura', ma vedendole piuttosto come una cosa sola. Per esempio, l'attuale crisi ambientale non può essere compresa senza guardare al dilagante sfruttamento delle risorse naturali richiesto dal tardo-capitalismo. Allo stesso modo, i problemi sociali, la povertà e l'individualismo non possono essere affrontati ignorando l'ambiente fisico in cui si sviluppano. Un esempio di quest'idea è l'alienazione causata dal vivere in una 'giungla di cemento', con il diffondersi dell'urbanizzazione in tutto il mondo.

Today, at the beginning of the 2020s, the issues brought to the fore by the anti-corporate globalisation movement twenty years ago are still central. Its critiques of free-market globalisation as responsible for environmental degradation and social inequalities[4] are increasingly relevant, as the climate crisis worsens and the feeling of a lost sense of belonging and community grows. Nativist and populist claims to 'take back control' from immigrants and centralised EU bureaucracy have received great popular support not just in Brexit Britain, but more broadly across Europe.[5] Mainstream alternatives to such reactionary forms of politics tend to perform poorly in the general elections, but they also, and this is even more serious, seem unable to come up with new political imaginaries that can draw enthusiasm and participation, especially among younger voters.

Responding to these tensions, libertarian municipalism could redistribute power at a local scale, counter the surge of identitarian populism and rebuild communities. This entails the restoration of municipal assemblies and neighbourhood meetings as local forms of government, managed by rotatable delegates and linked to one another through confederal networks.[6] This interest in the local dimension of political action is due to the fact that libertarian municipalism views the world through a socio-ecological lens, thus rejecting any divide between 'society' and 'nature', but rather seeing them as one. For instance, the current environmental crisis cannot be understood without looking at the rampant exploitation of natural resources that late capitalism demands. Similarly, social problems, deprivation and individualism cannot be fully addressed if we ignore the physical environment where they develop. The alienation caused by living in a 'concrete jungle' is a major example of this, as urbanisation spreads across the globe.

[4]   Frederick H. Buttel and Kenneth A. Gould, "Global social movement(s) at the crossroads: some observations on the trajectory of the anti-corporate globalization movement," *Journal of world-systems research* 10, no.1 (2004): 37-66.
[5]   Albena Azmanova and Azar Dakwar. "The inverted postnational constellation: identitarian populism in context," *European Law Journal* 25, no. 5 (2019): 494-501.
[6]   Murray Bookchin, "Libertarian municipalism: the new municipal agenda," https://www.social-ecology.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Libertarian-Municipalism-The-New-Municipal-Agenda.pdf [Reproduction of excerpts from the book 'From urbanization to cities' (1987; London: Cassell, 1995), with revisions.] (Accessed: 10/10/2020);
Murray Bookchin, "The meaning of confederalism," *Green Perspectives*, November 20, 1989. http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/bookchin/gp/perspectives20.html (Accessed: 10/10/2020)

Figure 1.
The cantons of Rojava self-administration, January 2014. https://rojavainformationcenter.com/graphics-and-maps/

Il confederalismo democratico in Rojava è un esempio di come potrebbe essere in futuro un'Europa più progressista, inclusiva ed egualitaria. Attualmente sotto attacco della Turchia, l'Amministrazione Autonoma del Nord e dell'Est della Siria (Rojava) rappresenta uno degli esperimenti politici più innovativi degli ultimi decenni. Istituito nel 2012 dal PYD (il Partito dell'Unione Democratica curdo, legato al PKK), il Rojava copre quasi un terzo del territorio siriano e la sua popolazione eterogenea è composta da arabi, curdi, cristiani siriaci, assiri, armeni, yazidi, turkmeni e ceceni.[7] Il nucleo municipalista libertario del confederalismo democratico del Rojava è direttamente ispirato dagli scritti di Murray Bookchin. Le sue teorie hanno rimodellato le idee del leader curdo in carcere Abdullah Öcalan e sono state diffuse e discusse all'interno del movimento curdo.[8]

Rojava's democratic confederalism could be the example for what a more progressive, inclusive and egalitarian Europe could look like in the future. Currently under attack from Turkey, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava) represents one of the most innovative political experiments in decades. Established in 2012 by the PYD (the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, tied to the PKK), it covers almost a third of Syria and its heterogenous population is made up of Arabs, Kurds, Syriac Christians, Assyrian Christians, Armenian Christians, Yazidis, Turkmens and Chechens.[7] The libertarian municipalist core of Rojava's democratic confederalism is directly inspired by Murray Bookchin's writings. Bookchin's theories reshaped imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan's ideas and were circulated and discussed in the Kurdish movement.[8]

[7]   Anya Briy, "Rojava: statelessness in a time of pandemic," *openDemocracy*, May 19, 2020. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/rojava-statelessness-time-pandemic/ (Accessed: 10/10/2020);
    David Graeber, "Foreword," in *Revolution in Rojava: democratic autonomy and women'sliberation in Syrian Kurdistan*. Michael Knapp, Anja Flach and Ercan Ayboga (London: Pluto Press, 2016);
    "Beyond the frontlines: the building of the democratic system in North and East Syria," *RIC – Rojava Information Center*, December 19, 2019. https://rojavainformationcenter.com/storage/2019/12/Beyond-the-frontlines-The-building-of-the-democratic-system-in-North-and-East-Syria-Report-Rojava-Information-Center-December-2019-V4.pdf (Accessed: 10/10/2020);
    Saed, "Rojava," *Capitalism Nature Socialism*, 26, no.1 (2015):1-15.
[8] Michael Knapp, Anja Flach and Ercan Ayboga. *Revolution in Rojava: democratic autonomy and women's liberation in Syrian Kurdistan*. (London: Pluto Press, 2016).

Joseph Tyrrell, *Towards the Monastery*, Kakheti, Georgia, 2017.

Il progetto confederalista del Rojava si è sviluppato dopo l'inizio della guerra civile in Siria (2011), quando il PYD ha guidato rivolte popolari contro la dittatura di Assad. Le milizie del PYD, le Unità di protezione popolare (YPG) e le Unità di protezione delle donne (YPJ), hanno successivamente resistito con successo agli attacchi dell'ISIS, sconfitto com'è noto a Kobanî nel 2015.[9] Dopo aver sconfitto forze autoritarie e fondamentaliste, le comunità del Rojava hanno redatto la Carta del contratto sociale, in cui si afferma che le decisioni politiche debbano essere prese a livello locale dai comitati di quartiere, di solito composti da 15-30 individui ciascuno. Di questi, il 40% devono essere donne. I comitati discutono questioni riguardanti i problemi sociali, come la violenza di genere, nonché l'economia, l'energia e l'approvvigionamento alimentare. Dato che questo sistema comunitario si sviluppa attorno a principi anti-autoritari, le case dei cittadini sono rappresentate politicamente ad ogni scala amministrativa, dai distretti e le città ai cantoni, e i delegati sono generalmente pagati in natura.[10]

Attraverso questo esperimento di democrazia partecipativa decentralizzata, una società così multiculturale e multietnica come il Rojava si mantiene in equilibrio. Le minoranze etniche e religiose sono protette dalla Carta del contratto sociale. Per quanto riguarda i rifugiati, il loro numero elevato rappresenta una sfida considerevole per i cantoni e un cambiamento nella struttura demografica della regione, dato che gran parte di loro sono persone non curde sfollate internamente da altre parti della Siria, per via della guerra civile in corso. Tuttavia, il sistema economico confederale cerca di incorporare i rifugiati nella forza lavoro e di impiegarli nelle cooperative.[11] Inoltre, i diritti dei rifugiati sono difesi dall'articolo 37 della Carta, secondo la quale "Tutti hanno il diritto di richiedere asilo politico. Le persone possono essere espulse solo a seguito di una decisione di un organo giudiziario competente, imparziale e composto in maniera adeguata, dove vengano garantiti tutti i diritti di un giusto processo".[12] Inoltre, c'è un notevole tentativo di integrare i rifugiati nella lotta del Rojava per la liberazione delle donne. Per esempio, le Case delle donne, istituzioni interamente femminili che si occupano di proteggere i diritti delle donne sono state istituite in alcuni campi profughi.[13]

The Rojava confederalist project emerged after the start of the Syrian Civil War (2011), when the PYD led popular uprisings against the Assad dictatorship. The PYD's militias, the People's Protection Militias (YPG) and the Women's Protection Units (YPJ), later successfully resisted attacks from ISIS, which they notoriously defeated at Kobanî in 2015.[9] After beating authoritarian and fundamentalist forces, Rojava communities drafted the Social Contract Charter, which states that political decisions are to be made locally by neighbourhood committees, usually composed of between 15 and 30 individuals each. Of these, 40% need to be women. Committees debate issues concerning social problems, like gender-based violence, as well as the economy, energy, and food supplies. Since this communitarian system develops around anti-authoritarian principles, people's houses are represented politically at all scales, from districts and cities to cantons, and delegates are usually paid in kind.[10]

Through this experiment in decentralised participatory democracy, Rojava's strikingly multicultural and multi-ethnic society maintains an effective balance. Ethnic and religious minorities are protected by the Social Contract Charter. With regards to refugees, their great number represents a considerable challenge for the cantons and a change in the demographic structure of the region, as a large proportion of them are non-Kurdish people internally displaced from other parts of Syria because of the ongoing civil war. However, the confederal economic system tries to incorporate refugees in the workforce and employ them in cooperatives.[11] Furthermore, refugees' rights are defended by article 37 of the Charter, stating that "Everyone has the right to seek political asylum. Persons may only be deported following a decision of a competent, impartial and properly constituted judicial body, where all due process rights have been afforded".[12] In addition, there is a remarkable attempt to integrate refugees in Rojava's women's liberation struggle. For instance, Women's Houses (entirely female institutions that work to protect women's rights) have been established in some refugee camps.[13]

[9]   Rosa Burc, "Confederal Kurdistan: the 'commune of communes'," *openDemocracy*, June 8, 2016. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/confederal-kurdistan-commune-of-communes/ (Accessed: 11/10/2020)
[10]   Saed, "Rojava," 1-15.
[11]   Knapp, et al., *Revolution in Rojava*.
[12]   Knapp, et al., *Revolution in Rojava*, 131.
[13]   RIC, "Beyond the frontlines".

Anche se il suo futuro è incerto e minacciato dall'intervento straniero, l'esperimento del Rojava apre opportunità per una futura Europa multiculturale. Le attuali condizioni politiche e sociali in Europa sono adatte a una nuova ondata di immaginazione politica radicale. La pandemia del Coronavirus ha innescato la seconda recessione che dovrebbe succedere 'una volta nella vita' in pochi anni, poco dopo la crisi finanziaria globale del 2009. Contemporaneamente, il movimento Black Lives Matter negli Stati Uniti ha dato nuova linfa alle proteste delle minoranze etniche, di chi è privato dei documenti e dei gruppi di migranti che lottano per essere integrati nelle società europee. La richiesta di giustizia sociale e di riappropriarsi di un futuro che si prospetta cupo hanno alimentato movimenti sociali in tutto il continente negli ultimi anni (per citarne un paio, le proteste anti-austerità e i Fridays for Future). Inoltre, forme sperimentali di politica sono già emerse principalmente su scala municipale. I gruppi di cittadini 'dal basso' si sono organizzati in tutto il mondo per fornire il loro sostegno a migranti e rifugiati che sono stati abbandonati dalle autorità statali.[14] Inoltre, molte amministrazioni municipali, come quella di Ada Colau a Barcellona, provengono da piattaforme popolari che portano avanti la logica del localismo progressista, la solidarietà e il coinvolgimento dei cittadini nel processo decisionale.[15] Ulteriori passi verso una politica orizzontale, che guardi al Rojava come un esempio di come le società si possano evolvere in maniera radicale e sperimentare con la propria politica, possono aiutare a creare un'Europa veramente inclusiva. Questo scenario politico progressista che io immagino si sviluppa nella cornice teorica dell''oltre l'Europa'. Questa prospettiva mette al centro la dimensione locale come sfera politica principale, trascende l'autorità statale e riprende la tradizione popolare delle pratiche di mutuo soccorso, che esistono da secoli in tutto il continente.[16] Radicata in una rete di localismi democratici e animata da un senso inclusivo di appartenenza al territorio, un''Europa oltre l'Europa' potrebbe finalmente emanciparsi dallo spettro del populismo razzista e sanare le fratture con il territorio.

Even though its future is uncertain and threatened by foreign intervention, Rojava's experiment opens up new possibilities for a future multicultural Europe. The current political and social conditions in Europe are suitable for a new wave of radical political imagination. The coronavirus pandemic has triggered the second 'once-in-a-lifetime' recession in over just a few years, shortly after the global financial crisis of 2009. Simultaneously, the Black Lives Matter protests in the US have reinvigorated ethnic minorities, undocumented and migrant groups' struggle to be integrated in European societies. Calls for social justice and to reclaim a future that looks bleak have fuelled social movements across the continent over the past few years (e.g. anti-austerity protests, Fridays for Future). Moreover, experimental forms of politics have already been emerging largely at the municipal scale. Citizens' grassroots groups have been organising throughout to provide support to migrants and refugees that have been let down by state authority.[14] In addition, many municipal administrations, such as Ada Colau's one in Barcelona, come from grassroots platforms that promote progressive localism, solidarity and citizens' involvement in the decision-making process.[15] Further moves towards horizontal politics, looking at Rojava as an example of how radically societies can evolve and experiment with their political life, can help create a truly inclusive Europe. This progressive political scenario I envision is embedded in the 'beyond Europe' frame. This frame centres the local as the main dimension of politics, transcends state authority and draws from the popular tradition of mutual aid practices, which have existed for centuries across the continent.[16] Rooted in a network of democratic localisms and animated by an inclusive sense of belonging to the territory, a 'Europe beyond Europe' would finally be able to emancipate itself from the spectre of racist populism and heal the rift within the land.

[14]   Donatella Della Porta, *Solidarity Mobilizations in the 'Refugee Crisis': Contentious Moves.* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), Ebook.
[15]   Oscar García Agustín, "New Municipalism as Space for Solidarity," *A Journal of Politics and Culture* 74 (2020): 54-67.
[16]   Milan, "Beyond Europe," 242-264.

In conclusione, in questo saggio ho illustrato le opportunità che il municipalismo libertario può offrire al futuro dell'Europa come modo alternativo di organizzare la vita politica. Discutendo la traiettoria della rivoluzione del Rojava verso il confederalismo democratico, ho sostenuto che l'Europa dovrebbe usarla da esempio per reimmaginare il proprio futuro. Evidenziando la crescita dei movimenti politici locali, l'attivismo di base e le iniziative di solidarietà, ho dimostrato che questi spazi per una politica locale progressista non appartengono solo alla sfera del pensiero utopistico, bensì esistono già in tutti i paesi europei. Pertanto, utilizzando il concetto di 'oltre l'Europa', è possibile dare alla luce nuovi scenari, al fine di lavorare collettivamente verso un futuro più democratico ed inclusivo.

In conclusion, I have illustrated the opportunities that libertarian municipalism as an alternative way of organising political life can provide for Europe's future. Discussing the Rojava revolution's trajectory towards democratic confederalism, I have argued that Europe should use it as an example to re-imagine its future. Highlighting the growth of local political movements, grassroots activism and solidarity initiatives, I have shown that these spaces for progressive local politics do not belong to the mere sphere of utopian thinking, but rather already exist throughout European countries. Thus, by employing the 'beyond Europe' frame, new imaginaries can be foregrounded, in order to work collectively towards a more democratic and inclusive future.

Giovanni Penna

Joseph Tyrrell, *Biebrza National Park, Poland, 2017.*

Liza Deléon travaille sur les différents liens entre territoire et identité, que ce soit à travers la littérature, l'aménagement du territoire ou la gouvernance locale. Dans son article Les Imbéciles Heureux qui sont Nés Quelque Part, *elle observe la façon dont le tourisme de masse nous conduit à repenser notre rapport aux paysages culturels et explore les différents outils de lutte pour le maintien des singularités territoriales.*

Liza Deléon studies the various connections between territory and identity, be it through literature, spatial planning or local governance. In her article Wanna Live Like Common People, *she observes how mass tourism makes us rethink our relation with cultural landscapes and explores the tools that can be used in order to maintain territorial singularities.*

WANNA LIVE LIKE COMMON PEOPLE:
ON THE MUSEUMIFICATION OF SPACE

LES IMBÉCILES HEUREUX QUI SONT NÉS QUELQUE PART : SUR LA MUSÉIFICATION DE L'ESPACE

Au cours de l'été 2018, la grande plage de Karnag (Bretagne, France) s'est vue fleurie de croix noires par le collectif Dispac'h, qui dénonce la spéculation immobilière : chaque croix portait le nom d'une commune du littoral breton estimée mourante. C'est qu'à Karnag, le parc immobilier se compose à 73% de résidence secondaire ; ainsi, hors-saison et sans touristes, la ville se meurt. Anecdotique en apparence, la question des résidences secondaires est pourtant transversale pour les territoires : l'occupation du littoral par une population secondaire et saisonnière, le plus souvent retraitée et aisée, fait grimper les coûts immobiliers, chassant les actifs et les jeunes. Cette fuite des forces vives perpétue le cycle du vieillissement démographique et de la perte d'attractivité, condamnant les villes à une économie du tourisme dont on connaît la fragilité.[1]

Néanmoins, le rejet exprimé par Dispac'h ne repose pas uniquement sur l'argument économique, aussi sérieux soit-il : à l'image de mesures de régulation telles que le statut de résident débattu en Corse, les protestations contre le tourisme de masse s'appuient largement sur un sentiment d'identité lié au sol. "Tourists go home !", peut-on lire sur la page Facebook de Dispac'h, un farouche rappel aux slogans anti-immigration de l'Europe la plus réactionnaire. En effet, le collectif compte parmi les acteurs militants pour l'indépendantisme breton : leur rejet de la mono-industrie touristique s'exprime conjointement à une forte identité territoriale.

It is the summer of 2018: the main beach of Karnag (Brittany, France) is blooming with black crosses, planted there by the activist group Dispac'h in order to denounce real estate speculation. Each cross is wearing the name of a town deemed dying. In Karnag, the housing stock is 73% holiday homes - off-season and without tourists, the town is decaying. Although it might seem trivial, the subject of holiday homes intersects with a number of territorial issues: the appropriation of the coastline by a secondary and seasonal population (most often retired and well-off) tends to raise real estate costs, driving away young assets. This outflow perpetuates the ageing process and the loss of attractiveness, dooming towns and cities to a tourism-lead industry, known for its vulnerability.[1]

Nonetheless, Dispac'h's rebuffing does not stand only on an economic argument, however serious: public outcry against mass tourism often relies on a feeling of territorial identity. Regulations such as the current resident status debated in Corsica are one example. "Tourists go home!" one can read on Dispac'h Facebook page, a fierce reminder of anti-immigration slogans from the most reactionary part of Europe - for Dispac'h is part of the Breton separatist movement: its rejection of a tourism-centered mono-industry coexists with a strong territorial identity.

[1]   Claire Goavec and Jean-François Hoarau, "Vulnérabilité Économique Structurelle Et Dépendance Touristique : Quels Enseignements Pour Les Petites Économies Insulaires En Développement," *Région et Développement* 42, (2015): 157-188.

Joseph Tyrrell, *Carnac Stones*, Brittany, France, 2017.

Le microphénomène breton est une illustration parmi d'autres des liens entre territoire, identité et mondialisation. Bien sûr, le littoral breton n'est pas la seule région d'Europe touchée par le surtourisme : on pense à Barcelone, absente de la carte mondiale jusqu'au Jeux Olympiques de 1992, aujourd'hui musée à ciel ouvert dont les populations précaires sont repoussées toujours plus loin du centre. Le phénomène de muséification est double : s'il transforme l'espace en objet de conservation, il fige également ses dynamiques fonctionnelles, souvent dans un souci esthétique. « Dans certains centres historiques prestigieux (Venise, Tolède et dans une moindre mesure Bruges), ce processus de muséification a pris une ampleur sans précédent au cours des vingt dernières années. Il est d'autant plus mal vécu par les populations résidentes qu'il se double d'une désappropriation symbolique des lieux. Le Vénitien, par exemple, voit sa ville transformée en une sorte de Disneyland : lui qui y vit et y travaille se sent considéré comme l'indigène d'une culture minoritaire ».[2] Ainsi, ces territoires ont bénéficié, fût un temps, de cet afflux massif de populations curieuses, avant que leur attrait ne devienne un fléau ; aujourd'hui, la base militante locale réclame un retour de la gestion territoriale à la population.

Brittany's micro-phenomenon is one among many examples of the existing links between territory, identity and globalisation. Of course, the Breton coastline isn't the only European region affected by overtourism. Barcelona is another example: absent from the global map until the Olympic Games of 1992, the city stands today as an open-air museum where impoverished locals are continuously driven farther from the center. Indeed, museumification is a double phenomenon: if it turns space into an object of preservation, it also tends to freeze functional dynamics for the sake of aesthetics. "In some prestigious historic centers (Venice, Toledo and to a lesser extent Bruges), this museumification process rose to an unprecedented scale during the last twenty years. The Venetians, for instance, observe their city transformed into a sort of Disneyland: they who live and work here feel as if an indigenous belonging to a minority culture".[2] Thus those cities once benefiting from its massive influx of population are today suffering from success - it is no wonder local activists are asking for spatial management to return into local hands.

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[2]   Jean-Michel Decroly, "Tourisme et dynamiques démographigieux : des relations multiples, denses et mal connues," *Espace Populations Sociétés* 2, (2003): 247.

La ville : un artefact culturel comme les autres ?

Il peut sembler paradoxal, voire réactionnaire qu'à l'heure de la mondialisation, c'est-à-dire à l'heure où de plus en plus de personnes ont accès au territoire mondial, celui-ci devienne un terrain de bataille. Dans son article « Sentiment d'appartenance et territoires identitaires », publié dans la revue L'espace Géographique (vol.35, 2006), France Guerin-Pace explique qu'à chaque individu est attaché un ensemble de lieux (naissance, origine de la famille, dans lesquels il a vécu successivement, qu'il fréquente ou qu'il a fréquenté, de vie de ses proches, de vie souhaitée ou de projets éventuels) : « Tous ces lieux constituent le patrimoine identitaire géographique de chacun ».[3] Ainsi les liens entre territoire et identité sont évidemment profonds et mutuellement constitutifs. Or, la question identitaire est toujours sujette à une potentielle crispation, et la territorialisation de l'identité apparaît comme une réaction logique à l'élargissement des horizons : si cet espace est à tout le monde, alors autour de quoi construit-il sa singularité, et comment conserver cette singularité à l'heure de l'homogénéisation de l'espace ?

Cities as cultural artifacts

It may seem paradoxical, even reactionary, that in times of globalisation - a time when a growing number of people have access to global space - space itself has become a battlefield. In her article "Feeling of belonging and identity territories", France Guerin-Pace explains that individuals are attached to a set of places (birthplace, place of family's origins, place of residence of relatives, desired place of residence, prospective projects' place, etc.): "all those places make up the geographic identity heritage of each person".[3] Links between identity and territory are indeed deep and mutually constitutive - but identity remains an agitated and tense subject. The territorialisation of identity appears as a logical reaction to the broadening of horizons: if this space belongs to everybody, what makes it singular, and how can its singularity be maintained in the times of the homogenisation of space?

Burak Beşir Fındıklı, *A young, dynamic, feminine Paris replaces its old, classical, and masculine version*, Jardin des Plantes, Paris, 2016.

Dans cette optique, il convient d'appuyer les singularités territoriales ; et, pour que cette mise en lumière soit effective, il lui faut justement être reconnue par le public. L'identité territoriale oscille ainsi entre rejet du touriste et besoin de reconnaissance par ce touriste, dans une optique de préservation identitaire. On parle aujourd'hui de refolklorisation (dénaturalisation pour certains) du territoire, phénomène qui tend à s'institutionnaliser : les acteurs du territoire ont en effet rapidement compris l'intérêt, identitaire comme économique, de la reconnaissance d'un patrimoine territoriale par le grand public. Il serait simpliste de condamner univoquement la démarche au nom du mercantilisme : la Métropole Européenne de Lille (France), en profonde souffrance suite au phénomène de désindustrialisation des années 1980s, a trouvé un nouveau souffle économique et une identité territoriale renouvelée suite à sa nomination en tant que Capitale Européenne de la Culture (2004). Il est donc certain qu'un afflux de nouvelles populations (passagères ou sédentaires) dans un espace longtemps délaissé porte les germes d'un changement de dynamique territoriale, potentiellement bénéfique. Revenons à Karnag et Barcelone : jusqu'où pousser la commodification de l'identité territoriale, bénéfique à petite dose, destructrice à son paroxysme ? Comme pour tout ce qui touche à la consommation, des "alternatives" ne manquent pas d'émerger : on pense au "slow tourism", à "l'écotourisme", etc. En effet, qui aujourd'hui oserait encore se revendiquer "touriste" autrement que dans l'autodérision ? Voyageur.se, flanneûr.se, aventurier.e, adopté.e même, on n'est jamais simplement "touriste" : il faut aimer le territoire, comprendre son histoire et son patrimoine pour y avoir droit de passage.

The highlighting of territorial singularities is one answer - and for those singularities to be seen, they need to be acknowledged by the masses. Hence territorial identity wavers between the rejection of tourists and the need of their acknowledgement for the conservation of local identity. Talks about "refloklorization" - a denaturalization for some - tend to institutionalize this process: territorial stakeholders quickly realized the economic and emotional potential of territorial public recognition. Caution is needed here: it would be simplistic to belittle the institutional approach on the ground of its mercantilism. The European Metropolis of Lille (France) for instance - a suffering post-industrial city - truly found economic and identity renewal in this process, after being nominated to be a European Capital of Culture in 2004. None would be foolish enough to claim that refolklorization can not be empowering to some territories: it is certain that an influx of new populations - transient or settled - in a derelict space holds potential for a dynamic of renewal. So let us get back to the cases of Karnag and Barcelona: beneficial in small doses, destructive at its peak, how far should the push for territorial commodification go? As for all the means of consumption, "alternatives" do emerge, notably "slow tourism" and "ecotourism". Indeed, who would still dare, to label themselves as a tourist today? Traveler, flâneur, adventurer, adoptee even - one is never just a tourist: the space we walk through has to be loved and understood in order to be appropriated.

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[3]   France Guérin-Pace, "Sentiment d'appartenance et territoires identitaires", *L'espace Géographique* 35, (2006).

Du changement structurel à l'heure de l'action individuelle

Or, il serait là aussi simpliste de n'orienter le sujet que vers une simple question de choix individuel. Les recherches démontrent qu'il est nécessaire d'agir à un niveau structurel sur les conflits entre résidents et touristes, afin d'éviter la transformation des centres historiques européens en espaces désertifiés, en simples scènes pour la consommation touristique : l'aménagement du territoire, l'urbanisme, la participation citoyenne et une attention particulière de l'administration publique à ce sujet sont des domaines-clés pour éviter ce phénomène de muséification de l'espace. Récemment, une alliance de 22 villes européennes a fait entendre sa voix pour imposer des restrictions à la firme Airbnb et autres plateformes de locations court-terme, qui tendent à transformer des quartiers entiers en espaces de passages réservés à une population touristique. De la même façon, en mars 2019, Madrid a adopté une loi pour fermer plus de 10 000 appartements utilisés comme locations de court-terme, afin d'éviter que son centre ne se transforme "en parc d'attractions touristiques". L'Union Européenne a également son rôle à jouer dans la préservation de ses villes : en septembre dernier (2020), la Cour Européenne de Justice a légitimé cette posture, en donnant raison à une législation française qui impose une autorisation municipale pour les locations de court-terme. Ce jugement pourrait ouvrir la voie à des actions similaires dans d'autres villes européennes. La maire de Paris déclarait en réponse : « L'heure est venue pour l'Europe d'adopter une nouvelle approche réglementaire qui serve l'intérêt général : celui de l'accès au logement et de la qualité de vie ». La démarche nous rappelle l'importance de conserver des compétences gouvernementales suffisantes, contre le processus de privatisation, afin de s'assurer que les autorités publiques, locales comme nationales, ne perdent pas leur autonomie dans le processus de décision.

Structural change in times of individual action

Personal awareness of cultural differences is not, in itself, a bad thing; yet it would also be simplistic to treat this subject solely as a personal choice. Research shows it is necessary to act on conflicts between dwellers and tourists at a structural level, in order to avoid historic city centers turning into scenes for touristic consumption. Urban, spatial and development planning, citizen participation and a strong public leadership are key tools in avoiding territorial museumification. Recently, an alliance of 22 European cities (Eurocities) gathered to protest against Airbnb and other such platforms which tend to turn entire neighbourhoods into temporary hostels. Similarly in March 2019, Madrid adopted a measure closing more than 10,000 short-term rental apartments in order to prevent its city center from becoming a "tourist amusement park". The European Union also has a part to take in its own cities' preservation: last September (2020), the European Court of Justice legitimated a French law enforcing the need for municipal authorisation for short-term rentals. This decision could lead the way for similar actions in other European cities: "It is time for a new European regulatory approach that serves first and foremost the general interest, which is for us housing access and liveability in our cities", Paris' mayor declared in answer. This stance is a stern reminder that it is vital for public authorities to maintain sufficient competences against the privatization of services, in order to ensure an independent decision-making process.

[4]   Alexandra Mientjes, "Is Amsterdam Turning Into A Museum?" *Popupcity.net*, August 8, 2013.
[5]   Paulette Dellios, "The Museumification of the Village : Cultural Subversion in the 21st Century," *The Culture Mandala: Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies* 5 no. 1, (2002).

Il est essentiel de se rappeler que l'industrie du tourisme existe d'abord en tant que service, dans un but de diffusion de la culture et de développement économique comme identitaire. Le Service Public pour l'Héritage Culturel des Pays-Bas affirme : « [Les sites culturels] maintiennent en vie les souvenirs et donnent du relief à l'image actuelle que nous nous faisons de nous-même. L'héritage culturel est une balise pour notre identité et une source de fierté pour tous. »[4] Mais à qui sert vraiment la muséification des villes et quelles sont les implications socioculturelles du phénomène de muséification ? De l'homogénéisation conformiste de l'espace à une singularisation tout aussi convenue, « la muséification subvertit et invertit »[5] les dynamiques locales culturelles et économiques : l'héritage culturel propre à chaque ville devient patrimoine commun, transformant nos façons même d'habiter la ville. C'est la raison même pour laquelle de nouveaux outils de gouvernances sont à inventer, afin de s'assurer que, par une conformation touristique de l'espace, ces dynamiques n'excluent pas les habitants de leur propre territoire et de leur propre identité.

One should be reminded that the aim of the tourism industry is also to be of service to society, by spreading knowledge and developing territorial identity as well as local economy. The Dutch State Service for Cultural Heritage claims: "[Cultural sites] keep memories alive and give texture to our present self-image. Cultural heritage is a beacon for our identity and a source of pride for everyone".[4] But who does the museumfication of cities ultimately serve, and what are the socio-cultural implications of the phenomenon of museumification? From conformist homogeneization to banal singularization, "museumification subverts and inverts" local cultural and economic dynamics: each city's cultural heritage becomes common heritage, transforming our ways to inhabit our cities.[5] Hence new governance tools are needed today, in order to make sure those dynamics do not exclude locals from their own territory and identity through touristic conformity.

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
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