

Making the Digital Service Act Work in Arabic: A Targeted Amendment to Strengthen EU Platform Governance and Euro-Arab Digital Diplomacy

Haj Taleb, Hala

Introduction

The European Union has positioned the Digital Services Act (DSA) as a global benchmark for platform accountability, systemic risk governance, and the protection of fundamental rights online (European Union, 2022). Yet one structural blind spot persists: the DSA's operational language expectations are built around the official languages of EU Member States, even when platforms' most consequential harms and most contested enforcement errors occur in widely used non-EU languages. Arabic is the clearest case.

Arabic is not a marginal language in the Union's digital public sphere. It is the everyday language of large and diverse communities across Member States, including citizens and long-term residents, and it is the principal language connecting EU-based users to political, cultural, and conflict-related discourse across the EU's Southern neighbourhood. Survey-based estimates suggest that around 1.1 percent of EU residents report being able to speak Arabic, implying a community on the order of five million people across the Union, with higher shares reported in several large Member States, including France, Germany, and Spain (language knowledge /eu, 2024; Eurostat, 2025b). National data points in the same direction. In Spain, 1.6 percent of the population reports speaking Arabic



Funded by
the European Union

implemented by
the College of Europe



College of Europe
Collège d'Europe



Natolin

well, which corresponds to roughly three-quarters of a million people (CVC, 2024). Citizenship acquisition captures only part of this social reality, but it underlines the scale of long-term settlement: in 2023, Syrian nationals were the largest group of new EU citizens with 107,500, followed closely by Moroccan nationals with 106,500 (Eurostat, 2025a).




Figure 1 Main recipients of an EU country citizenship, 2023; Source: Eurostat, retrieved from *migr_acq*

The policy challenge is not abstract. Civil society documentation of platform enforcement in Palestine-related content has highlighted patterns of over-removal, suppression, and opaque decision-making. Human Rights Watch documented over 1,000 cases of unjustified takedowns and other suppression of peaceful Palestine-related expression on Meta platforms since October 2023 (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Independent human rights assessment work has similarly underlined recurring due process and consistency concerns in Meta's content governance in the Israel-Palestine context, including problems that are inseparable from language and context capacity. (Business for Social Responsibility, 2021) These controversies spill directly into Euro-Arab relations because they shape perceptions of whether European digital governance is impartial, rights-based, and applied without discrimination.

The DSA already recognises that systemic risks are not uniform. Its systemic risk duties require providers to consider how risks vary by context, including where linguistic differences affect the spread of harms or the quality of enforcement (European Union, 2022). At the same time, the DSA's language-related transparency expectations are operationalised mainly through Member State official languages, leaving a gap between legal intention and day-to-day compliance capacity for widely used non-official languages.

This brief proposes a precise, actionable amendment: create an "additional supported languages" mechanism under the DSA for very large online platforms and very large online search engines, beginning with Arabic. The objective is not to make Arabic an EU official language, nor to export norms into Arab legal systems. It is to ensure that, inside the EU enforcement space, platforms have the linguistic competence and governance arrangements needed to assess risks, apply rules consistently, and provide meaningful due process for Arabic language users. Done carefully, this is both a digital rights reform and a strategic confidence-building measure in Euro-Arab cooperation.

Why has Arabic become a DSA credibility test in Euro-Arab relations?

Euro-Arab relations in the mid-2020s are shaped by two parallel dynamics. First, the EU's regulatory posture has evolved from market making to rulemaking with extraterritorial effects, including through the DSA's systemic risk framework and its supervisory role over very large platforms. Second, Arab states and regional institutions have placed digital transformation, inclusion, and governance capacity at the centre of development and international cooperation agendas. The Arab Digital Agenda 2023 to 2033, prepared through a partnership between ESCWA and the League of Arab States, frames digital technology as a pathway to equal opportunities and sustainable development and emphasises implementation mechanisms and stakeholder coordination (UNESCWA & League of Arab States, 2023).

Against this backdrop, language is not a technical footnote. It is the interface where rights, trust, and power are felt. For Arabic-speaking communities in Europe, content moderation errors can translate into civic marginalisation: speech is removed without adequate explanation, complaint mechanisms feel inaccessible, and community-specific harms are missed because classifiers and reviewers' capacity is weak. For Arab partners, recurring controversies over Arabic-related political content reinforce a perception that platform governance is shaped by geopolitical asymmetries rather than neutral standards.

The Palestine case illustrates the reputational stakes for the EU. Documentation of platform enforcement controversies has been widely circulated among Arab civil society actors and media ecosystems, and it is frequently interpreted through the lens of discrimination, dehumanisation, or political bias. Human Rights Watch's report argues that systemic suppression of peaceful Palestine-related content is inconsistent with human rights due diligence expectations (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Even when enforcement controversies are rooted in company policy choices rather than EU rules, the EU is increasingly seen as responsible because the DSA is marketed as the new accountability regime and because the Commission directly supervises very large platforms (European Union, 2022).

Arabic language governance failures also carry an accountability cost, not only a speech cost. Human Rights Watch warns that accelerated removals of material classified as terrorist or violent extremist content can erase potential evidence of war crimes and other atrocities when platforms lack credible preservation pathways for investigators (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Syria offers a concrete illustration. Facebook removed a citizen journalist page that documented troop movements and the aftermath of attacks after it was flagged as "extremist content", then restored it after acknowledging a moderation error (Perrigo, 2020). On YouTube, Syrian Archive has tracked large-scale losses, and Wired reported the group's estimate that Google removed 123,229 of the 1,177,394 Syria-related videos it had backed up between 2012 and 2018, including records linked to chemical attacks and strikes on hospitals (Wired, 2018).

This is not abstract for Europe. Universal jurisdiction cases against former Syrian regime figures are already active, from the Koblenz proceedings in Germany to in absentia convictions in France, alongside cases pursued in the Netherlands and Switzerland (European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, 2022; Associated Press, 2024; Rechtbank Den Haag, 2024; Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, 2024; Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, n.d.). Large-scale removals do not need to erase all evidence to be harmful. They can still fragment the open-source record, increase verification costs, and weaken the documentation ecosystem that complements survivor testimony and formal investigative files. This strengthens the case for making Arabic performance auditable under the DSA risk assessment and transparency regime.

At the same time, Europe's own security and democratic resilience agenda is now explicitly linked to platform governance. The Commission and the European Board for Digital Services have sought to anchor commitments on disinformation and hate speech in the DSA compliance ecosystem through codes of conduct and monitoring approaches linked to systemic risk governance (European Commission, 2025a; European Commission, 2024). These developments increase the strategic value of Arabic language coverage. Disinformation, hate speech, and incitement dynamics are often language-specific, dialect-sensitive, and context-dependent. If Arabic is under-



**Funded by
the European Union**

**implemented by
the College of Europe**



College of Europe
Collège d'Europe



Natolin

resourced, two outcomes become more likely, both politically costly. The first is under enforcement, where harmful content remains visible because detection is weak. The second is over-enforcement, where political speech is suppressed because systems cannot distinguish context, satire, reclaimed slurs, or journalistic documentation. Either outcome undermines the EU's credibility as a rights-based regulator and complicates partnerships with Arab League actors who are building their own digital governance capacities and who increasingly scrutinise European approaches.

What the DSA already requires, and where language falls through

The DSA's internal logic already provides the legal hooks for treating language as a compliance capability rather than a voluntary corporate feature.

First, the DSA's systemic risk regime expects platforms to differentiate risk across contexts. Article 34 requires very large platforms and search engines to identify and assess systemic risks in the Union, including risks related to illegal content and adverse impacts on fundamental rights. It also makes clear that the assessment is not generic: "The assessment shall take into account specific regional or linguistic aspects" (European Union, 2022, Article 34). The recitals reinforce this operational expectation by indicating that localised risks and linguistic differences should be reflected in risk analysis and, by implication, in mitigation design (European Union, 2022).

Second, the DSA's transparency architecture recognises language as an accountability variable. Article 42 requires very large platforms and search engines to report, among other elements, on the qualifications and linguistic expertise of content moderation staff, alongside outcome-relevant indicators broken down by Member State official languages (European Union, 2022). This is important because it shows the legislator's intent to treat language capacity as an auditable compliance input and to measure performance at the language level. But it also reveals the gap: the breakdown requirement is tied to Member State official languages, not to actual language use patterns on the services.

Third, the DSA's approach to terms and conditions confirms that language is treated as a safeguard for user rights. Article 14 frames comprehensibility as a duty, requiring that key restrictions and moderation information "shall be set out in clear, plain, intelligible, user-friendly and unambiguous language" (European Union, 2022, Article 14). The intent is clear: comprehension is part of fairness and transparency. The limitation is also clear: the Regulation does not automatically translate that principle into structured obligations for widely used non-official languages inside the Union.

Fourth, the DSA enforcement ecosystem is designed to be technically informed and evidence-based. The Commission's enforcement is supported by technical capacity, including the European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency. The cooperation framework emphasises structured coordination between the Commission, Digital Services Coordinators, and the European Board for Digital Services (European Commission, n.d.; European Union, 2022). This matters because any language extension needs to be anchored in enforceable, measurable expectations rather than symbolic commitments.

Taken together, the DSA already embeds a principle: language differences can generate differentiated risks and require differentiated mitigation. The practical problem is that the DSA's mandatory language metrics and certain public-facing language breakdowns remain tethered to Member State official languages, leaving a gap between intent and lived experience for Arabic-speaking communities.



An Arabic compliance pathway that respects rights, avoids norm export, and can be audited

The reform proposed here is deliberately narrow: it is a language capability amendment, not a content policy rewrite. It aims to translate the DSA's existing intent on linguistic risks into a measurable compliance obligation for very large platforms and search engines.

The core mechanism is an “additional supported languages” clause for very large services. In practice, this would mean that when a language meets an objective threshold of use among recipients of the service in the Union, the provider would be required to meet specified DSA-related obligations in that language. Arabic would be listed as the initial priority language, with a pathway to add others through delegated or implementing measures. While this brief focuses on Arabic, the mechanism is intentionally replicable for other widely used non-EU languages in Europe, including Turkish, Ukrainian, Urdu, Chinese, and Russian. Arabic is a pragmatic first designation because technical cooperation can be anchored in regional institutions and multilateral partnerships, including ESCWA and the League of Arab States, rather than relying on politically sensitive government-to-government coordination with states where relations with the EU may be more contested (UNESCWA & League of Arab States, 2023).

The obligations covered should be limited to those where language competence is essential to rights and risk governance:

1. **Risk assessment and mitigation:** Providers would be expected to demonstrate that their risk assessments and mitigations meaningfully cover Arabic language risks in the Union, including dialect-aware analysis and a fundamental rights impact framing. This is not an instruction to take a political stance. It is a requirement to show that the risk governance process is not blind to a major linguistic environment that the DSA itself requires providers to consider (European Union, 2022).
2. **Transparency and audit relevant metrics:** Providers would report, for Arabic, the same categories already required for Member State official languages, including staffing linguistic expertise and relevant accuracy indicators, so that regulators and independent auditors can assess whether Arabic is treated as a serious compliance domain (European Union, 2022).
3. **User due process interfaces:** Where platforms provide statements of reasons, complaint handling, and terms and conditions summaries, the goal is that Arabic-speaking users in the Union can understand decisions and use remedies effectively. This aligns with the DSA's emphasis on clarity and accessibility, while recognising that comprehension is not guaranteed by providing information only in Member State official languages (European Union, 2022).

The design principle is legitimacy through co-production rather than unilateral definition. The EU should not claim authority over Arabic language norms. Instead, the EU can require platforms to build Arabic competence for EU compliance purposes, while the resources that enable competence are developed through a partnership architecture that includes Arab regional institutions and civil society.

A realistic way to do this is to launch an Arabic DSA compliance baseline as a joint technical initiative. It would not produce a single political definition of hate or disinformation. It would instead generate three practical assets that platforms, regulators, and vetted researchers can use to test systems.

First, a shared Arabic language risk taxonomy aligned to DSA categories. This would map risks to DSA-relevant domains such as illegal hate speech under EU and Member State law, incitement risks, harassment, information manipulation patterns, and content moderation error types such as over-removal without explanation. It would explicitly note that legal thresholds differ across Member States and that the Arabic context is diverse.

Second, an Arabic evaluation dataset designed for auditing and red teaming. The goal would be to create a benchmark set of Arabic posts and narratives, drawn from public sources, that represent dialect variation and



Funded by
the European Union

implemented by
the College of Europe



College of Europe
Collège d'Europe



Natolin

contextual ambiguity. This supports the DSA's evidence-based enforcement and the Commission's technical oversight posture (European Commission, n.d. c).

Third, a roster of vetted expertise and civil society nodes. Human Rights Watch's report on Meta's Palestine content highlights years of documentation by organisations such as 7amleh and Access Now (Human Rights Watch, 2023). These actors, alongside Arabic language researchers in European universities and diaspora organisations, can act as sources of contextual knowledge and legitimacy. The League of Arab States, through its partnership with ESCWA on the Arab Digital Agenda, can provide an umbrella for coordination that does not privilege a single state's political preferences (UNESCWA & League of Arab States, 2023).

This pathway also fits within the EU's evolving approach to platform governance through codes and benchmarks. The Commission's approach to codes of conduct signals that structured voluntary commitments can become compliance reference points for assessing risk governance maturity and implementation quality (European Commission, n.d. a).

Managing sensitivities: what this reform is, and what it is not

Any language reform touching Arabic content will be politically sensitive. The brief, therefore, builds on a set of guardrails that are consistent with DSA principles and with Euro-Arab diplomatic realities.

First, the reform should not be framed as the EU "adding Arabic to the DSA" in a symbolic way that triggers constitutional debates about EU official languages. The more precise framing is: the EU is clarifying that very large services must support certain compliance functions in additional languages where this is necessary to protect fundamental rights and mitigate systemic risks within the Union. This is a functional compliance standard, not a linguistic status claim.

Second, the reform must avoid collapsing distinct policy domains. Disinformation, hate speech, and incitement have different legal and normative meanings across jurisdictions. The EU's DSA compliance logic is built around EU law and Member State law, and the EU has strengthened its approach to illegal hate speech through its updated code architecture (European Commission, n.d. b). Arab states have their own legal frameworks and political sensitivities. The partnership approach should therefore emphasise technical capacity and rights-based process, not content alignment.

Third, the reform should explicitly protect freedom of expression and due process. One of the most persistent critiques from Arabic-speaking users is not only the removal itself but removal without intelligible explanation and without an effective remedy. The Tech Policy Press discussion of Palestinian digital rights and the DSA highlights concerns about over removal and the risk that expanded regulation could amplify speech constraints if procedural safeguards are weak (Domínguez de Olazábal, 2023). Any Arabic language obligation should be paired with the principle that platforms must improve explanation quality and complaint accessibility for Arabic speakers, not simply expand automated takedowns.

Fourth, legitimacy should be anchored in plural representation. Arabic is not one context. It spans dialects, religious communities, and political identities. A credible Arabic baseline cannot be produced by a single government, a single European agency, or a single civil society organisation. This is where the League of Arab States can play a pragmatic role as a convening umbrella, in partnership with ESCWA's technical work on digital development, without turning the project into an intergovernmental censorship instrument (UNESCWA & League of Arab States, 2023).

Fifth, the approach should strengthen, not dilute, EU enforcement capacity. The Commission and the Board have already built cooperation mechanisms and technical support structures, including ECAT and Board working groups (European Commission, n.d. c; European Union, 2022). Arabic language coverage can be integrated into this existing architecture through targeted expertise pools and auditing criteria. This is more realistic than creating a new institution.



**Funded by
the European Union**

**implemented by
the College of Europe**



Brugge

College of Europe
Collège d'Europe



Natolin

Finally, the reform should be testable. The strongest critique of platform language commitments is that they are hard to verify. The DSA's audit and transparency logic, including language-related reporting in Article 42, provides a ready-made verification pathway (European Union, 2022). The question becomes measurable: how many Arabic-speaking reviewers are trained to apply EU-relevant rules, what accuracy and error rates are observed in Arabic, how do complaint outcomes differ, and how are risks documented and mitigated across Member States with high Arabic use?

Conclusion

Arabic has become a litmus test for whether the DSA can deliver on its own promise: a safer online space that protects fundamental rights, is accountable to evidence, and is applied fairly across the Union's real linguistic landscape (European Union, 2022). The DSA already signals that linguistic differences matter for systemic risks and that language expertise should be reported and scrutinised. Yet current obligations remain tethered to Member State official languages, leaving a gap between intent and lived experience for Arabic-speaking communities.

Bridging this gap is not only a domestic EU inclusion measure. It is a strategic Euro-Arab governance opportunity. A targeted Arabic compliance obligation, designed as a functional standard for very large services and implemented through co-produced technical benchmarks, can reduce politically damaging enforcement controversies, strengthen the credibility of EU digital regulation in the Southern neighbourhood, and create a platform for cooperation with Arab regional institutions that are already investing in digital inclusion and governance capacity (UNESCWA & League of Arab States, 2023).

The value of the proposal is its specificity. It does not ask the EU to solve content moderation politics. It asks the EU to ensure that when platforms claim DSA compliance, they can deliver rights and risk governance in Arabic inside the Union, in a way that can be audited, challenged, and improved.

Policy implications

- A narrowly tailored legislative amendment is feasible and strategically coherent. The EU could introduce an "additional supported languages" mechanism for very large platforms and search engines, enabling the Commission to designate languages based on objective usage thresholds among recipients in the Union. Arabic is the most defensible first designation because of its societal salience and the documented enforcement controversies affecting Arabic-related discourse. (Human Rights Watch, 2023; Eurostat, 2024)
- Enforcement can begin even before a formal amendment through interpretive guidance and audit practice. The Commission and the Board could clarify, in guidance on risk assessments and transparency reporting, that linguistic differences include widely used non-official languages where risks are demonstrably localised. This would operationalise the DSA's own logic and enable auditors to treat Arabic capability as a compliance-relevant factor. (European Union, 2022)
- The EEAS can treat Arabic language platform governance as a confidence-building measure in Euro Arab dialogue. Without turning this into a content alignment exercise, the EEAS can convene a structured dialogue alongside the Commission, ESCWA, and the League of Arab States to support an Arabic DSA compliance baseline focused on rights, transparency, and risk measurement. (UNESCWA & League of Arab States, 2023)
- Civil society participation is not optional if legitimacy is the goal. Evidence from Palestine-related enforcement controversies shows that documentation capacity often sits with specialised Arab and Palestinian digital rights organisations. Integrating such actors into benchmark design and oversight improves contextual accuracy and reduces the perception that language governance is being imposed from above. (Human Rights Watch, 2023)



**Funded by
the European Union**

**implemented by
the College of Europe**



Brugge

College of Europe
Collège d'Europe



Natolin

- A language reform strengthens, rather than competes with, EU initiatives on disinformation and hate speech. The EU's compliance ecosystem increasingly relies on measurable commitments and monitoring practices that make language capability a practical enabler of existing priorities, not an additional policy silo. (European Commission, 2025a; European Commission, 2024)



Funded by
the European Union

implemented by
the College of Europe



Brugge

College of Europe
Collège d'Europe



Natolin

References

- Associated Press. (2024). *France issues arrest warrants for Syria's Assad over chemical attacks* (or relevant AP reporting on French Syria accountability proceedings). <https://apnews.com/>
- Business for Social Responsibility. (2021). *Human rights impact assessment: Meta's content policy and enforcement in relation to Israel and Palestine*. <https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Human-Rights-Due-Diligence-of-Metas-Impacts-in-Israel-and-Palestine-in-May-2021.pdf>
- CVC. (2024). *El español en el mundo: Anuario del Instituto Cervantes 2024*. Cuadros basados en datos del INE (2021). https://cvc.cervantes.es/lengua/anuario/anuario_24/moreno/cuadros.htm
- Deutsche Welle. (2025). *Online disinformation and sectarian narratives during Syria's coastal violence*.
- Domínguez de Olazábal, I. (2023, November 6). *The Digital Services Act and Palestinian digital rights: A complex intersection*. Tech Policy Press.
- European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR). (2022). *Syria: Criminal complaints and trials in Europe (case tracker)*. <https://www.ecchr.eu/en/case/syria/>
- European Commission. (2025a). *Commission endorses the integration of the Code of Practice on Disinformation into the DSA framework as a Code of Conduct on Disinformation*. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation>
- European Commission. (2024). *Code of conduct plus on countering illegal hate speech online integrated into the DSA framework*. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online>
- European Commission. (n.d. c). European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency. https://algorithmic-transparency.ec.europa.eu/about_en
- European External Action Service. (2025). *EEAS Strategic Communication Task Forces, including Task Force South and EU communication in Arabic*.
- European Parliament. (2025). *Answer given by Executive Vice President Virkkunen on behalf of the Commission to written question E 003271 2025, including DSA complaint handling and reversal figures*.
- European Parliament & Council of the European Union. (2022). *Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act)*. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/euinarabic_ar
- European Union. (2022). *Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act)*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj>
- Eurostat. (2024). *Acquisition of citizenship statistics for 2023*. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_acq/default/table?lang=en
- Eurostat. (2025b, July 11). *EU population increases for the 4th consecutive year*. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20250711-1>
- Human Rights Watch. (2023). *Meta's broken promises: Systemic censorship of Palestine content on Instagram and Facebook*. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/12/21/metas-broken-promises/systemic-censorship-palestine-content-instagram-and>
- Human Rights Watch. (2020). *Video unavailable: Social media platforms remove evidence of war crimes*. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/09/10/video-unavailable/social-media-platforms-remove-evidence-war-crimes>
- Husovec, M., & Urban, J. (2024). *The Brussels effect of the Digital Services Act*. Verfassungsblog. <https://verfassungsblog.de/will-the-dsa-have-the-brussels-effect>
- language knowledge /eu. (2024). *Explore Arabic language knowledge in Europe*. <https://languageknowledge.eu/languages/arabic>
- Turillazzi, G., et al. (2023). *The risk assessment and mitigation obligations of the Digital Services Act*. SSRN.
- Perrigo, B. (2020, April 6). *These tech companies managed to eradicate ISIS content, but they are also erasing crucial evidence of war crimes*. TIME. <https://time.com/5814807/isis-social-media-removals-war-crimes/>



- Rechtbank Den Haag. (2024). *[Case title and judgment details for the Netherlands Syria related conviction]*. <https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/>
- Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression. (2024). *Universal jurisdiction and Syria accountability: case documentation / legal monitoring*. <https://scm.bz/>
- Wired. (2018, October 4). *The Internet is deleting evidence of war crimes*. <https://www.wired.com/story/chemical-weapons-in-syria-youtube-algorithm-delete-video/>
- Stiković, I. (2024). *The EU's Digital Services Act and its impact*.
- Syria Justice and Accountability Centre. (n.d.). *Investigation and case building*. Syria Justice and Accountability Centre. Retrieved February 16, 2026, from <https://syriaaccountability.org/investigation-and-case-building/>
- UNESCWA & League of Arab States. (2023). *Arab Digital Agenda 2023 to 2033*. <https://ada.unescwa.org/en/resources/arab-digital-agenda-2023-2033-digest>



El Hiwar project

El Hiwar III is an EU-funded project implemented by the College of Europe (Bruges, Belgium). It designs, organises and facilitates a series of activities with the aim of building capacity, contributing to information exchange and interactions between the EU and the LAS. These activities take various formats, such as policy dialogues, summer schools, training programmes, policy briefs, etc.

The League of Arab States is a central partner in the stabilisation of the region and the main institutional interlocutor with the Arab world. At the first EU-LAS summit in Sharm El-Sheikh (Egypt) on 24-25 February 2019, the leaders agreed to deepen Arab-European ties to enhance the stability, prosperity, and well-being of the two regions. Both sides agreed to boost cooperation towards security, conflict resolution and socio-economic development throughout the region. Leaders also reaffirmed the need to strengthen economic cooperation between the two regions to spur investment and sustainable growth. The summit in Egypt marked the start of a new dialogue between the EU and the LAS. Leaders committed to hold EU-LAS summits regularly.

This project is designed to reinforce the dialogue and cooperation with the League of Arab States.

El Hiwar III aims to contribute to the implementation of the EU-LAS Joint Work Programme on information and training, complementing the formal EU-LAS activities taking place outside of El Hiwar (e.g. Ministerial and PSC meetings, other political exchanges with EU-LAS counterparts, EU-LAS Strategic Dialogue).

Whenever relevant, El Hiwar III can provide inputs for the preparation of formal EU-LAS relations meetings (e.g. preparation of policy briefs) or for the implementation of decisions made during Ministerial meetings, summits, etc. Likewise, El Hiwar III can provide inputs in the framework of relevant multilateral events.

El Hiwar III also aims to contribute to enhancing the partnership between the EU and Arab countries by sharing knowledge and expertise to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in Arab countries.

More information: coleurope.eu/elhiwar
Contact: elhiwar@coleurope.eu

About the HiwarBrief

HiwarBrief: New Voices, New Ideas from the El Hiwar Summer School is a publication featuring policy briefs produced by participants of the Summer School on Euro-Arab Relations.

This initiative translates the knowledge gained during the Summer School into practical recommendations, contributing to ongoing Euro-Arab cooperation efforts.

Guided by Eduard Soler i Lecha, an El Hiwar expert, participants draft policy briefs on key issues explored during each edition of the programme. In 2025, these focused on digital citizenship, youth agency in technology, and the development of inclusive digital societies, reflecting the priority of leveraging digital tools to empower youth and strengthen Euro-Arab cooperation.

HiwarBrief fosters the exchange of ideas among emerging experts while strengthening the El Hiwar network, offering participants a channel to reach policymakers and advocate for impactful change.



This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of its author and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union nor the League of Arab States



**Funded by
the European Union**

**implemented by
the College of Europe**



College of Europe
Collège d'Europe



Natolin