The European Union’s Role in the Formation of India’s Climate Change Policy

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About the Author

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the role of the European Union (EU) in the formation of India’s climate change policy; an increasingly high profile issue area. It is based on an extensive study of relevant literature, EU-India policy documents and the execution of thirteen semi-structured interviews with experts; many of whom have experienced EU-India cooperation on climate change first-hand. A three-point typology will be used to assess the extent of the EU’s leadership role, supporting role or equal partnership role in India, with several sub-roles within these categories. Further, for clarity and chronology purposes, three time periods will be distinguished to assess how India’s climate policy has evolved over time, alongside the EU’s role within that. The findings of the paper confirm that the EU has demonstrated signs of all three roles to some degree, although the EU-India relationship in climate policy is increasingly an equal partnership. It offers explanations for previous shortcomings in EU-India climate policy as well as policy recommendations to help ensure more effective cooperation and implementation of policies.
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa</td>
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<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
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<td>CO2</td>
<td>Carbon Dioxide</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>GEEREF</td>
<td>Global Energy Efficiency &amp; Renewable Energy Fund</td>
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<td>GHG</td>
<td>Greenhouse Gases</td>
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<td>INCCA</td>
<td>Indian Network for Climate Change Assessment</td>
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<td>JAP</td>
<td>Joint Action Plan</td>
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<td>KVA</td>
<td>Kilovolt-ampere</td>
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<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<td>MRV</td>
<td>Measuring, Reporting and Verification</td>
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<td>NAPCC</td>
<td>National Action Plan for Climate Change</td>
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<td>NCDMA</td>
<td>National Clean Development Mechanism Authority</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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Introduction: climate diplomacy and the EU’s role in the developing world

The EU has increasingly recognised that emerging powers like India are “already key players in global politics, but it would nonetheless like to see them engaged to yet a greater degree in the global governance of the environment, notably when it comes to climate change”. Although EU-India relations date back to the early 1960s their cooperation has developed and gained a higher profile in recent years. It is important, however, to acknowledge that their relations are still undergoing an evolutionary process. Despite effective collaboration in certain policy areas since the formalisation of their Strategic Partnership in 2004, and the start of the EU-India Summits in 2000, their cooperation has not been without difficulties; their relationship being often compared to a ‘loveless arranged marriage’. The commonalities and shared visions of the two partners (such as, democracy and respect for human rights) have not guaranteed successful cooperation.

An often neglected area of discussion is EU-India collaboration on climate change policy. The focus on the EU’s dialogue with BRIC countries on a multilateral level has omitted its bilateral relations with the heterogeneous individual BRIC nations. Further, where research on EU-Asia relations has been conducted, it has tended to focus disproportionately on EU-China relations, or heavily politicised topical issues such as the EU-India negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). This paper thus fills an important gap in current research; taking into consideration the broader context and evolution of the EU-India relationship while focusing specifically on climate change policy. So why does the EU want to influence India at all? Firstly, because the “protection of the environment is one of the EU’s major political commitments and aspect of its external relations actions”, demonstrated by its attempt to lead on the multilateral level at high-profile United Nations Climate Change Conferences (UNCCCs) and encourage a common approach internationally. Secondly, cooperating with a key developing country also adheres to the EU’s broader

development agenda and commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (applicable until 2015). Given that “climate change is not only an environmental problem but also poses a clear risk to development if not addressed effectively”, there are many incentives for collaborating with India in this policy domain. The EU is recognised as one of the world’s largest donors of development assistance that is helping countries mitigate against the disastrous impacts of climate change which are expected to increase poverty levels are an important aspect of this.

This paper argues that the EU has demonstrated signs of all three roles in India: as a leader, as a supporter and as an equal partner, all to a lesser or greater extent depending on the time period in question. The EU has found possessing a significant leadership role problematic – thus although acting as a necessary agenda setter and successfully encouraging India to upscale its commitment to international targets – it was nevertheless a modest role, challenged by India’s rising confidence and quest for international recognition. In terms of its supporting role, the EU demonstrated this most visibly in the second time phase by giving India financial and technical expertise through a rising number of dialogues and committees, expanding information sharing and best practice. Finally, this paper will show that the EU-India relationship has been progressively moving towards an equal partnership; the two actors increasingly working in a non-hierarchal and cooperative setting, co-financing projects and collaborating more on R&D. Overall, the EU has moved from a minor leadership role in phase one, to an equal partner role in phase three, although this has not been a simple nor problem-free transition.

The findings of this paper are primarily based on secondary literature and thirteen interviews; giving a more unique and up-to-date insight on the issue. Given that the EU’s role in India has changed significantly overtime, it is important to acknowledge the evolution of the relationship chronologically with three time periods. This will help justify how the EU has transitioned from possessing a minor ‘leadership role’ in the earliest stages of EU-India cooperation, to a more ‘supporting role’ and ending, presently, as more of an ‘equal partner’. In brief, the first phase (1990-1999) recognises that although India established diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community as early as 1963, in the area of climate change very little EU-India cooperation is visible prior to the 1990s, substantiating Goddeeris’s claim that

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6 Ibid.
the relationship initially took a slow pace.  The second period (2000-2009) commences on an important landmark date in EU-India relations, 2000, when the first ever EU-India Summit took place in Lisbon; climate change becoming a rising feature year on year as their relationship progressed to a Strategic Partnership. Finally, the third phase, covering the period from 2010 to present, features key developments in the partnership at the UNCCCs and the finalisation of India’s Twelfth Five Year Plan (released in April 2012).

**India’s position on climate change**

This section addresses India’s climate change policy on the domestic and international level.

**How worried should India be about climate change?**

India recognises that it is entering a phase of “increasing environmental stress”, as one of the world’s most vulnerable countries when it comes to climate change, acknowledging the huge financial implications climate change could, and is already having, on its booming economy. The cost of climate change is huge on all fronts, from the unpredictable funds needed to recover from natural disasters, to the high cost of adaptation. For example, the increasingly vulnerable agricultural sector requires more investment from the Indian government to overcome the problem of rainfall unpredictability, “rain-fed agriculture making up 70% of farmed land and increased drought having a devastating impact on India’s rural economy”. Finally, the inseparable link between development and environmental policy is brought into the spotlight when considering the consequences of climate change. As a nation recognised for its large and poor population, climate change will create further water and food insecurity, reduce income stability and have serious health implications.

Firstly, in terms of basic needs, “the receding of the Himalayan glaciers will affect water security across the entire northern part of the Indian subcontinent”, resulting in

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water shortages and lengthened periods of drought. Further, concerning food security, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) suggested that climate change “will lead to huge crop losses and leave large patches of arable land unfit for cultivation”, as India’s resource base is attacked and the poorest, particularly those based in the most rural regions, left with limited food. Secondly, on the matter of rising income instability, natural disasters will result in “widespread habitat loss and population displacement”, giving rise to climate migrants, both within India and its vulnerable neighbouring countries (such as Bangladesh) who are also highly susceptible to flooding. Fourthly, concerning health, India is a ‘black carbon hotspot’, which, defined as “a component of soot and a potent climate-forcing agent found in atmospheric brown clouds”, could severely deteriorate the health of (particularly poor) Indian people.

**India’s contribution to climate change**

As is obvious from the aforementioned paragraph, India’s vulnerability to climate change impacts is high and this is due to worsen as, unsurprisingly, the country’s absolute emissions are rising as it develops, and its emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) are “projected to increase by about 47% between now and 2020”. This is still, however, relatively low compared than for other developing nations, such as China, to whom India is often compared. India’s transport sector is highly polluting, energy intensive and the country is a high net importer of foreign oil. Further, India relies about “70% on coal and there are plans to build more coal-fired power plants”, although is coming to the realisation that it cannot depend on coal to this extent anymore. Even at present only “around 2% of India’s electricity comes from renewable sources”, this is likely to rise significantly throughout the next decade.

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16 Ibid.
Climate diplomacy: explaining India’s negotiating position

India’s position on climate change has long been dominated by its belief in a common but differentiated responsibility. By adhering to this principle, India “puts the burden of responsibility to address climate change on the shoulders of developed countries”, arguing that historically they have been the main contributors to GHG emissions in the atmosphere, and therefore should use their financial and technical resources to resolve the problem.17 This mind-set was partially overturned at the Durban UNFCC (2011) although the ethos still resonates in many of India’s actions. However, despite a difference in approach between the EU and India from an eco-imperialistic and equity perspective, there is a “strong environmental ethic embedded in Indian culture […] which] remains unchanged despite increased prosperity”, and this is reassuring to the EU as it searches for common ground.18 However, India’s rapid yet ‘uneven’ development, unmistakable from the persistence of poverty regardless of rising economic prosperity, has resulted in the country presenting a perplexing and somewhat contradictory position in climate change policy. This is partially attributed to its “schizophrenia of being both poor and rich at the same time”, often gaining it the ‘victim label’.19 However, India still appears largely undecided as to whether it benefits more from presenting itself as “the weak and insecure India, or, the India of hope and confidence that seeks to stride the world stage”.20 This ultimately makes it a complex actor for the EU to work with, challenged by “the evolving nature of the tension between economic, social and environmental development” in India.21

More recently the creation of The National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) has seen climate change rise up India’s domestic priority list, creating renewed optimism in international and EU-India climate policy. So why is India taking this issue increasingly seriously? Martin Wright noted three key reasons for this development in

20 Ibid.
21 Schunz and Belis, op.cit., p. 8.
an insightful interview.\textsuperscript{22} Firstly, Indian policy makers have now realised that climate change is a major issue on the diplomatic stage and given their strong business minds do not want to miss out on a ‘money making’ opportunity; seduced by the idea of making a profit from the carbon trade for instance.\textsuperscript{23} Secondly, Mr Wright’s perspective concurs with that of Schunz and Bels who maintain that India is increasingly conscious of its vulnerable status when it comes to climate change impacts, thus is increasingly creating policies at the domestic level which acknowledge the broader international political debate on this issue.\textsuperscript{24} Thirdly, India’s energy concerns have made climate change a high politics issue, Martin Wright, for instance suggests that the potential for renewable energy in India has had a big impact on India’s approach; especially in the case of solar energy.\textsuperscript{25}

The evolution of India’s climate change policy on the domestic level

Prior to the 1990s climate change seldom featured in Indian policy. This does not mean that it did not have environmental concerns, but rather that climate change was not a key priority in the country’s overall political narrative.\textsuperscript{26} Thus, although climate change may not have been an independent policy area until more recently, GHG emission reduction and sustainable development are visible as indirect successes of broader environmental policy. For example, India’s commitment to reducing deforestation, noticeable as early as the Forest Conservation Act (1980) and later the Forest Rights Act (2006), resulted in the “strict restricting and regulating [...] the use of forest land for non-forest purposes without the prior approval of Central Government”, ensuring that forests, which act as carbon sinks for carbon emissions, were protected.\textsuperscript{27}

As Ian Thornton maintains, the last ten years have seen India’s confidence grow and its emergence as an economic power has given it an expanding role in creating environmental regulations.\textsuperscript{28} For example, in the area of energy efficiency and security, the government is increasingly investing in renewable energy, the New Renewable Energy Policy (2005), for instance, “promoting the adoption of sustain-

\textsuperscript{22} Interview with Mr Martin Wright.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Schunz and Bels, op.cit., pp. 1-17.
\textsuperscript{25} Interview with Mr Martin Wright, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{26} Interview with Mr Ian Thornton.
\textsuperscript{28} Interview with Mr Ian Thornton, op.cit.
able and renewable energy sources by facilitating the speedy deployment of renewable technology through indigenous design, development and manufacturing”.29 Further, concerning consumption, at the start of the second time period India created the Energy Conservation Act (2001) to reduce consumption in various sectors and later the Energy Conservation Building Code (2006) which saw the introduction of a “regulatory code designed to ensure energy efficiency in all buildings with above 500 KVA connected load or air-conditioned floor areas of over 1000 square metres”.30 As an unintended consequence, this has also set a positive foundation for EU-India climate cooperation, such as for their Joint Declaration on Enhanced Cooperation in Energy (2012).

More recently, in the third phase, “India has been successful in maintaining a steady decrease in its emissions intensity, an indicator of the decoupling of its economy and emissions”, revealing that, with political will, progress can be made quickly.31 Peter Luff revealed that progress is in part attributable to the new set of competent Indian Ministers and advisers who have successfully shaped policy, giving the example of Mr Jairam Ramesh, the Indian Minister of Environment and Forests, who helped break the Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) deadlock at the Cancun UNCCC in 2010.32 This new generation of ‘climate aware’ policymakers have helped strengthen the NAPCC, which since 2008 “established a concrete framework to address climate in the domestic context”.33 It achieves this by setting targets across various key sectors, which relate to broader climate policy, with eight national missions, including “solar energy, energy efficiency, a sustainable habitat, water, sustaining the Himalayan ecosystem, ‘Green India,’ sustainable agriculture and sustainable knowledge for climate change”.34 For example, in the solar energy mission, India’s Solar Mission sets the ambitious goal of “installing solar-power generation capacity of 20,000 MW by 2022”, thus addressing energy security and climate change concerns simultaneously and reducing the country’s reliance on more polluting energy sources, such as oil and coal.35 Further, the impact of these missions is large-scale; India’s National Mission on Energy Efficiency (applicable until 2015), for

30 Ibid., p. 20.
31 Interview with Mr Peter Luff.
32 Ibid.
33 Rastogi, op.cit., p. 130.
example, “is expected to reduce energy consumption by 5% and save about 100 million tonnes of CO2 annually by 2015”.  

Evidence: The EU’s leadership role in India’s climate policy

As many commentators recognise, “the EU increasingly aspires to play a leading role in global politics, it engages itself in negotiations, cooperation schemes and conflict resolution processes”, climate change being a prime example of this. Leadership in itself is a broad and somewhat contested concept; it can be defined in a multitude of ways and is hard to quantify. Overall leadership can be considered “an asymmetrical relationship of influence in which one actor guides or directs the behaviour of others towards a certain goal, over a certain period of time”. Within this broader leadership role, the EU’s agenda, standard and target setting role will be discussed; important sub-roles within the broader concept of EU leadership. Firstly, agenda setting considers the EU’s ability to raise the profile and salience of climate change in India, the European Commission increasingly attempting to act beyond its borders by applying regional processes to shape policy on a global scale. Secondly, the standard and target setting role will consider whether the EU has made India more ambitious in this regard.

The EU as an agenda setter

In terms of the EU’s agenda setting role, phase one in particular (the 1990s) was a period where there was a clear need for the EU to step up and take on this leadership role, which it demonstrated to some extent both on a bilateral and multilateral level. Gauri Khandekar recognises that the EU often leads in terms of making proposals and then getting India to agree to them, or at the very least, creating the need for action towards an agreement on a particular proposal. This is crucial, she added, as India rarely makes proposals, therefore it needs the EU to instigate a dialogue before it takes action. This has exacerbated substantially since the start of EU-India Summits in 2000, however EU-India bilateral contact has been notably less publicised than multilateral contact. On a multilateral level, the EU can to some extent be considered one (of many) international players which

36 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Interview with Ms Gauri Khandekar.
40 Ibid.
encouraged a greater profile for climate change in India’s action plans and national strategy documents. The EU’s role here is attributed, as Tim Gore stated, to the Union’s ability to be one of the first to act in climate policy and having some of the most developed institutionalised policies in the world. However, the EU’s ability to lead beyond simply agenda setting, but also in the implementation and enforcement of emissions cuts is still uncertain.

The EU as a target and standard setter

Concerning the EU’s ability to set targets and standards, Gauri Khandekar argues that EU leadership is proven in this area by its success at setting ambitious targets and encouraging Indian negotiators to ‘aim high’ and not simply settle for lowest common denominator targets. In the first phase during which “several EU countries took the lead in establishing voluntary domestic emission reduction targets” at UN level, this encouraged India to take responsibility for its emissions and move towards setting its own targets. Subsequently, in phase two, “India had success at maintaining a steady decrease in its emissions intensity”, the EU being one of the key actors who encouraged India to set more ambitious targets. Graham Watson, Member of the European Parliament (MEP), attributes the EU’s success here to its ability to adopt a persuasive as opposed to dictating approach. Despite some level of influence, the EU’s leadership potential has been significantly limited by its failure to meet its own emission reduction targets and set a better example, this Tim Gore maintains, is an important pre-requisite before India will cooperate further with the EU.

Evidence: the EU’s supporter role in India’s climate policy

There is certainly potential for the Union to support India’s path towards sustainable growth and development given its vast technical expertise and financial resources. Negative publicity regarding the financial crisis in Europe often leads observers to

41 Interview with Mr Tim Gore.
43 Interview with Ms Gauri Khandekar, op.cit.
44 Schreurs and Tiberghien, op.cit., pp. 19-46.
45 Rastogi, op.cit., p. 127.
46 Interview with Mr Graham Watson.
47 Interview with Mr Tim Gore.
overlook that, in the long term; the EU is still in a very capable position to financially support developing partner countries. However, India’s rising economic prosperity has caused “substantial disagreement amongst member states concerning the financial contribution for developing country adaptation and mitigation measures”, and whether they still merit financial support. There are two sub-roles within the potential ‘supporter role’ for the EU which will now be discussed, supporting India via financial means or through technical expertise and information sharing.

The EU as a financial supporter

There is limited evidence of the EU as a financial supporter in the first phase; in part due to climate change being seen as a low policy priority in India during that period. The only exception worth noting is in the area of research, whereby, typically via the European Commission, the Union supported India financially when it financed or co-financed research.

The second time period saw the creation of a financial mechanism (2008), an outcome of the 2005 EU-India Summit, which enhanced the EU’s financial supporter role. Although not created exclusively to finance climate change projects, the Delhi-based Action Plan Support Facility “was created to generate financial support for implementing the EU-India Joint Action Plan”. Further, the third phase (2010) saw this financial mechanism evolve as climate change began to be considered independently from broader EU-India environmental concerns.

The EU as a supporter through technical assistance and information sharing

The EU’s supporter role in India through technical assistance and information sharing is an important consideration given that, according to Prasanta Biswal, India needs the EU’s help with technology innovation more than money. India generally welcomes the support and intervention of external actors, stating at the High Level India-EU Dialogue (2009) that “by working well together we can achieve much more than by working separately”; EU support to expand green technologies is thus

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48 Groen, Lisanne and Niemann, Ame, “EU Actomess and effectiveness under political pressure at the Copenhagen climate change negotiations”, paper prepared for the Twelfth European Union Studies Association Conference, Boston, 3-5 March 2011, p. 12.
49 Luff and Whitfield, op.cit., pp. 1-29.
50 Interview with Mr Prasanta Biswal.
appreciated. EU-India R&D collaboration complements India’s domestic efforts, for instance the GANGES Forum set up in 2010, which “comprised of the world’s leading environmental scientists of Indian origin [and] was established to advise the Government of India on the countries environmental science agenda”.

There are several examples of India’s role as a supporter in the second phase. Firstly, the 2002 ‘Asia Pro Eco Programme’, which includes India as a target country, helped “strengthen the environmental dialogue between Asia and Europe through the exchange of policy information, technologies and best practice that promote more resource-efficient, market-driven and sustainable solutions to urban environmental problems in Asia”. As well as increasing the dialogue between the two actors it also began the process towards finding Asia-specific solutions; acknowledging Asia’s diversity and distinct needs. Secondly, the establishment of the EU-India Science and Technology Steering Committee in 2004 increased collaboration by “establishing work programmes and [...] organising several EU-India thematic workshops”. For example, the workshops covered “clean coal technologies and carbon capture storage, climate change research needs and renewable energy research and technology development”. Thirdly, the EU has supported India technologically in the area of renewable energy, promoted through the November 2008 GEEREF initiative, an “innovative public private partnership initiated by the European Commission aiming to transfer clean and renewable energy technologies to developing countries”. As Surabhi Rajagopal argues, initiatives like this have had a bigger impact on influencing India’s climate policy than larger scale EU-India Summits.

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54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.


57 Interview with Ms Surabhi Rajagopal.
Evidence: the EU’s role as India’s equal partner in climate policy

The very concept of an ‘equal partnership’ suggests that the relationship is free of hierarchy and that players are able to sit on the same table, co-financing research and projects, under the label of equal ownership. The EU-India equal partnership is visible on both a bilateral and multilateral level and it is evident that as the two “enter a new phase in relations, getting the bilateral compact right appears a key precondition”, before any joint projects or common strategies are finalised on a larger scale.  

An equal partnership: on a bilateral level

Firstly, on a bilateral level, the biggest landmark thus far has been the start of EU-India Summits, which “cover many aspects of the cooperation between the EU and India, including climate change and sustainable development [...] and help] establish new priorities for the coming year”. Notable positive outcomes thus far include “the fifth Summit in 2004, which declared India and the EU to be Strategic Partners and in 2005 when a Joint Action Plan (JAP) was agreed”. More recently, the twelfth summit showed “a fresh sign of the EU’s renewed political engagement towards its strategic partnership with India”, with the visible presence of many high-profile EU representatives, challenging previous criticism that the EU was ‘not taking the partnership seriously’ enough by only sending low rank officials to meetings. Beyond formal summits, in 2008, an important high-level dialogue was created in the form of an EU-India roundtable discussion, considering “cooperation in the key field of sustainable development, in particular in the context of climate destabilisation as a natural fit for the India-EU partnership”. These dialogues focused on areas of disagreement and stagnation free of pressure and media attention. The focus on finding common goals and solutions, not simply EU solutions to Indian problems, has aided the move towards an equal partnership. Peter Luff (a key figure in the introduction of these discussions) observed India’s satisfaction at being listened to for the first time, appreciating the relaxed setting and option to stray from the agenda.

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60 Ibid.
61 Khandekar, “EU-India: Getting the bilateral compact right”, op.cit.
63 Interview with Mr Peter Luff.
An equal partnership in climate negotiations: on a multilateral level

On a multilateral level, Gauri Khandekar suggests there has been a visible disconnect and lack of synergy between the two actors. The lack of synergy was particularly visible prior to the Copenhagen UNCCC (2009), when “India defined three basic national interests: no legally-binding emissions reduction target, no legally-binding peaking year for the country and a distinction between supported and unsupported mitigation actions by developing countries in respect of MRV”. However, India consented to the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 and as a result committed to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which was designed “to enable developed countries to meet their GHG reduction targets at a lower cost through projects in developing countries”. Although an opportunity for closer EU-India cooperation, the CDM in reality saw more negotiations between individual EU member states and India taking place as opposed to united EU-India cooperation. Further, it is likely to become more controversial in the third time period given that, “after December this year [2012] no new projects in India will be eligible for European financing through the CDM to encourage the funding to move to less developed countries such as Indonesia”.

Martin Wolf accuses India of possessing “a strong interest in securing an effective global agreement on climate change. However, it also possesses an interest in paying the smallest possible price for reaching that agreement”. However, the third time period saw positive signs of these barriers being overturned. For instance at Durban (2011), both “the EU and India played a key role in final negotiations that unlocked the pact on the last morning of the conference [... finding] the compromise that provided the basis to launch negotiations on a new global legal framework for climate action”. The success of the Union has thus been in climate

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64 Interview with Ms Gauri Khandekar, op.cit.
67 Keating, op.cit.
68 Ibid.
diplomacy, particularly concerning conflict resolution and helping to promote a healthy BRIC-EU relationship. Overall, their “interaction and coordination within UN bodies is not robust”, which has to some extent reduced the EU’s influence, but the actors are increasingly fighting along the same policy lines, as equal partners.71

An equal partnership in research

Prior to phase two little existed regarding EU-India collaboration on research. There was notably the “EU-India JAP adopted in 2005 which included a significant research and an innovation dimension”.72 This inspired the first ever EU-India Ministerial Science Conference in 2007, which encompassed climate change and associated energy issues and successfully resulted, for instance, in “the implementation of regular coordinated calls for proposals between the EU and India in the fields of solar energy research.”73 Further, at the beginning of phase three, the ‘2010 Conference on India-EU/Member State Partnership for a Strategic Roadmap in Research and Innovation’ saw discussions unfold on resource shortages, such as water shortages, worsened by climate change.74 A renewed acknowledgement of their enhanced cooperation and keenness to cooperate further in this area is visible under the framework of the EU-India Joint Declaration on Research and Innovation Cooperation, of February 2012, which refers to “the vibrant and strong cooperation in science and technology between India, the EU and many of its member states, through a rich diversity of ongoing bilateral initiatives, programmes and schemes”.75 As Kirsten Bound highlighted in an interview, the amount of money being invested into EU-India research has increased dramatically in recent years, opening the door for innovative and feasible solutions to climate change.76

71 Khandekar, “The EU and India: A Loveless Aranged Marriage”, op.cit., p. 3.
72 European Union-India Joint Declaration on Research and Innovation Cooperation, New Delhi, India, 10 February 2012, accessed 03/02/12, available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/india/summit_en.htm.
73 Ibid.
75 European Union-India Joint Declaration on Research and Innovation Cooperation, op.cit.
76 Interview with Ms Kirsten Bound.
Factors which stagnated progress from the EU’s side

It has previously been acknowledged in this paper that the EU-India relationship is undergoing an evolutionary process, which allows for some degree of error as cooperation deepens. Stagnation and conflicts faced in other areas of EU-India cooperation have undoubtedly had an impact on progress in climate change policy, for example over developments in the Emissions Trading Scheme and in the EU-India FTA negotiations. However, there are several factors, on the EU’s side, which have contributed to slow progress in cooperation in climate change policy.

Firstly, the EU has been accused of not understanding India’s negotiating position, both in climate change negotiations specifically and as an actor on the global stage more generally. Commission President José Barroso’s own words described “India’s journey over the last few decades as astounding; it is now a major world power, with impressive economic growth, a burgeoning middle class and a significant influence on its surrounding region and beyond”. However, the Union has to some extent become obsessed with this image of India, forgetting that, in reality, “there are two Indias that exist in parallel; the image of an India of grinding poverty, a creaking socialist style economy and communal violence […] and] the burgeoning democracy with a booming market”. Thus, approaching India uniquely as a rising economic power and showing an “insufficient awareness and understanding among EU stakeholders about India’s development needs and challenges”, is too simplistic.

Secondly, partially as a result of the aforementioned difficulty, the EU has had problems trying to understand India’s complex needs and priorities; it has been accused of negotiating badly when trying to shape India’s climate policy. To begin with, “a major error was the decision to negotiate environmental issues, including climate change, through confrontational negotiations instead of through other mechanisms that could foster unstinting cooperation”, particularly relevant in the earliest stages of cooperation. This was, in part, a result of “few policymakers and

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79 Fujiwara and Egenhofer, “Understanding India’s Climate Agenda”, op.cit., pp. 1-6.

diplomats appearing to know what the strategic partnership actually entailed”. As a consequence, a more hierarchical, domineering and seemingly patronising negotiating position was adopted by the EU initially, with an unhealthy reliance on the path dependency model as it tried to encourage India to move on “a path of convergence towards Western norms and standards”. As Kirsten Bound rightly states, path dependent models often fail because countries are looking to adapt best practices in a way that suits their unique development, the EU would have been better to acknowledge the diversity of climate solutions. A consequence was that, on some level, the EU curbed any hope of innovative and tailored solutions to India’s climate change challenges. Prasanta Biswal underlined that the EU should help India develop a unique model of solutions, not steer it based on its own very unique and specific experience.

Thirdly, the EU has disproportionately focused on ‘getting agreements’ when the main problem is the implementation of agreed policies and targets. As Peter Luff stated, the Indian government often fails to carry out its policies or meet targets and unless Indian Ministers are really keen to do something they do not pursue things very strongly. For example, despite a joint statement following the 2007 EU-India Summit, accentuating India’s commitment to R&D and solar energy programmes, “the critical objectives have not progressed either far or fast enough”. The EU has thus, in a sense, overestimated India’s political will to implement international and EU-specific agreements.

Factors which stagnated progress from India’s side

Until recently, India has lacked a comprehensive understanding, firstly, of the EU’s scope and purpose and, secondly, of climate change as an independent issue. In the former case, Vogel reiterates that “ignorance about the EU is widespread”, with India unable to comprehend the Union’s complex and unique structure. Evidence of this came out of the High Level India-EU Seminars, whereby Indian negotiators

81 Vogel, op.cit.
83 Interview with Ms Kirsten Bound, op.cit.
84 Interview with Mr Prasanta Biswal, op.cit.
85 Interview with Mr Peter Luff, op.cit.
87 Vogel, op.cit.
claimed that “it was difficult to know which of the many different EU institutions and
directorates to deal with”. 88 On the second point, India’s awareness of the climate
dispute issue, Tim Gore reiterated that recognition of climate change is still very
much found only at the elite level, not at the general public or ground level in
India. 89 Prasanta Biswal boldly stated that “no more than 10% of Indians know about
complete change!” 90 This has resulted in a lack of pressure or lobbying on the Indian
government to fully implement climate change policies or deepen cooperation with
the EU.

Secondly, beyond the lack of understanding and awareness of the EU in India there
is also the tenacious issue of its negative perception of the Union, Gauri Khandekar
stating that “India is EU-sceptic, not Europe sceptic”. 91 Prasanta Biswal stated, for
instance, that the EU should put its moral authority first and do more on its own side
before it lectures others. 92 Further, there is “a growing perception on the Indian side
that the EU’s days as an economic world power are over”, reducing its partnership
appeal. 93 India consequently seeks many of the same partners as the EU and has
often demonstrated “frustration that the EU’s Asia policy is much more focused on
China”, making it feel sidelined and less important at a time when it is seeking global
recognition and influence. 94 These factors combined have resulted in India preferring
bilateral cooperation with EU member states over cooperation with the EU as a single
body. Peter Mandelson summarised the EU’s reaction, stating that, “just as Europe
should take India seriously; I want India to take Europe seriously. I read recently in a
report that Indians do not think very much about the EU. This is a shame if it is true”. 95

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89 Interview with Mr Tim Gore, op.cit.
90 Interview with Mr Prasanta Biswal, op.cit.
91 Interview with Ms Gauri Khandekar, op.cit.
92 Interview with Mr Prasanta Biswal, op.cit.
93 Speiss, Clemens, “India’s Role in Regional Economic Integration in Asia”, in Wülbers, Shazia
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Thirdly, India’s thin government structure and small staffing has made the progress towards making agreements slower. Gauri Khandekar reminds us that India only has approximately 700 diplomats, with only 4 being ‘Europe West’ diplomats dealing specifically with EU relations. Does this suggest that cooperation with the EU is still a low priority for India even today? Further, India’s government structure is often regarded as chaotic, for example.

Chintamani Rao, chair of the Scientific Advisory Council to the Prime Minister, likens the Indian approach to science and innovation to the preparations for an Indian wedding. There is quite often chaos. So many people appear to be in charge that no one is actually in control.

Finally, the dominance of big businesses and corporate interests in India has had a massive influence, and not always a positive one, on climate policy according to Martin Wright. A KPMG study revealed that “the lack of stakeholder pressure on Indian companies is in sharp contrast with other countries where preferences of investors, employees, and customers typically convince companies to plan to reduce their carbon impact”, resulting in a ‘half-hearted’ commitment to meeting government targets. Further, Martin Wright adds that the significant diversity in the approaches of Indian companies towards meeting emission reduction targets makes it hard to monitor progress. From the EU’s perspective this has exacerbated implementation problems and pinpointed where additional pressure needs to be applied.

**How to move forward: policy recommendations for the EU**

This section puts forward five policy recommendations for the EU to successfully enhance cooperation with India in the area of climate policy.

**Accept the changing global order**

India’s rising influence has inevitably transformed the global order; its changing status is considered by some a threat and by others an opportunity. To some extent
“Europe has a problem with the shifting geography of power in the world and with India’s emergence in particular”, which it recognises itself. Lena Kolarska-Bobinska (Deputy Chairwoman of the European Parliament’s Delegation to India) stated that “in Europe we think that we are big and important, we are not aware of how the situation in the world is changing”. However, in contrast, India clearly has realised its importance and therefore “will refuse to walk the course of an ‘old world order’ power”. This power shift should not be seen as a threat to the EU’s international leadership in climate policy, but an opportunity to cooperate further with a rising power to develop more innovative solutions to shared global problems.

The importance of climate diplomacy

Concerning climate diplomacy, Martin Wright states that “the EU should adopt a careful position, playing a game which works for both them and the political allies and partners they are working with”. As we enter further into this era of ‘global responsibilities’, climate change represents a pressing global problem which requires cross-border commitments. Thus, for the EU and India to move towards a necessary equal partnership, the EU needs to “understand India and the factors that explain her foreign policy, as this would greatly help the EU to develop a more harmonious relationship with the Asian power” and eliminate any negative perceptions of the Union.

Tailoring its approach, the EU should go regional in India

At present, the EU typically approaches India as a single unit, when in reality it is not a monolith, its diversity being demonstrated by the many interest groups and states all of which have their own agenda and priorities. To overcome the policy implementation gap in India, the EU has to approach each Indian state or target group differently. In this regard, two interesting suggestions came out of the interviews conducted. Firstly, Ian Thornton suggested that the EU should adopt a ‘sub-federal’ approach as opposed to centralised approach in India, taking note of

102 Vogel, op.cit.
103 Ibid.
104 Khandekar, “Understanding India”, op.cit.
105 Interview with Mr Martin Wright, op.cit.
106 Khandekar, “Understanding India”, op.cit.
107 Ibid.
108 Interview with Mr Martin Wright, op.cit.
the UK Department for International Development (DFID) progress at eliminating poverty in India by targeting poorer states rather than India as a whole unit. The EU should therefore recognise India’s diversity by expanding the number of regional projects, acknowledging the varying capabilities and needs of each state. Secondly, Graham Watson suggested an Indian state and EU member state partner scheme, as conveniently the EU, like India, has twenty-seven member states, therefore it would be logical to pair up each EU member state with an Indian state.

**The importance of policy linkage**

As Rastogi rightly states, for the EU to play an active role in the formation of India’s climate change policy, it needs to persuade India “that action on climate change does not come at the expense of economic growth or development goals, and that these can, in reality, go hand in hand”. The EU therefore needs to use policy linkage, for example combining development and environmental initiatives, to increase the appeal of its climate change policies. This would be effective, according to Prasanta Biswal, as psychologically it is better to talk to India about development (such as education or poverty related matters) than climate change specifically. It is preferable to present the economic benefits or development benefits as the first priority and combating climate change as the second ‘hidden’ goal. He added the example of India’s solar mission, arguing this was sold on its development and not climate change benefits, and it was therefore more successful and well implemented.

**More contact, more progress**

Climate change policy will only see limited progress with annual EU-India Summits and intermittent dialogues. Thus, to reduce policy fragmentation and implementation problems and “improve the EU-India strategic partnership, bilateral dialogues must be underscored and enriched”. The EU could take one or more of the following actions to address the aforementioned problem. Firstly, it could

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109 Interview with Mr Ian Thornton, op.cit.
110 Interview with Sir Graham Watson, op.cit.
111 Rastogi, op.cit., p. 127.
112 Interview with Mr Prasanta Biswal, op.cit.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Khandekar, “Understanding India”, op.cit.
increase the staffing size of the EU Delegation to India to ensure more frequent communication and a better monitoring of progress. Secondly, the actors should try to organise more regular face-to-face contact to strengthen the partnership; "reciprocal visits from Indian politicians to Brussels would increase the EU’s visibility in India and create a better understanding of each other’s role in the new developing global architecture". The shocking reality is that in 2011, “four years into her term, EU delegation head Daniele Smadja has yet to meet Congress president Sonia Gandhi” in person, highlighting the gravity of this problem. Thirdly, contact could be increased through the institutionalization of EU-India relations.

**Conclusion**

This paper has discussed the EU’s role in the formation of India’s climate change policy, demonstrating that the India-EU relationship is complex and constantly evolving; especially concerning climate change policy. India still faces significant development and economic challenges as well as difficulties adjusting to its new status as a rising global power. The EU should try to understand that climate change is just one of many priorities for the Indian government, and that, despite its increasing assertiveness, it still faces many structural and political issues which can delay policy implementation. Meanwhile, India should recognise that “with increasing power, comes increasing responsibility”, thus it must try to fully comprehend the impact of its actions, or lack of action, especially concerning shared global problems. Further, in terms of priorities, it does not need to focus exclusively on economic development or environmental policy; “as it develops it can ensure that it does so in a sustainable, low carbon way”. A challenge the EU persistently faces when trying to deepen climate change cooperation with India is that where there is scope for EU-India cooperation, there is equally scope for India to cooperate with other actors, such as its important neighbour China. India is thus in an increasingly powerful position to ‘pick and mix’ whom it wants to work with or retain sovereignty by keeping policy at the domestic level. However, this should not be disconcerting for the EU, it simply needs to develop a greater understanding of

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116 Khandekar, “EU-India: Getting the bilateral compact right”, op.cit.
118 Interview with Mr Peter Luff, op.cit.
120 Patodia, op.cit.
121 Interview with Dr Ruth Katumuri.
India’s needs and adapt its negotiating position accordingly. From now onwards, the EU’s priority should be to sustain the political momentum by “raising its game in India: being more present, visible and coherent”.122

The time for negotiation and stagnation in climate policy is running out; “India and Europe [have] to work together towards restructuring global political and economic structures, within the context of tackling climate destabilisation”.123 Observers focus disproportionately on the negative aspects of their relationship, however, as Ruth Katumuri rightly stated, the barriers are less now than in the past and the scope for cooperation in climate change policy is greater than ever before.124 The reality is that just as the EU needs India, India needs the EU as well. This should be reason enough for the two actors to strengthen their relationship in this policy area. As “interdependence and inclusiveness are the catchwords of the new global order in which both the EU and India must co-exist”, climate change policy presents the ultimate test to the solidarity of their relationship.125 With political will, determination and compromise, there is no doubt that India and the EU can work together to reduce the disastrous implications of climate change; the EU as a body uniting European countries and India as a key voice of the BRIC countries and developing nations.

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122 Mandelson, op.cit.
124 Interview with Dr Ruth Katumuri, op.cit.
125 Khandekar, “Understanding India”, op.cit.
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