European by Force and by Will: Portugal and the European Security and Defence Policy

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About the Author

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Abstract

This study assesses the ‘drivers’ and ‘breakers’ of Portugal’s participation in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Given Portugal’s traditionally Atlanticist stance, why and how has it supported the ESDP and to what extent, and in which particular domains, has Portugal been able to project its preferences in security and defence policy onto the European level? I argue that Portuguese participation in the ESDP has been motivated by a reactive posture that seeks to avoid marginalisation in European affairs through active participation in the inner circles of European integration. From a strongly Atlanticist position, Portugal has moved towards a willingness to be on the frontline of ESDP. Furthermore, Portugal has started to ‘upload’ some of its national security policy preferences, notably with regard to Africa, to the European level. However, some ‘breakers’ are visible although they do not result from a traditional opposition between Atlanticists and Europeanists. Political action has not followed at the same pro-European pace as political discourse due to chronic budgetary difficulties and a lack of consensus on the direction of Portuguese security policy. Although Portugal is one of the most active supporters of European engagement in Africa, this commitment is not embraced wholeheartedly as it threatens privileged historical relations. In addition to literature and official documents, the research for this paper draws heavily on interviews with Portuguese, European and member states’ officials involved either in ESDP decision-making or in Portuguese diplomatic and security establishments.

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1 The author would like to thank Professor C. D’Aniello for her assistance while writing his Master’s thesis, which this paper builds on, as well as all officials who agreed to be interviewed.
1. Introduction: Fundamentals of Portuguese Security Policy

Se tutto deve rimanere com'è, è necessario che tutto cambi.
(Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, Il Gattopardo)

For many European countries, participation in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is tantamount to significant changes in their security and defence policies. For Portugal, it broke a centuries-old tradition of reluctant interventionism in European affairs. Portuguese security policy doctrines are to this day ingrained with a belief that due to the geographical position of the country more harm than good can come from intervening in European affairs.

Accession to the European Community in 1986 constituted a major turn in Portugal’s international outlook. Europe is now as important an element of Portuguese foreign policy as the Atlantic dimension or relations with former colonies. And since its creation, the ESDP was added as a realm of Portuguese security and defence policy. In fact, Portugal “wants to be in the frontline of the establishment of the Common Security and Defence Policy, including by participating in the EU military missions and in the structured cooperation in the field of defence”.2

However, the path towards fully embracing ESDP has not been carried out without some ‘ifs’ and many ‘buts’ as Portugal sided with the most Atlanticist countries that were doubtful of a European security policy in the beginning of the 1990s.

Given Portugal’s traditional Atlanticist stance, why and how has it supported the ESDP and to what extent, and in which particular domains, has Portugal been able to project its preferences in security and defence policy onto the European level? I argue that Portugal’s participation in the ESDP has been motivated by a reactive posture that seeks to avoid marginalisation in European affairs through active participation in the inner circles of European integration. From a strongly Atlanticist position, Portugal has moved towards a willingness to be on the frontline of ESDP. Furthermore, Portugal has started to ‘upload’ some of its national preferences in terms of security policy, notably with regard to Africa, to the European level. However, some breakers are visible although they do not result from a traditional opposition between Atlanticists and Europeans. Political action has not followed at the same pro-European pace as political discourse due to chronic budgetary difficulties and a lack of consensus on the direction of Portuguese security policy. Although Portugal is one of the most active supporters of European engagement in

Africa, this commitment is not embraced wholeheartedly as it threatens privileged historical relations.

To better understand the nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) one must be aware of the dynamics between national foreign policies and the CFSP/ESDP. This paper applies the concept of Europeanisation to study the interaction between ESDP and Portuguese security policy. The added value of the Europeanisation approach is that it "attempts to strike a middle path: it accepts that member states adapt to CFSP decision-making structures and norms, while at the same time recognizing that these same member states are themselves actively involved in creating these structures and norms". In this regard, Wong defines Europeanisation "as a process of change manifested as policy convergence (both top-down and sideways) as well as national policies amplified as EU policy (bottom-up projection)".

Portugal is thus ‘European by force’ as it is evident that there has been a process of convergence of Portuguese security policy with the ESDP in terms of modernisation of the armed forces, political discourse and institutional and bureaucratic changes (top-down dimension of Europeanisation). In a broader sense, Portuguese participation in the ESDP is itself characterised by a reactive posture, that is Portugal has not been one of the pioneers in terms of European security and defence but has tried to catch up with its partners. However, Portugal has also increasingly become ‘European by will’, participating in the different cores of European integration such as ESDP. Moreover, it has begun to perceive the ESDP as a platform to which it can ‘upload’ and through which it can pursue specific national interests, as epitomised by the Presidencies of the Council of the European Union and by the advocacy of an ESDP mission in Guinea-Bissau (bottom-up dimension of Europeanisation).

The research for this study was conducted mainly through a review of the existing literature and documents as well as twenty interviews in spring 2009 with Portuguese, other member states’ and European Union officials who are involved either in the ESDP or in the Portuguese security policy decision-making.

I will first look at how Portuguese security and defence policy has adapted to the ESDP in terms of modernisation of the armed forces, political discourse, and other institutional changes. This adaptation also considers the contributions made by Portugal to the ESDP military and civilian capabilities and to its operations and missions. Secondly, I will focus on how Portugal has tried to project its own priorities to the European level, especially concerning Africa, as exemplified by the ESDP mission.

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4 Wong, op.cit., p. 322.
in Guinea-Bissau, and by using the mechanism of the rotating Presidencies of the Council of the European Union.

2. The Road to Normality

When CFSP was first launched in the early 1990s Portugal was part of the Atlanticist caucus that regarded suspiciously any security and defence dimension for the EU. Throughout that decade, the Portuguese position evolved substantially to supporting a gradual integration of the Western European Union in the EU during the Intergovernmental Conference that led to the Treaty of Amsterdam. Hence, by the time of the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration, Portugal had already substantially changed its stance regarding an eventual security and defence dimension for the EU. The transformations undergone in the security and defence bureaucracies and the modernisation of the Portuguese armed forces serve as useful benchmarks for assessing the extent to which ESDP is now part of Portuguese security considerations.

2.1 Portugal’s Adaptation to the ESDP

2.1.1 Political Discourse and Bureaucratic Adaptations

The practical development of the ESDP has contributed to softening ‘conceptual reluctances’ many member states had. France’s rapprochement with NATO and the United States’ more favourable approach to ESDP contributed to that. Yet, Portugal maintains reservations about the EU’s role as the provider of European collective defence.5

The Portuguese government has been a strong advocate of the Treaty of Lisbon. However, once again, Portugal is very careful about how the permanent structured cooperation will take place. Portuguese Director-General of National Defence Policy Paulo Vizeu Pinheiro criticised the criteria put forward by the former European Defence Agency’s Chief Executive Nick Witney6 as being questionable, but said that Portugal should nevertheless “appear in a potential first group of good students”.7 Pinheiro’s statements are important for two reasons. First, they show Portugal’s willingness to participate in the permanent structured cooperation, which will eventually set out the inner circle of European defence. Second, they display anew Portuguese concerns regarding the establishment of ‘directoires’ within ESDP.

5 Interview.
Some reservations are still expressed in Portugal concerning ESDP. Portuguese military sectors remain acculturated to NATO and therefore mistrust the ESDP decision-making process. However, this favours further development of ESDP. Portuguese officers pointed out a need to revise the functioning of the European Union Military Committee, since there is no appropriate follow-up of the Chiefs of Defence meetings, making ESDP less credible when compared with NATO. The creation of the Defence Council of Ministers would be an important step in order to correct such a flaw. Within the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ESDP belonged since its creation to the CFSP directorate headed by the European Correspondent. Before the 2007 Portuguese Presidency of the EU, the ESDP desk was integrated in the Security and Defence Directorate alongside the NATO and Disarmament and Non-Proliferation desks.

At the moment, the Portuguese delegation to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is composed of three diplomats, two military counsellors and one representative to the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. The Portuguese Permanent Representative to the PSC has Minister Plenipotentiary rank. The delegation to the PSC is said to have a considerable degree of autonomy and is seen as capable of influencing decisions taken in Lisbon since they have direct access to information and understand more easily which positions are acceptable to the other partners. Although the Portuguese Military Representation is double-hatted and based in NATO Headquarters, the number of personnel dealing with ESDP affairs increased in 2009.

Within the Ministry of Defence, ESDP is dealt with by the Multilateral Relations Department of the Directorate-General of National Defence Policy and is said to be one of the biggest workloads alongside NATO and Technical-Military Cooperation with Portuguese-speaking countries.

Inter-ministerial coordination is assured through working groups. The cooperation between the two Ministers is said to work rather well. However, there have been some issue-specific divergences concerning, for instance, the revision of the Athena mechanism’s common costs. It is acknowledged that such a revision would make Portuguese participation in ESDP missions easier, but Portugal has not yet developed a coherent position with regard to this issue since the Ministry of Foreign

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8 Interview.
9 Interview.
11 Interview.
12 Interview.
13 The Athena mechanism finances the common costs of EU operations with military or defence implications. ESDP civilian missions are financed directly via the CFSP budget.
14 Interview.
Affairs and the Ministry of Defence hold opposing views. The Ministry of Defence is willing to enlarge the common costs of the Athena mechanism, as that would allow reducing expenditure under the principle ‘costs lie were they fall’. However, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pays the common costs, an increase in the fixed contributions would put a heavier burden on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ budget. Other divergences concern the creation of the Defence Council of Ministers, to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is opposed because that would mean losing part of its control over ESDP, and the launching of the EU Security Sector Reform (SSR) mission in Guinea-Bissau, vis-à-vis which certain officials within the Ministry of Defence were initially reluctant.15

2.1.2 Modernisation of Portuguese Armed Forces

The 2001 White Book on National Defence states that the modernisation of Portuguese Armed Forces should be made in accordance “with the international commitments […] to the EU Rapid Reaction Force”.16 In this regard, the priorities defined were the acquisition of a Multipurpose Logistics Ship (MPL), foreseen for 2005, which would allow the transport of battalion-size forces and increase Portugal’s sealift capabilities.17 The MPL was given high priority in the revised Military Programming Law in an effort to obtain the capabilities necessary to be a Battlegroup framework nation.18 This was publicly confirmed by the Minister of Defence who announced the construction of a 210 million Euro MPL ship with a capacity of 650 troops.19

Improvement in airlift tactical capabilities would be achieved by replacing the Lockheed Martin C-130 Hercules with four Airbus A-400M.20 Portugal also decided to participate in the NH-90 helicopter programme although the possibility of leaving the programme was considered because of the high costs involved. The decision was not taken thanks to the NH-90’s “strong political component related to the development of the European defence industry”.21 This reasoning, however, was reversed by Minister of Defence Portas, who candidly said he was “not available to

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15 Interview.
17 Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional, op.cit., p. 66.
18 Interview. ‘Framework nations’ take the operational command of EUBGs and usually provide the bulk of the contributions to the Battlegroups.
20 Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional, op.cit., p. 77.
pay for political or label prices". In 2002 Portugal quit the Airbus A-400M project in exchange for the US-made Lockheed Martin C-130J Hercules. The Portuguese Government considers returning to the A-400M project a “strategic objective” and has taken other decisions with the European factor in mind, as the recent acquisition of 12 C-295M aircraft made by EADS-CASA, a leading European aircraft producer and party to the Airbus A-400M project, demonstrates.

The development of a competitive European defence market has always been advocated by Portugal as a crucial step towards a more effective ESDP. For instance, Portugal considered one of the major flaws of the Amsterdam Treaty to be the fact that no step had been taken concerning the (lack of) competitiveness of European defence industries. Portugal thus wholeheartedly supported the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) which it considered "of paramount importance to drive up the military capabilities of the EU". On the other hand, Portugal is one of the main European defence equipment importers and participation in the EDA could lead to the disappearance of feeble national defence industries. In reaction, Portuguese governments have supported an allowance of "room for small and medium enterprises and for specific national defence industries to be brought in".

In 2007 defence expenditure totalled 1.48% of Portuguese GDP, below the 1.69% EU average and a 2% decrease from 2006. Investment in equipment procurement and R&D almost doubled, but still represented only 12% of the total defence expenditure against the 20% average of the EU. In 2007, Portugal spent 22.8 million Euro in collaborative defence equipment projects or programmes, of which 22.7 million Euro were for European projects. Only 8% of Portugal’s total equipment procurement is European, but this was a substantial increase compared to 2006 (0.2%).

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23 Interview.


26 Ibid.

Within the EDA, Portugal subscribes to the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement and participates in the following programmes and projects:  

- Development Capabilities Plan in all the Integrated Development Teams and in the following Project Teams: Software Defined Radio, Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Explosives Ordnance Disposal, 21st Century Soldier Systems, Maritime Surveillance, European Air Transport Fleet (EATF);  
- Three EDA strategies (Defence, Technological and Industrial Base, Research and Technology, and Armaments Cooperation);  
- Category A projects: Joint Investment Programme on Force Protection;  

Portugal has also participated in strategic transport international cooperation systems such as the Strategic Air Lift Interim Solution and the Multinational Implementing Arrangements. Portugal is considering rejoining the latter and joining the Eindhoven-based Movement Coordination Centre Europe and the Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Centre. It is supportive of and involved in the European Union aircraft carrier group (a French proposal) and in the military Erasmus programme, even organising the first tentative course on ESDP for students of different European military academies.

Member states contribute military and civilian capabilities voluntarily to achieve the ESDP objectives. Below I will analyse the contributions made by Portugal to the military and civilian Headlines Goals and to the more than twenty ESDP missions and operations launched so far.

### 2.2 Portugal’s Contributions to the ESDP

#### 2.2.1 Military and Civilian Capabilities

Following the adoption of the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG), the Portuguese contributions to the HHG were considered “relatively low” but “sufficient to signal the country’s political interest in remaining inside the process”. Portugal committed 2.2% of its active military forces for the HHG, whereas the average contribution of member

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29 The EATF was supposed to pool only A-400M aircrafts, but in order to allow the participation of countries that are not participating in the Airbus grouping, the project was extended to also include C-130 aircrafts. Interview.  
31 Interview.  
states was 5.1%. "In terms of the proportion of active forces pledged [...] Portugal, Greece and Italy were at the bottom."33 A more significant contribution was hampered by budgetary restrictions and by the lack of appropriate military capabilities.

In 2004, the Council of the European Union approved the Headline Goal 2010, which shifted the focus to high readiness multinational Battlegroups designed for out-of-area operations.34 Then Minister of Defence Luís Amado stated, "the ambiguous relation with the structured cooperation and its potential of variable geometry make participation in the Battlegroups politically and militarily impossible to refuse".35 The Portuguese contribution was made to a multinational Battlegroup (Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece - EUABG) based on the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) that was on stand-by during the first half of 2006.36 Portugal was able to participate in this first rotation with only one military staff officer.37 This Battlegroup has a clear Mediterranean scope, though one might expect Portugal to participate in a Battlegroup with a more Atlanticist focus. Portugal indeed tried to participate in a Battlegroup with the United Kingdom, which declined.38 Portugal also participated with an Engineering Company comprising 120 troops in another Battlegroup next to Spain (framework nation), France and Germany that was on stand-by during the first half of 2008.39

The EUABG was on stand-by for a second time in the first half of 2009. Portugal contributed one Marines' Company. A more substantial participation was hampered by the lack of a Landing Platform Dock vessel.40 In December 2008, France, Belgium, Spain, Finland and other member states argued that the European Union could deploy its Battlegroups in eastern Congo's Nord-Kivu province. The UK and Germany, with Battlegroups on stand-by, opposed, as did Portugal, which participated in the SIAF-based Battlegroup on stand-by from January 2009 due to domestic political concerns (three elections scheduled in 2009).41 But Portugal also believes that the

38 Interview.
41 Interview.
utilisation of the EU Battlegroups “must not be pushed” and that the defined criteria for their utilisation “must be strictly respected”.\footnote{42}

Courela claims that “Portugal has been contemplating the creation of a Luso-Spanish land-forces Battlegroup”.\footnote{43} My research found opposite conclusions: a land-forces Battlegroup between Portugal and Spain would involve a very high-level of military integration that is not yet acceptable at the political level.\footnote{44} Furthermore, Portugal prefers Battlegroups with at least three countries to balance Spain’s possible predominance: “it would prevent us from having to deploy the Battlegroup in places that have no interest for us”.\footnote{45}

Portugal is trying to obtain the required capabilities to be a Battlegroup framework nation.\footnote{46} It is more likely, however, that Portugal will be the lead nation of a future EU Battlegroup based on the EUROFOR, in which France, Italy, Spain and Portugal participate. Portugal will have the rotating command of EUROFOR in 2011 and has proposed making it available to the European Union as a Battlegroup.\footnote{47} This would mean a significant increase in the Portuguese contribution to the Battlegroups since the unit on-call to the EUROFOR is the Rapid Reaction Brigade, “the light force with the highest readiness of the Portuguese Army”, previously deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor.\footnote{48} Portuguese officials also consider that a possible EUROFOR-based Battlegroup can be a model for future Battlegroups since it is founded upon a new concept of permanent forces allocated to the EU for particular periods of time.\footnote{49}

The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008) intends to provide the EU with the necessary capabilities to conduct civilian crisis management operations, in four main areas: Police, Rule of Law, Civilian Administration and Civil Protection. Portugal has defined the following civilian capabilities to be put at the EU’s disposal:\footnote{50}

- 350 police officers, mostly Public Security Police and gendarmes, but also 17 Judicial Police agents;

\footnote{42}{Interview.}
\footnote{44}{Interview.}
\footnote{45}{Interview.}
\footnote{46}{Interview.}
\footnote{47}{Interview.}
\footnote{48}{“Eurofor – Portuguese Contribution”, EUROFOR, http://www.eurofor.it/unit_on%20call.htm, retrieved 22 April 2009.}
\footnote{49}{Interview.}
• 8 experts for rule of law missions;
• 4 experts for civilian administration tasks;
• 104 personnel for civil protection tasks.

Portugal seems to have difficulties concerning the civilian dimension of ESDP. This lack of adaptation is not a specific Portuguese problem but is general to the ESDP civilian crisis management since it relies on experts and bureaucracies (ministries of Justice and of the Interior) whose priorities are not the same as those of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Defence, and on experts who do not have a tradition of being deployed abroad. A civilian crisis management course was recently launched by the Ministry of Defence in order to train experts in this field.

Portugal is one of the main European contributors in the field of police capabilities. In view of the realisation of the CHG 2008 target for police forces, the gendarmeries of France, Italy, Spain and Portugal launched a joint initiative "to enhance coordination and information exchange between these institutions, [...] to provide a basis for the creation of the EU police rapid reaction force". The forces from these four countries make up almost 25% of the 5,000 police forces defined in the CHG 2008. Portugal is also one of the countries participating in the European Gendarmerie Force, constituted by France, Italy, Spain, Romania, the Netherlands and Portugal, capable of deploying 800 people within 30 days.

2.2.2 Participation in ESDP Missions and Operations

Portugal participated timidly in the first ESDP military operations. In 2003 Lisbon committed six personnel to Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and one military staff officer for Operation Artemis in the DR Congo. A general reason accounting for this could have been the high number of troops deployed abroad in 2002 and 2003.

Concerning Operation Artemis, various explanatory factors have been pointed out for Portugal’s non-participation on the ground. First of all, this was a quasi-French operation done at the European level, where the force generation process was almost inexistent. Secondly, the Portuguese military establishment is said to have mistrusted ‘the scope and aims’ of this first EU out-of-area military operation. Similarly, the fact that this was a peacemaking operation also contributed to

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51 Interview.
54 Ferreira-Pereira, "Portugal and ESDP", op.cit., p. 42, and Interview.
55 Ferreira-Pereira, "Portugal and ESDP", op.cit., p. 42.
Portugal’s unwillingness to participate. A third possible reason was Angola’s démarche to the Portuguese Government stating they would prefer Portugal not to intervene in the region.

In EUFOR Althea Portugal decided to sustain the 246-troop contingent and the Force Commander that had already been engaged in SFOR. Portugal’s contribution has been progressively reduced in accordance with the evolution of the mission but accounted in 2006 for 8.5% of the European total. Another reason for Portugal’s engagement in Althea is the fact that it was the first ‘Berlin plus’ operation, therefore testing the complementarity between the EU and NATO.

Portugal participated in 2006 in EUFOR RD Congo with 33 marines comprising a special operations unit and a C-130 aircraft with 17 air force personnel. The Portuguese role in force projection has been praised by some “as a very important contribution for the success of the operation”, but others consider that the Portuguese contribution was not substantial. Apparently, familiarity with Africa played a role in Portuguese participation in this mission, as Germany asked Portugal to participate prior to Berlin’s final decision to commit forces.

EUFOR Chad/RCA – launched in 2008 – was planned during the Portuguese EU Presidency of 2007. Portugal contributed two military staff personnel and one C-130 aircraft that in two months carried out 70% of the total strategic airlift of the mission. According to the Portuguese Minister of Defence:

Portugal, while holding the Presidency of the European Union, did everything to push for the concretisation of a military mission within the framework of ESDP to support the UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic […] Portugal wants to be in the frontline of the foreign, security and defence policy of the European Union. Portugal participated in all the European military missions and had to do so in EUFOR Chad-RCA, the fourth and biggest military operation of the European Union.

Portugal also made symbolic contributions to the EU operations in Sudan in support of Amis II and to EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Portugal has thus participated in all the EU military missions, although with not very substantive contributions in terms of numbers. Some conclusions can be drawn from this picture. First, Portugal demonstrates

56 Interview.
57 Ferreira-Pereira, “Portugal and ESDP”, op.cit., p. 42, and Interview.
60 Ferreira-Pereira, "Portugal and ESDP", op.cit., p. 43.
61 Interview.
62 Interview.
63 Interview.
64 Pinheiro, op.cit., p. 148.
65 Nuno Severiano Teixeira, "Portugal no Chade: um dever humanitário", Público, 25/01/08.
willingness to be involved with the ESDP process and to be seen by its partners as an active contributor. Second, low contributions can be explained by some problems in terms of national decision-making as regards force generation for ESDP operations. This process takes too long for European requirements due to inadequate structures at the military level.\textsuperscript{66} Portugal is trying to address some of these difficulties by creating a new national financing mechanism.\textsuperscript{67} Third, Portugal has opted to provide strategic airlift capabilities, an instrumental part of out-of-area operations, in which the EU has some deficiencies. Fourth, the biggest contribution Portugal has made thus far concerns the Althea operation, conducted in a theatre of operations that only recently became part of Portuguese security interests. Despite Africa’s importance in Portuguese foreign and security policy, the relatively small Portuguese participation with troops on the ground may result from the fact that Portugal is suspicious of a gendarme’s role in Africa.\textsuperscript{68} There seems to exist a clear preference for conflict prevention in Africa, including through ESDP civilian missions rather than an involvement in military crisis management operations. Finally, although the Portuguese Defence Minister stated that a balance should be sought between Portuguese contributions to NATO and EU operations,\textsuperscript{69} NATO operations, being more muscled, receive bigger contributions: KFOR, SNMG-1 and ISAF account for around 600 of the roughly 750 Portuguese troops deployed abroad in 2009.

Considering all the military operations of the EU (excluding EU NAVFOR Atalanta), Portugal has deployed 313 troops representing a total effort of 11,34 per thousand. These figures rank Portugal as the ninth contributor in absolute terms and the eighth in relative terms for ESDP military operations.\textsuperscript{70} The recognition that Portugal is reluctant to place all the bets in Europe is implicitly made when the Director of National Defence Policy states that in the eventuality of defining criteria for permanent structured cooperation the national contributions to other organisations have to be considered.\textsuperscript{71}

Concerning ESDP civilian missions, Portugal contributed to all operations except EUPOL Afghanistan, AMM Monitoring Mission in Aceh, EUPAT FYROM and EUJUST

\textsuperscript{66} Interview.
\textsuperscript{67} Pinheiro, op.cit., p. 150.
\textsuperscript{68} Interview.
\textsuperscript{70} Anne-Claire Marangoni, Le Financement des Opérations Militaires de l’UE: des Choix Nationaux pour une Politique Européenne de Sécurité et Défense?, Bruges, College of Europe, Master’s Thesis, 2008, Annex VI.B, p. 71. The effort is the quotient (x1000) between the national contributions to ESDP military operations and the effectives of the Armed Forces.
\textsuperscript{71} Pinheiro, op.cit., p. 148.
THEMIS Georgia.\textsuperscript{72} Portugal sent 33 police officers to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and two police officers to Operation Proxima in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Portugal participates with three people of the Borders and Foreigners' Office in EUBAM Ukraine-Moldova, and with one diplomat (political counsellor of the Head of Mission) and three gendarmes in EUBAM Rafah. Concerning the rule of law missions, in EUJUST LEX Iraq Portugal has participated with four personnel and organised a criminal investigation course for Iraqi judicial agents.\textsuperscript{73} In the other missions Portugal has made little more than symbolic contributions: one person to EUMM Georgia and two each to EUPOL COPPS and to EULEX Kosovo.

Portuguese engagement in the EU civilian missions conducted in Africa is much more significant. In EUPOL Kinshasa Portugal participated with 12 police officers, including the Head of Mission,\textsuperscript{74} which made up 15\% of the total contributions to this mission. 18 Portuguese police officers have participated in its successor EUROPOL RD Congo, which is the second largest contribution (30\% of the total), and the Portuguese Head of Mission was reappointed. For the EUSEC RD Congo mission, 7 experts have been provided. In EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, 11 out of the 19 initial members of the mission were Portuguese.

In terms of police missions, Portugal has been one of the pioneers and has made significant contributions to the two police missions in RD Congo. In both ESDP civilian and military operations there seems to be a particular interest in those conducted in Africa; Portugal has so far participated in all the ESDP missions carried out on that continent. However, it seems to have adopted a different strategy in what concerns participation in military and civilian missions. For the former, Portugal has tried to participate no matter what the scope or the location of the mission were, while in the case of civilian missions much more significant contributions have been made to those conducted in Africa. This is further stressed by the fact that, despite being the eleventh absolute contributor to ESDP civilian missions, Portugal is the fifth country with bigger average shares considering only the missions where it actually participated (7,1\% of the personnel deployed).\textsuperscript{75}

As I have shown, ESDP has had a substantial impact on Portuguese security policy by generating changes in the political discourse and bureaucracies. The modernisation of Portuguese Armed Forces now proceeds with the European factor in mind, and the contributions given by Portugal to the EU military and civilian operations have

\textsuperscript{72} Data concerning ESDP civilian missions obtained from the SIPRI Database on Multilateral Peace Operations, http://conflict.sipri.org/SIPRI_Internet, retrieved several times.
\textsuperscript{73} Gomes, "Intervenção do Ministro da Defesa Nacional na Sessão de Abertura Solene do ano lectivo do IESM", op.cit.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
been significant. Moreover, in the path towards fully embracing ESDP, Portugal has also started to ‘upload’ some of its interest onto the European level.

3. Speaking European but Thinking Portuguese?

In the literature on the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy, the EU is often said to be used as a veil by member states to promote their own interests. This is usually done in order to surmount political (accusations of neo-colonialism) or financial (by sharing the costs with the EU and other member states) difficulties. Portugal has purposefully started to use the EU with this same reasoning in mind by promoting an ESDP mission in Guinea-Bissau and by using the Presidencies of the Council to promote its preferences and harvest eventual long-run benefits.

3.1 Mixed Feelings About Africa

3.1.1 Portuguese Africa Policy at the EU Level

Portuguese bilateral relations with its five former African colonies constitute one of the most important vectors of Portuguese foreign policy. In terms of security and defence, relations are conducted bilaterally through Technical-Military Cooperation Agreements and multilaterally at the level of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP).

The ESDP has shown a considerable focus on Africa by conducting three military operations and four civilian missions in Africa thus far. In addition, the EU supports the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This support is very complex and is further complicated by the programmes led by EU member states. In this regard, Portugal conducts the already mentioned Technical-Military Cooperation programmes and launched within CPLP the Support Programme to Peacekeeping Missions in Africa (PAMPA). These programmes are seen as valuable for Portuguese security policy but also as an important asset to Portuguese foreign policy as a means of preserving Portugal’s influence in those countries. According to a report of the French prime minister’s Centre d’analyse stratégique, “Portugal would like its programmes to be integrated in the EU training policy, but does not want all of its programmes to be Europeanised”. Portugal is considered one of the four European member states - alongside France, the UK and Belgium - that “can be considered to have a real African policy”.

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78 Bagayoko, op.cit., p. 6.
There is a clear gap between Portuguese political discourse and practice concerning the European support to African capabilities. There seem to exist two main perspectives: "a conservative one, which considers that cooperation at the EU level is harmful for bilateral relations; and a pragmatic one, which understands that European multilateral cooperation is already out there".79 A Portuguese absence would mean losing any type of privileged relationship: "either we are in or we are out. Angola is in the African Stand-by Force. If we do not participate in the European initiatives they will end up being trained by the French".80 In consequence, it is Portugal’s objective to be a ‘leading country’ in AMANI AFRICA and to be able to Europeanise one of the CPLP centres of excellence for the next AMANI AFRICA cycle.81

However, other sectors of Portuguese security policy are critical of the EU programmes based on the French RECAMP (‘Renforcement des capacités africaines au maintien de la paix’). They argue that Portugal should focus on bilateral cooperation with the Portuguese speaking countries, on multilateral initiatives within the CPLP and on bilateral cooperation with Brazil and the United States. The idea of Europeanising the CPLP centres is particularly resented.82 On the diplomatic side, it is acknowledged that the Europeanisation of the Portuguese programmes would carry some risks in terms of losing direct control of those programmes. For these reasons, Portugal is trying to fund some of its programmes through the EU without fully Europeanising them.83 Although it is supportive of the concept, Portugal thinks "it is not yet able to give to AMANI what we do at the CPLP level".84

Portugal participates in the EURO RECAMP - AMANI AFRICA but does not have a leading role in spite of its declared ambitions. For instance, Portugal is not part of the international team implementing the EURO RECAMP - AMANI AFRICA 2008-2010 cycle that involves representatives from France, the UK, Belgium and Italy.85 Portugal was supportive of the AMANI - AFRICA concept but "diverged from the French position on some aspects" of its completion by supporting only a light implementation mechanism.86

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79 Interview.
80 Interview.
81 Ibid.
82 Interview.
83 Interview.
84 Interview.
86 Bagayoko, op.cit., p. 12.
3.1.2 The Case of EUSSR Guinea-Bissau

EUSEC DR Congo, focusing on security sector reform, attracted particular Portuguese attention because it was considered that similar actions could be promoted "to the benefit of the Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa". The PAMPA, launched in 2006, already foresaw that Portugal would "actively continue to make efforts towards the consolidation of EU security sector reform policies in Africa, in view of the potential selection of Guinea-Bissau". The November 2007 European Council meeting, under the Portuguese Presidency, "considered that an ESDP action in the field of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau would be appropriate". Later, the Council decided to launch a civilian ESDP mission to "provide local authorities with advice and assistance on SSR in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau".

All my interviewees agreed that Portugal played a very active role in launching this mission. For some, "all the presidencies like to launch an ESDP mission", but this was also a "pragmatic choice for the European level" combined with a willingness in promoting the African Portuguese-speaking countries within the EU. Support for this mission was also motivated by the understanding that Portugal did not have all the necessary resources to conduct the mission by itself, or at least that the cost would be considerably lower if conducted at the European level. Similarly, conducting such a mission under a European veil lessens some political problems that could arise with Guinea-Bissau if the mission were conducted bilaterally. It also contributes to call the international community’s attention to a country that has been neglected.

Portugal would have preferred a military mission because the Guinean armed forces are the main political actor and problem, playing a decisive role in the country’s political life. For this reason Portugal supported as Head of Mission a Spanish General. Other countries, however, consider that SSR missions are inherently civilian or that the mission should have a comprehensive approach. The appointment of a Spanish Head of Mission was ill-regarded by the Portuguese Armed Forces, who

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87 Ferreira-Pereira, "Portugal and ESDP", op.cit., p. 42.
91 Interview.
92 Interview.
93 Interview.
94 Interview.
95 Interview.
96 Interview.
97 Interview.
considered that Portugal was giving away its privileged relationship with Bissau.\textsuperscript{98} For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it was important that this mission "was not seen as a Portuguese mission".\textsuperscript{99} Furthermore, Portugal already has one Head of Mission and it would have been politically difficult to have another. By ensuring that the post of Deputy Head of Mission would go to a Portuguese national and that most of the experts on the ground were Portuguese, Portugal acquired an important ‘soft direction’ of the mission.\textsuperscript{100}

The launching of the mission was not consensual among member states due to budgetary constraints and because it was not deemed a common European interest.\textsuperscript{101} Italy was opposed to its launching because it was interested in promoting its own African agenda that focuses on the Horn of Africa.\textsuperscript{102} France was not very enthusiastic either but gave Portugal its support based on a trade-off involving Portugal’s contribution for the preparation of EUFOR Chad/RCA under the Portuguese Presidency. According to one author, the French idea of an ESDP operation in Chad “was clearly no priority, but the incoming Portuguese presidency put the proposal back on the agenda”.\textsuperscript{103} For Portugal, having the other countries’ support was seen as possible only thanks to the “enthusiastic” Portuguese participation in ESDP.\textsuperscript{104}

Thus, as a result of “the difficulty to find a common ground between member states in view of undertaking ambitious actions in Africa”, which was especially evident in the case of EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, the ESDP mission is very “limited in personnel and tasks to perform” and “no operational activities are included in the mandate”.\textsuperscript{105} In consequence, a significant Portuguese contribution in terms of personnel was instrumental to the conduct of the mission thanks to its knowledge of the country and also because only five other member states contributed personnel: as many as 11 Portuguese experts (out of a total of 19) have been seconded to the mission. Finally, Portugal’s contribution matches the country’s political engagement with the mission but is also explained by more straightforward reasons, such as language.

\textsuperscript{98} Interview.
\textsuperscript{99} Interview.
\textsuperscript{100} Interview.
\textsuperscript{101} Interview.
\textsuperscript{102} Interview.
\textsuperscript{104} Interview.
Portugal also pushed for the continuation of the one-year mandate of the mission\textsuperscript{106} that was extended until November 2009. It remains to be decided whether the EU will also participate in the implementation phase of the National SSR. In fall 2009 it is not clear whether the EU will continue to be involved on the ground with an ESDP mission. Some member states have lost their interest because it is a small mission without a pressing European interest at stake, but Portugal has worked for "Guinea-Bissau to stay on the European radar"\textsuperscript{107} and recent developments in the region might lead to a redefinition of the EU's role in West Africa. The political instability in Guinea-Bissau and the EU's reaction to it also cast doubts on the EU's engagement in Guinea-Bissau. Portugal was the only country that became politically engaged while "[t]he EU's reaction was almost inexistent as member states did not decide to re-evaluate their engagement in this country, leaving the mission even weaker than before".\textsuperscript{108}

Thanks to the privileged position occupied during six months, the Presidencies of the Council are used by member states to promote national preferences while trying at the same time to have as successful a Presidency as possible. Since the ESDP was launched, Portugal held the Presidency of the Council twice. In 2000, the ESDP was still in an embryonic phase, while in 2007 it was already fully operational and many institutions had been created in the meantime.

3.2 Making Use of the Presidency

3.2.1 The 2000 Portuguese Presidency

Portugal held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2000, right after the ESDP had officially been conceived during the June 2000 Cologne European Council. At the same time, Portugal held the Presidency of the Western European Union (WEU) and was "able to maintain the rapid momentum that had been built-up since the Franco-British declaration at Saint-Malo in December 1998".\textsuperscript{109} The Portuguese Presidency of the WEU focused on the organisation's progressive integration into the EU.\textsuperscript{110}

Following the Helsinki and Cologne European Councils, the Portuguese Presidency of 2000 was commissioned to advance a number of tasks towards the consolidation of


\textsuperscript{107} Interview.

\textsuperscript{108} Weiler, op.cit., p. 22.


\textsuperscript{110} Isabel Ferreira Nunes, Multilevel Role Prescriptions – Portugal, NATO and the CFSP, Twente, University of Twente, PhD Thesis, 2006, pp. 213-214.
ESDP and to present a Progress Report of the HHG at the Feira European Council of 2000. Therefore, some ESDP landmark decisions were taken during the Portuguese Presidency that resulted from timetables defined beforehand. Nevertheless, during the Portuguese Presidency six main steps were developed towards fulfilling the HHG:

[D]efining the strategic context for EU operations; formulating the key assumptions to guide operational planning; selecting more adequate scenarios for the employment of forces and identifying force capabilities needed for the selected scenarios; developing force packages endowed with capabilities and readiness needed to intervene in selected scenarios; and utilising the force packages to define the total scope of requirements underlying the HHG.

These tasks were preceded by the implementation of the interim ESDP structures like the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff. To fulfil the tasks it had been mandated, Portugal worked closely with the interim ESDP structures. In Brussels, the military representatives were reinforced. In Lisbon an ESDP task force was established within the Portuguese Military Staff with financial support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Under Portuguese chairmanship of the interim EU Military Committee a methodology to achieve the HHG was defined, which was translated to the Capabilities Development Mechanism. Furthermore, a timetable was set out scheduling for late 2000 a Capabilities Commitment Conference. The then Portuguese Chief of Defence was presented as a possible candidate for Chairman of the EUMC. Despite support from some member states, notably France, the Portuguese candidacy was withdrawn due to lack of real political interest.

The steps taken towards operationalising the ESDP politico-military structures were considered by the Portuguese Foreign Minister as a "conceptual breakthrough" that represented "the foundation of a real operational capacity, supported by the necessary instruments to enable the Union to take autonomous action in military and non-military crisis management". However, one of the main concerns of the Portuguese Presidency was the EU-NATO relationship and "keeping Washington and Ottawa informed and on board" by "stressing the mutually reinforcing effect of European defence and NATO and the practical aspects of the relations between

111 Interview.
112 Ferreira-Pereira, "Portugal and ESDP", op.cit., p. 38.
113 Interview.
114 Interview.
117 Interview.
119 Ibid., p. 99.
the European Union and NATO. In this context, modes of consultation with non-EU NATO members were arranged. At the Feira European Council the creation of four ad hoc working groups between the EU and NATO were proposed: security issues, capability goals, modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, and the definition of permanent arrangements for NATO-EU consultation.

Another important innovation of the Portuguese Presidency concerned the civilian aspects of crisis management, the importance of which had been stressed in the Helsinki European Council. As a result, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management was set up in May/June 2000 and a Council-Commission coordination mechanism was established. Furthermore, a seminar was held in Lisbon in order to define capabilities needed in the area of civilian crisis management. A specific target for EU police capabilities was set in the member states in order to provide, by 2003, 5,000 police officers, one thousand of which deployable within 30 days.

According to the then Portuguese Foreign Minister, Portugal’s particular experience in police missions abroad was a major factor in stressing the need for a police component for conflict prevention and crisis management missions and accounted for the early definition of a specific target for police capabilities in the Feira European Council. Some authors consider that the Portuguese interest in promoting the civilian dimension of ESDP derived from the possibility that such missions could be undertaken “in the context of missions of national reconciliation and national reconstruction in former Portuguese Africa.”

The ESDP, because of its recent launch and political importance, constituted a crucial part of the exercise of the Portuguese Presidency and contributed to a first intensive contact of the military establishment with the brand-new ESDP. Seven years later, Portugal held the Presidency of the Council with a significantly transformed ESDP landscape. Several bodies had been created in the ESDP realm and many military and civilian missions had been deployed.

3.2.2 The 2007 Portuguese Presidency

In order to conduct the Presidency in the area of ESDP, a working group was created within the Ministry of Defence chaired by the Director of National Defence Policy. The Portuguese Military Representative in Brussels was also reinforced with two extra
officers. Preceding the Presidency, the Minister of Defence had diplomatic contacts with EU member states, African capitals (mainly Luanda and Kinshasa) and the countries of the ‘5+5 dialogue’, as well as with the High Representative Solana and with the Secretary-General of NATO. Among the EU countries, the Minister met with its German and Slovenian counterparts (members of the Troika) but also with the Ministers of Defence of the UK, France and Spain, which is symptomatic of Portuguese diplomatic relations within the ESDP.

One of the tasks of any Presidency is completing the mandate received from the previous presidencies. Concerning the development of EU military capabilities, the Progress Catalogue 2007 was approved and it was considered that a new capabilities planning process was not required. Concerning the civilian dimension, the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 was successfully concluded under the Portuguese Presidency and a new Civilian Headline Goal for 2010 was presented. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, responsible for the overall supervision of the ESDP civilian crisis management missions, was established within the Council Secretariat.

At the ESDP level, Portugal defined as specific priorities cooperation with Africa and with the southern Mediterranean countries. In this regard, Portugal organised together with the EU Institute for Security Studies a high-level conference on "ESDP and the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa" which sought to promote African capabilities as well as the security sector reform dimension of ESDP. The Defence Minister of Ghana, the country holding the Presidency of the African Union at the time, joined the informal Ministers of Defence Meeting held during the Portuguese Presidency. An EU-Africa summit was organised and the EU-Africa strategic partnership was launched and further detailed through the 2008-2010 Action Plan which has peace and security as its top priority. In terms of operations, the Portuguese Presidency was instrumental in preparing and planning two ESDP missions in Africa, one in Chad/RCA and the other in Guinea-Bissau.

One of the most interesting innovations of the Portuguese Presidency was the organisation of the first joint Council meeting between Ministers of Defence and Ministers of Development which identified "initial pragmatic actions for increased coherence in some of the areas spanning the security-development nexus: strategic

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127 The ‘5+5 dialogue’ gathers five south-west European countries (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta) and five north-west African countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya).
128 Ibid., p. 27.
planning, Security Sector Reform, partnerships with regional and sub regional organisations, and humanitarian aid and security".131

Concerning the Mediterranean countries, Portugal sought to encourage "political and security engagement with the Mediterranean countries in order to develop and deepen the dialogue on ESDP and security issues" and strengthen cooperation in areas such as "conflict prevention, partnership building measures and crisis management activities, and also military support to civil protection".132 For these purposes, a working session was organised during the informal Ministers of Defence meeting of September 2007 where the five African countries of the ‘5+5 dialogue’ participated. This was seen by Portugal as an important step: for the first time a more restricted Euro-Mediterranean meeting was held in order to overcome some of the political problems that this dialogue faces at a broader level.133

Portuguese officials concluded that "we have never seized a Presidency so well".134 As an advisor to the Minister of Defence stated, Portugal had an "extra and a post Presidency agenda", aware that the conduct of the Presidency could have subsequent benefits for Portuguese foreign and security policy.135 That is especially the case for the five Northern African countries of the ‘5+5 dialogue’ with which Portugal is now deepening its bilateral cooperation in the field of defence. Similarly, the Portuguese position within NATO and CPLP has improved after having advanced the agenda of these two organisations at the EU level. Relations with some African countries, namely Ghana, RD Congo and Angola and with the Africa Union in general, were also developed thanks to the work of the Portuguese Presidency.136

The ESDP mission in Guinea-Bissau is a good example of bottom-up Europeanisation, although Portugal is still generally reluctant towards Europeanising its policies vis-à-vis Africa. The Presidencies, similarly, represent an institutional mechanism through which a country can steer the EU’s activities during six months. The horizon in preparing the Presidencies goes well beyond those six months and the Presidency agenda is very often influenced by ‘extra and post Presidency agendas’.

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132 "ESDP Portuguese Presidency Programme", op.cit.
133 Interview.
134 Interview.
135 Costa, "Uma Experiência de Presidência na Área da Defesa", op.cit., p. 31.
136 Ibid., and Interview.
4. Conclusion: European by Force and by Will

Given Portugal’s traditional Atlanticist stance, I have tried to explain why and how it has supported the ESDP and to what extent, and in which particular domains, Portugal has been able to project its security and defence preferences onto the European level. Assessing the convergence between Portuguese security policy and the ESDP, I looked first at the political discourse justifying Portuguese participation in ESDP and at the transformations that the security establishment and the Portuguese armed forces underwent as a result, including the contributions to ESDP missions and operations. To answer the second part of my question, I focused on Portugal’s ESDP engagement in Africa and on the Presidencies of the Council as moments when the interactions between the European and national levels are more manifest.

Portugal’s participation in ESDP has been motivated in part by a reactive posture that seeks to avoid marginalisation in European affairs through active participation in the inner circles of European integration. Portuguese security policy has tried to adapt but political action has not followed the same pro-European pace as political discourse due to chronic budgetary difficulties and to a certain lack of consensus on the direction of Portuguese security policy. The relatively low contributions in terms of capabilities are the result of structural problems of Portuguese defence and not of unwillingness to commit more deeply to ESDP. However, some efforts were made in terms of increasing investment in equipment procurement and R&D and in switching Portugal’s equipment procurement to the European market. By making a EUROFOR-based Battlegroup available to the EU, Portugal takes an important step in providing a more capable force that goes beyond participation in the EUBG only for political reasons.

At the civilian level, Portugal has played an especially active role concerning the police capabilities, a domain in which the country is one of the top European players. With regard to the remaining dimensions of civilian crisis management Portugal has had obvious difficulties.

In terms of participation in civilian and military ESDP missions, Portugal figures in the first half of the contributors, which again shows the political commitment of the country. Portugal has participated in all the military operations and even if the contributions are not substantial, Portugal has made important contributions in the area of strategic airlift. Taking civilian and military operations together, Portugal has shown a clear focus on Africa as it has participated in all the missions on that continent thus far. While in respect to the military missions Portugal follows a strategy of participating in all ESDP military missions, even if sometimes without troops on the ground, Portugal is more selective when it comes to the civilian missions, focusing its efforts clearly on Africa.
Portugal has started to ‘upload’ some of its national preferences in terms of security policy to the European level in particular with regard to Africa. The case of EUSSR Guinea-Bissau is a paradigmatic case of projection of a national interest to the European level. Portugal had taken the political initiative, is the most active contributor to the mission and has been lobbying for its continuation. This is clearly a case of a member state using the EU as a veil for its national preferences but also of using the European level to surmount certain divergences at the bilateral level. However, the small scale and limited mandate of the mission show that it is not perceived as a real European priority by most of the member states. Concerning the EU’s support to African peace and security capabilities, Portugal expresses considerable reservations. Although at the political level the willingness to fully participate in projects like EURO RECAM - AMANI AFRICA is expressed, in certain sectors of the security and defence establishment there is evident disagreement about the Europeanisation of Portuguese activities.

A common factor of the two presidencies held by Portugal since the launching of the ESDP is that they will not go down in history thanks to what was achieved in terms of European Security and Defence Policy. However, taking into consideration the overall weight of the country for the ESDP, some important measures were taken especially with regard to the 2000 Presidency that was held when the ESDP was having its first and significant developments. The 2007 Presidency is remarkable for the way Portugal was able to conciliate its national interests with European interests. This Presidency was indeed portrayed by my interviewees as consensual, but Portugal clearly admits it had an ‘extra and post Presidency agenda’.

Looking at Portugal’s participation in ESDP leads to the conclusion that even small member states have a certain scope to influence the policy. The political weight of the big member states is undeniable: “big member states are important just because they are big!” Yet, in a crisis management domain such as the ESDP, not only absolute military capabilities, but also political engagement, expertise and niche capabilities matter. Coherence of action and active participation in the debates were also mentioned as ways for small member states to influence the ESDP system.

The ESDP will definitely evolve in the near future through structured cooperations. For the countries willing to participate, the pre-requisites to be defined will provide benchmarks they will have to meet. This will test the real political commitment of member states and allow for an increasing convergence between their security policies and the ESDP as a whole. For Portugal, structured cooperation will constitute a challenge. Lisbon is undoubtedly willing to participate, but deeds must follow

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137 Interview.
138 Interview.
words. The picture is not all gloomy for Portugal since both in terms of objective criteria and of political motivation the situation in other member states is worse. But Portugal has purposefully been following a ‘multivector’ security strategy by participating actively within the UN, NATO, the EU and the CPLP. Portugal is doing its best to avoid difficult choices and wishes to be in the frontline of ESDP. For these reasons, a further Europeanisation of its security policy is likely to occur. Portugal is also aware that its role in ESDP has to be improved by being an active producer of international security. This has led mainly to a Europeanisation of crisis management through which the ESDP assumes an increasingly important role for Portuguese security policy, while NATO and transatlantic relations are still regarded as the ultimate guarantee of Portuguese and European defence.
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Alda Silveira Reis, Head of Unité Politique de défense et capacités, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU;

Alexandre Reis Rodrigues, Vice-Admiral, Secretary-General of the Portuguese Atlantic Committee; former Commander of NATO HQ in Lisbon and of EUROMARFOR;

António Leão Rocha, Portuguese diplomat, Deputy Ambassador to the EU Political and Security Committee (Político-Military Group, EU-NATO Capabilities Group);

Carlos Durrant Pais, Portuguese diplomat, Ambassador to the EU Political and Security Committee (2006-2009);

Gabriel do Espírito Santo, General, Portuguese Chief of Defence (1998-2000);

Joana Caliço, Portuguese diplomat, ESDP Unit, Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

João Mira Gomes, State Secretary for Defence since 2006. Portuguese diplomat, former Ambassador to the EU Political and Security Committee (2005-2006); former Director of CFSP Directorate/European Correspondent (1997-2000), Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

João Ribeiro de Almeida, Portuguese diplomat, Director of CFSP Directorate/European Correspondent, Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Chief of the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs Cabinet (2005-2006);

José da Costa Pereira, Portuguese diplomat, Head of Unit Africa (seconded), General Secretariat of the Council; Director of the Security and Defence Directorate at the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000-2001);

José Eduardo Garcia Leandro, Lieutenant-General, Chairman of Portuguese Observatory of Security, Organised Crime and Terrorism (Observatório de Segurança, Criminalidade Organizada e Terrorismo); former Military Counsellor at the Portuguese Delegation to NATO;

José Luís Pinto Ramalho, General, Portuguese Chief of Army Staff; Chief of the Minister of Defence Cabinet (1999-2001) and Director-General of National Defence Policy (2001-2004);
Luís Leandro da Silva, Portuguese diplomat, Head of ESDP Unit, Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Official from an EU member state, requested anonymity;
Official from an EU member state; requested anonymity;
Official from the EU Military Staff, General Secretariat of the Council; requested anonymity;
Paulo Vidal, Principal Administrator, Mission Support Unit, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), General Secretariat of the Council of the EU;
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Quentin Weiler, PSC coordinator and Nicolaïdis counsellor at the French Permanent Representation to the Political and Security Committee of the European Union;
Rui Brito Elvas, Colonel, Military Counsellor (Military Capabilities), Portuguese Permanent Representation to the EU Political and Security Committee; Military Counsellor also during the Portuguese Presidency of 2000;
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