The Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership: A Comparative Analysis

Peter Miltner
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Peter Miltner

Master Thesis in European Interdisciplinary Studies
Academic Year 2009/2010

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Published by the College of Europe Natolin Campus
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FUNDACJA KOLEGIUM EUROPEJSKIE
ul. Nowoursynowska 84 · PL-02-792 Warszawa · Poland/Pologne
e-mail: publications.natolincampus@coleurope.eu

First edition: April 2011
Printed in Poland

Graphic design and layout: Wojciech Sobolewski

ISBN 978-83-63128-03-6
PETER MILTNER

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Introduction: The Natolin Best Master Thesis

PROF. DR. ERWAN LANNON
DIRECTOR OF STUDIES
COLLEGE OF EUROPE, NATOLIN CAMPUS, WARSAW

The College of Europe (CoE) was the world’s first university institute of postgraduate studies and training specialised in European affairs. Its origins date back to the 1948 Hague Congress. Founded in Bruges (Belgium) in 1949 by leading European figures such as Salvador de Madariaga, Winston Churchill, Paul-Henri Spaak and Alcide de Gasperi, the idea was to establish an institute where university graduates from many different European countries could study and live together. The Natolin campus of the College of Europe in Warsaw (Poland) was established in 1992 in response to the revolutions of 1989 and in anticipation of the European Union’s 2004 and 2007 enlargements. The College of Europe now operates as ‘one College - two campuses’.

The European Interdisciplinary Studies (EIS) programme at the Natolin campus invites students to view the process of European integration beyond disciplinary boundaries and offers them a comprehensive, well-rounded understanding of the European Union. Students are awarded a ‘Master of Arts in European Interdisciplinary Studies’. This programme thus takes into account that the phenomenon of European integration goes beyond the limits of one academic discipline and is designed to respond to the increasing need for experts who have a more comprehensive understanding of the European integration process and European affairs. The EIS programme is open not only to graduates in Economics, Law or Political Science, but also to graduates in History, Communication Studies, Languages, Philosophy, or Philology who are interested in pursuing a career in European institutions or European affairs in general. This academic programme and its professional dimension prepare graduates to enter the international, European and national public sectors as well as the non-governmental and private sectors and may also serve as a stepping stone towards doctoral studies.

Recognised for its academic excellence in European studies, the Natolin campus of the College of Europe endeavours to enhance its research activities. A research programme aimed at producing high-quality research on EU internal and external policies in line with the specificities of the EIS academic programme was therefore designed in 2010. Beyond research and policy-oriented workshops and conferences, a new series of publications, the “College of Europe Natolin Papers” including research papers, policy papers and studies has been created. The first issues will be published in 2011. The
current series of publications, the “Natolin Best Master Thesis”, aims at highlighting the research work done by EIS Masters students and to promote the association of the latter to research activities conducted in Natolin. In order to get their Masters degree, all students have to write a Thesis within the framework of one of the course they follow during the academic year. The research theme chosen by the student or proposed by the Professor supervising the Thesis must be original and linked to European policies and affairs. An interdisciplinary approach is also encouraged. Masters theses are written either in French or in English, the two official languages of the College of Europe, often not the native language of the students. A scientific committee selects the two or three Best Masters Thesis among more than 100 produced on the campus every year. By publishing them, we are proud to disseminate some of the most interesting research work produced by our students throughout the wider European studies academic community.
The Masters Thesis of Mr Peter Miltner aims to analyse and compare the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) with the Eastern Partnership (EaP), two major multilateral sub-regional components of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Very few analysts have so far compared the two frameworks in a systematic fashion and this is certainly one of the most interesting aspects of this analysis.

The first part of the Thesis deals mainly with the general objectives, principles and instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The concepts of differentiation and sub-regionalism are also analysed. As emphasised by the author “the ENP, despite promoting differentiation as one of its main components, is still inaccurately perceived as a ‘one-size-fits-all approach’. By drawing attention to the differences between a Southern and Eastern neighbourhood, critics of the ENP call not only for individual, bilateral differentiation, but also for regional or subregional approaches”. Indeed, the last point mentioned by the author is one of the main elements of the current revision of the ENP.

The second part of the thesis is an analysis of the main characteristics of the Union for the Mediterranean in comparison with the Barcelona Process/Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The conclusions are very clear: “by setting up the UfM, the politicians responsible didn’t listen to concerns and didn’t trust in the experience they should have obtained from the Barcelona Process, which was already over a decade in existence”. This is particularly true at the beginning of the year 2011. The Secretary General of the UfM has resigned, the Egyptian co-president had to go in exile and despite the appeal of the French President to reinvigorate the UfM it seems that there is a growing consensus among the Member States that the UfM in its current form is not the most appropriate framework for developing Euro-Mediterranean relations in light of the recent revolts across the Arab world.

The third part of the thesis is devoted to the Eastern Partnership. The objective of this initiative is not only about introducing a new multilateral dimension to ENP-East or about counterbalancing the UfM, but it is also to “create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries”.

1 Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 7 May 2009, 8435/09 (Presse 78), point 2.
As underlined by Peter Miltner “what becomes clear is that an attempt has been made to create an ‘ENP Plus’, by further strengthening the ENP’s bilateral component and adding a multilateral one. How successful the EaP will be in achieving these goals remains to be seen”. Indeed it is difficult to say whether the EaP has been a real success. New dynamics and incentives are certainly required to improve the added value of this partnership for the Eastern partners of the EU. Despite the quite clear medium/long term EU accession prospects for the European neighbours, the uncertainties of the final objectives and the rationale of the ENP have certainly handicapped the implementation of the EaP.

The fourth and final part of the thesis is certainly one of the most interesting as it compares systematically the two sub-regional frameworks. A number of comprehensive Tables give the reader a clear overview of the commonalities and differences of the two frameworks. One of the conclusions drawn by the author is that “the principles of multilateralism and regional cooperation dominate in the UfM, while a predominance of bilateralism with a rather low institutionalization of multilateral elements can be observed in the EaP”. One could however argue, on the other hand, that given the problems encountered in the framework of the UfM, the bilateral track of the Euro-Mediterranean relationships has become more and more important. Also, the unilateral character of most of the operational ENP instruments (ENPI, country reports and progress reports) have diluted the partnership approach into a very euro-centric strategy.

By way of a conclusion Mr Miltner argues that “a separation and differentiation between European neighbours and neighbours of Europe should be maintained and further developed within the newly established frameworks of the EaP and the UfM. By doing so, the special needs of each of the sub-regions can be more adequately addressed, while also dealing individually with each of the countries in the respective sub-regions.”

One can certainly agree with this conclusion but one should also refer to the wisdom of the founding fathers of the European integration process that always promoted inclusive approaches and referred to supranational ideals. Bridges between the two regions have also to be built especially between civil societies including between academics and students from all ENP countries and this is precisely one of the missions of the College of Europe. At the end, if the ‘European neighbours’ have this perspective to join the European Union one day they will have to integrate not only the ‘Community/EU acquis’ but also the ‘Euro-Mediterranean acquis’.
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSS</td>
<td>Black Sea Synergy</td>
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<td>EaP</td>
<td>Eastern Partnership</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>EMPA</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<td>MEDA</td>
<td>Community assistance programme for the Mediterranean countries</td>
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<td>ND</td>
<td>Northern Dimension</td>
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<td>NEC</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partnership and Cooperation Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPMME</td>
<td>Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Community Technical Assistance programme for the Commonwealth of Independent State</td>
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<td>UfM</td>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean</td>
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Abstract

This Master Thesis aims to give an overview and a comparison of two different policy frameworks, which are installed in the EU’s neighbourhood: the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The two policy frameworks are compared to each other with the help of a number of criteria and set into a wider context with other EU policies.

Despite the fact that both the EaP and the UfM were only created in the two last years, (the UfM in 2008 and the EaP in 2009), there exists already a considerable number of scientific texts analyzing them. These texts are published mainly in form of journal articles or online publications. Together with official EU documents, which lay out the institutional basis of the two approaches, the aforementioned publications – which are mostly dealing with only one of the two policy frameworks separately – are the basis of reference for this work, which intends to help filling the gap of comparison of the two policy frameworks.

In order to find out the main differences and communalities between the two policy approaches of the EaP and the UfM, the work is structured in the following way: first, a short overview of the overall policy framework for the EU’s neighbourhood, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), is given, and the approaches of differentiation and sub-regionalism are defined (chapter 1); second, the policy frameworks of the UfM and the EaP are examined separately in chapters 2 and 3, which is done with the help of different criteria such as the aims and principles or the institutional level of the two policy frameworks; lastly, the EaP and the UfM are examined together (chapter 4) and a conclusion of the overall findings is drawn.

Main result of the analysis is, that the differentiation of policy approaches towards two different sub-regions in the EU’s near abroad, an Eastern and a Southern neighbourhood, is mainly pursued alongside the criterion of the ‘Europeanness’ of the partner countries, which are included in the different policies. Towards the Eastern neighbourhood, where the EU has European partners, another policy is set up than in the case of the Southern, Mediterranean and mostly non-European neighbourhood. Despite the fact that the large groupings of countries included in the different policies represent rather artificially created sub-regions, it is argued that a differentiation of policies towards each of the different neighbourhoods proves useful and therefore the EaP and the UfM are needed to respond to the individual needs of each of the two sub-regions concerned.

Keywords: Eastern Partnership, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European Neighbourhood Policy, Union for the Mediterranean, Sub-regionalism
Résumé

Ce mémoire a l'intention de donner un tour d’horizon et une comparaison de deux politiques différentes qui sont appliquées dans le voisinage de l’Union Européenne (UE): l’Union pour la Méditerranée (UPM) et le Partenariat Orientale (PO). Dans le mémoire, les deux politiques sont comparées l'une à l'autre au moyen d'un nombre de critères et leur rapport avec d'autres politiques de l'UE est analysé.

Même si l’UPM et le PO étaient seulement créées pendant les deux années dernières, (l’UPM en 2008 et le PO en 2009), il y existe déjà un nombre considérable de textes qui se consacrent à l’analyse des deux politiques. Ces textes sont pour la plupart publiés en forme d’articles de revues ou de sources internet. Ensemble avec des documents officiels de l’UE, qui représentent le fondement institutionnel des deux politiques, les textes mentionnés – qui, pour la plupart, analysent l’une des deux politiques séparément – forment la littérature de base pour ce mémoire, qui a pour l’intention à aider de fermer la lacune dans la recherche en ce qui concerne la comparaison des deux politiques.

Pour démontrer les différences et points communs entre le PO et l’UPM, le mémoire est structuré de la manière suivante : premièrement, une brève vue globale porte sur la politique universelle pour le voisinage de l’UE, la Politique Européenne de Voisinage (PEV), et les concepts de différentiation et de sous-régionalisme sont définis (chapitre 1) ; deuxièmement, chapitres 2 et 3 analysent les politiques du PO et de l’UPM séparément, ce qui s’achève par des critères comme leurs objectifs et principes ou le niveau institutionnel des deux politiques ; dernièrement, l’UPM et le PO sont directement comparé l’un à l’autre (chapitre 4) avant qu’une conclusion des résultats soit tirée.

Le résultat principal de l’analyse est, que la différentiation des politiques envers deux sous-régions différentes dans le voisinage de l’UE – un voisinage est et un voisinage sud – se fait surtout par le critère de 'l’européennité' des pays partenaires qui sont inclus dans les politiques différentes. Envers le voisinage à l’est, où l’UE a des partenaires européens, une politique différente est mise en place que dans le cas du voisinage du sud, qui est formé par des pays méditerranéens et notamment non-européens. Même si ce sont des grands groupes de pays qui sont inclus dans les deux politiques et qui forment des sous-régions plutôt artificielles, ce mémoire argumente que la différentiation des politiques envers chacun des voisinages différents se révèle utile et de ce fait on a besoin de l’UPM et du PO pour pouvoir répondre aux besoins individuels des deux sous-régions en question.

Mots-clé: Partenariat Oriental, Partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen, Politique Européenne de Voisinage, Union pour la Méditerranée, Sous-régionalisme
Introduction

In Poland we distinguish between the EU’s southern and eastern neighbours: in the south we have neighbours of Europe, in the east we have European neighbours of the EU that—if they fulfil the criteria—will one day be able to apply for membership.¹

The European Union (EU) has grown steadily and, since the ‘big bang’ enlargement involving ten Central and Southern European countries in May 2004 and the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, contains 27 member states. The EU of today has little resemblance to the beginnings of European integration, which began in 1957 with the signature of the Treaty of Rome by Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. That is why the enlargement of the European Community and the EU has been called “the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument”,² which brought peace and stability to large parts of the European continent. However, this successful instrument has found its limitations, since an ever-growing EU could go beyond the scope of even the EU’s newest institutional arrangements which have been introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. By the enlargement towards other countries, the EU could lose its capability to act. Accordingly in 2006, the discussion about ”the Union’s capacity to absorb new members”³ was evoked by the European Council and was further elaborated in the Special report of the Commission.⁴

But how shall the EU act towards its neighbourhood, which has also grown with the last enlargements, if not by its ‘most successful’ policy, the policy of enlargement? The citation at the beginning of this text sketches two of the issues that will be dealt with amongst others in this paper, namely the differentiation of approaches towards specific, (sub-regional) groups of states and a possible criterion of distinction, a possible future membership of the EU. However, there are more neighbours of the EU than those in

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the South and the East, which are sometimes forgotten, namely those in the North and West of Europe and in the Balkans region.

Connected to the EU via the European Economic Area (EEA) are Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, with the latter’s population having repeatedly refused EU membership and Iceland as a potential member, having handed in its application for membership in 2009. Besides Liechtenstein, there are four other micro-states on the European continent, i.e. Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican City, which are not members of the EU. Another state in the heart of Europe, without EU membership but connected to the EU by special relations within the Schengen zone is Switzerland.

Besides the current candidate countries for EU membership Turkey, and Croatia as well as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the Western Balkans, there is also an EU perspective for the remaining countries of the region, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and possibly Kosovo.

This list of 16 European neighbour states which could potentially become EU members makes it clear that further commitments to other states in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood might not be welcome to every EU member state and not even be feasible in practice. Nevertheless, the EU has developed different policy approaches towards its neighbourhoods in the South and East during recent years, which will form the focus of this work.

First, there is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also referred to as the ‘Barcelona Process’, concerning the EU’s Southern neighbours, which was launched in 1995. Second, an overall policy towards all eligible direct and some indirect neighbours in the South and East, is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in which currently 14 out of 16 possible partners are fully taking part. This was introduced at about the same time as the ‘big bang’ enlargement in 2004. Third, two specific arrangements that divide the ENP countries into two (sub-regional) groups of states have to be mentioned and are going to be closely examined in this thesis: the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), founded in 2008 as a replacement framework for the EMP, and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), a new policy framework that has been applied to six Eastern neighbours of the EU since 2009.

It is highly important for the EU to maintain or establish good relations with its old and new neighbours and it is of vital interest to have a secure and peaceful neighbourhood. One of the aims of the ENP is to “prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between

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5 The Russian Federation, although a direct neighbour of the EU, is not taking part in the ENP.
the enlarged EU and its neighbours." 6 However, the question is, whether there are any dividing lines created between different groups of neighbours through the different sub-regional policies of the UfM and EaP. Therefore, it is pertinent to question what the differences are between the two policy frameworks of the UfM and EaP and if there is even a need to separate the neighbourhood into two different sub-regional entities. Another question would be, what kind of conclusions, if any, has the EU drawn from its longer experiences with the EMP and shorter ones with the ENP regarding the setup of the new UfM and EaP frameworks.

By now there is a large quantity of literature dealing with one or the other policy, but not many scientific texts or studies have been devoted so far on the comparison of the different, newly established policies in the EU’s neighbourhood; this is partly due to the fact that they are quite new. 7 That is why in this study an attempt is made to compare the UfM and the EaP in order to obtain a detailed overview of their differences and similarities.

In order to do this, chapter 1 will give an overview of the overall policy framework for almost all of the EU’s neighbours in the South and East – the ENP. A further section in this chapter is devoted to the concepts of differentiation and sub-regionalism, while in chapters 2 and 3 the EaP and the UfM are closely examined separately. In chapter 4 a comparison will be undertaken before the conclusion sums up the principal findings of the study and offers some expectations concerning the future development of the different policies.

7 There is for example a study conducted by Lannon and van Elsuwege, comparing EMP/ENP with the Northern Dimension, a study by Cianciara, comparing UfM and EaP from a very specific angle or the Working Paper by Kochenev, touching all upon ENP, UfM and EaP, cf.:

1. The ENP: Between a Catch-all Approach and Bilateral Differentiation
1. The European Neighbourhood Policy: Between a Catch-all Approach and Bilateral Differentiation

This chapter aims to give a brief overview of the ENP, which has been developed throughout the last decade. On the one hand, the term ‘neighbourhood’, that appeared in the EU’s vocabulary for the first time in 1999,\(^8\) signalled “the intention to design a more coherent and strategic approach towards third countries in the EU’s immediate geographical vicinity”\(^9\) and has been implemented through the ENP. On the other hand, it is only one policy framework approach among others and includes the approach of ‘differentiation’\(^10\). Therefore, besides describing the origins, scope, instruments and aims of the ENP, the concept of differentiation will be introduced and briefly discussed in this section, as well as the concept of sub-regionalism, which describes the tendency of dividing the overall framework into different sub-groups of states.

1.1. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

1.1.1 Origins

Before the ENP was established, the EU had already put in place far-reaching bilateral agreements in the form of Association Agreements (AAs) with many of its Southern neighbours and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with many of its Eastern neighbours, that would later be included in the ENP in 2003/2004.\(^11\) A further approach with both bilateral and multilateral levels of engagement was established through the Barcelona Process/EMP regarding a number of Mediterranean neighbours. This is going to be explained in more detail in the next chapter.

According to Dannreuther, those bilateral and multilateral frameworks failed somewhat to generate substantive progress, and this was a reason to develop a new policy approach.

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\(^8\) In the Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, “the stability and security of our continent and its immediate neighbourhood” was mentioned. See: Council of the European Union, *Presidency Conclusions Cologne European Council 3 and 4 June 1999*, SN 150/99, Cologne, 04.06.1999.


\(^11\) See Annex, Table I.
framework – the ENP. But the reasons for the development of a new policy by the EU towards its neighbourhood can also be seen as a consequence of the successful policy of enlargement, which lead in 2004 to a change in the external borders in the East, and which, with Malta and Cyprus entering the EU, increased the importance of relations with the EU’s Mediterranean neighbours. Dannreuther additionally claims that an enlarged EU should care more about the outcomes of its regional policies if it wants to be a serious global player. At the same time, the enlargement and the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands concerning the European Constitution in 2005 caused ‘enlargement fatigue’, both amongst the population and within the EU institutions, where the ‘absorption capacity’ of the EU to take in more members was discussed. That is also why no country with an “explicitly recognized prospect of membership” was included in the ENP and why the expression of “everything but institutions”, (meaning, that membership was not foreseen for the countries taking part in the ENP) was proclaimed by the then president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi. In conclusion, it can be said that the ENP is an attempt to reform [...] failed strategies [...] [towards the EU’s neighbours while keeping] the principal foundation of these earlier policies which is to exclude the perspective of future membership. [Therefore] [t]he ENP [...] does not seek to replace but rather to reinforce the acquis of earlier policies and the institutions and policies set up by the PCAs and the Association Agreements.

The ENP was finally developed through a series of documents starting with the joint letter to the Council by the High Representative Mr Javier Solana and Commissioner

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15 Cf. ibid, op. cit., note 12, p. 186.
19 Dannreuther, op. cit., note 12, p. 190.
Patten in August 2002, named ‘Wider Europe’, and the Commission’s Communication, ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A new Framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’. This framework was approved by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting in June 2003, and the final ENP Strategy Paper by the Commission, also recommending the inclusion of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the ENP, was eventually decided upon by the GAERC in June 2004. Parallel to the development of the ENP, the EU also elaborated its first Security Strategy, where the promotion of “a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean” was repeated and the goal of “Building Security in our Neighbourhood” was pointed out as a strategic objective.

1.1.2 Geographical Scope

In the communication finally setting up the ENP strategy, the neighbourhood is described as “Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region”, and is composed of the “EU’s existing neighbours and […] those that have drawn closer to the EU as a result of enlargement.” The ENP is open to the three Eastern European countries Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, with Belarus having the possibility to fully participate under the condition of reforms having been implemented. Russia is left outside the ENP, and instead its strategic partnership with the EU shall be further developed in different ways. Besides the three Eastern European countries, the three in the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia take part in the ENP, as do ten EU partners around the Mediterranean, i.e. Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, as well as the Palestinian Authority. Out of these countries, Libya can only

21 Council of the European Union – General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2518th Council meeting - External relations - Luxembourg, 16 June 2003, C/03/166, Luxembourg, 16.06.2003, p. V.
28 Ibid, p. 11.
properly benefit from the ENP after once having fully accepted the Barcelona *acquis*.*

Looking at a map (Cf. Figure 1) reveals that the 'ring of friends' the EU wants to establish through the ENP consists of three different, geographical entities, that are not connected to each other, composed of different Eastern European, Southern Caucasian and the Mediterranean partners.*

**Figure 1: EU and the ENP Partner States**

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30 Ibid, pp. 7 and 12.

Some of the ENP countries, namely Armenia and Azerbaijan aren’t direct neighbours of the EU by land or sea. However, this would be the case should Turkey become an EU member state one day. Jordan is included in the ENP since it was already included in the EMP, but does not border the Mediterranean Sea and is therefore not a direct EU neighbour country either. Dannreuther sums up that “[t]he resulting collection of countries in the ENP […] [creates] an unusual regional grouping”, and further calls it an ‘artificial’ one.

1.1.3 Aims

One of the main aims of the ENP is not to allow the “emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours”, thereby creating a “coherent regional approach” towards the neighbourhood. As further goals, the following can be cited:

- Stability, through the support of political and economic transition and help in settling regional conflicts;
- Security, by means of helping to fight against corruption, organised crime and different kinds of trafficking;
- Prosperity, by helping the ENP partners to develop economically and modernise.

These goals had, in similar form, already been communicated in 2003, when they were divided between a general objective for all countries,

- to reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity and values based on deeper economic integration, intensified political and cultural relations, enhanced cross-border cooperation and shared responsibility for conflict prevention between the EU and its neighbours,

and a specialized one for specific countries,

- to anchor the EU’s offer of concrete benefits and preferential relations within a differentiated framework which responds to progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reform.

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33 Dannreuther, op. cit., note 12, p. 187.
34 Commission of the European Communities, ENP Strategy paper, op. cit., note 6, p. 3.
1.1.4 Principles and Instruments

The main benefit from the possible cooperation announced in 2003 was to further the closer economic integration with the EU. Specifically, all the neighbouring countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms).38

Further possible incentives named by the Commission in 2003 can be found in Table 1.

**Table 1: Possible Incentives of the ENP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Enhanced assistance, better tailored to needs (regional cooperation)</td>
<td>• Intensified cooperation to prevent and combat common security threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• New sources of finance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Greater EU political involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prosperity</th>
<th>Values and intensified relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Extension of the internal market and regulatory structures</td>
<td>• Perspectives for lawful migration and movement of persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Preferential trading relations and market opening</td>
<td>• Greater efforts to promote human rights, further cultural cooperation and enhance mutual understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• New instruments for investment promotion and protection</td>
<td>• Integration into transport, energy and telecommunications networks and the European Research Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support for integration into the global trading system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** own illustration, on basis of: Communication from the Commission, Wider Europe, op. cit., note 2, pp.10 – 15.

Basic principles within the common ENP approach towards the whole neighbourhood are the differentiation and conditionality approaches, retained from the enlargement policy in order to reduce imbalances between the EU and its neighbours.39 In addition, joint ownership is introduced as a further constituting principle of the ENP.40

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38 Ibid, p. 10.
The differentiation approach is realized through the so called ‘Action Plans’, which are to be elaborated jointly by the Commission and the country concerned and approved by the Cooperation or Association Council. Action Plans set out the objectives and priorities to be pursued during a certain period as well as concrete benchmarks and timetables for their achievement. In order to assess the progress of the Action Plans, annual Progress Reports reviewing the achievements shall be published. The element of joint ownership becomes visible by the fact that the Action Plans are elaborated jointly between the partners, and hence “[t]here can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities”. However, this principle seems to collide with the principle of conditionality, which is also meant to be maintained through the setting up of benchmarks in the Action Plans. The communications of the Commission from 2003 and 2004 make the following statements regarding conditionality:

Engagement should therefore be introduced **progressively**, and be **conditional on meeting agreed targets for reform** [emphasis in the original].

Whenever future macro financial assistance operations and other operations pursuing macro-economic objectives are negotiated with the ENP partner countries, the Commission considers that the conditionality element should draw on the economic priorities and measures of the Action Plans, ensuring that this type of assistance is an additional incentive to pursue political and economic reform.

That conditionality already applies outside the Action Plans is apparent in the cases of Belarus and Libya, who are still not eligible to benefit fully from ENP programmes with whom no Action Plan has been concluded so far. Also in two further cases, namely Algeria and Syria, no Action Plan has been concluded yet. However, in the case of Algeria, relations with the EU have been based on an Association Agreement (AA) since 2005 which is now about to be implemented; with Syria on the other hand, an AA has

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41 For an overview of the Action Plans already put in place, see Annex, Table I.


been elaborated in 2008, but the signing process has not begun.47

Perhaps the most important tool concerning the ENP is its financing instrument, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) that replaced several old financial assistance instruments (Cf. Table 2). Amongst these, are the Community assistance programme for the Mediterranean countries (MEDA) and the Community Technical Assistance programme for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). These programmes are now replaced by multi-country programmes, which apply to the respective countries in the Southern and Eastern region; there is also an Inter-Regional Programme set up.

Table 2: ENPI Indicative Allocations for the Period of 2007-2010 (in mil. €)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multi-country Programmes</th>
<th>Total 827.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Regional Programme</td>
<td>260.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Programme – South</td>
<td>343.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Programme – East</td>
<td>223.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Programmes</th>
<th>Total 4,116.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern ENP partners (10)</td>
<td>2,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern ENP partners (6)</td>
<td>1,034.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Cross-border Cooperation Programmes | 277.1 |
| Governance Facility & Neighbourhood Investment Fund | 400 |

| Total                             | 5,621.20 |


The greater part of the funding, however, is given to the individual countries through the respective Country programmes, where Russia also, due to its former participation in TACIS is still the recipient of some funds. Finally, there is also funding planned for Cross-border Cooperation Programmes and an investment fund has been established (Cf. Table 2).

1.1.5 Further Evolution of the ENP

In addition to several Progress Reports which have drawn overall conclusions regarding the implementation of the ENP, the policy itself has already been revised by two further communications of the Commission, entitled ‘Strengthening the ENP’ (2006) and ‘A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy’ (2007). These documents took stock of the achievements and setbacks of the policy. What is more, many proposals of how to strengthen and further develop the ENP in order to make it work more effectively have been produced. These proposals touch upon, for example, topics like further economic integration, mobility and the management of migration, strengthening political dialogue and tackling regional conflicts to name only a few. Alongside the communication of 2006, several non-papers were published by the Commission, one of them specifically concerning the further possible economic integration of the EU’s neighbourhood. In this paper, the idea of a so called ‘Neighbourhood Economic Community’ (NEC) was presented, and it was stated, that “[t]he ultimate realisation of a NEC would be the creation of an area of economic integration common to the EC and its neighbouring ENP partners”. It seems that the EU wants to increase the incentives available for the ENP countries by giving them the perspective of full integration into the common market without giving them access to the actual EU institutions.

1.1.6 General Conclusion and Points of Criticism

The ENP was established to replace several other policy frameworks relating to the EU’s expanding neighbourhood and applies to 16 countries, of which only 14 can fully benefit from it so far. Besides the coherent framework which is set up for the neighbourhood – that is why Triantaphyllou and Tsantoulis call the ENP a “catch-all approach” – it incorporates a strong component of differentiation, which is implemented through

bilaterally concluded Action Plans with the respective partners, building on and further developing formerly concluded bilateral agreements between the EU and their partners.

Whereas some authors commend the ENP and its elements (such as its specific goals, its approaches such as differentiation, or the new financing instrument ENPI[53]) there is also some criticism put forth:

- The offers and incentives made by the EU towards the partner countries are not concrete enough and therefore may not produce the same positive results as the prospective of EU membership in the case of other states;
- Despite the setup of individual Action Plans with objectives and timelines, these are criticized as being too vague and not prioritized enough;
- The ENP could not fill the gaps that already existed in other regional frameworks, such as the EMP;
- Despite the establishment of the co-ownership approach, asymmetries remain, and are even aggravated through the lack of regional cooperation amongst the partners.[54]

A final point of criticism that is brought forward by some authors is the large variety of countries that are included in the ENP. These critics describe the ENP as “the mixing of the southern and eastern neighbourhoods into one pot”,[55] which leads Noutcheva and Emerson to the conclusion that actually two different neighbourhoods, a Southern and an Eastern one, exist, in terms of geography, political system and cultural and economical elements.[56] Comelli also criticises that, concerning possible future membership, no distinctions are made in the ENP between different countries, which “could cause disappointment in those European countries that have clearly stated their desire to join the Union”,[57] this is especially the case for Ukraine, whose leaders were indeed

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disappointed about the lack of an enlargement perspective in the ENP.\textsuperscript{58}

In conclusion, it seems that the ENP, despite promoting differentiation as one of its main components, is still inaccurately perceived as a 'one-size-fits-all approach'. By drawing attention to the differences between a Southern and Eastern neighbourhood, critics of the ENP call not only for individual, bilateral differentiation, but also for regional or sub-regional approaches. That is why before examining the regional policies of the EaP and UfM, the concepts of differentiation and sub-regionalism will be briefly introduced.

1.2 The Concepts of Differentiation and Sub-regionalism

1.2.1 Differentiation

The notion of differentiation was first connected to discussions about the scope of integration by the EU member states themselves. In discussions about different concepts and degrees of EU integration, terms like ‘flexibility’, ‘concentric circles’, ‘enhanced cooperation’ and even ‘differentiation’ appeared in the 1990s.59 As a conclusion, de Schoutheete defined differentiation as “the organized and structured form of diversity”,60 and Flaesch-Mougin applies the term as a component of the EU’s external policy, which is being worked out more and more frequently in the framework of a global approach towards a region or a grouping of countries. The determination of a model of relationship proper to each is made taking into account the characteristics of the states of that group, the long-standing relations with Europe and the economic and political interest which they represent for the European Union.61

This definition and description is perfectly valid in the case of the ENP, which represents the ‘global approach’ and comprises a strong component of differentiation through the Action Plans, as one of its basic elements. The bilateral agreements between the EU and the respective partner countries already existed as a means to have different relationships with different partners and are a peculiarity of this approach.

A further element of differentiation, which will be analyzed in the coming chapters, relates to different groupings of countries through different sub-regional approaches that either existed before and are further strengthened by the ENP, or indeed are newly created within the ENP.

1.2.2 Sub-regionalism

The terms ‘region’ and ‘sub-region’ are broadly discussed in the discipline of international relations. As Cottey observes, the term ‘region’ is already used within the context of the

61 Ibid.
United Nations Charter of 1945, where the notion of ‘regional arrangements’ below the UN level is introduced. Therefore, the term ‘region’ refers, according to Dwan, to “some comprehensive area”, like for example Europe. A ‘sub-region’ in turn, can be described as a “smaller grouping of states embedded within [a region]”. Sub-regional cooperation is therefore a process of regularized, significant political and economic interaction among a group of states. [...] [It] can take place at [...] the national government level, or between sub-state actors [...] [and] usually involves interaction at both levels among a wide variety of actors across a range of issues.

Another feature of such cooperation that may be observed so far in European sub-regional cooperation like the Visegrad group or the Balkan Conference on Stability and Cooperation is the low degree of institutional structures: “Subregional cooperation, therefore, is not integration”. Referring to Cottey it can be added that the notion ‘sub-regional’ not only includes geographical considerations, “but also history and politics”. This points towards ties amongst members of sub-regional groupings as regards “economic, social, cultural, and security relations between them”.

The term of sub-regionalism is clearly connected to that of differentiation and can be understood as one of its characteristics: the EU applies diverse policies towards different regional groupings of countries in an organized and structured way. What exactly defines the relations with the different groupings of countries that are included in the UfM and the EaP will be thoroughly described in the following chapters. Table 3, however, provides a first taste of what the characteristics of both neighbourhoods might be.

64 Cf. Cottey, op. cit., note 13, p. 5.
65 Dwan, op. cit., note 64, p. 2.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Cottey, op. cit., note 63, p. 6.
69 Dwan, op. cit., note 64, p. 2.
Table 3: Characteristics of the EU’s Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Southern neighbourhood¹</th>
<th>Eastern neighbourhood²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political regime</td>
<td>Mostly authoritarian regimes with stability for a long time, pressure from Islamist political/religious movements.</td>
<td>Members of former communist bloc, short history of independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Mainly market economies with minimum level of exposure to international competition.</td>
<td>Former central planning, transition economies, weak regulatory framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Some resistance towards European ideas, norms and governance methods (except for Israel).</td>
<td>Most have the long-term goal of EU-integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific problems</td>
<td>Demographic explosion, water scarcity, absence of democracy, slow economic growth, drug trafficking, arms proliferation, religious extremisms, regional conflicts.</td>
<td>Russian influence/interventionism, weak traditions of statehood, lack of international experience, autocracy and centralism, poorly-controlled borders, secessionist movements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ This term refers to the original members of the EMP, before the new members were admitted in 2007/08, cf. also Annex, Table 2.
² This term refers to the six Eastern neighbours included in the EaP, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.


The overview given in Table 3 leads to the conclusion that the different groupings of countries included in the EU’s Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods can upon first glance be called sub-regions, since various similarities exist amongst their members and despite the fact that generally they don’t represent geographically attached entities.

However, especially in the case of the Southern neighbourhood, the question of how useful it is to group together such a big number of countries remains valid. In spite of the fact that many of the characteristics named in Table 3 apply to most of the countries of the group, they do not apply to a large extent in the cases of Israel or Turkey. Furthermore, it must be mentioned that further sub-regions among the sub-region, namely the Maghreb
and Mashreq groups or the Agadir cooperation states can be further distinguished from each other.\footnote{ Cf. Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, ‘From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy: Assessments and Open Issues’, \textit{CEPS Working Document}, No. 220/2005, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2005, p. 6, available at: http://www.ceps.eu/node/1055, (consulted on: 22.03.2010); Marchesi, \textit{op. cit.}, note 55, p. 190.} The question of whether the groupings of countries included in the respective policies of the EaP and the UfM proves to be well-chosen, and whether the needs of these countries can be addressed through the policies in a consistent way, remains an open question to be answered in the coming chapters.
2. The UfM: Putting EU-Mediterranean Relations on a New Multilateral Level
2. The Union for the Mediterranean: Putting EU-Mediterranean Relations on a New Multilateral Level

The ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ was set up by the Draft Joint Declaration during the Council’s Paris Summit for the Mediterranean in July 2008,\(^7\) and eventually approved at a meeting of the Council of the EU in November 2008. From that point it was called Union for the Mediterranean.\(^7\) The Council praised the newly created framework as having “injected a renewed political momentum into Euro–Mediterranean relations”\(^7\). Whether this is seen as such by the scientific community, and whether in the setup of the UfM it was taken account of criticisms that have repeatedly been brought forward against both the EMP and ENP, will be examined in the following sections.

2.1 The Barcelona Process/Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

2.1.1 Origins, Aims and Institutional Setup

Despite the fact that the only real neighbourhood of the European Community during the Cold War consisted of its Southern neighbours in the Mediterranean region, relations with these partners were only upgraded as a consequence of the break-up of the Soviet camp after 1989.\(^7\) This happened mainly on the initiative of Southern EU members such as France and Spain.\(^7\) With the so called ‘Barcelona Declaration’ of November 1995, the 15 EU member states and their 12 Mediterranean partners\(^6\) aspired “to give their future relations a new dimension” and to turn “the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity”\(^7\).

The established framework of the Barcelona Process/EMP was based on three thematic baskets, whose setup was similar to that created by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the

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\(^1\) Ibid, p. 3.
\(^7\) Cf. Marchesi, *op. cit.*, note 55, p. 189.
\(^6\) For an overview of the participating states and the development over time, see Annex, Table II.
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The baskets aimed at establishing a partnership between the EU and its Southern partners which was political and security-based, economic and financial and social and cultural in nature. Inside these baskets, fairly concrete targets were set out to be reached, among them the creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2010, and in the annex of the declaration a more detailed work programme was concluded. With reference to Philippart, three basic principles can be recognized:

- Equality in the partnership;
- Complementing rather than displacing bilateral activities;
- Comprehensiveness, decentralisation and gradualism in the approach.

Alongside those principles, three organisational levels are set up within the EMP, i.e. through unilateral, bilateral and multilateral structures (Cf. Annex, Figure I).

The unilateral level is set up for the attribution of finances towards the Mediterranean partners via the MEDA-instrument, where the entire decision-making competence is on the EU side. This unilateral level is at the same time representing the top-down approach within the policy, since the financial transfers can be suspended in the case of non-compliance with the principles agreed upon.

The bilateral structure of the EMP is mainly ensured within the framework of the establishment of AAs between the EU and its partners, in which Association Councils on the ministerial level and Association Committees on the senior official level have been set up. In cooperation with some countries, Association Sub-Committees have also been set up regarding specific thematic issues.

The multilateral dimension finally touches upon several newly created structures; these are meetings held on a regular basis every two years at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Sectoral Euro-Med Ministerial Conferences, the ‘Euro-Med Conference’ and the ‘Euro-Med Committee’ at senior official level, meeting six times a year but also Euro-Med Sectoral Working Groups. Some more fora on the multilateral level are introduced through the Euro-Med Parliamentary Forum and Euro-Med Civil Networks, which

introduce a bottom-up element into the framework by loosely including civil society groups in the framework.\textsuperscript{81}

\subsection*{2.1.2 Development of the EMP}

The EMP, despite many criticisms against it, has persisted until this very day in the shape of the UfM and has attracted more and more states around the Mediterranean to become members during its time of existence (Cf. Annex, Table II). Some of its initial institutions have developed throughout the last years. The Euro-Med Parliamentary Forum has become a real Parliamentary Assembly in 2004 (EMPA), with three Permanent Committees and one ad hoc Committee. Furthermore, the Euro-Med Non-Governmental Platform has found a loose institutional setting and the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures was founded in 2005 to promote cultural dialogue, cooperation and mobility.\textsuperscript{83}

The development and progress of the framework has also been carefully examined; this was the case indirectly in the European Security Strategy of 2003, where it is stated that

\begin{quote}
[t]he Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union’s interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process.\textsuperscript{84}
\end{quote}

Although classified by some observers as a ‘fiasco’, since besides the European Heads of State or Government only some ministers of the Southern partners took part in it,\textsuperscript{85} the 10\textsuperscript{th} anniversary Euro-Med Summit of November 2005, held in Barcelona, was intended to give new input to the EMP. It set up a Five Year Work Programme, which named objectives and priorities for four different sectors, i.e. in the field of the Political and Security Partnership, Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform, Education and Socio-Cultural

\textsuperscript{81} Cf. Philipart, \textit{op. cit.}, note 83, pp. 2 – 4; Lannon and van Elsuwege, \textit{op. cit.}, note 7, p. 55; Jünemann, \textit{op. cit.}, note 84, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{82} Cf. Philipart, \textit{op. cit.}, note 83, pp. 2 – 4; Lannon and van Elsuwege, \textit{op. cit.}, note 7, p. 55; Jünemann, \textit{op. cit.}, note 84, p. 11.


Exchanges and in the matters of Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security.\textsuperscript{86} By adding the latter area of further engagement, it can be said that the three-basket approach from 1995 has been extended. Finally, with the introduction of the ENP in 2003/04, the financial instrument MEDA was replaced by the ENPI in 2007.

The Barcelona Process/EMP had been working for about 13 years when, in 2008, its scope changed significantly. This went along with a name-change, and the policy became known as the ‘Union for the Mediterranean.’ There are some positive implications of the all encompassing approach of the EMP such as the fact that for the first time Israel and the Arab countries were brought to one negotiation table, and that cooperation between the partners on the administrative level had a socialising effect.\textsuperscript{87} Nonetheless, many authors express their points of criticism towards the EMP. The question to be asked is, how far, if at all, in the setup of the UfM these criticisms were taken into consideration. This is an element that will be closely examined in the next sections of this chapter.


\textsuperscript{87} Cf. Marchesi, \textit{op. cit.}, note 55, p. 194; Jünemann, \textit{op. cit.}, note 84, p. 8.
2.2 The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)

2.2.1 Origins

Already during the voting campaign in the run up to the presidential elections in France in 2007, candidate Nicolas Sarkozy presented his ideas about a ‘Mediterranean Union’.\textsuperscript{88} He repeated these ideas on the evening of the election on the 6\textsuperscript{th} of May 2007.\textsuperscript{89} The project to create this Mediterranean Union – in the meantime the project had been re-baptised ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ – caused heavy discussions amongst the EU member states, notably between France and Germany, since the intention was not to include all EU members as had been the case with the EMP before, but only Mediterranean coastal states. As the project was given more detail over time through speeches made by Nicolas Sarkozy and after the concerns of other EU members were listened to, a compromise was found: the new policy should be based on the EMP and therefore complement rather than replace it.\textsuperscript{90} Also, all EU members would take part in the new policy and the provisional name, introduced by the Council in its summit in March 2008, ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’, reflects the difficult process of negotiation.\textsuperscript{91}

After all the discussions, the communication of the Commission concerning the new framework was published in May 2008,\textsuperscript{92} with the framework called the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ was concluded at the Paris Summit of July 2008 in a joint declaration by 43 participating countries.\textsuperscript{93} This high participation in the summit is to be commended as a success on a diplomatic level, since the Heads of state or Government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Syria also took part in the meeting.\textsuperscript{94} Certainly, the summit has also to be seen as a political success for Nicolas Sarkozy, who finally managed to introduce his project, even if the final setup is different from the initial proposal. The ministerial conference of the partners in November 2008 in Marseille approved the declaration of July and described the framework in further detail, which obtained its final and shortened name, ‘Union for the Mediterranean’.\textsuperscript{95} After all, the


\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, pp. 304, 322, 328 and 330; Coustilliere, \textit{op. cit.}, note 91.


\textsuperscript{93} Council of the European Union, \textit{Joint declaration Paris, op. cit.}, note 74.

\textsuperscript{94} Cf. Coustilliere, \textit{op. cit.}, note 91.

\textsuperscript{95} Council of the European Union, UfM ministerial conference Marseille, \textit{op. cit.}, note 75.
EMP had become an international, inter-governmental organisation between the EU, its member states and the implied partner states from the Southern Mediterranean.96

2.2.2 Geographical Scope

The UfM, after the initial discussions around membership, eventually reached an even larger scope than before and the final geographical expansion can be seen in Figure 2.97

Figure 2: EU and the UfM Partner States

97 For the evolution of membership in the EMP and UfM see also Annex, Table II.
Besides the 27 EU members, there are 17 Mediterranean partners with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaca and Montenegro newly admitted at the Paris summit and Libya as (an old) observer state taking part in the project. In conclusion, it can be observed that participants include not only many EU members without a Mediterranean coast but also Mauritania and Jordan (which also lack this characteristic), since they had previously been included in the EMP. What is more, the single partners can be characterized through a variegated mixture of different ties with the EU besides the UfM, ranging from the observer state of Libya with no contractual ties to the EU, many partners such as Egypt or Tunisia taking part in the ENP to Turkey, which is currently negotiating an EU accession.

Also the notion of the ‘Southern neighbours’, when referring to the EU’s partner states in the UfM has to be clarified when it can be observed that some of them, such as Monaco, the participating states from the Balkans or even Turkey, are found further north on a map than the EU member state Cyprus. Another guest at the meetings of the UfM whose geographic expansion is not shown on the map is the League of Arab States, which indirectly enlarges the geographical scope of the UfM towards the Middle East.98

2.2.3 Aims and Principles

After all contradicting projects were abandoned, the aim set for the UfM was to preserve and continue the process of cooperation between the EU and its Southern neighbourhood and therefore preserve all the previously implemented Barcelona acquis. An idea about what the ‘Barcelona acquis’ actually is, is given in the Paris summit declaration, which denominates the Barcelona Declaration with its three chapters of cooperation, the Five-Year Work Programme of 2005 with the fourth chapter of cooperation as well as all conclusions of Euro-Med ministerial meetings to be included.99 Furthermore, all the ‘old aims’ already proclaimed earlier within the EMP such as the vision “to build together a future of peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social and cultural understanding”100 remain valid for the future. However, new aims of the UfM are to give a new impulse to the Barcelona process [...]

- by upgrading the political level of the EU’s relationship with its Mediterranean partners;
- by providing more co-ownership to our multilateral relations; and

100 Ibid, p. 9.
by making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional projects, relevant for the citizens of the region.\textsuperscript{101}

In light of these aims, Aliboni and Ammor point out that “[t]he deep political meaning of the UfM, but also its main challenge, is the attempt to share decision-making and management between the regions north and south of the Mediterranean Sea.”\textsuperscript{102}

**Co-Ownership and Multilateralism**

Co-ownership is the most important of the principles that are inherent in the UfM. The principle finds its expression on all levels of interaction, beginning with the Co-presidency of the organisation: one EU member state (in accordance with the Treaty provisions) and one partner from the Southern states – Egypt from 2008 until 2010 – will preside over the organization together, and also jointly chair at the level of “Ministerial meetings, Senior Officials meetings, the Joint Permanent Committee and, when possible, experts/ad hoc meetings”.\textsuperscript{103} The upgrading of relations between all partners involved finds expression in the institution of biennial meetings at the level of Heads of State or Government, where the EU Commission will also be represented as an additional party of the agreement. These meetings, alternating location between the EU and the states of the Southern partners, shall set up regional projects and affirm broader two-year Working Programmes for the UfM.\textsuperscript{104}

**2.2.4 Institutional Setup and Levels of Interaction**

Besides the aforementioned newly concluded biennial meetings at the level of Heads of State or Governments (the next is scheduled to take place in Barcelona on the 7\textsuperscript{th} of June 2010)\textsuperscript{105} and the co-presidency, some further new institutions have been set up or old ones strengthened. The Senior Officials Committee was strengthened by giving it an overall mandate to deal with all aspects of the UfM and to prepare the ministerial meetings as well as projects and annual work programmes. The Senior Officials take over competences from the Euromed Committee, which is to be dissolved.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{102} Aliboni and Ammor, op. cit., note 88, p. 4.
**New Multilateral Bodies**

A new committee has been created with the Joint Permanent Committee in Brussels which assists the Senior Officials and takes over the remaining tasks of the Euromed Committee. Further, it convenes and is entitled to act in the case of “an exceptional situation”.

A new institution with “a key role within the institutional architecture” is the Joint Secretariat, an autonomous body, rather technical in nature, which shall be connected to all other structures of the process. The Secretariat is based in Barcelona and headed by a Secretary General and five Deputy Secretary Generals. The Jordanian Ahmad Masádeh was chosen as the first Secretary General and the Palestinian Authority, Greece, Israel, Italy, and Malta provide the Deputy Secretary Generals for the first three-year period.

There was also a proposal from the Committee of the Region and noted by the Council, to create a Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly which would be composed of “local and regional elected officials [...] similar to parliamentary representation in the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly.” Lastly, the Euro-Mediterranean University in Piran/Slovenia, was inaugurated in June 2008 and “marked an important step in building cultural and educational bridges between the North and South of the Mediterranean.”

In brief, this whole set of newly introduced meetings and institutions amplifies the multilateral and intergovernmental level of the former EMP. What is more, additional fora of multilateral cooperation besides the governmental level in the form of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly have been created, and institutions like the Secretariat or the Senior Officials Committee, distinct from the UfM, have been set up or strengthened.

**Concrete Projects**

The Euro-Mediterranean University serves as one example of the objective of making the UfM more visible to the citizens, but it must also be mentioned that in setting up the UfM, six specific projects have been identified in order to reach this objective. The thematic focal points of these projects are

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108 *Ibid*.
• De-polluting the Mediterranean;
• Building maritime and land highways;
• Civil protection;
• Developing alternative energies, especially solar energy;
• Higher education and research, (the Euro-Mediterranean University is included here);
• The Mediterranean Business Development initiative.112

How effectively these new institutions will work and if they will work together with the institutions put in place before, still remains to be seen. The work has so far progressed very slowly; one reason for this was a long controversy about the Secretary General which blocked the opening of the Secretariat until March 2010. (It was originally envisaged for May 2009.)113 Also, the Senior Officials Committee met several times but dealt almost entirely with the Middle East Conflict and the second meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of November 2009 in Istanbul was cancelled.114

In observing these problems, it should be asked if they could have been anticipated, particularly taking into account the experience the actors should have had from the EMP, which had faced similar problems. Therefore, it may prove useful to evaluate which possible or anticipated shortcomings were discussed before the final configuration of the UfM institutions had been taken into account and which not.

A look at Table 4 makes it clear that many recommendations and potential shortcomings foreseen were brought to the attention of the actors setting up the UfM, but that many proposals were not taken into account. In the basic documents setting up the UfM,115 only some of the recommendations are included; many of them are not mentioned, or referred to only fleetingly. One of the main concerns and predicted shortcomings were the persisting regional conflicts, notably the Israeli/Palestinian conflict but also other struggles between neighbouring countries such as the conflict between Cyprus and Turkey. These conflicts indeed proved to paralyse the institutions that rely more than before on regional consensus due to the enhanced co-ownership principle.

Therefore, it seems that while setting up the new framework, only some concerns were listened to, while others died away without having any real effect.

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113 Cf. Ibid, p. 10; Spanish presidency of the EU, News, op. cit., note 112.
114 Cf. Lannon and Martin, op. cit., note 86, p. 22.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Recommendations for setting up of UfM</th>
<th>Implementation into the UfM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional conflicts</strong></td>
<td>▶ Danger for Co-ownership</td>
<td>▼ Several meetings blocked by Israeli-Palestinian conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Institutional setting**   | ▶ Co-ownership could become a failure (because of regional conflicts)  
▶ Secretariat could become problem: Deputy Secretary Generals, etc. ▶ Better: create working groups 
▶ EMPA should be strengthened + establish mechanisms of consultation with civil society 
▶ Create links between civil society and new institutions such as the Permanent Committee/Secretariat 
▶ Strengthen networks  
▶ Anna Lindh Foundation should be strengthened in order to promote pluralism  
▶ Establish common Committees/Working groups, where civil society is included, not only creation of intergovernmental institutions | ▼ See above  
▼ Setting up of Secretariat and election of Deputy Secretary Generals took long time due to regional conflicts  
✓ Role strengthened through documents establishing the UfM (UfM-Docs)  
✓ Projects can be initiated in cooperation with the Secretariat  
✓ Civil society acknowledged, but not further strengthened  
✓ Foundation shall get observatory role in annual reports  
▼ Mostly the strengthening of cooperation on governmental level took place, but no enhancement of civil society |
| **Partnership**             | ▶ Equity of staff members             | ✓ Equity of staff members through Co-ownership |
| **Goals**                   | ▶ Final objective should be made clear | ▼ No final objective presented, rather general goals pronounced |
| **Principles**              | ▶ Conditionality component should be introduced  
▶ Introduction of enhanced Euro-Med cooperation, open to all willing partners  
▶ Found UfM on Barcelona *acquis*, if possible by protocol/declaration  
▶ Inter-relationship with ENP should be clear | ▼ Conditionality not specifically mentioned in UfM-Docs  
▼ No specific mention in the UfM-Docs, but possible for projects  
✓ UfM founded on Barcelona *acquis*, but no protocol/declaration  
▼ No mentioning of the ENP, besides the ENPI |
| **Financing**               | ▶ Create independent financial mechanisms and establish donor conferences | ▼ No new financial mechanism, but Secretariat shall search for additional funding for regional projects |
### Recommendations for Setting Up of UfM II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Area</strong></th>
<th><strong>Recommendations for Setting Up of UfM II</strong></th>
<th><strong>Implementation into the UfM II</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Projects** | - New projects to fight corruption and to further human rights, rule of law and democratic governance  
- New projects in field of free movement of persons and in fight against xenophobia should be created  
- Civil society should be included in monitoring of project preparation, implementation and monitoring of projects  
- Concrete projects should include: knowledge society/innovation, environment/sustainable development, mobility facilitation of students/researchers  | ✗ The new projects don't tackle these areas  
✗ The new projects don't tackle these areas, but  
✓ Commitment to promote dialogue between cultures/diversity  
✓ Civil society can initiate new projects with the secretariat, but:  
✗ No monitoring foreseen in the UfM-Docs.  
✓ De-pollution of the Mediterranean, alternative energies, higher education/research, but: no focus on 'normal' education |
| **Priorities** | - Make South-South regional cooperation a priority  
- Human dimension should be focused upon / free movement of persons  
- Priority of conflict settlements should be on Israel/Palestine, don't include further countries with conflicts | ✓ More regional projects  
✗ No new commitment made to migration issues  
✗ Conflict between Israel/Palestine named as an outstanding issue, but no new proposal for settlement and new members with further disputes (e.g. Balkans states with border disputes) |

2.2.5 The Union for the Mediterranean and the ENP

Astonishingly, the ENP is not mentioned in detail in either of the documents constituting the UfM. The Paris Declaration, like the previous Commission's communication, states that the UfM “will be complementary to EU bilateral relations with [...] countries which will continue under existing policy frameworks such as [...] the European Neighbourhood Policy”\(^{116}\). Furthermore, only the ENPI, replacing the former MEDA funds is briefly referred to. In turn, the EMP and now the UfM are mentioned in documents concerning the ENP, stating, for instance, in 2007 that “[t]he ENP and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are mutually reinforcing: the bilateral frameworks of the ENP are better suited to promoting internal reforms, while the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation framework provides the regional context”.\(^{117}\)

Concerning funding, it should be stated that the amount of money dedicated to the UfM countries within the ENPI has not been increased but that the EU hopes to mobilize additional funds through regional projects from the private sector, the EU budget and UfM members, and “contributions from other countries, international financial institutions and regional entities”.\(^{118}\) To acquire this funding “will be the main task of the Secretariat, supposed to act as a clearing house for new projects, and to sponsor donor conferences”.\(^{119}\)

Therefore, it can be concluded that, seemingly, there was no proper review of the ENP while setting up the UfM, even though this had been recommended beforehand\(^{120}\) and although the two policies should be closely connected and are in fact connected through the ENPI. This reasonable suspicion is also put forward by Balfour, who states that

\[\text{[t]he aims and purposes of the EMP and the ENP have never been discussed, nor have the motivations behind the creation of the EMP. What is more, an analysis of the reasons for its successes and failures has simply not been carried out. [...] At best, the UfM simply adds a further layer of activities or strengthens aspects of existing ones; at worst, it could lead to the erosion of some of the conceptual underpinnings of the EMP and ENP without offering an alternative analysis of the problems in and with the region.}\]

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\(^{117}\) Commission of the European Communities, *A strong ENP, op. cit.*, note 50, p. 3.


\(^{121}\) Balfour, *op. cit.*, note 122, p. 105.
2.2.6 The Union for the Mediterranean and the Regional/International Context

At this point, it should be repeated that within the EU, those countries neighbouring the Mediterranean have a special interest in the Southern neighbours, due to their proximity, a multitude of links and therefore "interests are at stake".122

The EU’s Internal Regional Context

Therefore, Spain and France but also Italy, Greece and Portugal have promoted Mediterranean interests throughout the years and managed to install the EMP as counterweight to the new policy towards Central and Eastern Europe from the beginning of the 1990s. Spain and France also lobbied for the Southern neighbours to be included in the ENP, a policy originally designed solely for the Eastern neighbourhood, and Italy and Spain were also the first EU partners consulted by Nicolas Sarkozy in the setup of the UfM.123 What is more, Cianciara points out that, generally speaking, these countries “established a useful informal mechanism of coordination within the EU”, based on “frequent bilateral and multilateral meetings”.124 Therefore, it becomes clear that the EU’s policy towards the Southern Mediterranean is mainly influenced by its Southern members and their lobbying within the EU’s negotiations and agenda-setting. It is evident that this regional grouping can also be seen as a counter-initiative against Central European and Eastern EU members, who are more likely to promote their regional interests regarding the Eastern neighbourhood.

The External Regional Context

However, outside the EU, there are countries that compete for influence in the Mediterranean. First of all, there is the USA, which has a massive military presence in the Middle East and which launched their ‘Greater Middle East’ Project in 2004, aiming at bringing democracy, peace and prosperity to the region,125 thus launching an ‘economic offensive’ in the Mediterranean region.126

At about the same time, the Council approved the ‘EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East’ (SPMME), in June 2004, including 20 third-parties overall, namely:

- Eight Arabic members of the UfM: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia;
- A further nine member states of the League of Arab states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen;
- Three non-Arabic countries: Iran, Israel and Turkey (the latter two also participating in the UfM).  

This strategy, “an example of soft law”, but equipped with political legitimacy by the European Council,  

intends to connect the mentioned countries to the Mediterranean region and together making them “a common zone of peace, prosperity and progress” through partnership and cooperation.  

Eleven principles for action and some priorities to be concentrated on are included in the SPMME which shall pursue different tracks for ENP and EMP partner states and the rest of the parties. In doing so, the SPMME creates a complementary approach between EMP, ENP and SPMME.  

Jünemann praises this initiative as a good attempt to correct the artificially drawn line of the Mediterranean region, but warns that it also could be counterproductive, since the Barcelona acquis does not have to be accepted by the partners.  

In conclusion, the EU’s influence and role in the Mediterranean region depends in addition to its internal considerations on  

changes in the international and regional contexts, for instance the failure of the Peace Process, the fight against terrorism, Asia’s interest in the Mediterranean, and the economic crisis and the position of the new US.  

(consulted on: 22.02.2010).

130 Cf. Lannon, The EU’s Strategic Partnership, op. cit., note 130, pp. 365 and 368.
The EU therefore tries to maintain its influence through the amplification of its strategies towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

2.2.7 General conclusion and points of criticism

The UfM was founded in summer 2008 at a grandiose summit, thereby bringing worldwide attention to the Mediterranean region. It has replaced the EMP but conserved the Barcelona acquis, thus amplifying the principle of co-ownership, putting the policy on a higher political level by strengthening its intergovernmental dimension and creating new institutional settings.

The policy has been commended for its approach of flexible multilateralism and is expected to “become a school in real partnership and a producer of confidence”. However, the UfM has still to cope with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which prevented the adoption of a joint strategy by the Euromed Ministerial Conference on Water since the participants could not agree whether to call the Palestinian territories ‘occupied territories’ or ‘territories under occupation’. Consequently, problems and points of criticism that have previously been voiced with respect to the EMP remain valid and are also articulated in relation to the UfM. The criticisms towards both the EMP and UfM are summarized in Table 5.

With a closer look at the Table it becomes apparent that problems like the Israeli/Palestinian conflict are still of high relevance to the functioning of the UfM. The UfM can’t solve the problem of the conflict, but by setting up new institutions, this conflict and others could have been taken into consideration. Instead, the UfM was enlarged, new conflicts such as on the Balkans were imported and the new institutional setting with a focus on co-ownership and intergovernmental fora remains paralyzed by the regional conflicts.

It can therefore be summarized – as in the case of the implementation of recommendations – that by setting up the UfM, the politicians responsible didn’t listen to concerns and didn’t trust in the experience they should have obtained from the Barcelona Process, which was already over a decade in existence.

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134 Coustilliere, op. cit., note 91.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Criticism towards/ problems of EMP</th>
<th>Criticism towards / problems of the UfM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Regional conflicts** | • Israeli/Palestinian conflict blocks functioning (for example: Charta for peace/stability, in general, blocks political/security sector cooperation)  
• Also: conflicts in Western Sahara, Turkey-Cyprus, Libya | • Israeli/Palestinian conflict paralyzed several Committees/conclusions  
• Dispute over deputy Secretary General between Cyprus/Turkey |
| **Institutional setting** | • Weak regional cooperation component (South-South) | • Difficult to find solutions in an enlarged UfM  
• Intergovernmental politics strengthened on the cost of multilateral institutions and civil society networks  
• Strengthening of the EMPA and setup of Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly not specified  
• Lack of visibility caused by complex institutional setup |
| **Partnership** | • Asymmetries in relationship: EMP entirely administered by Europeans, donor-recipient-approach/Euro-centric approach  
• Partner-approach is undermined by asymmetries/weak element of policy | • Southern partners with same criticisms towards UfM as towards EMP before: political and economic power in favour of EU, asymmetries persist |
## The Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership: A Comparative Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Criticism towards / problems of EMP II</th>
<th>Criticism towards / problems of the UfM II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals</strong></td>
<td>• Political/security basket failed</td>
<td>• No concrete plan for reaching nuclear-weapon free zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Long lasting procedure of setting up AAs</td>
<td>• Not yet a common definition of terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mostly priority of economic cooperation, negligence towards social and political goals, also: collision of different goals such as security and democracy (notably after 9/11)</td>
<td>• No steps taken on multilateral level to tackle problem of irregular migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• No progress in trade liberalisation</td>
<td>• Only few clarifications about the economic and trade aspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principles</strong></td>
<td>• No benchmarks (especially not in the case of human rights/democracy)</td>
<td>• Coownership and co-presidencies expose UfM to regional conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conditionality not applied (no response to events)</td>
<td>• Principles of co-ownership and conditionality are not compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Absence of positive conditionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>• No new financial means within ENPI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched at a joint summit of Heads of State or Government of the EU and the partnering Eastern states in Prague, in May 2009. The concrete proposal of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), a joint initiative by the Polish and Swedish governments, had been published in May 2008, and the final elaboration of the policy was accelerated by the war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, also coinciding with the gas supply cuts from Russia to Ukraine in January 2009. These incidents clarify the “tug-of-war for influence between the West – most notably the EU, NATO and the US – and the Russian Federation,” for which the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood provides the theatre.

The region is important for the EU because of its geostrategic significance as a link between Central Asia and Europe, a transit route for energy supplies and as “outpost for the war against terrorism”. At the same time, the region has many challenges such as frozen conflicts, religious extremism, poverty, transnational organized crime and a lack of democratic governance and respect for human rights, which makes the EaP “an ambitious project for 21st century European foreign policy”. The aim of this chapter is to outline and describe its concrete characteristics.


137 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit Prague, 7 May 2009, 8435/09 (Presse 78), Brussels, 07.05.2009.


139 The Commission was asked by the Council to elaborate a proposal concerning the EaP until Spring 2009, but the latter accelerated this process – given the war of Georgia and Russia – at its extraordinary meeting, cf. Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council 19/20 June 2008, Presidency Conclusions, 11018/08, Brussels, 20.06.2008, p. 19; Council of the European Union, Extraordinary European Council, Brussels 1 September 2008, Presidency Conclusions, 12594/08, Brussels, 01.09.2008, p. 4.


141 Ibid.


3.1 Origins

The very first attempt at building a specific policy for the new Eastern neighbourhood was introduced in 2006 by Germany within its concept ‘Neue Ostpolitik’ in the run-up to its EU presidency in the first half of 2007. The concept foresaw, inter alia, the establishment of the ‘ENP Plus’, a strengthened ENP towards its six Eastern neighbours Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. This idea didn’t materialise, but found a promising successor in the shape of the Polish-Swedish proposal for creating the EaP in May 2008.

The UfM in turn, in its final phase of setup before the inaugurating summit in June 2008, “clearly provided a window of opportunity and created a momentum, where the EaP could be proposed and effectively approved by all the 27 EU member states” As already mentioned, the further development was accelerated under the shadow of the war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 and led to the Commission’s communication on the EaP in December 2009, in which a detailed EaP framework was designed. Eventually, the Council adopted a declaration concerning the new partnership, praising it as an ‘ambitious’ initiative in March 2009 and fixed the date for the inauguration summit to take place in Prague on the 7th of May 2009. The summit of Heads of State or Government is almost a misnomer, since “all heads of the EU Mediterranean member states were absent, thus confirming their indifference towards this […] initiative”, and also some other important European leaders such as the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown didn’t attend. On the other hand, some of the Eastern partners did not send their highest level representatives either. In the case of the missing Belarusian president Lukashenka – invited to Prague after some meetings with high ranking European politicians beforehand – was agreed upon before the summit, since his presence could have provoked criticism.

144 Cf. Kempe, op. cit., note 139, p. 2.
3.2 Geographical Scope

The EaP is a policy which the 27 EU members direct towards their six partners in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus; states which are already included in the ENP (Cf. Figure 3). This is why Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine as direct EU neighbours in Eastern Europe take part in the initiative whereas Russia is not included. The case of Belarus – like in the ENP – is a bit more difficult, and the Commission points out that Belarus would be included in the EaP ‘as appropriate’, depending “on the overall development of EU – Belarus relations”. However, since Belarus was invited to the opening summit and agreed on the declaration, it can be seen as a participating state that has to reform to be fully included.

Figure 3: EU and the EaP Partner States

Source: Own illustration with recourse to the map editor stepmap, accessible at: http://www.stepmap.de, (consulted on: 22.04.2010).

151 Commission of the European Communities, EaP, op. cit., note 149, pp. 3 and 9.
The South Caucasus incorporates three further EaP countries, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. By looking at the map one can see that the Eastern European and South Caucasus partners don’t form a geographical entity but two distinct and unconnected (sub-)regions. Nevertheless, even the grouping together of the countries within these two regions is contested, notably in the case of the Southern Caucasus, which has, according to Longhurst and Nies, “been invented by EU policy makers” and does not take account of these three countries’ different perceptions of each of their neighbours.152 A further remark shall be made regarding the general idea of the ‘Eastern neighbours’: undoubtedly, the six partners are situated more in the East of Europe than the EU members, but in the case of the Caucasian states, it has to be acknowledged that they are also located more in the South than most of the EU states. The differentiation between Southern and Eastern neighbours and also the name of the EaP could therefore be questioned. At least, when examining it, it should not be forgotten that the EaP includes also a certain Southern perspective with both Armenia and Azerbaijan bordering Turkey and Iran.

3.3 Aims and Principles

First of all, the EaP has the general aim of promoting “stability, security and prosperity” in the six partner countries.\textsuperscript{153} In order to achieve these goals, the common values “including democracy, the rule of law, [...] respect for human rights [...] as well as the principles of market economy, sustainable development and good governance” shall be at the core of the EaP.\textsuperscript{154} The new partnership shall also further the goal of strengthening the ties that already exist between the EU and the partner countries, with the concrete objectives of “political association and further economic integration”.\textsuperscript{155}

\textit{Strengthened Bilateralism, New Multilateralism and More Flexibility}

While these goals arise from the intention to deepen the bilateral ties between each of the partners and the EU, there is also the goal of introducing a multilateral component, which has been missing within the ENP framework towards the Eastern neighbours so far and has only existed for the Southern neighbours through the EMP/UfM. Therefore, another aim of the EaP can be seen as counterbalancing the UfM and its strengthened multilateral component that appeared only relatively recently.\textsuperscript{156} It has also to be mentioned that none of the countries are obliged to participate in multilateral activities, since they “should be voluntary and based on the principles of a cooperative approach”; at the same time, “[t]hird states will be eligible for the participation on a case-by-case basis” in activities of the EaP.\textsuperscript{157}

What is more, according to Cianciara, “[t]he whole concept draws on the experience of the Visegrad group, enabling the countries concerned to better integrate within the grouping, while implementing internal reforms and adjusting to EU standards”,\textsuperscript{158} “so that when the fatigue has passed, membership can become quite natural”.\textsuperscript{159} However, regarding the prospect of future membership of the EU, the EaP has a rather disillusioning message for the partner countries, stating that “[i]t will be developed without prejudice to individual partner countries’ aspirations for their future relationship with the European Union”.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{153} Council of the European Union, \textit{Joint declaration Prague}, \textit{op. cit.}, note 140, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{157} Council of the European Union, \textit{Joint declaration Prague}, \textit{op. cit.}, note 140, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{158} Cianciara, \textit{EaP – opening a new chapter}, \textit{op. cit.}, note 148, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{159} Radosław Sikorski, cited in Żygulski, \textit{op. cit.}, note 1.
\textsuperscript{160} Council of the European Union, \textit{Joint declaration Prague}, \textit{op. cit.}, note 140, p. 5.
Complementarity, Joint Ownership, Differentiation and Conditionality

Alongside the strengthened bilateral and newly created multilateral ties, the EaP also aims at being a framework complementary to those that exist already, such as the multilateral framework Black Sea Synergy (BSS), which includes, amongst others, Russia, Turkey and all EaP partners except for Belarus, but also with the already existing bilateral ties. The principle of differentiation between the partners is closely related to that of conditionality, since “[i]ncreased European Union engagement will [depend] [...] on the progress made by individual partners”\footnote{Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council, March 09, op. cit., note 150, p. 19.}. In short, those countries with the biggest progress and commitment to the shared values can benefit more than others who don’t demonstrate this progress. As a last point, joint ownership must be mentioned, through which the EaP “will be developed jointly, in a fully transparent manner”\footnote{Council of the European Union, Joint declaration Prague, op. cit., note 140, p. 5.}, and by which the “multilateral framework [...] should operate on a basis of joint decisions of EU Member States and Eastern partners”\footnote{Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council, March 09, op. cit., note 150, p. 20.}.
3.4 Institutional Setup and Levels of Interaction

In accordance with the aforementioned aims and principles, the EaP develops on something of a double track, by furthering bilateralism and by introducing multilateral components. The most detailed overview of the planned institutions, platforms and projects is given by the Commission's communication, while the final joint declaration of the Prague summit concentrates on the overall principles, thus neglecting the very details that should be put in place within the EaP framework.

**Bilateral Cooperation**

The bilateral cooperation between the EU and the Eastern partners touches upon the following five areas:

- New contractual relations;
- Gradual integration into EU economy;
- Mobility and security;
- Energy security;
- Supporting economic and social development.

In relation to the first point, new AAs are planned, designed to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) that are currently in place with all partners except Belarus. Furthermore, a 'Comprehensive Institution-Building programme' shall be installed in order to develop the partners' administrative capacities. The integration into the EU's economy foresees the creation of FTAs with the partners, while the mobility and security area comprises on the one hand cooperation in border management, the fight against organized crime, but on the other, also the objective of visa facilitation and more flexibility for workers. Regarding the final two points on the list, the Commission plans to conclude bilateral agreements on increasing the EU's and partners' energy security and on diminishing disparities between different regions in the partner states.164

**Multilateral Cooperation**

The multilateral cooperation within the EaP framework will be developed on the following four levels:

- Meetings of the EaP Heads of State or Government every 2 years;
- Annual meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs attached to the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council;
- Four thematic platforms at the level of Senior Officials prepared and chaired by the EU Commission;

Panels supporting the work of the platforms.

While the first two layers of multilateral cooperation are self-explanatory, some more should be said regarding the thematic platforms and panels. The thematic platforms and panels shall develop clear goals to be reached, and at the same time render it possible to monitor the achieved progress. The platforms shall meet at least twice a year (the first platform meetings took place in Brussels in June 2009)\textsuperscript{165} and report to the Foreign Ministers meeting. They will focus on the topics of

- Democracy, good governance and stability;
- Economic integration and convergence with EU policies;
- Energy security;
- Contacts between people.

Additional to the four levels of cooperation mentioned in the Commissions’ communication as the most important ones, there are some further multilateral elements that should not be forgotten. The first is the so called ‘flagship initiatives’, which are aimed at “providing visibility and focus to multilateral cooperation”;\textsuperscript{166} they shall furthermore attract private funding. Two more forms of cooperation promise a greater level of institutionalisation than the flagship initiatives, namely the Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus Local and Regional Assembly and EU-Neighbourhood East Parliamentary Assembly (EURO-NEST PA), which shall be expanded, as well as a Civil Society Forum.\textsuperscript{167}

This multitude of multilateral fora from the level of Heads of State or Government to the level of civil society is a layer of cooperation which was still missing in the Eastern neighbourhood within the ENP framework so far, but is rather assured through loose cooperation fora without creating a complicated institutional framework.


\textsuperscript{166} Commission of the European Communities, \textit{EaP}, op. cit., note 149, p. 12. For further information regarding the Thematic Platforms, Panels and Flagship initiatives see also:


3.5 The Eastern Partnership and the ENP

As already mentioned, the EaP is to be understood as complementary to existing policy frameworks. With regards to the ENP, it can be stated, however, that the EaP clearly builds on it and aims to strengthen its bilateral dimension while adding multilateral activities. This attempt to try to be coherent with the ENP, but also to broaden its scope becomes clear when noting that participating in the ENP is a prerequisite for participation in the EaP. Furthermore, it is clearly stated in the documents setting up the EaP that it is to be seen as "a specific Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy." In this regard, the ties referring to the very beginnings of plans concerning the partnership, that was meant to be an 'ENP Plus', can still be recognized.

Regarding finances, the EaP relies on and is embedded in the ENPI financing framework, which has been increased specifically for the EaP by €600 million until 2013. The additional funds are foreseen for Institution Building Programmes, Pilot regional development programmes and the implementation of the Eastern Partnership Multilateral dimensions. The logic behind supplementary financing, that of conditionality or, how Longhurst and Nies call it, referring to the Commission's logic, is a 'more for more' - approach. The EaP manages, from their point of view, to show “that partners can only expect to get more from the EU, if they, themselves give more of a sustained commitment to reform”, what was not the case and therefore the core problem of the ENP. Since the EaP is based to such a large degree on the ENP and may appear as a mere follow-up, the additional funding provided by the new framework seems to be the “only real change” to some authors when compared to the ENP.

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172 Longhurst and Nies, op. cit., note 56, p. 3.
173 Kochenov, op. cit., note 7, p. 33.
3.6 The Eastern Partnership and the Regional/International Context

The EaP has firstly to be regarded as a project initiated by Central and Northern European EU members, but should also be placed in a larger, specifically Eastern European context, where there might be a clash of interests between the EU and its big neighbour, Russia.

The EU’s Internal Regional Context

As previously shown, the EaP was the result of initiatives from Germany, and later Poland and Sweden, all of them Central and Northern European EU countries. There were also other countries from precisely these parts of Europe, namely Great Britain, Denmark and the Czech Republic to be the first recipients of Polish and Swedish lobbying for their project. Poland connected its support for Nicolas Sarkozy’s proposal of the UfM with the suggestion that France should be in favour of creating a similar project in the East. Furthermore, it seems that the creation of the EaP was possible only because the UfM had been founded,174 and for the purpose of regaining an equilibrium of initiatives involving the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighbours.

Undoubtedly, the EU members do have different regional preferences towards specific neighbouring regions, a conclusion supported by the low participation of Mediterranean Heads of State or Government in the EaP’s inaugurating Prague summit.

The External Regional Context

The interests other than those of the EU might to be focussed in Eastern Europe and the Caucasian region can be easily surmised when recalling the war in Georgia in August 2008 and the ‘gas war’ in January 2009. The reactions from the Russian side towards both the ENP and specifically towards the EaP were rather critical. Also, the cooperation between the EU and Ukraine, excluding Russia, in order to modernize the latter’s gas transit system outraged the Kremlin.175 Estimations of how authentic Russian leaders’ criticism is, regarding the EU’s ‘zone of interest’ or ‘sphere of influence’ in Eastern Europe, vary from author to author. Some state that the EU is a “competitor in Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence”,176 while others claim that the EaP could

175 Cf. Akçakoca et al., op. cit., note 143, p. 25.
never be “a cause for concern as it simply represents a minor addition to the European Neighbourhood Policy, which Russia was never seriously anxious about”.

Nevertheless, that the EU takes Russia seriously as a partner is shown by its special relations with it, with regard to which four thematic ‘common spaces’ were created in 2003 and also by the fact that negotiations about a new agreement, replacing the PCA of 1994, began in 2008. Furthermore, the fact that the EaP cooperation can be opened to third parties allows for the possibility of momentum building in support of the inclusion of Russia.

Other Regional Cooperation Frameworks

Further EU policies in Europe’s Northern and Eastern sphere, both including Russia, are the Northern Dimension (ND) and the Black Sea Synergy (BSS). The ND, “an autonomous EU foreign policy tool”, was founded in 1999 and in its present composition includes the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia. The ND possesses an institutional structure in the form of ministerial meetings and the so called ‘Steering Group’; projects are implemented and partnership initiatives jointly set up.

The BSS was set up by the Commission in 2007 and includes Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Romania and Russia as well as all non-EU EaP partners except for Belarus. It aims at bringing the non-EU partners, which are connected to the EU by different types of relations, together in a multilateral framework. The BSS does not have any proper institutions and is organized around several specific thematic areas, and therefore it also relies on cooperation with the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation.

Declaring the EaP a complementary approach is very much related to the BSS, as it includes five of the six Eastern partners. The BSS is therefore also mentioned in the

de27a218bc26c7bcd7bcd.html, (consulted on: 13.04.2010).

177 Mikhelidze, op. cit., note 151, pp. 9 – 10.
relevant documents defining the EaP\textsuperscript{182} and the Council underlined in March 2009 the EU’s commitment to strengthen the Black Sea Synergy and to support its implementation, noting that its focus is on regional cooperation in the Black Sea region, whereas the Eastern Partnership focuses on approximation and will strengthen the links of partner countries with the EU.\textsuperscript{183}

These explanations lead to the conclusion that there is a multitude of different policy and cooperation frameworks in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, and the EaP will have to find a way to coexist with the other frameworks in place.

\textsuperscript{182} Cf. for example: Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document, \textit{op. cit.}, note 169, p. 11.

3.7 General Conclusion and Points of Criticism

The EaP, inaugurated in May 2009, has developed into a new policy framework for six Eastern neighbours of the EU, is it designed to follow on from and complement other frameworks that are already in place such as the BSS and the ENP. It strongly builds upon the ENP and follows the logic of the enlargement policy by maintaining the principle of conditionality. Besides strengthening the bilateral ties with partners, notably existing within the ENP, the EaP further aims to add a regional, multilateral component to relations amongst the partners such as the BSS has already initiated.

Accordingly, many observers question how much extra value the EaP brings, since it is said to duplicate “already existing mechanisms, such as trade agreements, energy deals, and assistance for civil society or student exchanges”\textsuperscript{184} For the critics, it is obvious that the EaP offers nothing that was not possible through the implementation of the ENP-APs [...] and therefore, it would have been far more sensible to analyse the progress of the ENP critically and only then draft a new initiative to overcome the shortcomings of existing mechanisms and policies\textsuperscript{185}

More concretely, the EaP has been criticized for giving Belarus the chance to participate in it when real political reforms are still not in sight in this country, because resolution mechanisms for the regional conflicts have not been included well enough and for not clarifying properly whether Russia or not would be able to join some EaP actions, and, if yes, on the basis of which invitation process\textsuperscript{186}

There was some criticism of the EaP from some of the Eastern partners, in particular Ukraine, because the EaP groups together countries that are at different stages in terms of their integration processes with the EU\textsuperscript{187} and because for Ukraine, “any form of neighbourhood policy without membership perspective cannot satisfy”\textsuperscript{188}

If analysis similar to that conducted on the UfM is applied to the EaP (concerning the

184 Łapczynski, op. cit., note 153, p. 149.
185 Mikhelidze, op. cit., note 151, p. 10.
187 Cf. Meister and May, op. cit., note 179, p. 3.
188 Hennadij Udovenko, diplomatic head of Ukraine, cited in: Cianciara, EaP – Opening a new chapter, op. cit., note 148, p. 3.
setup of the policy and the recommendations for it beforehand), the result is a mixed balance. This can be seen in Table 6.

While many recommendations have been accepted or implemented, for example, proposals for cooperation in certain fields, for a clear conditionality component and for additional funding, others, such as a clear membership perspective or a clear commitment to conflict resolutions with regards to the persisting problem of unresolved regional conflicts, remain outside the sphere of the EaP.

What becomes clear is that an attempt has been made to create an ‘ENP Plus’, by further strengthening the ENP’s bilateral component and adding a multilateral one. How successful the EaP will be in achieving these goals remains to be seen.

**Table 6: Recommendations for the EaP and their Implementation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Recommendations for the EaP</th>
<th>Implementation of recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Partnership        | ◗ Give attractive offer, suited to provide reforms  
                   | ◗ Quicker opening of markets, creation of free trade area, facilitate movements of persons  
                   | ◗ Energy cooperation             | ✓ New AAs envisaged with establishment of creating FTAs and visa facilitation  
                   |                                           | ✓ Cooperation in energy security one of the most important points |
| Belarus            | ◗ Emphasise support for democratic change, give clear set of rules | ✓ Conditionality principle applies to Belarus, non-paper sets out clear rules |
| Regional conflicts | ◗ Make efforts to solve frozen conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh | ✗ No particular mentioning of the regional conflicts, only early-warning arrangements are enhanced |
| Institutional setting | ◗ Find a good balance between differentiation and regionalism | ✓ Both principles combined with further focus on bilateral relations and without creating non-administrable institutions |
### Area Recommendations for the EaP Implementation of recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Recommendations for the EaP</th>
<th>Implementation of recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals</strong></td>
<td>➤ Spread knowledge of EU/ European idea through information campaign</td>
<td>✗ Visibility of the EaP through concrete projects, and aim to promote the principles and mobilize support exists, but no concrete information campaigns introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principles</strong></td>
<td>➤ Give clear timelines and clear final goal/objective: EU membership? ➤ Russia should not be excluded/should be integrated into concrete projects/should be given observer status to EaP ➤ Make clear that EaP is no alternative to membership ➤ Enhance conditionality approach ➤ Clear monitoring</td>
<td>✗ No clear timelines and no membership perspective given ✗ No observer status for Russia, however: participation of third states in projects possible ✓ Membership not excluded, but not furthered within EaP ✓ Conditionality clearly mentioned as main principle ✓ Monitoring foreseen for platforms and connected to conditionality approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Priorities</strong></td>
<td>➤ Conflict resolution</td>
<td>✗ Conflict resolution does not appear as top priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financing</strong></td>
<td>➤ Clear commitment of financing</td>
<td>✓ Additional funds provided</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Comparison of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership

The findings from the separate investigations of the UfM and the EaP during the previous chapters shall now be compared with one another and their differences and similarities examined. One similarity has already been demonstrated in the past two chapters: to a certain extent, both the UfM and EaP neglected concerns and recommendations that were voiced prior to their setup, and criticisms of the two policy frameworks remain which stem from this. This, too, was noted in previous chapters.

In order to be as coherent as possible in the further comparison, the structure of this chapter is based on the one already applied in the previous chapters.

4.1 Origins of the Different Frameworks Compared

The way in which the two frameworks of the EaP and UfM were set up differs in many ways. In the case of the UfM, which goes back to one particular initiative from France and more precisely to the then candidate for the French presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy, the introduction to the project was difficult: between France and Germany, notably, tensions grew regarding various ideas relating to the UfM, especially concerning its geographical scope.\(^{189}\)

Poland and Sweden, on the other hand, learned from this problematic example, and avoided presenting the proposal as a ‘one-state prestige project’ trying to involve all EU member states, so that the initiative was better received than that of the UfM. Furthermore, the two countries reined in their ambitions and reduced the proposal to its minimum possible size, from sixty pages to only three.\(^{190}\) Also, the fact that former proposals of a similar ilk, made by Germany, had already been discussed amongst the EU members might have furthered the smoother proceeding, leading to the final adoption of the initiative.

Besides the different processes of discussions to which the proposals were exposed, it must be stated, of course, that the UfM did not begin from zero as the EMP already

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\(^{190}\) *Ibid.*
provided a long-lasting forerunner framework. The EaP did not start from zero either, but was mainly built on the ENP which had only been introduced in 2003/04 and therefore could not build on such as long an experience of multilateral and regional collaboration with the partners. As for the political declarations setting up the two frameworks, they were both joint declarations by the Heads of State or Government of both the EU states and their respective partners, with the Paris summit of June 2008 as a diplomatic and political success and the Prague summit as something of a failure, as the participation of high ranking politicians was lower than expected.

In short, the two frameworks differ first of all in their tradition of previous cooperation, in how the concrete proposals were dealt with and in the final setup processes.
4.2 Geographical Scope, Differences Between Members and EU Membership

Whereas the EaP comprises the 27 EU members and six Eastern partners, the UfM comprises no less than 16 members from around the Mediterranean in addition to the EU-27, plus Libya as an observer state.

Geographical Scope

On a map (Cf. Figure 4), one can see the result of having this number of members: the territory covered by the UfM is much larger than that of the EaP. Interestingly, the ‘Southern’ and ‘Eastern’ partners’ territories are directly connected to each other through land borders, namely via Turkey as a direct neighbour of the three Caucasian states Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Furthermore, with the states from the Western Balkan region that are now part of the UfM and with Monaco, the EU basically ‘surrounds’ some of their partners, and there are parts of EU territory (Greece, Malta and Cyprus) that are situated further south than some of the UfM partners. Also the fact that not all EU partners of the UfM, such as Jordan and Mauritania, have a Mediterranean coast is worth mentioning. The notions and concepts of the ‘Southern’ and ‘Eastern’ partners and the ‘Mediterranean’ can thus be seen to be quite fluid and at times the terms may seem almost arbitrarily chosen.

Differences Between the Member States

What is perhaps more interesting than simply the geographical reach of the frameworks are the differences amongst their members. If one takes the UfM, for instance, one can observe significant differences between its Southern members when it comes to culture, political systems, economic development and religion, as becomes obvious when comparing Israel and Mauritania, for example.
In short: “each of the two initiatives pertains to a disparate group of countries with incongruent political, social and cultural identities”. Of further interest are the levels of bilateral relations between the EU and the states which are taking part in the two policy frameworks (Cf. Table 7).

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191 On this map, the states are called partnering states for the sake of simplicity, without regard to their level of implication in the respective policies. Therefore, Libya, as an observer of the UfM, is also colored in blue, but but is labelled ‘observer’.

192 Popielawska, op. cit., note 182, p. 4.
The Table, which is certainly not exhaustive, aims to give a short overview of the most important relations between the EU and its partners. It reveals that in both of the policies there is a large variety of different agreements between the EU and its partners. This goes from countries like Libya, only an observer in the UfM, and Belarus, a partner of the EaP but which cannot fully benefit from it before it implements its own political reforms, that have no bilateral contractual relations with the EU to the other extremes: countries like Ukraine in the East, which is about to negotiate an AA, or Croatia and Turkey in the Southern grouping, which are officially negotiating their accession to the EU.

### Table 7: Different Bilateral Relations Between EU and EaP/UfM-Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of EU relation with UfM partners</th>
<th>Level of EU relation with EaP partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Libya without contractual relations to EU and only an observer</td>
<td>• Belarus without contractual relations to the EU and not yet fully taking part in ENP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mauritania a member of ACP agenda</td>
<td>• All other EaP states with PCAs and at least ENP Action Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Some of the partners with (Interim) AA, ENP members with Action Plans</td>
<td>• Ukraine with Association Agenda towards establishment of an AA, replacing ENP Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monaco with agreement on application of certain Community Acts, uses € as currency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Albania/Montenegro/BiH: potential candidates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Turkey/Croatia: EU candidates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### EU Membership

Membership of the EU is already being negotiated with some European partners included in the UfM such as Turkey or Croatia. The EU is most open to further Western Balkan members of the UfM as well as Monaco. Enlargement is also a hot topic in the Eastern neighbourhood, as has already been mentioned in citing Ukraine’s criticism against the ENP and EaP regarding their lack of enlargement perspective. On the other hand, the “individual partner countries’ aspirations” have been implicitly recognized in the declaration setting up the EaP\(^\text{193}\) and in February 2010, the European Parliament recognized “that Ukraine, as a European country, shares a common history and common values with the countries of the European Union, and acknowledges Ukraine’s European

\[^{193}\text{Council of the European Union, Joint declaration Prague, op. cit., note 140, p. 5.}\]
A further detail concerning EU membership which is inaccessible to the non-European UfM members but potentially possible for the EaP members, is addressed by Devrim and Schulz who see in the more homogenous situation of the EaP “a clearer vocation towards Enlargement [sic.]” than in the case of the UfM. What is more, they show that the rationale behind the foundation of the UfM was “to find alternatives to Enlargement, especially regarding Turkey [while] Poland’s motivation regarding the EaP seems to be the opposite”. There is further support for this view in the citation of the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs at the beginning of this text.

Thus, it has become clear in this section that the two policy frameworks of the EaP and UfM cannot only be distinguished by their number of partners and the different perspectives regarding future EU membership. It has been shown that something the two frameworks have in common is the variety in their participating states and the differing characteristics within each group of partner states. This may cause concern about calling these groupings of countries ‘sub-regions’.

195 Devrim and Schulz, op. cit., note 192, p. 6.
196 Ibid, p. 5.
4.3 Aims and Principles

The general principles and aims outlined in both of the declarations inaugurating the EaP and UfM read very similarly at a first glance. The UfM proclaims “peace, democracy, regional stability and security” as major goals,\(^\text{197}\) the EaP’s general aims of reaching “stability, security and prosperity” are not very dissimilar.\(^\text{198}\) When examined more closely and in greater detail, however, differences become more visible.

In this regard, Table 8, dating from 2008 (and therefore not including later changes introduced by the EaP and UfM) provides an initial overview of the point of departure of each framework.

**Table 8: Organising the Neighbourhood**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>The South</th>
<th>The East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU’s Principal Method</strong></td>
<td>• Barcelona Process regional approach, supplemented by bilateral ENP;</td>
<td>• ENP bilateral approach with small elements of sub-regionalism (Black Sea Synergy);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A Common Strategy for the Mediterranean in its entirety;</td>
<td>• Common Strategies for Ukraine (and Russia);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Economic integration will lead to regional stability and democracy</td>
<td>• Attempts at transforming states into Western-looking democracies and market economies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Security issues privileged.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU’s Longer-term Vision of the Relationship</strong></td>
<td>• A well-governed region and partner for EU;</td>
<td>• Well-governed states, resembling Europe;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Stability and security;</td>
<td>• Stability, security and democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Economic prosperity and regional integration;</td>
<td>• Resolution of conflicts;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deeper economic relations with the EU and amongst states in the region;</td>
<td>• Towards deep free trade with EU on bilateral basis;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Resolution of regional conflicts;</td>
<td>• Closer relations with EU – but not membership;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inter-regionalism between the EU and Barcelona Process states.</td>
<td>• &quot;Carrot&quot; of membership, currently not available, but not impossible to conceive of.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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and a basis for comparing the actual setups of the two initiatives. What becomes apparent when looking at the Table is that in the EMP, the EU put its focus mostly on regional cooperation with the aim of security being most important, while in the East the bilateral track of cooperation prevailed and the only method of involving some of the partners in a regional policy used to be the BSS. A second observation, looking at the second line of the Table, is that the EU wants to reach more or less the same goals in each of the neighbourhoods with a slightly bigger focus in the South on security. Nevertheless, the means of reaching these goals is regional and inter-regional cooperation in the case of the Southern partners, whereas in the case of the Eastern partners the bilateral track of integration has been given priority.

If the findings of the chapters which looked at the EaP and UfM separately were taken into account, this image from before the establishment of the EaP and UfM would change slightly: while in the UfM, the regional component of cooperation is still dominant and even amplified through the setup of new multilateral bodies, further attempts have been made to enlarge its co-ownership component. In the case of the EaP, the bilateral component that had dominated before has been strengthened even further, while at the same time an additional, multilateral component to the framework has been incorporated. The concentration on bilateral cooperation and complete neglect of multilateral and regional cooperation has been abandoned in introducing the multilateral component of the EaP. Furthermore, joint ownership has been introduced to the EaP, like in the case of the UfM, which may conflict with the principles of conditionality and differentiation between different countries that are inherent to the EaP. Furthermore, in both of the cooperation frameworks, a minor component of openness to the participation of third states of open cooperation has been added, which mainly exists in the case of specific projects.

After having made these observations, on the basis of the pre-EaP and UfM philosophies of relations between the partners, it can be concluded that the actual situation is still largely in line with the situation shown in Table 8. However, in the case of the EaP, the component of multilateral regional cooperation with and within the Eastern neighbourhood has been added. The following question presents itself: why, in the Southern neighbourhood, did the multilateral component dominate and continues to do so, while in the Eastern neighbourhood the bilateral one is predominant?

First of all, since the EaP is mainly based on the ENP it incorporates and concentrates further on its instruments and principles such as conditionality and differentiation, which are inspired more by the principles of former enlargement strategies, albeit without offering the ‘golden carrot’ of enlargement. Also, the aims of the initiators of the EaP to work towards possible EU membership of the Eastern partners, as was
seen in the previous sections of this text, give clues in this regard: the Eastern partners shall be integrated insofar as it is possible, and reforms should take place that, should enlargement fatigue be overcome one day, could permit them to join the EU.

On the other hand, the original Southern partners to be included in the EMP have always been seen as a region already existing. As Longhurst argues, “there was a willingness from their side to integrate on a regional basis”. Since for the non-European partners among them EU accession is not possible, stronger regional institutions were created, while in the Eastern case, although multilateral regional cooperation has been put in place, the institutions only exist on a low organisational level since an enlargement involving these countries remains a possibility.

To sum up this section, it can be said that the principles of multilateralism and regional cooperation dominate in the UfM, while a predominance of bilateralism with a rather low institutionalization of multilateral elements can be observed in the EaP. This is explained on the basis of former policy approaches towards the region, as well as other perspectives, namely a possible EU enlargement towards the East. In both initiatives, the principle of co-ownership plays a decisive role, while the EaP, especially, depends more on conditionality and differentiation within its bilateral approach, principles developed in recurrence to the logic of enlargement policy.

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4.4 Institutional Setup and Levels of Interaction

This section shall begin by making a connection with what has been delineated above: the logic of a possible further enlargement and the principles connected to it, which find expression in the different policies of the EaP and UfM, affect the setup of institutions to a great extent. As Cianciara states, “the UfM’s new institutions were important for all the ‘neighbours of Europe’, but such an institutionalized ENP was to be avoided in the eastern context, where neighbours aspire for accession”.201 That is why the basic principle regarding the setup of institutions seems to be: ‘avoid them in the East while furthering their development in the South’. In order to be able to closely examine this assumption, the attempt is made in Figure 5 to draft the institutional setup and the levels of interaction among the partners within the two respective frameworks. Due to the sheer complexity of planned future institutions and those already in place, the scheme will only show the most important ones and sketch some of the relations that exist (or will exist) among them.

Nevertheless, the scheme shows that the relations between the partners on the unilateral and the bilateral level are basically the same when comparing the two frameworks. On a unilateral basis, the EU attributes funds to the partners. In the case of the EaP, the ENPI was increased, but this was not the case for the UfM, where private funding will be acquired in order to increase the budget. On a bilateral level, meetings of the Co-operation or Association Councils or Committees take place, depending if an AA (in the case of the most UfM partners) or a PCA (in the case of most EaP partners) is the basis for bilateral relations between the EU and its partners.

It is on a multilateral level that the greatest number of meetings, summits and platforms or different fora involving non-state actors is put in place. Starting with the UfM, biennial or annual meetings on the level of Heads of State or Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs or sectoral ministers are put in place. On the next highest level, Senior Official meetings take place, which are supported by the Joint Permanent Committee, located in Brussels. A connecting institution with a cross-sectional function towards all other institutions is the Joint Secretariat, based in Barcelona, which is furnished with its own legal personality. With this Joint Secretariat, led by a Secretary General whose work is supported by a number of Deputy Secretary Generals, the UfM is given an institution which characterizes mostly international organisations. Additional to the mentioned institutions, a number of further fora and platforms, as well as the Parliamentary Assembly are in place and a Regional/Local Assembly will be set up.

4. Comparison of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership

Source: own composition, inspired by Philippart, op. cit., note 83, p. 34. * not all of the institutions mentioned in the scheme, such as the Regional and Local Assemblies, are already working. Explanations: support ↔ close interaction ↔ printed in bold letters: institutionalized actors
Marked in bold in this scheme are institutionalized relations between the partners that do not take place in the form of loose meetings, but which are installed in a specific, permanent place and work continuously. Aside from the Secretariat and the Joint Permanent Committee, these include the Euro-Med University, set up in Piran/Slovenia and the Anna Lindh Foundation, located in Alexandria/Egypt. All permanent institutions except for the Anna Lindh Foundation have been set up recently within the UfM framework and did not exist before 2008. The institutional level in the UfM has been expanded and put on a higher institutionalized and permanent level, notably as regards the multilateral relations.

When analyzing the EaP on a multilateral level, it is more straightforward than in the case of the UfM. The Eastern framework has, like the UfM, institutionalized the meetings on the level of Heads of State or Government and Foreign Ministers as well as the Civil Society Forum, and the two Assemblies that are to be instituted. Unique to the EaP are the four thematic Platforms that are run on the level of the Senior Officials, and the Panels that support their work. What becomes clear is firstly that the cooperation on a multilateral level is not as much or as varied as in the UfM, and secondly that no permanent institutions such as the Secretariat in the case of the UfM have been put in place.

Therefore, on the whole, it can be concluded that the institutional framework which has developed in the case of the UfM over more than a decade is much more complex on the multilateral level than that newly set up in the case of the EaP. Furthermore, the degree of institutionalization is higher in the UfM; some permanent institutions such as the Euro-med University, and, more significantly, the Secretariat as a body with its own legal personality, have been set up. These observations are shared by Devrim and Schulz: “In contrast to the Union for the Mediterranean [...] the establishment of new institutions is not part of the Eastern Partnership. The Commission’s aim is to place the EaP within already existing EU structures, without establishing or duplicating institutions.”

Therefore, the EaP’s institutional structure, especially on a multilateral level, is less developed than that of the UfM.

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202 Devrim and Schulz, *op. cit.*, note 192, p. 3.
4.5 The Two Policy Frameworks and the ENP

First of all, it must be stated that the multitude of frameworks that has been put in place in the EU’s neighbourhood is very complex. As can be observed, even within the context of only one of the policy frameworks there are so many institutions and mechanisms introduced that it becomes more and more difficult to maintain a clear overview. Accordingly, Lannon and Martín have this to say in relation to the UfM:

The articulation between EMP, the ENP and the UfM has become extremely complex and is still not precisely defined as discussions are still going on at various levels on the practical impact of the new institutional architecture of the Union for the Mediterranean.203

It remains to be seen how the frameworks will really function and how much they will have to be adjusted so that they don’t contradict or conflict with each other or simply duplicate previously existing institutions and structures. What can be observed already is the fact that one of the policy frameworks, namely the UfM, is essentially not referring or adjusting at all to the ENP, since the latter goes almost unmentioned in the documents that set up the UfM.

The case of the EaP is the complete opposite. This policy framework is based on the ENP and thus refers much more frequently to it in its founding documents, since it is meant to incorporate principal elements such as differentiation and conditionality. Therefore, it can be called a sort of Eastern ‘ENP Plus’, namely an expanded ENP with regard to bilateralism, complemented by newly introduced multilateral cooperation fora. Also, it is worth mentioning that, since the EaP is based on the ENP, inclusion in the ENP is something of a prerequisite for becoming a member of the EaP. Since the ENP is planned to include Belarus as well, it is addressed by the EaP, while Russia, not a member of the ENP, is the only direct neighbour in the Eastern neighbourhood which is not covered. Among the UfM members, on the other hand, not all are covered by the ENP, but those that are not have other bilateral relations to the EU (Cf. Table 7). Not being addressed by the ENP is not an obstacle for a membership of the UfM.

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203 Lannon and Martín, op. cit., note 86, p. 63.
4.6 The Two Policy Frameworks and the Regional/International Context

Both inside the EU and outside it, regional interests and conditions affect the EaP and the UfM. With regard to the international level, a kind of competition amongst regional groups regarding external priorities for certain neighbouring regions can be observed.

The EU’s Internal Regional Context

In this regard, it has already been shown in this text that before the end of the Cold War, the Southern neighbourhood was EC’s focus of interest, but relations with it were only upgraded after the end of the East-West conflict as a reaction to the new policy of openness towards Central and Eastern Europe. The ENP, originally designed for the Eastern neighbourhood, was extended to the Southern neighbourhood after lobbying from the Mediterranean EU members. What followed was the establishment of the UfM, which in turn favoured the creation of the EaP. In short, whenever one of the neighbourhoods seemed to be in a more advantageous position, regional groupings of states within the EU lobbied to counterbalance this development, and in this, the EaP can also be seen as a reaction to the development of the UfM. This phenomenon has been described as an “East-South equilibrium’ between different peripheries, what, [i] n practice [...] means that any new initiative for the East must be counter-balanced by a parallel initiative for the South and vice versa”.204

The group lobbying systematically on behalf of the Southern neighbours are located in the South of Europe, such as France, Spain, Italy, Greece or Portugal, most of them bordering the Mediterranean Sea. The Central and Northern European countries such as Germany, Poland and Sweden favour the EaP-policy, focusing on the Eastern neighbourhood. A regional grouping, made up of Central European states, is the Visegrad group, consisting of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Unlike the group of Mediterranean states, this group of countries has not yet cooperated and is not likely to cooperate regarding European issues. However, when Poland sought their support, the Visegrad countries, Hungary in particular, expressed approval of the EaP initiative.205

These observations demonstrate that among the EU states, some lobby in favour of one regional policy in the EU’s neighbourhood and some favour the other. In doing this, states attempt to have their near neighbourhood benefit more from the EU’s policy, if the other neighbourhood risks to be favoured. This also produces side-effects as seen

204 Aliboni et al., op. cit., note 123, p. 13.
at the summit which set up the EaP: the Mediterranean EU members showed their disinterest, didn't participate on the highest level and therefore caused the summit to fail, in a way. But at the same time, the external regional context and influence on the two policies should not be neglected.

The External Regional Context

The UfM and the EaP both have a specific regional context in which they are set up. The UfM, taken with its forerunners, the EMP/Barcelona Process, is the first regional EU initiative towards the Southern neighbourhood. It prioritized a form of regional cooperation that artificially separated some countries in the Middle Eastern region that belong to the 'Mediterranean' area, from the rest of the Middle East.\(^{206}\) “The creation of a comprehensive approach regarding the whole region from Morocco to Iran and Iraq together with the whole Arabian peninsula [sic.]”,\(^{207}\) is nevertheless assured by the EU SPMME set up in 2004, which establishes “a new geopolitical approach” towards a larger region.\(^{208}\) In this, the EU applies a new strategy, not only to countries “in its immediate vicinity but also towards the ‘neighbours of its neighbours’”.\(^{209}\)

Therefore, the EU is connecting its already established UfM to a wider range of states and thus also counterbalances the interests of other big powers in the region, such as the US and some Asian countries.

Similarly, the EU has knotted a web of several regional strategies in its North-Eastern neighbourhood. The EaP is only the latest of three currently existing regional approaches towards this region with the ND, elaborated in 1999, and the BSS, which has existed since 2007. The latter involves five out of the Eastern partners that also take part in the EaP and therefore in order to assure the proper functioning of both initiatives, good coordination should be maintained. The mechanism of openness towards third states participating in the EaP’s regional projects can be seen as an attempt to not exclude Russia or Turkey entirely; they take part in the BSS but not the EaP.

In brief, it is not solely the internal regional EU context (with EU members favouring relations towards regions in their proximity) but also the regional context outside the EU which becomes more and more important, and is taken into account by setting up policies aside from the EaP and UfM and by thoroughly connecting them.


\(^{207}\) Lannon, \textit{The EU’s Strategic Partnership, op. cit.}, note 130, p. 368.

\(^{208}\) \textit{Ibid.}

\(^{209}\) \textit{Ibid.}
4.7 Interim Conclusion

At the end of this chapter comparing the frameworks of the EaP and the UfM, a first interim conclusion can be drawn: besides the overall framework towards both Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods of the ENP, each of the initiatives sets up a specific policy towards one of the groupings of neighbouring countries. In how far thereby “[c]oherent and effective long-term policies towards both the East and the South”\footnote{Aliboni et al., ISS report \textit{op. cit.}, note 123, p. 13.} are developed and finally realized can be questioned. Once all institutions are set up and are functioning properly (in cooperation also with other policy frameworks), a final answer to this question can be given.

For the time being, the main points of criticism that are expressed against the frameworks are firstly that neither of them implemented all of the recommendations that were given before their establishment. For the UfM, the main obstacle to a proper functioning is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which still blocks some of the institutions. Furthermore, persisting asymmetries between North and South, the rather general goals lacking concrete implementation and the lack of additional funding within the ENPI should be mentioned. Concerning the EaP, some commentators question what value it adds in comparison to the ENP, and criticise the inclusion of Belarus, the lack of initiative to tackle regional conflicts and the missing commitment of future EU membership for the Eastern partners.

Table 9 aims to give an overview at a glance of the collected findings which have been presented throughout this and the previous chapters.
Table 9: Findings Regarding the EaP and UfM at One Glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Union for the Mediterranean</th>
<th>Eastern Partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Origins**              | • EMP/Barcelona Process as forerunners  
  • Initiative of France (Nicolas Sarkozy), discussions about the UfM Inaugurating summit as a diplomatic and political success | • Based on ENP, with 'ENP Plus' as original proposal (Germany)  
  • Poland/Sweden as initiators of the initiative  
  • Inaugurating summit as a diplomatic and political failure |
| **Geography / members**  | • EU-27 and 16 Southern partners + Libya as observer take part  
  • Big variety of states, different bilateral relations to EU | • EU-27 and 6 Eastern partners, all covered by ENP, and with different levels of bilateral relations to EU |
| **EU-perspective**       | • European UfM members can become EU members | • Principally, EU membership is open to these European partners |
| **Aims and principles**  | • Peace, democracy, regional stability and security  
  • Logic of regional, multilateral approach is predominant  
  • Co-ownership, but no special emphasis of the conditionality principle, projects open to 'interested partners'  
  • 'Barcelona acquis' preserved | • Stability, security and prosperity  
  • Logic of bilateralism dominates, new multilateralism component and co-ownership, cooperation with third states  
  • Differentiation, conditionality: logic of ENP is followed, instruments of enlargement policy applied |
| **Institutional setup and levels of interaction** | • Concentration of cooperation on multilateral level, strong intergovernmental component through regular summits  
  • Permanent institutions like the Secretariat (with own legal personality), Joint Permanent Committee, Euro-Med university and Anna Lindh Foundation; Parliamentary and Regional Assemblies  
  • Multitude of different platforms and fora, involving civil society | • New forms of multilateral cooperation introduced  
  • Regular summits of Ministers / Heads of State or Government institutionalized  
  • No proper permanent institutions  
  • Thematic platforms and Panels, Parliamentary and Regional Assembly |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Union for the Mediterranean II</th>
<th>Eastern Partnership II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
<td>• No additional funding within ENPI, but search for private funding</td>
<td>• Additional funding of € 600 mil. within ENPI until 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relation to ENP</strong></td>
<td>• No special reference made to ENP in documents setting up the UfM</td>
<td>• Based on ENP, strong relation emphasised in documents setting up the policy, common financial instrument: ENPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Common financial instrument: ENPI</td>
<td>• ENP involvement as something of a precondition for entering EaP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Not all of the members are also partners within the ENP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional context</strong></td>
<td>• Support within the EU from Southern EU states such as France, Italy and Spain, which lobby for the Southern Policy</td>
<td>• Support within the EU by Central European and Northern states such as Germany, Poland and Sweden, no systematic lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East as wider geopolitical strategy, connected with UfM</td>
<td>• Third countries can take part in projects of the EaP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• ND and BSS further multilateral regional frameworks in North-East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Criticisms</strong></td>
<td>• Not all the recommendations taken into consideration</td>
<td>• Not all the recommendations taken into consideration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mostly, same problems as the EMP: regional conflicts block functioning, asymmetries persist, lack of final perspective, complex institutional setup, general goals but lack of concrete implementation, lack of new financial means</td>
<td>• Inclusion of Belarus, cooperation of Russia not specified, no concentration on resolution of regional conflicts, added value to ENP dubious, no EU membership perspective provided</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own composition on the base of findings already mentioned in the text.
Conclusion

In closing this thesis, it is unnecessary to repeat much of what has already been said. Nevertheless, the questions which were asked at the very beginning of the text shall be repeated again in order to answer them or at least offer an assessment.

First of all, what are the differences between the two policy frameworks of the UfM and the EaP? This question has been answered in the last chapter and therefore we shall defer to it and specifically to Table 9, which gives a general overview. However, despite similarities such as the fact that in the setup of both initiatives, not enough notice was taken of criticism towards the EMP and ENP and recommendations, there are many differences regarding, for example, the origins, the institutional setting or the regional context of each of the initiatives. But what appears to be the main difference between the two policies of the EaP and the UfM? In this regard, importance shall again be ascribed to the words of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikorski, cited at the beginning of this text, which distinguished European neighbours from neighbours of Europe.

This criterion of distinction between the six Eastern European neighbours, and the Southern neighbours, who, for the biggest part, are Europe’s neighbours without the possibility of entering the EU appears to be the most important and decisive. Due to this distinction, some institutions of the UfM have a permanent character while neither of the Eastern ones do; because of this fact, the unilateral character of relations with the Eastern partners has been strengthened and only a weaker multilateral component been introduced, while in the Southern framework the main focus remains rather multilateral. Many more examples could be given for this decisive criterion.

Secondly, the question of the need to separate the neighbourhood into two different sub-regional groupings of countries must be posed again. If one takes the definition of a sub-region to mean a smaller ensemble of states within a region, connected through economic, social, cultural, and security relations inter alia between and among each other on different levels, the regions designated by both of the policies of the EaP and the UfM can to a certain extent be called sub-regions, included in the larger region of the European neighbourhood. Yet only to an extent, since the ties between some neighbouring countries are not good, given the persistence of certain existing or frozen conflicts, amongst other factors.

The variety of approaches towards the neighbourhood thus ranges widely between the 'catch-all'-approach of the ENP, sub-regional groupings such as the BSS, the UfM, or the EaP and elements of differentiation through bilateral relations with individual states.
within each of these frameworks. Sometimes it is difficult to keep an overview of the multitude of approaches:

> [g]iven that as new policies are formulated, the old ones remain running, an increasingly blurred cloud of multiple overlapping legal and political arrangements linking the EU and its immediate neighbours risks reaching the point when complexity and poor articulation will result in the failure of the whole system – an issue which will certainly need to be addressed by the EU in the nearest possible future.\textsuperscript{211}

Let us therefore re-examine the argument concerning the need for and the sense of separation between two neighbourhoods, in the light of the criterion ‘European/non-European’, which is especially recommended by some authors. Meister and May, for instance, see the ‘special treatment’ of the Eastern neighbours as a ‘positive development’,\textsuperscript{212} while Longhurst calls for a “greater differentiation in the EU’s approach […] along an axis of European neighbours/non-European neighbours”, and for giving a clear EU perspective to the Eastern neighbours.\textsuperscript{213} Others ask if, with the introduction of the UfM and EaP, the ENP has been divided into an “‘ENP South’ and ‘ENP East’”\textsuperscript{214}

It seems that from the perspective of the EU states, and supported by many voices of academia, the multi-fold approach of policies in the European neighbourhood towards several sub-groups is needed. However, Devrim and Schulz, while also calling for a development on an Eastern and a Southern dimension in the EU’s neighbourhood, warn that the competition between different regional approaches cannot create any added value, assuming that groups of EU states try to achieve only their specific regional interests.\textsuperscript{215} Kochenov finally argues that the results of the EaP and UfM are “additional layers of policy and regulation being added on top of the ENP’s already existing structures of dubious workability”.\textsuperscript{216}

In actual fact, a dense web of different policies, in which the ENP, the EaP and the UfM (among others) play a certain role, is in place in the EU’s neighbourhood. Still, it is argued here that despite the existence of this web, which is sometimes difficult to overlook, a separation and differentiation between European neighbours and neighbours of Europe should be maintained and further developed within the newly established frameworks

\textsuperscript{211} Kochenov, \textit{op. cit.}, note 7, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{212} Cf. Meister and May, \textit{op. cit.}, note 179, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{213} Longhurst, \textit{More differentiation in the ENP, op. cit.}, text-p. 52, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{214} Longhurst and Nies, \textit{op. cit.}, note 56, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{215} Cf. Devrim and Schulz, \textit{op. cit.}, note 192, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{216} Kochenov, \textit{op. cit.}, note 7, p. 30.
of the EaP and the UfM. By doing so, the special needs of each of the sub-regions can be more adequately addressed, while also dealing individually with each of the countries in the respective sub-regions. Nevertheless, in order to avoid confusion regarding the different policies, their structures and competences, there should be regular evaluations of their functioning; duplications should be reduced where they exist and synergies should be aimed at where the potential for them exists.
The Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership: A Comparative Analysis

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### Annexes

#### Table I: Bilateral Treaties Between the EU and the ENP Countries Plus Action Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENP Partner Countries</th>
<th>Bilateral Agreements (Entry into Force)</th>
<th>ENP Country Report</th>
<th>ENP Action Plan (Adoption)</th>
<th>Further Agreements</th>
<th>Member in Other Regional Cooperation Framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>AA (09/2005)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>UfM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>PCA (05/1999)</td>
<td>03/2005</td>
<td>11/2006</td>
<td>EaP</td>
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<td>Belarus</td>
<td>PCA signed in 1995, frozen since 1997</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>EaP</td>
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<td>03/2007</td>
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<td>06/2005</td>
<td>UfM</td>
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<td>03/2005</td>
<td>01/2007</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>05/2004</td>
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<td>05/2004</td>
<td>05/2005</td>
<td>UfM</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>AA signed in 2004, update in 2008, not yet ratified</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>UfM</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>AA (03/1998)</td>
<td>05/2004</td>
<td>07/2005</td>
<td>UfM</td>
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1  Association Agreement  
2  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement  
3  Interim Association Agreement.

### Table II: EMP and UfM Members, Development Over Time

<table>
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<th>Nov. 1995: Barcelona Declaration (27)</th>
<th>1999 (27+1)</th>
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<th>2008: UfM (43+1)</th>
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<td>Libya (observer)</td>
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</table>

**Figure I: The Three Organisational Dimensions of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership**

**The Multilateral Dimension:**
**The EMP Institutional Framework**
- **Euro-Med Parliamentary Forum**
  - EP interpal. delegations Maghreb & AMU; Mashreg & Gulf States; Palestine; Israel
- **Euro-Med Networks**
  - Euromed civil forum, Euromesco; Unimed, Euromed energy forum, Euromed transport forum, etc.

**The Bilateral Dimension:**
**The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements**
- **Council**
  - Coreper Working Groups
  - Article 113 Committee
  - European Comission
- **Association Council**
  - EU + MS + MP (ministerial)
- **Association Committee**
  - EU + MS + MP (senior official level)
- **Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process**
  - EU Troika + MP
- **Meeting of Senior Officials on Political and Security Questions**
  - MS + MP

**The Unilateral Dimension:**
**MEDA Programme**
- **European Parliament**
  - Budgetary commission
  - Foreign Affairs commission
- **European Comission**
  - DG Relx + DG Aidco + ‘technical’ DGs + delegation
- **Council**
- **Med Committee** (management committee) MS
- **European Investment Bank**
- **Article 1.4 Committee**
  - (set at the Bank) Commission + MS

Source: Eric Philippart, op. cit., note 83, p. 32.
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