Johannes THEISS (DE), *The Process of Negotiating Military Intervention in Libya: How NATO Unites on 'Unified Protector'* (supervisor Prof. Meerts)

Entering a war is probably the most extreme decision a state or an organisation can take. However, processes that lead to this decision take place in secrecy. The same holds for the analysis of multilateral compromise on the use of force, which constitutes an even more relevant subject of inquiry against the backdrop of a global collective security system. By asking how this compromise was achieved in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) intervention in Libya, the so-called ‘Operation Unified Protector’, this study seeks to provide valuable insights into a topic on which public information is almost not available. While focusing mainly on dynamics of the negotiation process inside NATO’s Headquarters in Brussels, the analysis includes other negotiation fora, such as the United Nations Security Council and domestic contexts.

Taking a European perspective, the study compares the positions of the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Germany, and Turkey. This selection reflects not only a necessary measure within a limited scope of analysis but also an emphasis on major actors of the case in terms of held positions and (lack of) military engagement. Moreover, it focuses on negotiations between three key actors of the European Union, its biggest accession candidate, and its main transatlantic partner.

Besides explaining the outcome, the study also aims at making a theoretical contribution to the field of negotiation analysis. It states the hypothesis that variables inherent to the process of negotiation determine its result while situational factors remain constant. In order to test this hypothesis against empirical evidence, existing theoretical concepts and approaches are integrated into a single analytical causal model, consisting of independent variables related to structure, strategy, as well as actors, interacting variables, and dependent variables related to the outcome. The structural variables include e.g. power, coalition-building, leadership, procedural aspects, such as agenda-setting or a single negotiation text (SNT), two-level games, and ripeness. The strategic ones focus e.g. on game theory, best alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNA), distributive and integrative bargaining, as well as different types of moves, such as entrapment or concessions. Actor-related variables account e.g. for the principal-agent approach and modes of conflict behaviour. Interacting variables comprise time, information, and communication. The outcome is finally assessed according to criteria, such as efficiency, stability, and distribution.

Based on expert interviews, the study seeks to provide first-hand insights into a single case. Taken from the perspective of the negotiation process, a detailed sequence of events in the Libya crisis is presented, too. Moreover, lessons learned are drawn in order to provide some pieces of advice for the practical negotiator. Stating that largely factors inherent to the negotiation process determine its outcome while situational aspects, nevertheless, exert some influence, the analysis concludes by largely confirming its hypothesis. The application of an integrated model proves useful in creating a holistic picture of the case while also demonstrating that used concepts and approaches are complementary.